

REGIONALISM WITHOUT REGIONS

Reconceptualizing Ukraine's Heterogeneity



Edited by
ULRICH SCHMID and
OKSANA MYSHLOVSKA

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ULRICH SCHMID
and
OKSANA MYSHLOVSKA



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Note on Transliteration

Transliteration from Ukrainian in this volume is done in accordance with the transliteration system adopted by Decision 55 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, January 27, 2010, “Pro vporiadkuvannia transliteratsii ukrainskoho alfavitu latynytseiu,” <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/55-2010-%D0%BF>. Geographical references were transliterated from Ukrainian names, where appropriate.

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*This volume is dedicated to the memory of Bohdan Solchanyk
(1985–2014), who participated in the project and died
on the Euromaidan as one of the “Heavenly Hundred.”*

1. Introduction

OKSANA MYSHLOVSKA, ULRICH SCHMID
and TATJANA HOFMANN

Ukraine has emerged as an independent state in a world where technological developments, transnational flows and mass movements of population are questioning the very existence and authority of nation-states, the viability of cohesive and clearly bounded national identities and cultures. This condition has been defined as “a generalized condition of homelessness” (Said 1979, 18), “beyond ‘culture’” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992), “beyond ‘identity’” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000), or as “superdiversity” (Blommaert 2013; Vertovec 2007). The new era in the development of modernity has been conceptualized as a stage of ambiguity, ambivalence, liquidity, uncertainty and complexity transforming modern social institutions at the intersection between national and global (Bauman 1991 and 2000; Giddens 1991; Lyotard [1979] 1984). The authority of nation-states has withered in favor of other centers of power and identification, such as regions, cultures or values. More recently, it has become evident that globalization tendencies have created new dividing lines in Western societies between “cosmopolitans” who have benefited from globalization, and are in favor of secular/rational values, open borders and multiculturalism, and “communitarians” who see themselves as losers with regard to globalization, and support cohesive nation-states, the control of borders and traditional values (Merkel and Kneip 2018).

Ukraine is an especially prominent case in point in this debate. “Ukraine,” most probably meaning “borderland,” has been a place of “incommensurable contradictions,” as Gupta and Ferguson (1992, 7) would have it. The different denotations of “Ukrainian territories” have been located in the contested borderland between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Tatar steppe, Muscovy and Moldavia; later, between the Polish-

Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire, and the Tsardom of Russia; and eventually between the Danube Monarchy and the Russian Empire (Rieber 2014). In the absence of Ukrainian statehood (with the exception of a very brief period following the February Revolution in Russia in 1917), and having found itself in the borderlands of other multinational states for most of its history, the population inhabiting the territory of modern Ukraine developed multiple and often competing loyalties, identities and identifications. Natalia Yakovenko (2002, 333) sees Ukraine as a historical contact zone between West and East: “The space which today is the territory of Ukraine for many centuries was divided by constantly shifting borders: between linguistic and ethnic groups, states, religions, political and cultural systems as well as cardinally diverse economic systems.” Ukraine emerged in its present borders during the Soviet period, and the Soviet Ukrainian statehood project still remains a uniting legacy for all the territory of Ukraine.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the country embarked on the search for a new set of unifying principles. A number of scholars who have studied the dynamics of ethno-national identities in post-Soviet Ukraine during the early post-Soviet period have noted that Ukraine was characterized by “a weak sense of national identity,” lacking a common project of “banal nationalism,” a stable cultural core, a “powerful transcendent idea” or “a common social contract of reciprocal rights and obligations” to unite the country (Wilson 2002, 31). Mykola Riabchuk (2000) explained and problematized the weakness of national identity in contemporary Ukraine in terms of the absence of continued statehood, late modernization, “late” nation creation, and assimilation of the elites.

At the same time, regionalizing trends were put in motion in the early post-Soviet period as different parts of Ukraine started to rediscover, reimagine and formalize their historical pasts. One prominent stereotype about Ukraine that emerged during the early post-Soviet period pointed to the dichotomy found in the country. In his famous *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Samuel Huntington (1996, 138) called Ukraine a cleft country at the fault line between civilizations: “Ukraine is divided between the Uniate nationalist Ukrainian-speaking west and the Orthodox Russian-speaking east.” This simplified view of Ukraine as a country split into two clearly demarcated parts—the democratic, pro-European and mentally familiar west, and the totalitarian, pro-Russian and mentally foreign east—has been common among a number of domestic and foreign observers (Riabchuk 2000 and 2003). Furthermore, other key issues which split the country have included the attitude

to relations with Russia, ethnic nationalism and collective memories of World War II, and in particular the attitude to the Ukrainian nationalist movement of the interwar and wartime period (represented by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists [OUN] and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army [UPA]).

Thus the post-Soviet transition can be seen as a process of simultaneous nationalization, regionalization and transnationalization. The process of nationalization is reflected in the fact that an increasing number of people have identified with Ukrainian citizenship and accepted Ukrainian as the state language. According to our research, in 2013, more than two-thirds of the population in the east and the south claimed to have mastered Ukrainian on a good or excellent level, and more than 80 percent agreed that a civil servant must master Ukrainian and that Ukrainian should be a compulsory subject at school. National perception has been accompanied by the rewriting of history narratives in which the Ukrainian nation and the formation of the Ukrainian state throughout history have become the central themes, with simultaneous “othering” of neighboring states and other ethnic groups (Kasianov 2009; Portnov 2013; Yakovenko 2007). How delicate these matters are is highlighted by the debates about the education law adopted on September 5, 2017, by the Ukrainian parliament. This law foresees mandatory instruction in Ukrainian starting from the secondary school level.

At the same time, there has been a process of regionalized historical imagination. Contested and controversial memorialization has acted across different regions of Ukraine in recent years, such as the erection of monuments to the OUN leader Stepan Bandera in western regions, to the Russian empress Catherine II in Odesa, to victims of the OUN-UPA in the east, and to Stalin in Zaporizhzhia. This memorialization can be seen not only as a reflection of regional memory making, but also as a response to certain events and policies either at the national level or in other regions. Furthermore, in conditions of market economy and gradual decentralization, regional administrations have increasingly competed against each other to attract resources from the center, for investment opportunities and benefits from strategic partnerships with neighboring states or other global counterparts. The trend toward regionalization has also been reflected in the academic research agenda. Recently there has been a marked shift toward regional studies in which the diversity and pluralism of regional pasts and presents have received increasing scholarly attention (on Lviv and Galicia, see Amar 2011 and 2015; Bartov 2007; Hrytsak and Susak 2003; Magocsi 2002; Mick 2015; Narvselius 2012a, 2012b, 2012c and 2015;

Risch 2011; Šabić 2007; and Wendland 2005; on Kharkiv, see Kravchenko 2009 and 2010, and Westrate 2016; on Donbas, see Adamovych 2006; Kuromiya 2002; and Swain 2007; on Odesa, see Richardson 2008 and 2014; on Crimea, see Sasse 2007 and Qualls 2009; on eastern Ukraine, see Pirie 1996; Rodgers 2006; Zhurzhenko 2004a, 2004b and 2010; Zhuk 2010 and Kasianov 2018). Finally, the country and the regions have been imagined as part of new transnational identities and communities, for example, Europe or the Orthodox *Russkii mir* (Russian World). Ukraine has started to be discursively included in the history and memory narratives of Eastern Europe (Bernhard and Kubik 2014; Blacker et al. 2013; Snyder 2003) and of Europe in general (Davies 1996; Judt 2005).

The premise of this volume is that a geographical approach would not be appropriate to study the problem of Ukrainian regionalism as it would ignore the multifacetedness of regional identification (and for a recent critique of this approach, see Curta 2001, 6–35). In this sense, the importance of Ukrainian regionalism is not only the result of a growing sense of local identification but of numerous encounters between various identities crossing discursive borders as well (Sahlins 1991).

Research design

This collaborative volume studies the phenomenon of regionalism in Ukraine from an interdisciplinary perspective. The *Region, Nation and Beyond: A Transcultural and Interdisciplinary Reconceptualization of Ukraine* project, which lasted from 2011 till 2015, involved the collaboration of dozens of scholars who are based in Ukraine, Poland, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Canada and the US, and who specialize in a variety of social science and humanities disciplines such as religion, economics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, linguistics, literature and history. While the volume does not include separate chapters on the political sphere and the media, political developments in relation to regionalism have been addressed in several chapters, most importantly in the ones dealing with contemporary memory politics, religious life, language planning and the Euromaidan. The role of media has partially been discussed in relation to the Euromaidan events. The data produced by the *Region, Nation and Beyond* project is accessible at the website <http://www.uaregio.org/>.

In the framework of the *Region, Nation and Beyond* project, a survey of 6,000 respondents who were representative of the country profile with respect to age, education and size of residency was conducted in all regions

of Ukraine between January and March 2013. A second survey using the same methodology was conducted in 2015 in all regions except for Crimea and parts of Luhanska and Donetska oblasts claimed by the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics. Each contribution to the present volume is based on the results of the 2013 survey. Furthermore, the volume includes a chapter focused on the Euromaidan and the developments in Ukraine since the Euromaidan, covering the composition, beliefs and identities of the Euromaidan participants, and the transformation of the regions since the Euromaidan. The 2013 survey asked respondents about the strength of their identifications with the following identity targets, on a scale from one to five: city, country, region, Ukrainian nationality, Russian nationality, other nationality, Eastern Slavic community, Europe, and a number of nonterritorial targets such as family, gender, age generation, profession, interest/hobby, religion, and social status. The survey also features questions about the economic situation of the respondents, their attitudes to risk, their levels of trust and envy as well as their attitudes to historical events and figures.

Some working groups combined the survey with focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. The literature group interviewed schoolteachers and young writers in Ukraine to map their imagining of the Ukrainian literary field. The language group organized twelve focus group discussions with schoolteachers of Ukrainian language and literature in the following cities of Ukraine: Chernihiv, Chernivtsi, Dnipro, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Lutsk, Odesa, Simferopol, Uzhhorod, and Zhytomyr. The religion group carried out ethnographic interviews, which allowed for analysis of what the particular categories meant to respondents. The economy group also conducted a managerial survey between January and March 2013, which included a sample of 625 firms in Ukraine, i.e., twenty-five companies per oblast (twenty-four in total) and Crimea. The section on the Euromaidan is based on in-depth interviews with Euromaidan participants.

The authors represented in this volume make an attempt to come to terms with Ukrainian regionalism from an interdisciplinary perspective. The chapter on identities and identifications combines sociology, social psychology and regional geography. The economy group went beyond standard economic theory and looked at the interaction between culture, society and economy in an interdisciplinary way by bringing together insights from different disciplines, namely sociology, psychology and behavioral economics; this group investigated whether differences in regional economic development can be explained by historical and cul-

tural legacies as reflected in attitudes to risk, envy and corruption across Ukraine in addition to geography, policy and economic conditions. The underlying assumption for this endeavor is a dynamic understanding of the notion of region. In the analyses, we do not depart from administrative borders of regions but try to conceptualize regions as relatively homogeneous patterns of attitudes, allegiances and identifications expressed by individuals living in a spatial unit. Our analyses of regionalism have taken into account that regions in Ukraine may be defined in very strong or very weak terms. A number of contributions to the present volume showcase the dynamism of identities, languages, loyalties and geopolitical orientations. The transformation of these elements has been accelerated by the events resulting from the Euromaidan, which has fostered the discourse dictating that loyalty to the Ukrainian state is a matter of national security.

The traditional focus in the study of regionalism in Ukraine has been on identity, with cultural and linguistic factors shaping regional divisions. Historically, Eastern Europe has been more preoccupied by questions of language, national literature and history, which served as factors in the legitimization of national statehood in the shadows of former dominant powers, than has been the case in western Europe. The Ukrainian language, literature and national history still continue to be treated as priority issues by some scholars, politicians and public intellectuals in Ukraine, and the debate has intensified since the beginning of the conflict in 2014. This collective volume broadens this approach by looking at how larger patterns and historical developments have influenced interregional differences in present beliefs, values and practices. In particular, these include patterns of human settlement (the “civilizational frontier”), modernization and institutionalization. Thus, in addition to trying to understand differences in terms of identities, languages and religious beliefs, the authors of this volume look at differences in individual and institutional (corporate) attitudes to risk, to envy and to materialism, as well as attitudes to corruption and informal practices.

Defining region and regionalism

The term “region” has manifold connotations and usages. Traditionally, a region is defined by geographical criteria and a varying degree of administrative self-government. The Assembly of European Regions (2010, 15) uses the following definition: “the territorial body of public law established at the level immediately below that of the State and endowed with political

self-government” (Article 1.1). Peter Schmitt-Egner (2005, 56) has come up with a definition of a region that takes into account both its size and its agency: “Region is a spatial unit of middle size endowed with an intermediary character. Its material substrate is the regional territory” (see also Schmitt-Egner 2001, 3–18). This definition helps to conceptualize the constitutive factors of a region. The regional territory is considered as a secondary materialization of a space of agency which unites individuals with similar attitudes below the level of the nation-state.

Every definition of a region produces borderlines. Georg Simmel (1992, 697) maintained that a “border is not a spatial fact with sociological effects, but a sociological fact which finds a spatial expression.” The epistemological problem with borders lies in the fact that only political borders are given and institutionalized (through border control and customs). However, there are many other invisible borders in societies that may even be less permeable than borders between nation-states. Also the quality of the border has to be taken into account: there are “hard” and “soft” borders, border strips and transitional zones. Moreover, the identity of the separated entities is unclear. Maité Lafourcade (1998, 501) states the problem as follows: “Historically, the border is the protection of one community against the hegemony of another. It is a barrier against the arbitrariness of the other, but who is the other? And who is oneself?” Regionalism then refers to the principle that every nation-state is not a homogenous entity but a legal abstraction that unites geographically, economically and culturally different zones. Within the framework of the central state, regions acquire authority, autonomy and agency.

Defining and clustering Ukrainian regions

Traditionally, the regions in Ukraine have been defined geographically (Hrushevskiy [1913] 1997, 7–12; Rudnitsky [1916] 1918), sometimes even in a naturalistic way (see Terletskiy 1930). Forest ranges, mountains and rivers seemed to provide sufficient evidence for the delineation of the territory claimed by the “Ukrainian people” and for borders between regions (Isaievych 1996, 63–74). Very often, a geographical definition of a region has been combined with a particular historical experience (for a historical overview of how regions have been understood, see Hrushevskiy [1913] 1997; Isaievych 1996; and Yakovenko 2002). In fact, the changing fates of Ukrainian history fragmented the country, and many regions in today’s Ukraine look back on a particular past that is reflected in architecture,

bureaucracy, folklore or education. The combination of geography and history has often brought about the construction of a regional mythology.

Ukraine consists of twenty-four oblasts. The name of the oblast is usually derived from its most important city. This means that “region” in Ukraine is often understood in terms of substate political units established around a defining anchor city. This is different from the conceptualization of Ukrainian political and cultural administrative division developed by Mykhailo Hrushevskyi and adopted by the Ukrainian Central Council in 1918. This system abolished the administrative divisions such as *gubernias* and *povits* inherited from the Russian Empire and introduced a division of the lands controlled by the Central Council into thirty-two regions (*zemli*), giving three cities—Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa, and their surrounding suburbs—a special status. The new system, however, was never fully implemented.

Most scholars acknowledge regionalism as a key factor in Ukrainian culture. However, there is neither a coherent understanding of the roots, character and implications of regionalism nor a consensus over the number of regions in Ukraine. The debate has found its most prominent expression in a book by Mykola Riabchuk (2003), who maintains that there are “two Ukraines”: a western Ukraine with a pure “Ukrainian” identity and an eastern Ukraine with a “creolized” Russian–Ukrainian identity. For Riabchuk, the western part of Ukraine is characterized by modern European national identity and the rest by “creole,” premodern identity showing contempt for the “autochthonous” Ukrainian culture and language (Riabchuk 1992, 2000, 2002 and 2003). The core idea behind this division is that part of Ukraine’s culture and identity is “othered” as nonautochthonous, neocolonial and anti-Ukrainian.

Mykola Riabchuk (2009) calls this antagonism a dilemma which cannot be solved. In this paradigmatic thinking, different parts of society such as politics, everyday culture and its representation (an “entire way of life and thought, symbolic representation, and everyday behavior”) melt into one. Moreover, the notions “Soviet,” “Russian” and “Eurasian” are also used close together, becoming rather axiological attributes of in- and exclusiveness:

The compromise is not easy to achieve, since Ukraine’s main domestic controversy is not about ethnicity, language, or regional issues, as Western reporters and, sometimes, scholars tend to believe. The controversy is primarily about values and about national identity as a value-based attitude toward the past and the future, toward “us”

and “them,” toward an entire way of life and thought, symbolic representation and mundane behavior. It seems hardly possible to find any compromise between democratic and authoritarian, anti-Soviet and Soviet, just as [with] the prospect of reconciling an American south and north divided by slavery. Yet it becomes increasingly clear that Ukraine, without coherent de-Sovietization, will never escape the “Eurasian,” authoritarian path of development promoted by Russia, and will never accomplish an effective westernization or modernization. (Riabchuk 2009, 27)

Yaroslav Hrytsak (2004) criticized this dichotomous view and came up with a much more detailed view of Ukrainian regions. Especially the Orange Revolution of 2004, which threatened to split the country, posed the question “One Ukraine or many?” (Barrington and Herron 2004) in all its urgency. Of course, the west-east divide exists, but it is only one cleavage among many others, and the election results of 2004 and other election results should not be mistaken for *the* dominant feature of the regional structure in Ukraine. For instance, back in 1998, 42 percent of all respondents approved of a possible accession to NATO in the west, while 29 percent did so in the east, and only 11 percent in Crimea. These numbers can be read in different ways: the west-east divide is there, but not in a very pronounced way. In all of Ukraine, the perspective of an accession to NATO did not find a majority—this was a uniting rather than a dividing feature. These findings are corroborated when it comes to accession to the EU: in 1998, this proposal found approval in all Ukrainian regions with rates from 55 percent to 61 percent—and yet the highest approval rate, however, was not to be found in the west but in Crimea (Meier 1998, 32). Some other scholars (Nemiria 2000, 189) have considered that economic factors have been the most important in shaping regionalism in contemporary Ukraine: “The wave of regionalism is primarily a reflection of the national economic crisis.”

Barrington and Herron (2004, 54) hold that the concept of region has to be regarded as an intermediate geographic entity: “regions must be large enough to justify the label ‘region’ but not so large as to combine together significantly different areas in terms of history, economics and demographics; very small regions (with the region in question created from a single oblast, ‘autonomous region’ or single city) and very large regions (half the country) must involve compelling cases for their treatment as such.” The authors explore the influence of historical, economic and demographic factors such as the historical legacies of belonging to different

state formations, levels of industrialization and urbanization, ethnicity, language, religion, education, gender, age and the personal economic situation of respondents on their views of the ethnic “other,” their support for the political system and regime and their voting behavior.

The overall finding of Barrington and Herron (2004, 78) is that

regional divisions in Ukraine are not as simple as an “east versus west” divide—or even a continuum from west to east. Certain regions of the country (the southwest and Krym, for example) differ greatly not only from each other but also from regions next to them. The estimation of models of views of the “ethnic other,” support for the political system and regime, and voting behavior in Ukraine indicate that the southwest is quite different from the neighboring oblasts in the heart of the west, while Krym is markedly distinct from its neighbors in the rest of the south.

Barrington and Herron (2004, 57) argue that “different regional frameworks can produce different substantive findings.” They show this by analyzing three different sets of regions (two, four and eight regions), and argue that studying regional divisions on the basis of eight regions is the most appropriate, as such a division best allows the economic, historical and demographic features of Ukraine to be captured.

Recent developments in Ukraine since the beginning of the Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea, the war in eastern Ukraine and the failure of the “Russian Spring” in the areas beyond the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics—studied in Hrytsak’s contribution to the present volume—have confirmed Barrington and Herron’s arguments about important intraregional differences in such large regional denominations as the “east” of Ukraine. However, Hrytsak’s argument goes even further by showing that the “east” can be divided into more than the two regions proposed by Barrington and Herron as a result of recent developments. During the Euromaidan crisis, Hrytsak (2013 and also his chapter in the present volume) pointed to the problem of western Ukrainian nationalism, which focuses on a specific historical victimology and a romantic understanding of the Ukrainian language. This Lviv type of rhetoric leads, according to him, to a dead end. For Hrytsak, the current crisis in Ukraine is not that much a clash of identities but rather of values. The focus on values is an emerging trend in the study of regionalism in Ukraine.

In the present volume, the chapter on identities and identifications by Maria Lewicka and Bartłomiej Iwańczak defines a region as “a homoge-

neous topographical area, different from neighboring areas,” and aims to define regions in Ukraine as homogeneous areas with respect to the identity profiles of their inhabitants. This chapter differentiates between regions defined on the basis of geographic and economic criteria, on the one hand, and historic regions on the other, the latter being the main focus of investigation in the chapter; the authors argue that a historic region is “a mental and not geographical construct and thus may be composed of geographically different milieux.” The chapter on religion by Catherine Wanner and Viktor Yelensky sees regionalism as “a political principle premised on achieving a greater degree of political autonomy for a substate structure.”

Legacies of complex, heterogeneous and overlapping history

Until World War II, the Ukrainian lands, divided between several states, were characterized by substantial ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity. Natalia Yakovenko (2009, 117) holds that the current term “Ukraine” to denominate the lands populated by Ukrainians across several states came into common use only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Transcarpathia was the last region that gradually adopted the name “Ukrainian” to designate the Ukrainian language in official use in the 1930s, when it became part of interwar Czechoslovakia (see the chapter by Juliane Besters-Dilger, Kateryna Karunyk and Serhii Vakulenko in the present volume). This was an act of “demarcating the real or imagined boundary of ‘our land,’” and the creation of “two geographic and cultural entities—the ‘land of the Other’ and ‘one’s own’ space,” infused with a set of imagined values, such as belief in a common origin, common interests, history or cultural tradition, projected onto the territory (Yakovenko 2009, 117). Yakovenko (2009, 118) endorses the thesis of Giovanna Brogi Bercoff that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ukrainian cultural space was characterized by “polymorphism,” that is, a “multilayered and polyglot character, mutability, and susceptibility to external assimilative influences.”

Historically, the territory of contemporary Ukraine was a peripheral borderland between Russia and Poland, which were, in turn, cultural peripheries of western Europe. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the local Ukrainians identified themselves as Ruthenians (*rusyny*) and the language they spoke as Ruthenian (*rusynska*). In the Russian Empire, they were called Little Russians (*malorosy*) and their language was referred to as Little Russian (*malorusskii*). In the nineteenth-century periphery of

the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ukrainian (Ruthenian), Russophile, Polish and Austrian–Rusyn models competed with each other in eastern Galicia (Himka 1988). Some imagined the nation in unity with the Slav, Orthodox or Christian world. The Russophile movement developed in eastern Galicia and Transcarpathia as a means of “othering” from the dominant Polish and Hungarian nations. Historical regions also experienced different approaches to modernization. The Austro-Hungarian Empire encouraged a Ukrainian movement, as a counterweight to Polish and Russian claims, by encouraging and sponsoring Ukrainian churches, schools, mass media and political parties as of the mid-nineteenth century. The local people were grateful for such a privileged treatment and became—as the emperor would have it—the “Tyroleans of the East.” Autonomous institutions would arrive in the Russian and then Soviet-ruled part of Ukraine at a later period.

The multiethnic and multiconfessional nature of the Ukrainian lands until World War II, and the absence of conventional nation-state-building processes, produced mixed and multifaceted identifications. The nation-building processes which debuted in the nineteenth century struggled to define “authentic” Ukrainian elements and to separate them from the structures and cultures of the imperial centers. Mykhailo Hrushevskiy’s *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* appeared between 1898 and 1936. It became a fundamental starting point in the formulation of a national history of the Ukrainian people, which separated the history of the people from that of other nations and claimed its ancient origin. Hrushevskiy “nationalized” various regional elements, and presented the history of the Ukrainian people as an uninterrupted historical process. For him, the names *malo-ruskyi*, *pivdenno-ruskyi*, *ruskyi* or *rusynskyi* were synonyms to denominate “the Ukrainian people” (Hrushevskiy [1913] 1991, 1).

The chapter on language in the present volume by Juliane Besters-Dilger, Kateryna Karunyk and Serhii Vakulenko shows that, historically, the language, which later received the common name of “the Ukrainian language,” was standardized to different degrees and enjoyed a different political and social status in eastern Galicia, left-bank and southern regions, right-bank regions and Volhynia, Bykovyna and Transcarpathia. Throughout history, it competed with other languages in each of the regions (Latin, Church Slavonic, Russian, Polish, Romanian, German and Hungarian) that were dominant in the spheres of administration, religion, education and literature. At the same time, the local rural population communicated in the vernacular (*prosta mova*), with substantial variances across regions. The local elites had been co-opted by the ruling states,

switching with ease between different jurisdictions and institutions, as fluency in several languages was a rule for the educated classes.

The adoption of Ukrainian as a medium of belles lettres, its standardization on the basis of the vernacular language and its elevation in status were an integral part of the nation-building process, first in the Ukrainian lands which were part of the Russian Empire at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, and then in the rest of the Ukrainian regions. There were some important differences in the models of Ukrainian language standardization that were pursued in the Russian-ruled and Austrian-ruled regions, with the “vernacular turn” happening at a later stage in the latter region. However, Ruthenian was first introduced into education, academia, the press, the church, and public life in the lands ruled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as similar developments were delayed by the political bans on the Ukrainian language in the Russian Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. At that time, intellectuals in different regions engaged in debates about the status of Ukrainian and the need to create a common standard. Such a standard was finally adopted in Soviet Ukraine only in the 1920s.

This chapter also discusses the case study of language planning in the ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous regions annexed by the Soviet Union to Soviet Ukraine in 1939–1945: Galicia, Volhynia, northern Bukovyna, and northern and southern Bessarabia (Budzhak). A Ukrainian majority in these regions (except for Budzhak) emerged only following the Holocaust, mass murders and forced resettlements during the wartime and early postwar period. Formerly widespread languages—Polish, German and Yiddish—almost completely disappeared as of the early postwar period in Galicia, Volhynia and Bukovyna, while the languages of some other national minorities, most importantly Romanian (renamed Moldavian by the Soviet authorities) and Hungarian, formerly dominant languages of the states to which the Ukrainian lands belonged before World War II, continued to be present to some degree in education, the press and culture in Bukovyna, Transcarpathia and Budzhak. Gradually, Russian was introduced as the language of prestige in the public sphere, in the press, education and culture in these regions. However, it remained in strong competition with Ukrainian beyond the public sphere throughout the Soviet period.

Wanner and Yelensky argue that historically religion has not been particularly useful in raising Ukrainian national consciousness or in constructing a unifying myth to consolidate the Ukrainian nation. Ukrainians were loyal to local religious communities and the main religious denomination, Orthodoxy, linked Ukraine closely to Russia. In left-bank Ukraine,

Orthodoxy was not perceived as imposed by Russia. Rather, it was understood to be an authentic, local and native faith tradition. In contrast, the Polonization and Catholicization of the elites in eastern Galicia, prompted the Greek Catholic clergy to play a key role in fortifying a religious identity that underpinned Ukrainian nationhood and specific political aspirations. Beginning in the nineteenth century, this church became a leading force in the national cultural revival in Galicia. Over time, a new generation of Ukrainian secular intelligentsia arose, mostly originating from families of the clergy. The Byzantine rite traditions of Ukrainian Greek Catholics became the most important identity marker distinguishing Ukrainians from Polish Roman Catholics in eastern Galicia.

Building a community of values through the constitution

With the constitution of 1996, Ukraine has become a modern state that constitutes itself not only on the basis of a common historical ideology but also on the basis of a community of values. Most notably the desired consensus is expressed in Article 3, where the “individual, his life and health, honour and dignity, inviolability and security” are recognized as the highest social value.¹ However, Article 2 already implicitly addresses the problem of separatism: “Ukraine shall be a unitary state. The territory of Ukraine within its present border shall be indivisible and inviolable.” This wording excludes both federalism and secession. The sovereign of the Ukrainian constitution is the “Ukrainian nation” as defined in Article 11: “The State shall promote the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness, traditions and culture, as well as development of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine.” In this text, the Ukrainian nation is not a given entity, but a construction that needs further “consolidation” and “development.” The wording of Article 11 begs the question of whether the “indigenous peoples” (the Crimean Tatars) and “national minorities” (Russians, Belarusians, Moldavians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Poles, Jews, Armenians) are part of the Ukrainian nation or not. Their special status seems to allow for a double identification: as a member of the “Ukrainian nation” and as a representative of a “national minority.” The

¹ The Ukrainian constitution is quoted according to the official version: www.kmu.gov.ua/document/110977042/Constitution_eng.doc.

blurred line between these “national” categories has its advantages: “indigenous peoples” and “national minorities” may choose themselves whether they want to define themselves as a part of a greater whole or as an isolated group within a foreign nation.

Article 132 stresses the importance of regionalism: “The territorial structure of Ukraine shall be based on the principles of unity and integrity of the state territory, the combination of centralization and decentralization in the exercise of state power, and the balanced socio-economic development of regions taking into account their historical, economic, ecological, geographical and demographic characteristics as well as ethnic and cultural traditions.” Again, regional diversity is cast in the framework of a unitary state which draws its legitimacy from the “Ukrainian nation.”

The cultural heterogeneity of Ukrainian regions, however, requires that the basic constitutional values be reduced to a narrow discursive kernel with an outer shell of unsaid and unspecified interpretation. The willingness of the individual citizen to agree to these values depends on the power of conviction that is inherent in the solemn text of this fundamental law. The rather broad margin of interpretation is not a shortcoming but a vital element of national cohesion. In the Ukrainian case, two lines of argumentation can be observed: on the one hand, there is an emphasis on the dignity of the individual which is clearly a post-totalitarian legacy that has its roots in Article 1 of the German Basic Law (“Human dignity shall be inviolable”). On the other hand, the constitution aims at a balance between central power and regional self-determination; the most prominent example is the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which has Chapter 10 (out of fifteen in the whole constitution) for itself. Interestingly enough, the Ukrainian constitution forbids parties that represent the interests of only one region. In other words, even though there is a strong regional factor in Ukrainian political and societal culture, there is general agreement that no region should dominate the rest of Ukraine.

Regionalism as a challenge and as a chance for Ukraine

The post-Soviet period saw a constant transformation of malleable, open and unfixed identities, identifications, allegiances and loyalties inherited from the pre-Soviet and Soviet pasts. The monitoring of the transformation of identities in the examples of the cities of Lviv and Donetsk that was undertaken between 1994 and 2004 showed that, while national (Ukrainian) identity has been the dominant identity in the list of ten top identities

in the city of Lviv (73.1 percent in 1994 and 74.8 percent in 2004), the regional (Donetskite) identity was dominant in Donetsk (55.5 percent in 1994 increasing to 69.5 percent in 2004) (Hrytsak 2009, 240). The overarching trend has been a gradual disappearance of Soviet identification in Donetsk between 1994 and 1999, accompanied by a slight strengthening of national (Ukrainian) identity (Hrytsak 2009). A notable characteristic of the city of Lviv is that the regional (Lvivite) identity was almost as strong as the national one, and the region has been the most stable in terms of identity change in the post-Soviet period. As discussed above, a number of scholars, politicians and civil society leaders have problematized the absence of a uniting national idea or of a consensus to accept “civic” identity as a nationwide project (Riabchuk 2000; Wilson 2002). For example, Wilson (2002, 32) considers that this plurality prevents the consolidation of a nationwide identity and preserves the “ambiguous middle ground between Ukrainian and Russian identities.”

Other scholars have argued that the wealth of Ukraine is the plurality of its identities, religions, historical legacies and cultural memory patterns (Nemiria 2000; Portnov 2013 and 2015; Sasse 2010; Shevel 2014; Wanner 1998; Zakharchenko 2013; Zhurzhenko 2010). In general, post-Soviet development has been a symbiosis of national and post-Soviet elements (Portnov 2010; Rodgers 2006). Gwendolyn Sasse (2010, 105) points out that “Regionalism has helped to safeguard Ukraine against radicalism—whether nationalist, liberal, or authoritarian—though it also tends to produce delays and stalemates” and stresses the “regional balancing throughout each phase of the country’s transition.” Similarly, Portnov (2015, 726) holds that “it is precisely this lack of a nation-wide consensus that has helped preserve the distinctive pluralism of post-Soviet Ukraine’s public space and has maintained ambiguity as a way of avoiding social conflict, an obstacle to the monopolization of public space in the service of one political force or another.”

The volume focuses on the social and cultural dynamics of Ukrainian regionalism. A number of contributions reflect on the fluidity of ethnic religious identifications and question the essentialist approach to the use of such categories as “Ukrainian” or “Russian.” More fluid, amorphous categories, such as that of “just Orthodox” to represent religious identification, combine Ukrainian and Russian into an overarching, blended confessional category. The experience of being “just Orthodox,” Wanner and Yelensky argue, yields an atmosphere of “ambient faith” which elevates the importance of religion and being religious over confessional allegiances. A number of contributions to the present volume also evaluate the impact on

present-day identifications, attitudes and values of the historical borders that run through the territory of Ukraine, such as those between territories that were civilized earlier and later, between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire, or between the Second Polish Republic and the Soviet Union.

The tragic events which have unfolded since 2014 pose the question of Ukrainian regionalism in the strongest possible terms. Will Ukraine be one country? Will there be a political consensus that balances the interests of the regions and the state? Will the central government in Kyiv manage to convince the regions that their claims are being served? The answers to these questions are by no means simple or obvious.

A state with strong regionalism is rather the rule than the exception in contemporary Europe. Intense, sometimes dramatic debates about regional autonomy may be observed in Great Britain, Belgium, Spain, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Switzerland, just to name the most prominent examples. Regionalism is a condition that frames the necessary nation-building consensus of individuals within a state. This consensus is at times weaker and at times stronger, but it produces a “state of mind” which is at the basis of the political state. What makes the Ukrainian case special is—according to our findings and following a suggestion by Yaroslav Hrytsak—the fact that regionalism as a defining phenomenon of Ukraine is more prominent than the regions themselves.

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2. The Regional Differentiation of Identities in Ukraine: How Many Regions?

MARIA LEWICKA and BARTŁOMIEJ IWAŃCZAK

Identities: National, local and beyond

As an outcome of its history, for centuries split between western (Polish–Lithuanian and Austro-Hungarian) and eastern (Russian) influences, due to the historical multiculturalism of its southern and western regions, Ukraine today is a strongly differentiated country. The differences concern historical heritage, the ethnic composition of its provinces, language, the level of urbanization and industrialization, mobility and generational rootedness in place of residency, religion, and a number of psychological dimensions such as values, the strength of local communities and the level of conservatism (Lewicka 2012a). Numerous countrywide surveys indicate that the main axis of the Ukrainian “mental” division is the broadly defined east-west dimension (Riabchuk 2003), encompassing several closely interconnected issues, mostly centered on attitudes toward the independence of Ukraine from Russia (for example, resistance to the legalization of the official use of the Russian language, cultivation of Ukrainian national heritage, and attitudes toward national heroes such as OUN and UPA leaders) versus positive relations with Russia (for example, support for the official use of the Russian language, or for economic or political unity with Russia).

This dividing line is correlated with differences in the content of national and ethnic identities. Quite understandably, the western regions show a strong Ukrainian identity whereas the ethnically mixed eastern regions lean toward mixed Ukrainian and Russian identity. Differences in the content of ethnic identities, however, do not fully explain the complexity of Ukrainian regionalization. As noted by Riabchuk (2013), the differences between Galicia and the eastern regions of Ukraine cannot be reduced to whether attitudes are pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian, but

instead—more importantly—the differences concern the way in which nation and nationalism are understood in different parts of the country. Using the theory of the three-stage process of the development of nationalism proposed by Miroslav Hroch (2003, 2004), Riabchuk (2013) suggests that, while the western regions of Ukraine have reached the final stage, C, of national identification (mass movement), and have thus developed a fully-fledged national consciousness, the post-Soviet territories have not gone beyond stage B (national agitation) or even stage A (scholarly interest), which is why the broad masses are largely indifferent to national or nationalistic ideas altogether.

Different factors might have contributed to this uneven development of Ukrainian nationalism: lack of support from the dominant elites in eastern parts of the country, Soviet ideological pressures deemphasizing the significance of nations and overemphasizing the value of belonging to a broader Eastern Slavic community under the guidance of Russia (*Russkii mir*), the linguistic complexity of eastern territories, and the high prestige of the dominant (that is, Russian) culture in former Soviet territories as compared to Ukrainian territory. Differences in national identities shared by Ukrainians inhabiting different parts of the country can thus be looked at not only from the point of view of their content (pro-Ukrainian versus pro-Russian, or anti-Russian versus pro-Russian), but also in terms of their complexity, strength and internal consistency. It is also worth exploring whether spatial categories such as place of living, national state or transnational territories, so important in the western parts of the country, play an equally important role in identifications of people from other regions. All this leads us to seek how important differences in identification may be for the understanding of Ukrainian regionalization.

In contrast to the criticisms which the concept of identity has met in empirical social sciences, such as sociology (Brubaker 2004; Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Tilley 1997), identity has proved to be an indispensable tool in understanding processes governing interpersonal and intergroup behavior. Most of the current controversies concerning identity are present also in psychological discussions, for example, whether it should be conceived of in “essentialist” or “social-constructivist” terms (Castano 2004; Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst 2004; Hogg and Ridgeway 2003; Reicher 2004), or how to cope with the growing internal complexity, overlaps and hybrid character of identifications in the contemporary world (Abrams 1999; Kwiatkowska 2009; Roccas and Brewer 2002). Nevertheless, the need for the construct itself is not questioned, as seen in the proliferating literature on this topic and in rich empirical output (Schwartz, Luyckx and

Vignoles 2011). Considered on an individual level, identity is an indispensable construct to understand human development across the life span and to account for disturbances in healthy psychological functioning at different stages of life (Erikson 1963; Kroger 2007). On the group level, the concept of social identity has become a valuable tool for understanding intergroup behavior: processes of stereotyping that follow from the “us” versus “them” distinction, the dehumanization of the “other,” intergroup conflicts and cooperation, or group-related emotions such as collective pride, guilt or shame.

Ease of self-categorization in terms of different identifications depends on numerous factors; some have their roots in the deep historical traditions of a group, in its salient, “primordial” features such as race or gender (Gil-White 2001), in the broadly understood game of interests (Tilley 1997), in the available social contexts within which the differentiations are made (Reicher 2004), while some others are underlain by the cognitive architecture of the human mind. For example, if one assumes that identity requires a differentiation from the “other,” then there should be an optimal level of abstractness of the identification category that makes this differentiation relatively easy; that is, the category should not be overly narrow, nor overly broad (Brewer 1991). This is probably one of the reasons why, despite all the efforts of European institutions, so few people find it easy to identify with Europe as a whole, not to mention such an abstract identity object as the “world” (transnational or cosmopolitan identifications). Psychological attempts to introduce such broad identity targets as “humanity,” in order to reduce existent prejudices, usually meet with (moderate) success only in social-psychological laboratories. As the majority of studies show, national identifications do not seem to lose their attraction, even in the countries that have been subject to the strongest pressures of globalization (Ariely 2012; Jung 2008; Norris 2003).

A national state is the most common spatial identification target, and it is so for a number of reasons. It satisfies the “optimal distinctiveness” rule (Brewer 1991), which means that there are many other targets on the same level that can be contrasted with it; it is capacious enough to give people a sense of togetherness; it has its (real or invented) history that offers a sense of continuity (Sani, Bowe and Herrera 2008); and it has borders that create the sense of group distinctiveness and differentiation from the “other” (Rothbart and Park 2004; Triandafyllidou 1998; Vignoles, Chryssochoou and Breakwell 2000). Last but not least, a national state is fitted with political and cultural institutions that constantly remind one about group belonging, creating everyday rituals known

as “banal nationalism” (Billig 1995). However, scales of place smaller than a country should also be easy objects of identification. This particularly applies to cities. Cities are well-defined wholes, and usually have well-delineated borders, proper names that identify them as separate entities, historical continuity, and a number of other features that make them easy to grasp cognitively and to imagine (Tuan 1975). It is no surprise then that people develop particularly strong bonds with their cities (or towns or villages) of residence, stronger than with relatively ill-defined neighborhoods or broader regions (Hidalgo and Hernandez 2001; Lewicka 2010). Studies carried out in Poland and Ukraine show that, when people are asked to pick out the three most important identification targets from various territorial scales, from city district to world, they usually select their country as their first choice and their city as second (Lewicka 2006). According to Norris (2003) the order is reversed: in most of the countries covered by the World Values Survey the local/regional identity was selected as the first, and the national as the second.

Identifications may also reach beyond the country or national level. Some transnational identities are able to satisfy the “optimal distinctiveness” rule (Brewer 1991). For the purpose of the present study, two transnational identities were chosen: European and Eastern Slavic, predicting that the latter will be stronger in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine, while the former will be stronger in its western parts. The reason for the significance of transnational identities may be not so much their ability to raise a clear cognitive representation of the identity object, as is the case with cities or countries, but more that the identities may be endowed with symbolic meaning transferred through ideological and politically instrumental messages (for example, the pan-Slavic ideology supported by Russia, or the belief that Eastern and Central Europe has always belonged to the world of European nations, present in the western parts of the country). Although the data collected in numerous surveys show that very few people in contemporary Poland or Ukraine tend to identify with “Eastern” or “Central Eastern” Europe, not many identify with Europe either (Lewicka 2012a); given the integrative processes within Europe, these transnational identities are definitely worth further investigation (Risse 2004).

People have multiple identities which are rarely restricted to territorial identifications alone. Alongside local community-based, city- or country-based, regional, national and transnational identities, people also identify with objects that are unrelated to their living place. People identify with their profession, age generation, family or gender role, religion or social

status. As societies become more mobile and more people participate in “spaces of flow” rather than “spaces of places” (Castells 2000), the role of nonterritorial identities may grow as well. It is often assumed that various forms of identity may complement each other in such a way that when one type of identification weakens, other identities may take over. For example, weaker national identities may be compensated by increased feelings of place belonging (lower-order identifications), by transnational identifications (higher-order), or by identities that do not refer to any territorial objects. Surveys carried out within Ukraine, such as the Lviv-Donetsk study (Chernysh and Malanchuk 2007; Hrytsak 2007), led to the conclusion that lower national identity among Donetsk residents, as compared to Lviv residents, is compensated by their higher regional and nonterritorial identifications. The other direction is also possible. For example, Zencey (1996) argues that a lowered local identity, a product of excessive mobility, tends to bring about an increase in nationalistic feelings—the only “stable” object in the life of educated Americans. A similar “trade-off” between national and local identities was observed by Kohr and Martini (1992) in their studies of German and Italian students. European efforts to reinforce the role of transnational regions are based on the assumption that this will decrease the role of national identities, thus preventing potential ethnic and national conflicts within Europe.

Identities form structures, that is, they combine into qualitatively different wholes or profiles. These structures may be looked at from the point of view of their content (to see which objects are targets of stronger and which of weaker identifications), their complexity (to see how many different identification objects they include), their internal consistency (to see whether people have mutually incongruent identifications—i.e., identifying with two conflicted nationalities, as is the case in many contested places), and finally their overall strength (since some people have stronger, some weaker overall identities). It is this latter aspect of identification that may be particularly relevant in studies carried out in Ukraine. As the findings from previous surveys showed, the difference between eastern and western parts of the country may consist not only in the content of identifications (i.e., Ukrainian versus Russian, or mixed national identities), but also in their overall strength. Lewicka (2012a), in two consecutive surveys carried out in 2003 and 2009, showed that place and national identifications were significantly weaker in the eastern parts of the country, particularly in the Donbas region, than was the case in its western parts (Galicia). The present survey inquires into both the content of the identity profiles and their shapes (their strength).

The geography of identities

The geographical dimension is rarely taken into account by social psychologists interested in identities or social attitudes. Adding a regional dimension requires from a researcher some acknowledgment of the historical and geographical context of the studied phenomenon—something that psychologists who aim at universal generalizations tend to avoid (Reicher 2004). On the other hand, sociologists, historians or regional geographers make rich use of the geographical dimension, thinking for instance of Putnam's classic study of regional differences within Italy that initiated research into the role of social capital in economic development (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993). A closer cooperation between different disciplines would no doubt help to enrich our picture of Europe. As one of the most prominent researchers in regionalism has stated, "Regional geography is indispensable to anyone wishing to understand today's world" (Claval 1998, 4). This view has been sadly confirmed by the recent events in Ukraine.

A region can be broadly defined as a homogeneous topographical area, different from neighboring areas. The French geographer Paul Claval (1998) differentiates between regions distinguished on the basis of objective geographical or economic features (relief, climate, type of production, vegetation or agriculture), and historical regions whose defining feature is the "common fate" shared by their inhabitants. Historical region is a mental rather than a geographical construct and thus may be composed of geographically different milieus. It is this second meaning of region that will be of interest in the present chapter, as it is directly related to people's identities and the feelings that people have for their place of living. "What (historical) regions have in common is that they have given rise to a collective consciousness: an area of land exists the identity of which is strongly perceived by a collective group. The people who live there share certain features. From that starting point, the feeling of belonging is perpetuated from one generation to the next: the geographic unit is a mental construct" (Claval 1998, 46).

Of course the regional status of a territory does not depend on whether people identify with it or not. There exist commonly recognized regions whose inhabitants do not have a strong sense of regional belonging. The strength of regional identification depends on many additional factors, such as whether the region played an autonomous political role in the past and thus has a collective memory adding to the sense of region-related continuity, or how easy it is to differentiate the region from its neighbors,

or whether it is a natural entity or rather an artificially created administrative unit (Paasi 2003). Of the four types of region distinguished by Hroch (2009)—former political units with their own history, traditional units of internal state administration, units defined by geographical, demographic or linguistic specificity, and regions constructed “from the top” by administrative decision—only some are potential objects of attachment among their inhabitants. For example, Ukrainian Galicia belongs to the first group, and this is probably one of the reasons why it is an object of strong emotional attachments.

Regions may be subsumed under one country or may cross country borders. Examples of the latter category include Silesia, made up of Polish, Czech and former German territories; Galicia, incorporating Ukrainian and Polish territories; Bukovyna, including Romanian, Moldavian and Ukrainian lands; or Podlasie, composed of Lithuanian, Belarusian and Polish territories. The postwar borders in Eastern and Central Europe cut through many traditional regions, leaving their different parts on two sides of a border.

Three approaches to the investigation of regional differences within a country are possible: (a) the bottom-up approach, when one starts from a very fine grain, the lowest possible geographical level of analysis, and combines it later into broader units using clustering and taxonomic methods applied to various criteria of comparison; (b) the top-down approach, when one starts from a ready map of regions, distinguished on the basis of some known (i.e., geographical or administrative) criteria, and compares them with respect to criteria of interest (i.e., expressed attitudes or political preferences); or (c) the intermediate approach, when one starts with regions of intermediate level and combines them into more general wholes on the basis of some other criteria.

Until the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and the ensuing war in eastern Ukraine, Ukraine was divided into twenty-four provinces (oblasts), one autonomous republic (Crimea), 479 divisions (*raions*), and 415 cities. These administrative units may be classified into broader categories (regions), but which units are considered similar enough to form a homogeneous region depends on the particular scholar and on the criteria employed. Some regions are more salient, though, than others. In Ukraine more agreement exists as to the borderland regions than the central parts of the country. Galicia, comprising Lvivska, Ivano-Frankivska and Ternopil'ska oblasts, and Donbas, comprising Donetsk and Luhanska oblasts, are unanimously agreed to be distinct regions, and prototypical, respectively, for the west and the east of the country. Much more difficult

to categorize is the Ukrainian center. For example, Zhytomyrska oblast has been considered by some researchers as a part of the northern region, along with Chernihivska and Kyivska oblasts (Nemiria 2000), and by others (Vasiutynskyi and Kalachnikova 1997) as part of the center, along with Vinnytska, Kirovohradska, Cherkaska, Khmelnytska and Kyivska oblasts. Nemyria (2000) classifies Poltavaska oblast as part of the central region (along with Vinnytska, Kirovohradska, Cherkaska and Khmelnytska oblasts), whereas others (Vasiutynskyi and Kalachnikova 1997) consider Poltavaska oblast as a part of the north, together with Chernihivska and Sumska oblasts. Also the east of Ukraine (Kharkivska, Dnipropetrovska and Zaporizka oblasts) has not been perceived as homogeneous. The number of regions differs as well, from two (left-bank and right-bank), through six, nine, eleven, to as many as thirty (Chernysh 2003).

This chapter aims to explore whether people's declared identities may be used to identify distinct country regions, and to estimate their number and distinctive features. It will try to identify qualitative differences between different identity profiles, that is, groups of co-occurring identifications. It will cut the whole studied sample into successive sectors differing in the content of their identity profiles, and will place these different identities on the map of Ukraine, testing their geographical distribution. Finally, oblasts will be compared with respect to their similarities in terms of identity profiles.

Methodology

Regional geography offers a rich array of methods that enable the identification of regions. However, the main issue is always the choice of the basic unit of analysis—how general or specific it should be. Claval (1998) suggests that the best basic unit should be the “commune” (*raion* in Ukraine). However, the use of such a fine grain is possible only when such low-level information is available. Usually this is possible in the case of objectively accessible information such as census reports or geodetic measurements. It becomes complicated when classification criteria are mental constructs that require access to people's subjective opinions, as collected in individual interviews. Studies that make use of representative samples of residents on such a low level of analysis must involve huge numbers of respondents, and this makes them very costly. In the survey that formed the basis for the analyses presented in this chapter, the overall sample was representative of the whole country population. The lower the level of analysis, the less rep-

representative specific subsamples (regions, provinces, residence points and so on) are. Nevertheless the number of respondents was so high (6,000) that it is possible to draw conclusions also from lower levels of analysis (i.e., the level of oblasts). The number of respondents in twenty-seven administrative units employed in this study is given in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. Frequencies of respondents in 27 administrative units

Number	Oblast	Number of respondents	Percent
1	Crimea	255	4.3
2	Vinnyska	216	3.6
3	Volynska	130	2.2
4	Dnipropetrovska	447	7.5
5	Donetska	561	9.4
6	Zhytomyrska	168	2.8
7	Zakarpatska	160	2.7
8	Zaporizka	243	4.1
9	Ivano-Frankivska	180	3.0
10	Kyivska	242	4.0
11	Kirovohradska	131	2.2
12	Luhanska	302	5.0
13	Lvivska	330	5.5
14	Mykolaivska	154	2.6
15	Odeska	303	5.1
16	Poltavska	200	3.3
17	Rivnenska	145	2.4
18	Sumska	156	2.6
19	Ternopil'ska	144	2.4
20	Kharkivska	363	6.1
21	Khersonska	144	2.4

Number	Oblast	Number of respondents	Percent
22	Khmelnytska	176	2.9
23	Cherkaska	174	2.9
24	Chernivetska	117	2.0
25	Chernihivska	149	2.5
26	Kyiv (city)	359	6.0
27	Sevastopol (city)	51	0.9
Overall		6,000	100


The analyses presented in this chapter are based on the level of individual respondents (scores of declared identities obtained from 6,000 persons). The survey was carried out in March 2013 and covered the countrywide sample, representative for the country profile with respect to age, education and size of residency (from villages to cities over one million). The survey included a number of measures covering various aspects of people's attitudes and beliefs, socio-demographic measures, information about language used and so on. The identity scale consisted of fourteen items. Participants were asked to rate, on a scale from 1 to 5, the strength of their identifications with the following identity targets: city, country region, Ukrainian nationality, Russian nationality, other nationality, Eastern Slavic community, Europe, and a number of nonterritorial targets such as family, gender, age generation, profession, interest/hobby, religion, and social status. The scores were next converted into standardized z-scores, such that scores higher than zero meant that identifications were stronger than the country average while scores lower than zero meant that identifications were weaker than the country average.

In order to test whether the declared identities form distinct profiles, and how many of the homogeneous and psychologically meaningful identity profiles can be revealed in the population studied, the scores of fourteen identities, collected from 6,000 participants, were subject to a series of five successive cluster analyses, with assumed two, three, four, six and ten clusters, respectively. In order to visualize the geographical distribution of consecutive identity profiles, their frequencies were compared against twenty-five provinces and two cities, and depicted on corresponding maps.

General identity profiles: Ukrainians, Russians and other national groups

Ukrainian territory is differentiated with respect to national self-attribution. Whereas the western, central and northern regions are predominantly homogeneous in terms of national self-categorization (Ukrainian), the south and east of the country are mixed, with Russians being a strong minority in the east and south; there are Tartars in the region of Crimea; and Chernivetska oblast and Transcarpathia have strong Hungarian, Bulgarian, German and other minorities, too. Figure 2.1 displays the ethnic composition of the studied sample, divided across ten country regions. With the exception of Crimea, in all provinces individuals who identified themselves as Ukrainians predominated, self-categorization as “Russian” was second, while the remaining minorities presented mostly in Crimea, in the south of the country (Odeska oblast) and the southwest (mostly Chernivetska oblast).


Figure 2.1. Ethnic self-categorizations of the studied sample across ten regions



Source: Survey (2013)

Before proceeding with cluster analysis, it is useful to have a look at general identity profiles obtained in the whole sample, divided according to the declared ethnicity of the respondents. Figure 2.2 presents the means of fourteen different identifications, computed separately for the three groups: Ukrainians, Russians, and the remaining ethnicities together. Scores higher than zero mean that this specific identification scored above the country average, while scores below zero mean that this specific identification scored below the country average.

Figure 2.2. Identity profiles across groups of nationalities




Source: Survey (2013)

The three profiles are strikingly similar, with the exception of declared national identities. Not surprisingly, Ukrainians show a stronger Ukrainian than Russian or “other national” identity, Russians identify with Russians more than with Ukrainians and other nationalities, while the remaining groups identify with other nationalities more than with Russians and (par-

ticularly) Ukrainians. The remaining differences are negligible (Figure 2.2), showing similarities rather than differences between different national groups inhabiting Ukraine.

Figure 2.3 presents analogous profiles based on centered means of identities. The procedure of centering (subtracting each raw item from the participants' general mean) seeks to eliminate individual differences in the attitude strength or acquiescence bias. Scores above zero describe identities that are above the participants' mean score (a higher identification than the participants' average), while scores below zero describe identities that are below the participants' mean score (a lower identification than the participants' average). The centered profiles thus show individual hierarchies of identification rather than their absolute strengths and, in analogy to the previous ones, have been computed separately for participants from Ukrainian, Russian and other minority groups.

Figure 2.3. Centered identity profiles of three groups of nationalities



Source: Survey (2013)

The shape of the profiles offers an insight into the relative importance of various identity targets in the three ethnic groups (as well as in the whole sample). For all respondents, irrespective of their ethnic belonging, such identity objects as gender, family, age generation, place of residence and national identity were stronger than the remaining objects (transnational or territory-unrelated objects such as profession, interests or social class). Not surprisingly, the most pronounced differences between the three ethnic groups referred to national identities. What is more interesting is the observed asymmetry in the relative strength of national identifications in the three groups. Difference in the strength of Ukrainian and Russian identities among Ukrainians is much bigger than the analogous difference among Russians. In other words, Russians identify less with Russians than Ukrainians with Ukrainians, and Russians identify more with Ukrainians than Ukrainians with Russians.

Smaller but still visible differences can be observed with respect to place identity (city and region—both lower among Russians and other minorities), Slavic identity (higher among Russians and other minorities), and religion and social class (higher among Ukrainians). Otherwise, the two ethnic groups did not differ either with respect to remaining nonterritorial identities or with respect to European identity.


How many different identity profiles?

The methodology of cluster analysis allows one to identify groups of qualitatively different profiles of fourteen identifications. Consecutive cluster analyses (two, three, four, six and ten clusters) yielded altogether a set of twenty-five identity profiles, whose contents have been depicted on corresponding graphs and their geographical distributions on corresponding maps. Since these are standardized data, scores above zero indicate identities stronger than the average of the whole sample, while scores below zero indicate identities that are below the sample average; the higher the score, the stronger this specific identification relative to the sample mean. A short overview of the results is given in Table 2.2, and the overall summary of the clustering process is shown in the form of a tree of successive clusters in Figure 2.9.

Two clusters split the whole population into those with relatively weak identities (Cluster 1), where most of the scores fall below the country average, and those with relatively strong identity (Cluster 2), where most of the scores fall above the country average (Figure 2.4). Interestingly, the

Russian identifications (and those of other minorities) accompanied weak identities, whereas Ukrainian identification was associated with strong identities. Thus the strength of identities is a formal feature of the profiles, different from the profiles' content (i.e., pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian), although correlated with it.


Figure 2.4. Two identity profiles and their geographical representation (frequencies of clusters in twenty-seven administrative units). Scores above zero indicate identities stronger than the country average, while scores below zero indicate identities weaker than the country average.



Source: Survey (2013)

The geographical distribution of the two profiles (Figure 2.4) shows that weak identities (Cluster 1) predominate in Luhanska oblast and are present among 50 percent of respondents from Donetska, Dnipropetrovska, Khersonska, Cherkaska, Poltavska and Sumska oblasts, located mostly in the east and northeast of the country. This confirms the findings obtained by Lewicka (2012a) in two other surveys: the eastern

Figure 2.5. Three identity profiles in the Ukrainian sample and their geographical representation



Source: Survey (2013)

regions of the country, apart from displaying stronger Russian and “mixed” identities, were also characterized by the overall weakest emotional attitudes toward their places of living and national issues. Overall, the strong identities (Cluster 2) predominated in the whole sample (Table 2.2, at the end of this chapter), but they prevailed in the western, the central and in some southern regions (Odeska oblast, Crimea and Sevastopol). The latter point does not mean that the majority of people in Odeska oblast or Sevastopol display a strong Ukrainian identity, as the content of the profile would suggest, but rather that its overall strength fits better the strong identities of Cluster 2 than the weak identities of Cluster 1. As will be shown later, a division of the Ukrainian population into more than two identity profiles yields a more accurate description of specific groups.


The next figure presents the division of the Ukrainian population into three identity clusters (Figure 2.5). The first profile (Cluster 1) is an almost exact replica of the strong identity profile (Cluster 2) from the previous analysis: 81 percent of respondents previously assigned to Cluster 2 fell into Cluster 1 in the present analysis (see Figure 2.9). This profile dominated in the west of the country, particularly in three oblasts of Galicia, in Transcarpathia and Rivnenska oblast, in central oblasts such as Vinnytska and Kirovohradska, in the city of Kyiv and Kyivska oblast, and in Chernihivska oblast (Figure 2.5 and Table 2.2).

The former weak identity cluster was split into two profiles in proportions of 35.6 percent (Cluster 2) and 62.0 percent (Cluster 3) (Figure 2.9 and Table 2.2). Cluster 2 represents weak local and weak Ukrainian identities, strong Russian and other national identities, and remaining identities of average strength. It is particularly pronounced in Crimea but also represented in the region of Donbas.

Cluster 3 represents an overall weak identity, particularly local and nonterritorial. It is evenly distributed across different regions, being most present in Cherkaska oblast, but otherwise with no clear dominance in any province.

Further divisions of the sample into, respectively, four, six and ten clusters revealed a visibly higher homogeneity of the strong than of the weak identity clusters (Figure 2.9). For example, the strongly pro-Ukrainian Cluster 1 of the tripartite division (Figure 2.5, Table 2.2) was also revealed in the four-cluster division (70.9 percent of the tripartite Cluster 1 entered Cluster 2 of the four-cluster division), and in the six-cluster division (75.2 percent of the tripartite Cluster 1 entered Cluster 2 of the six-cluster division), with the same psychological interpretation (Figures 2.6


Figure 2.6. Four clusters of identity profiles and their geographical representation



Source: Survey (2013)

and 2.7, Table 2.2) and a similar geographical distribution (Figures 2.6 and 2.7). Only when divided into ten clusters (Figure 2.8) did the pro-Ukrainian strong identity cluster split into three different profiles, with


Figure 2.7. Six clusters of identity profiles and their geographical representation



Source: Survey (2013)

Clusters 2, 3 and 8 all displaying a positive Ukrainian identification but differing in remaining features. Their description is given in Table 2.2, and a geographical representation in Figure 2.8.

Figure 2.8. Ten clusters of identity profiles and their geographical representation



Source: Survey (2013)

Regarding Clusters 2 and 3 from the tripartite division, Cluster 2 (with strong Russian and strong other minority and Slavic identities, weak local and Ukrainian identities, and average strength of remaining identities) was more homogeneous than Cluster 3 (with overall weak identity). Cluster 2 kept its integrity in the four-cluster division (Figure 2.9), and split into different clusters only in the six-profile divisions (Clusters 1 and 3) and ten-profile divisions (Clusters 5, 7 and 9); see Figures 2.7 and 2.8. A full description is given in Table 2.2.

The weak identity profile shown in Cluster 3 of the tripartite division (Figure 2.5) revealed considerable heterogeneity: it became split into two profiles in the four-cluster division (Clusters 1 and 4, Figure 2.6), split into three profiles in the six-cluster division (Clusters 4, 5 and 6, Figure 2.7), and split into three profiles in the ten-cluster division (Clusters 3, 6, 7 and 1, Figure 2.8). A detailed description is given in Table 2.2.

Figure 2.9. Summary of consecutive clustering partitions: the first figure denotes the cluster number, while the one below denotes the percentage of respondents from the higher-order partition that fell into this cluster




Figure 2.9 depicts consecutive divisions of the whole sample into different identity profiles. It is visible that, within Ukraine, a dominant group of inhabitants displays an overall strong identity profile that incorporates

a strong sense of belonging to the place of residence (city and region), strong nonterritorial identities (family, gender, age generation and so on) and a strong Ukrainian identification (see Table 2.2). This group is represented by the left-hand column of partitions in Figure 2.9. In the present procedure, ten divisions of the whole sample were produced. However, one can proceed further and test whether this strong pro-Ukrainian cluster continues to hold with more than ten divisions. Splitting the 6,000 participants into twenty different identity profiles resulted in a very uneven distribution of the sample (one of these profiles characterized only one respondent), but it also proved the resistance of the strong pro-Ukrainian profile to further splits. With twenty clusters, more than 1,000 respondents were characterized by this profile, and it was by far the most numerous cluster—displayed mostly by inhabitants of western and central Ukraine: three oblasts of Galicia, Volynska, Rivnenska, Vinnytska, Zakarpatska, Kirovohradska, Kyivska, Sumyska and Chernihivska oblasts and the city of Kyiv. This is probably the broadest and most homogenous region identified on the basis of the content of identities. The remaining regions are probably narrower and more diffuse.

The numbers of respondents in each cluster indicate the popularity of different identities across the country. As Table 2.2 shows, the high Ukrainian identity profiles were much more frequent than the high Russian identity profiles: the former cover 58.3 percent of the whole sample as compared to 41.7 percent in the two-cluster division, 48.1 percent as compared to 25.6 percent in the three-cluster division, 62.4 percent as compared to 19.8 percent in the four-cluster division, 56.1 percent as compared to 20.2 percent in the six-cluster division, and 52.0 percent as compared to 22.7 percent in the ten-cluster division. The remaining profiles covering other fractions of the sample do not show the dominance of any national identification, and their differences are due to other identity targets.

The above might suggest that national identity is the most important factor differentiating identities in Ukraine. A more thorough insight into the significance of specific identity targets revealed, however, that in the first division (two clusters), it was not the Ukrainian or Russian identity that was the main factor cutting the sample in two, but rather local identity (city and region) and a number of nonterritorial identities (gender, family, profession, age generation and social class). In other words, the strength of the overall profile was more of a distinguishing factor than whether the respondents claimed Ukrainian or Russian identity.

The role of national identifications grew with the increasing number of partitions. National identifications were the strongest discriminating

factors of all identity objects already in the three-cluster division, with Ukrainian identity playing a consistently stronger role than Russian identity. Identification with other nationalities was particularly significant in the six-cluster division (Profile 1 showed a particularly strong identification with ethnic groups other than Ukrainian or Russian). All nonterritorial identities played their role, too, and largely contributed to the overall strength or weakness of the profile. The least important were two transnational identities, Slavic and European—their role being visible only in the ten-cluster division.

The last analysis to be performed on individual identity scores involved checking the intercorrelations between identifications. As seen in the shapes of the identity profiles, some identifications tend to go together, while others exclude each other. Correlation and factor analyses confirmed these observations. Ukrainian identifications were positively correlated with local identification (city and region of residency) to a significant extent, whereas a negative correlation was observed between local identifications and Russian and other national identifications. This is an interesting finding suggesting firstly that, for Ukrainian citizens, their place of residency has a strongly national (Ukrainian) symbolic meaning, and secondly, that those with non-Ukrainian identifications may show a considerable amount of alienation from their living place. The more interesting cases, therefore, are those in which a strong Russian or other national identity coexists with above-average local identification (Profile 9 in the ten-cluster division). This was more often the case in Chernivetska oblast, and in Crimea and Odeska oblast, than in Donbas or the east of the country.

The identity objects concerned with traditional roles, such as gender and family, were positively correlated with Ukrainian identity to a significant extent, which was also revealed in identity profiles such as Profile 1 in the four-cluster division, Profile 6 in the six-cluster division, and Profile 3 in the ten-cluster division. This correlation, together with the positive correlation between Ukrainian and local identity, constitute arguments against the claim that weak national identities (for instance, weak Ukrainian identities among people living in the east of the country) tend to be compensated by strong local or nonterritorial identities.

As expected, Russian identity showed mild correlations with identification with other ethnic groups and with the Eastern Slavic community. No real association was found between European and Ukrainian identity. In fact both transnational identities, Slavic and European, seemed not to play an important part in people's identifications.

How many regions?


What can be inferred from these analyses about the regionalization of Ukraine? How can knowledge about the geographical distribution of identity profiles be used in the identification of regions homogeneous with respect to the content of identities? A look at the geographical distribution of identities (Figures 2.4 to 2.8) shows that there is a considerable diversity of individual identity profiles in each Ukrainian oblast. Even the division into two clusters—the strong, pro-Ukrainian, and the weak, pro-Russian—did not yield a clear-cut division of the country into two pieces. Galicia, the most pro-Ukrainian region, showed a fraction of inhabitants with weak identities, and Donbas, a province with high Russian identity, had a fraction of people with strong identities. The higher the number of clusters, the more diversified the picture of specific provinces becomes. Despite this internal diversity of provinces, some approximation of the number of qualitatively distinct regions, based on similarities in the identity profiles, seems possible.

In order to tackle this problem, a matrix of similarities was created between identity profiles represented by the inhabitants of twenty-seven provinces, which then served as the basis for identification of higher-order regions. Using the ten consecutive divisions that yielded altogether twenty-five clusters ($2+3+4+6+10$) and distributions of frequencies of each cluster in twenty-seven administrative units (provinces), similarities between every two provinces with regard to their corepresentation in each of the twenty-five clusters¹ were computed. Multidimensional scaling methodology was next applied to the similarity matrix, 27×27 , in order to identify dimensions of the space and location of all twenty-seven provinces in this space.

The rationale behind multidimensional scaling is that it arranges all compared objects (here, provinces) in an n -dimensional space, shows their relative localization, and thus groups them according to how similar they are on each of the identified dimensions. For the purposes of this analysis, two-dimensional space was used; placements of all twenty-seven provinces along the two dimensions are depicted in Figure 2.10.

Closer scrutiny of the two dimensions in Figure 2.10 reveals that Dimension 1 is mostly associated with differences in national identity. Oblasts whose inhabitants reveal higher-than-average Russian identity have values over zero on this dimension, and those with mostly Ukrainian identity have values below zero. The right pole of the dimension is represented by Sevastopol, Crimea and Luhanska oblast, closely followed by Odeska and Donetska oblasts, that is, by five administrative units whose inhabitants

Figure 2.10. Arrangement of twenty-seven provinces in the two-dimensional space obtained from the similarity matrix of identity profiles



score the highest on Russian identity. The left-hand pole of Dimension 1 is densely populated by more than ten oblasts, located in the west and center of the country with higher-than-average Ukrainian identity: Volynska, Lvivska, Zakarpatska, Ternopilska, Vinnytska, Kyivska, Kirovohradska, Ivano-Frankivska, Khmelnytska, Rivnenska and Chernihivska. High on this pole also are oblasts located in the north of the country: Zhytomyrska, Sumska, Cherkaska, Poltavska and—somewhat lower—the city of Kyiv (Figure 2.10).


Dimension 2 is more difficult to interpret, but the most probable interpretation is that it refers to the already discussed dimension of weak identities (values above zero on Dimension 2) versus strong identities (values under zero on Dimension 2). This dimension cuts across provinces that score high on Russian identity and those that score high on Ukrainian identity. The “weak identity” of Donbas, Dnipropetrovska, Mykolaivska or Khersonska oblasts scores above zero, and the “strong identity” of Crimea and Odeska oblast scores below zero on this dimension (Figure 2.10). Within the group of oblasts that score high on Ukrainian identity,

Dimension 2 differentiates between strong identities (i.e., Lvivska, Ivano-Frankivska, Ternopilska, Zakarpatska, Vinnytska or Chernihivska) and those with weak and fluid identities such as Sumska, Cherkaska, Poltavska or Zhytomyrska (see also Figure 2.4B).

Further confirmation of the suggested interpretation of the two dimensions comes from their correlations with fourteen measures of identity that formed the basis for our analyses. The first dimension correlated strongly (approaching $r = 0.9$) with national identifications (Ukrainian and Russian), while the second dimension showed weaker (between 0.2 and 0.5) but consistently negative correlations with the strength of all identifications except national ones. Obviously the first dimension, reflecting differences in the intensity of Russian and Ukrainian identifications, is a more important differentiating factor than the factor of general identity strength.


If we divide the whole set of provinces somewhat arbitrarily into equal intervals along Dimension 1 and Dimension 2, five different regions on Dimension 1 and four regions on Dimension 2 are obtained; their geographical distribution is given in Figures 2.11 and 2.12.

Figure 2.11. Final division into regions based on similarities of identity profiles (Dimension 1)



Source: Survey (2013)

Figure 2.12. Final division into regions based on similarities of identity profiles (Dimension 2)




Source: Survey (2013)

A warning is warranted here. Figure 2.11 and the preceding interpretations may, misleadingly, suggest that Ukraine is split into territories with Ukrainian identity and territories with Russian identity. One has however to bear in mind that all the analyses presented here have been carried out on *standardized data*: that is, data relative to the mean of the whole sample. As shown in Figure 2.13, an overall national identity in all but one of the provinces (Crimea) is predominantly Ukrainian. The reported differences therefore show a *relative* prevalence of Russian identity in some (eastern) provinces as compared to other (western and central) ones.

Comparison of the absolute values of the two national identities (Figure 2.13) shows that—apart from the dominant Ukrainian identity—the further east one goes, the more mixed (Ukrainian–Russian) the national identities of the inhabitants become. The complexity of national identifications in the eastern and southern parts of the country, as data from other countries with mixed identities show (Billiet, Maddens and Beerten 2003), may be one of the reasons for the less intense national feelings and perhaps the overall weaker identity profiles observed in these regions.

Figure 2.13. Absolute values of Ukrainian and Russian identifications across ten different regions




Source: Survey (2013)

The final step in our analysis consisted of integrating the two dimensions revealed through multidimensional scaling into one composite map of Ukrainian regions. This has been achieved by means of hierarchical clustering analysis, applied to scores of the two dimensions. The results are presented on the graph (Figure 2.14). The smaller the distance between the provinces (that is, the lower the level on which they are connected), the more similar they are.

Hierarchical clustering revealed one big region located mostly in the west and center of the country (Lvivska, Ternopil'ska, Vinnytska, Zakarpatska, Cherkivska, Khmelnytska, Ivano-Frankivska and Kyivska oblasts, and Kyiv city), closely associated with a smaller region consisting of Volynska, Rivnenska and Kirovohradska, that is, mostly provinces located in the northwest of the country, and a somewhat more distant region with no clear geographical localization (Chernivetska, Zaporizka and Kharkivska oblasts). The remaining provinces of the north and center of the country (Zhytomyrska, Cherkaska and Sumska oblasts) formed another region, connected on a higher level with the central eastern


region (Dnipropetrovska, Khersonska and Poltavska oblasts). The south and southeast were represented, respectively, by Crimea, Sevastopol and Odeska oblast, connected on a higher level to Mykolaivska, Donetsk and Luhanska oblasts. A look at Figure 2.10 reveals that provinces located in the east and south of the country are more dissimilar to each other than those located in the west and center, which is revealed as their bigger “spread” in the two-dimensional space. As a result, the distance between Mykolaivska and Kyivska oblasts seems smaller than the distance between Luhanska and Donetsk oblasts (Figure 2.10). A geographical representation of the final regions is depicted in Figure 2.15.

Figure 2.14. Results of the hierarchical cluster analysis applied to two dimensions differentiating identity profiles within Ukraine



Clusters (rescaled distances)

Figure 2.15. Geographical distribution of final Ukrainian regions distinguished on the basis of identity profiles



Source: Survey (2013)

Conclusions

This chapter has sought to identify regions within Ukraine that are homogeneous with respect to the identity profiles of their inhabitants. A method was proposed that combines the content analysis of identity profiles, the analysis of their geographical distribution, and the assessment of similarities between selected units of analysis (here, oblasts), leading finally to a division of the whole territory into regions based on similarity.

The main conclusion from the present analysis is that the most important dividing line in contemporary Ukraine is Russian identification, followed by Ukrainian identification. This dividing line has been correlated with a number of other measures applied in this survey, all related to attitudes toward Russia and the Russian language, not discussed in the present chapter, such as the use of Russian, the perception of Ukrainian and Russian culture as similar, or the attitude toward political union with Russia.

The other important finding revealed through this analysis is an identification of the factor of “identity strength.” Weak identity profiles most often characterized people with stronger-than-average Russian and “other national” identifications (Figure 2.4A), but this dimension also cut through the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian provinces, with Crimea and Odeska oblast on the strong side, and Zhytomyrska or Cherkaska oblasts on the weak side. Regional differences in the strength of identifications have also been noted in previous studies in which residents of eastern parts of the country revealed a significantly weaker attachment to their cities and regions, weaker overall local identity (Lewicka 2012a), and significantly more neutral responses to all national issues (Lewicka 2012b).

The higher neutrality, that is, the tendency to offer less extreme responses on the response scales, is the manifestation of a response style. Differences in response style, similar to these, were observed in cross-cultural studies comparing European and Asian (i.e., Japanese) samples (Wieczorkowska-Wierzbńska, Wierzbński and Kuźmińska 2014), and have been explained by qualitative differences in the belief systems of Asians as compared to Europeans: the tendency to accept the coexistence of contradictory beliefs by the former, and the rule of the excluded middle by the latter (Nisbett 2003). However, the less intense identifications may also be due to the objective existence of mutually incompatible identifications, here Ukrainian and Russian. In the contested places, where striving for national independence coexists with attempts to gain control over the country by the more powerful neighbor, a harmonious coexistence of Russian and Ukrainian identifications is not easy. One of the psychological measures that people may resort to in order to solve this contradiction is to diminish the importance of all issues related to national belonging, or to escape to a higher-order transnational identification (here, Eastern Slavic). The diminishment of identity strength in people with double national identities has been observed in Belgium (Billiet, Maddens and Beerten 2003). Another plausible interpretation has been offered in social-psychological research on attitudes, demonstrating that people hold stronger attitudes if they think that the attitudes are shared by their own group and differ from attitudes shared by the out-group (Holtz 2004). Within Ukrainian society, obtaining validations of one’s national beliefs from the in-group is more probable among those with Ukrainian than those with mixed Russian–Ukrainian identifications. A further plausible (and already mentioned) interpretation was offered by Hroch (2003 and 2004) and developed by Riabchuk (2013), suggesting that in the post-Soviet parts of the country, unlike the west, national consciousness has not yet reached its fully-fledged manifestation (phase C),

resulting in more neutrality on national issues. What, however, is still left to be explained is the fact that the observed differences in identity strength go beyond the level of national identification and generalize into local and some nonterritorial identities such as gender and family.

It should be emphasized that, although the dimension of identity strength was a weaker differentiating factor than that of national identification, it should not be underestimated. Weak attitudes, as social psychology teaches us, are easier to modify and are less resistant to various manipulations (Crano and Prislin 2006). Moreover, as the sad example of the present war shows, people with overall weak national (and other) identities fear radical beliefs such as nationalism, fascism and other forms of extremism. Persuasion that uses fear-provoking arguments addressing these issues may be particularly successful with this group.

Another finding obtained in the present analysis that is worth commenting upon is the positive relationship between Ukrainian identity and place identity, and an overall negative correlation between Russian identity and place identity. This was true not only for the two items of the identity scale (city and regional identity) but also for other measures diagnosing people's feelings for their place of residence, drawn from this survey: namely, attachment to place and interest taken in the history of the city and region of residence. A more detailed comparison of correlation coefficients in particular regions, though, showed that the negative relations between Russian identity and measures of belonging to place were particularly strong in the west, the region where Russians and Russian identities are in the minority, while in two other country regions, the south and Crimea, where Russians constitute a substantial fraction of the population, the correlations between Russian identity and measures of belonging to place were positive. It is worth noting that, in Odeska oblast and Crimea, place identity and place attachment were as strong as in the west or north of the country. Positive relationships between place and national identification thus seem to occur with respect to those national identities that are dominant or at least highly respected in the given region, and therefore where people can feel that the place has been appropriated by their national group (such that they can feel "at home" there). In most of the regions this applies to Ukrainian identity—that is, identity shared by proper "stakeholders" of the majority of studied places.

A general reflection is due here. One may wonder if the method described in this chapter has brought any results that are not already known or that could not have been obtained with less time-consuming means, for example, through comparing mean identities in twenty-seven

provinces or using only one clustering procedure. Of course a final answer can be provided only after having compared results from different methodologies. One of the clear advantages of the present approach, though, is that, because the lowest level of data was used (individual scores of identifications collected from 6,000 respondents) and not the level of mean identities averaged across twenty-seven administrative units, it yielded a highly differentiated and thus more accurate picture of specific provinces. As Figures 2.4 to 2.8 show, in each province one can find a representation of almost all identity profiles, albeit in different proportions. The division of the country along the east–west axis, that is, Russian versus Ukrainian identifications, does not come as a surprise and is generally known. What is interesting is that this axis turned out to be the most important dividing line also as a product of methodology that took into account the full differentiation of identity profiles within each province.

An advantage of the approach using more than one clustering is that it allows one to estimate the relative strength of individual clusters in consecutive divisions, and thus offers insight into the internal structure of identity profiles. The strong identity cluster centered on Ukrainian identification differed from the remaining clusters: it was not only the strongest in terms of intensities of identification, but also the most stable over consecutive divisions and the most widely distributed across the country. Within each identity cluster, there are probably identity dimensions that are structurally more important, creating an identity core, and some that are more “fluid.” One can wonder if national identity, particularly the fully developed version, such as Ukrainian identity in most of the Ukrainian provinces, should in fact be assigned the status of the core identity dimension. This would explain the positive correlations between this identification and other identities, such as place, gender or family. A closer scrutiny of differences between the strong pro-Ukrainian identity profile and profiles that evolved from the originally weak identity cluster may contribute to a better understanding of human identifications, an understanding that would take into account the relationship between their content and their formal properties, such as their dimensionality, strength and internal structure.

ENDNOTE

1. The similarity matrix of 27 x 27 provinces was created in several steps:
 - (1) A file was created with twenty-seven provinces x twenty-five measures of frequency of each cluster in each province.

- (2) For each pair of provinces a similarity was computed with respect to each cluster by multiplying their respective frequencies in this cluster. Therefore, if identity profile 1 in the two-cluster division was represented by 62.6 percent of respondents from Luhanska oblast and 32.7 percent of respondents from Lvivska oblast, then their similarity with respect to this profile would be $62.6 \times 32.7 = 20.47$. The same procedure was repeated for each pair of provinces and for each of the twenty-five profiles identified in the analysis.
- (3) Measures of similarity were next weighted by multiplying them by the number of clusters in each division. Co-occurrence in one of two clusters weighs less (is more probable) than co-occurrence in one of ten clusters. Therefore the assigned weights were the number of clusters in each division (two, three, four, six or ten).
- (4) In the final step the weighted measures of similarities were summed across each province. A matrix of overall similarities between twenty-seven provinces (27×27) was thus obtained. This similarity matrix was used in further analyses (multidimensional scaling, PROXSCAL method).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Table 2.2. Overview of identity profiles and their geographical representation

N clusters	Cluster	N	percent	Description	Most frequent in oblasts (percent of the oblast in brackets)
2	1	2504	41.7	Generally weak identities, Russian and other nationality above average	Luhanska (62.6), Dnipropetrovska (50.6), Poltavaska (50.5), Khersonska (51.4), Cherkaska (50.6)
	2	3496	58.3	Generally strong identities, Ukrainian above average, Russian and other nationality below average	Crimea (67.5), Vinnytska (73.1), Zakarpatska (80.0), Zaporizka (63.8), Ivano-Frankivska (68.9), Kyivska (65.3), Lvivska (67.3), Rivnenska (60.0), Ternopilska (70.8), Khmelnytska (65.9), Chernivetska (68.4), Chernihivska (69.1), Sevastopol (74.5)
3	1	2887	48.1	Ukrainian above average, Russian and other nationality below average, strong local and nonterritorial	Vinnytska (70.8), Volynska (50.0), Dnipropetrovska (40.5), Zhytomyrska (51.2), Zakarpatska (68.8), Zaporizka (50.2), Ivano-Frankivska (63.9), Kyivska (61.6), Kirovohradska (58.8), Lvivska (67.6), Mykolaivska (40.3), Poltavaska (43.0), Rivnenska (56.6), Sumska (48.1), Ternopilska (70.1), Kharkivska (43.3), Khersonska (45.1), Khmelnytska (59.1), Cherkaska (48.3), Chernivetska (67.8), Kyiv (52.9), Chernihivska (67.8)
	2	1536	25.6	Strong Russian and other nationality, weak Ukrainian identities, weak local, strong Slavic; profession and interests above average	Crimea (61.6), Sevastopol (80.4), Donetska (44.6), Luhanska (45.0), Odeska (43.2)
	3	1577	26.3	Generally weak identities of all kinds, particularly local and nonterritorial	Cherkaska (41.4)
4	1	1627	27.1	Strong Ukrainian, weak Russian and other nationality, local, gender and family identities above average, weak European and remaining nonterritorial identities	Vinnytska (40.7), Volynska (43.1), Khersonska (46.5), Sevastopol (43.1), Zhytomyrska (32.1), Zakarpatska (31.3), Ivano-Frankivska (34.4), Kirovohradska (36.6), Lvivska (35.2), Mykolaivska (37.0), Poltavaska (31.5), Khmelnytska (31.6)

N clusters	Cluster	N	percent	Description	Most frequent in oblasts (percent of the oblast in brackets)
4	2	2119	35.3	Strong Ukrainian and local, weak Russian and other nationality, strong nonterritorial	Vinnyska (47.7), Volynska (43.8), Zakarpatska (48.8), Kyivska (41.7), Kirovohradska (47.3), Lvivska (47.3), Rivnenska (50.3), Ternopilska (55.6), Khmelnytska (33.9), Chernivetska (47.0), Chernihivska (58.4), Ivano-Frankivska (38.9), Zhytomyrska (36.3), Zaporizka (38.7), Mykolaivska (30.5), Sumska (37.8), Kharkivska (33.9), Kyiv (39.0)
	3	1189	19.8	Strong Russian, other nationality and Slavic, weak local and Ukrainian	Crimea (45.1), Sevastopol (47.1), Donetska (33.2), Luhanska (38.7), Odeska (36.0)
	4	1065	17.8	Weak local and Ukrainian, other nationality above average, weak all nonterritorial	Rivnenska (33.8), Sumska (35.3), Cherkaska (34.5)
6	1	459	7.7	Weak Ukrainian, strong Russian, other nationality, Slavic and European, most nonterritorial identities above average	Odeska (22.8), Chernivetska (37.6)
	2	2226	37.1	Strong local and Ukrainian, weak Russian and other nationality, strong nonterritorial	Vinnyska (53.2), Zakarpatska (55.6), Zaporizka (40.3), Ivano-Frankivska (44.4), Kyivska (45.9), Kirovohradska (48.9), Lvivska (54.5), Rivnenska (50.3), Sumska (41.7), Ternopilska (54.2), Chernihivska (62.1), Kyiv (40.4), Chernivetska (34.2), Khmelnytska (44.9), Cherkaska (35.6), Volynska (38.5), Donetska (28.9), Zhytomyrska (36.9), Mykolaivska (27.9), Odeska (21.1), Poltavska (30.5), Kharkivska (34.4)
	3	912	15.2	Weak local and Ukrainian, strong Russian, strong gender and family, weak religious	Crimea (41.6), Donetska (25.0), Zaporizka (21.8), Luhanska (36.1), Odeska (21.8), Kharkivska (22.9), Sevastopol (82.4)

N clusters	Cluster	N	percent	Description	Most frequent in oblasts (percent of the oblast in brackets)
6	4	956	15.9	Weak local, gender, family and generational identity	Sumська (30.1), Kyivська (28.5), Rivnenska (25.5), Poltavська (20.0), Ternopilska (21.5), Kyiv (23.1)
	5	297	5.0	Weak local and Ukrainian, strong Russian and other nationality, weak all nonterritorial	----
	6	1150	19.0	Ukrainian above average, Russian, Slavic and European below average, weak most nonterritorial except gender	Volynська (38.5), Vinnytska (29.6), Kirovohradska (35.9), Mykolaivська (32.5), Poltavська (29.5), Zhytomyrська (25.0), Ivano-Frankivська (26.7), Lvivська (24.8)
10	1	253	4.2	Very low local, Ukrainian, and gender, strong other nationality and Russian, remaining average or below average	----
	2	1055	17.6	Strong Ukrainian, weak Russian and other nationality, strong remaining identities	Vinnytska (20.8), Volynська (26.9), Zakarpatska (35.0), Zaporizka (20.2), Kyivська (26.4), Kirovohradska (22.9), Lvivська (37.0), Rivnenska (39.3), Ternopilska (35.4), Chernivetska (23.9), Kyiv (24.0)
	3	1090	18.2	Ukrainian, local, gender and family above average, low remaining identities	Vinnytska (28.7), Zakarpatska (23.1), Ivano-Frankivська (27.8), Lvivська (25.8), Mykolaivська (30.5), Poltavська (31.0), Khersonська (40.3), Khmelnytska (22.7), Sevastopol (21.6)
	4	183	3.1	All territorial (local, national, transnational) average, nonterritorial below average	----
	5	462	7.7	Strong Russian, weak local and average other identities	Luhanska (23.2), Sevastopol (33.3)
	6	324	5.4	Local and national average, remaining identities weak	Volynська (21.5)
	7	748	12.5	Weak local and gender identities, average other identities	Kyivська (21.5), Poltavська (19.0), Rivnenska (19.3), Sumська (27.6), Kyiv (19.8)

N clusters	Cluster	N	percent	Description	Most frequent in oblasts (percent of the oblast in brackets)
10	8	970	16.2	Strong local and Ukrainian, low Russian, other nationality, Slavic, and European, high nonterritorial	Vinnytska (27.8), Dnipropetrovska (21.0), Zhytomyrska (20.8), Ivano-Frankivska (23.3), Kirovohradska (25.2), Sumska (34.6), Ternopilska (23.6), Khmelnytska (34.7), Cherkaska (26.4), Chernihivska (43.6)
	9	648	10.8	Overall strong identifications, Russian, other nationality, territorial and nonterritorial, with the exception of Ukrainian	Crimea (39.6), Odeska (25.4), Kharkivska (19.3), Chernivetska (29.9), Sevastopol (29.4)
	10	267	4.5	Extremely low local and Ukrainian, remaining identities average	----

3. The Ukrainian Past and Present: Legacies, Memory and Attitudes

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“Does Ukraine Have a History?” was the provocative title of an essay by an American historian in the early years of Ukrainian independence (Von Hagen 1995). The essay was severely taken to task by scholars of Ukraine, even by those who recognized that the essay was lamenting the absence of a rigorous historical science in Ukraine rather than denying it a past (Plokyh 1995).

As this chapter seeks to show, the Ukrainian dilemma lies not in the absence of history but in the presence of multiple historical narratives. The first part of this chapter demonstrates that the variety of historical experiences has produced contrasting and often conflicting legacies, which continue to weigh upon any attempts at forging a common narrative or even compatible historical accounts for what has become a common Ukrainian state. The second part, on memory, points out that the Ukrainian authorities have been clumsy in their attempts to manage official and societal memory and to mediate conflicts between multiple narratives. Still laboring under the burden of Soviet methodological and institutional paradigms, they have politicized history and polarized research instead of promoting a fruitful scholarly dialogue. Finally, the last part shows that multiple historical narratives and the politicization of the past provoke highly divergent attitudes to historical facts and figures, divergences that cannot be explained or broken down in terms of macroregions.

Ernest Renan ([1882] 1992, 10) sees the nation as composed of two “principles,” the past and the present. The former consists of the “possession in common of a rich legacy of memories,” while the latter depends on “the desire to live together.” Ideally, the past should nourish the present. As this chapter makes evident, Ukraine, with its rich but diverse and even

contradictory heritage, has some distance to go before it attains this ideal. At the same time, the multiplicity of historical narratives and memories is the norm rather than an exception in most countries.

Legacies

Whereas some forms of memory are a subjective phenomenon, comprising conscious reminiscences of the past, legacies belong to a category of tangible or even reflexive evocations of past patterns and paradigms. Legacies may take different forms: claims, practices or beliefs, which are understood, rightly or wrongly, as being securely grounded in the past. Legacies may draw on past state formations, on specific or more general historical experiences, or even on mythified historical moments. As will be seen in this section, the mimetic force of legacies is generally more firmly rooted than that of memory, but some legacies, like memory, may be manipulated and, at the very least, legacies are socially constructed and require construction and maintenance. Legacies may perhaps best be seen as the outcome of a process of memory consolidation. Lived and remembered selected social experiences are transformed into a more permanent form, usually with the passage of time.

Given its historical diversity, Ukraine offers a prime example of differentiated legacies. One must ask, for example: What has been the weight of Ukraine's Polish experience? This is already uneven as it covers the era of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (until 1795), the Partitions (1795–1918), and the Second Republic (1918–1939). And what is the legacy left by the Russian imperial presence in Ukraine (1654–1917), itself succeeded by the Soviet period (1917–1991)? It is the latter that weighs most heavily on contemporary Ukraine, not only because it is the most recent, but also because this is the only legacy that pertains to all of today's Ukraine, though not even for the entire period at that, as all Ukraine was Soviet only from 1945. And how should one assess the legacies left by more distant historical moments, such as that of the Kyivan principality, the Cossack hetmanate, or the Ottoman Empire? Or those that are more fleeting and more localized, such as the Austro-Hungarian legacy in western Ukraine? Or legacies of the peoples who migrated, or were deported or annihilated in the mass violence of the past century (Mick 2015; Törnquist-Plewa 2016)?

As these questions suggest, the superposition and, often, the clash of varying legacies reflect the regional diversity of contemporary Ukraine and, for that reason, are critically relevant to the question of Ukrainian regionalism. Legacies of the same state formations have different manifestations,

intensity and meaning in different regions of Ukraine. This chapter suggests too that, in addition to these legacies grounded in historical experience, there are ideational legacies that are both broader and deeper, though they too are not all-encompassing. In the first instance, there is the legacy of European romantic nationalism that continues to dominate the imagination of many, though not all, Ukrainians.

The Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Polish legacies

The Polish legacy in contemporary Ukraine is of particular interest because the Polish–Ukrainian relationship has shifted so markedly, both historically and in the present day. As Roman Szporluk (2009) has put it, Ukrainians (though they were not yet called such) in the Russian Empire who sought a “path to Europe” could follow one of two paths: via Russia, notably under Catherine II (reign 1762–1796), or via Poland. Paradoxically but understandably, the Polish path became feasible only when the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth itself had disappeared and the part of Poland that was absorbed by the Russian Empire between 1772 and 1795, a part that remained in Russian hands for over a century, had become Russia’s “internal West.” Polish nineteenth-century culture, with its keen sense of messianic victimhood—Poland as the Christ of nations—penetrated as far as Kharkiv University, whereas Kyiv University, founded in 1834 as a Russian imperial response to Polonization, had more Polish than Russian and Ukrainian students around 1850 (Szporluk 2009, 264). The Ukrainian national movement first appeared in the Russian Empire, not the Austrian one, modeling itself after the Polish example.

Polonization as Europeanization was thus a dominant pattern in parts of Ukraine under Russian rule. At the same time, in Galicia, under the Austrian crown, throughout the nineteenth century and especially after the devolution of Viennese rule in 1867, the national identity of its Ukrainians or Ruthenians (as they were then known there) was formed in opposition to Polonism. Austrian Ruthenians did not need a Polish path toward Europe, as they were already in Europe and looked to a European state, the Austrian Empire, to vouchsafe their identity; the fact that Vienna used its Ruthenians as a counter to the dominant Poles in order to maintain its own hegemony only strengthened the Ruthenian position.

What can be described as the negative Polish legacy for western Ukraine, the historical pattern of Polish domination and Polish–Ukrainian antagonism, persisted after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Poles and Ukrainians came into outright armed conflict during the imme-

diate post–World War I period, when Ukrainians tried to maintain a West Ukrainian People’s Republic in eastern Galicia (1918–1919). Polish–Ukrainian relations went from bad to worse in the interwar period. First, Poland abandoned its Ukrainian ally, Symon Petliura (1879–1926), in the aftermath of the Polish–Soviet War of 1919–1921, and then it failed to respect the conditions set by the Allied Powers’ Conference of Ambassadors in 1923 that had confirmed Polish sovereignty over Poland’s eastern (and Ukrainian) territories under a guarantee of territorial autonomy. Although Ukrainian deputies sat in the Polish Sejm (Parliament), the Polish repression of Ukrainian identity fueled Ukrainian nationalism even as it failed to suppress radical Ukrainian nationalist organizations. During World War II, Ukrainian–Polish animosity came to a head with atrocities known in Poland as the “Volhynian Slaughter” (*Wołyńska Rzeź* in Polish) and in Ukraine as the “Volhynian Tragedy,” followed soon after by the expulsion of Ukrainians from the southeastern territories of postwar Poland in what was designated as “Akcja Wisła” (Motyka 2013; Snyder 2003).

Notwithstanding such a history, the Polish legacy is seen by at least parts of Ukrainian society in surprisingly positive terms. Polish postcommunist governments have made a conscious and successful effort to repair the Polish–Ukrainian relationship, renouncing all territorial revisionism and lending strong support to Ukrainian national movements, both on the occasion of the Orange and the Euromaidan Revolutions. To be sure, tensions persist, notably around such historical issues as the Volhynian events of World War II, around individuals such as Stepan Bandera (1909–1959), a hero for Ukrainian nationalists and a villain for Poles, or even, in the more distant past, around the revolt led by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (c. 1595–1657) against the Poles, celebrated among many Ukrainians as a protonational event. Still, the legacy of Poland as a path to Europeanization has been revived in a new way and in a new context, as Poland has become Ukraine’s most ardent spokesman within the EU and NATO. The Polish legacy in Ukraine is thus evidence for the malleability of historical legacies as well as for the persistence of historical patterns.

The Russian imperial and Soviet legacies

The Russian imperial legacy has become merged in Ukrainian historical consciousness with the Soviet legacy not just because it lies further back in time but for other reasons as well: the Soviet Union itself took over many of the traits of its imperial predecessor, and moreover today’s Russian Federation draws abundantly on the legacy of its imperial predecessor,

both in symbolic and ideational terms. This is not to say that the Russian imperial legacy as such is absent in Ukraine: Peter I (reign 1682–1725) and Catherine II, both labeled “the Great,” are well-known, albeit contested historical figures in Ukraine (see the sections on memory and attitudes in this chapter), though one may well ask whether their memory has not been filtered through Soviet lenses (Survey 2013, questions 34–35). It has also been argued that it was during the Russian imperial period and under the impact of Russian national and Orthodox ideology that “an imaginary space of the ‘Kyivan past’” extending up to Lviv and Peremyshl/Przemyśl was created, constituting a sort of “intellectual *reconquista*” of a greater Ukraine in favor of a non-Polish past (Tolochko 2009, 166). As the same author puts it, the Ukrainian historical narrative “was able to cross the Dniπρο and claim the Right Bank as well” (Tolochko 2009, 166). The notion that the Ukrainian national narrative, relying on the twin pillars of the Cossack myth and the Kyivan past (see the next section), was largely “founded in eastern Ukraine and adopted with only minor modifications by Galicians and Bukovynians [i.e., west Ukrainians],” has found support among other prominent historians of Ukraine (Plokhyy 1995, 712). This is the case notwithstanding west Ukraine’s image of itself as the Ukrainian “Piedmont” or cradle of national identity, an image supported by other contemporary historians (Magocsi 2002a).

Though the Russian Empire has left its mark, it is the Soviet legacy that weighs most heavily upon Ukraine today. This is not only due to the fact that all Ukrainians have direct recollections or indirect familiarity, through family and other accounts, of the Soviet period; that is a phenomenon that belongs to the realm of memory rather than legacy. But here legacy merges with memory. The Soviet legacy finds specific expression in the widespread though not unproblematic acceptance of Ukraine within its present borders, as a unified and homogeneous, i.e., Ukrainian, national entity. The notion that “scraps of very different historical provinces” (Tolochko 2009, 165), once Polish, Romanian, Hungarian, as well as Russian, constitute a single unit requires a leap of the imagination; it is also the legacy of a powerful state, in this case, the Soviet Union, that created this reality and cultivated it for at least two generations. In this regard, the borders of Ukraine are the outcome of the “total wars” between major global powers of the first half of the twentieth century (Liber 2016).

Mykhailo Hrushevskyy (1866–1934), the leading Ukrainian historian of the early twentieth century and chairperson of the Ukrainian Central Council created in 1917, is one of the very few recent historical figures who have had monuments erected in their honor in much of independent

Ukraine (at least fifteen, the most eastern being in Poltava region) (see the next section). Otherwise, Andrii Portnov's (2012) pithy statement holds true, or at least it did until the Euromaidan Revolution: no one condemned in the Soviet period can acquire legitimacy today. The prime beneficiary of such continuity has been the literary figure, Taras Shevchenko (1814–1861), celebrated already in the Soviet period and, as such, easily transposed to the postindependence Ukrainian national narrative, although the transposition has involved purging Shevchenko of some Soviet accretions and excisions. Indeed, Shevchenko can be considered something of a “man for all seasons” as his image has evolved from that of a popular poet to that of a Bolshevik visionary and defender of the Soviet fatherland, then to that of a prophet of national liberation, an image promoted in the diaspora, and finally to that of an emblem of independent Ukraine (Ostriitchouk 2013, 175–222). In fact, as the project survey (Survey 2013) indicates, Shevchenko is one of the very few historical figures whose favorable reputation extends over the whole country, though to varying degrees. In Lviv, which considers itself the heart of the Ukrainian national revival, the postindependence Shevchenko monument stands very close to where the statue of Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924), now destroyed, had stood since 1952. Observers point out that, whereas in the Soviet period newly married couples would pose in front of the Lenin monument, they now do so in front of the Shevchenko statue (Wanner 1998, 185).

The spontaneous perpetuation of rituals, however, is not the only example of striking continuity with the Soviet past. The mode of representation of new cult personalities, such as Bandera in western Ukraine, is often indistinguishable from that of Soviet figures. Loosely referred to as “socialist realist,” the massive and heavy style favored both before and after independence was, in fact, common to both Western and communist monumentalization during a period largely defined by totalitarian aesthetics. Even today's Ukrainian nationalist artists have adopted this style, explaining that, whatever similarities may be detected between representations of contrasting ideological figures, they respond to popular expectations of the manner in which heroism is to be depicted (Liebich and Myshlovska 2014).

Even apart from Lenin statues and street names recalling the Soviet past, most public architecture, including museums and administrative buildings, dates from Soviet times, with the result that the Soviet past dominates the urban landscape. This is true even for western Ukraine. Lviv only became a major urban center in Soviet times (Bondarieva 2012) (on the creation of Soviet urban postwar modernity in some other Soviet

Ukrainian cities, see Qualls 2009; Zhuk 2010; Westrate 2016). The Soviet and Russian legacy remains dominant in other domains as well, even when not referred to as such. In the domain of historiography, for instance, this legacy is mediated through the notion of an “East Slavic” tradition or culture (see the next section). The project survey (Survey 2013) confirms that a plurality of Ukrainians, indeed virtually half of those polled, see Ukraine’s past as part of the East Slavic community, as opposed to the notion of the uniqueness of Ukraine’s history or of Ukraine belonging historically to Europe. Later in this chapter, this orientation will be explained in terms of the schooling that was received in Soviet times, although Oleksandra Gaidai (2014) has shown that such patterns persist even among post-Soviet university students. The term “East Slavic community” may be vague—as vague as that of “Europe”—and, strictly speaking, is relevant only to linguistic affinities: Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian are considered East Slavic languages. The term may also point to a common religious identity, given the prevalence—though not the monopoly—of Orthodox Christianity throughout the area designated as “East Slavic.” Given, however, the demise of both the tsarist empire and the Soviet Union, and the emergence of sovereign states throughout the area, “East Slavic” is, in fact, a substitute for “Russian” and “Soviet.” One Ukrainian in two therefore acknowledges the dominance of the country’s Russian/Soviet legacy. The dominance of this legacy, however, does not necessarily mean support for a political union with Russia, as is evident in the limited success of Russian plans in southern and eastern Ukraine.

Finally, imperial Russian and Soviet legacies, especially of the late Soviet period, are strongly embedded in the contemporary economic system in Ukraine and economic norms, practices and behaviors. The present oligarchic system and political corruption derive from “socialist consumption” patterns of the Brezhnev era (1964–1982) and Komsomol-controlled business activities of the 1980s (Zhuk 2010; Zhuk 2017), while being linked to long-term legacies of weak institutions and civil society.

Other legacies and myths

Other historical legacies are more fragmented. For example, western Ukraine, notably the city of Lviv, seeks to emphasize its Austrian and Austro-Hungarian heritage. It is true that Lviv has retained much of its Habsburg countenance, having been spared widespread war destruction. Nevertheless, the population of Lviv is largely made up of newcomers with no ties to the city in Habsburg times. Moreover, as critical intellectuals

have pointed out, Lviv endured thorough Sovietization in its forty-five years of Soviet rule (Risch 2011). To be sure, the city's image and self-image as a bastion of resistance to Sovietization is based on the opposition to Soviet rule incarnated in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) that continued its struggle for several years after the end of World War II. But the actual connection to Habsburg Galicia, nourished by the evocation of Robert Musil (1880–1942), Joseph Roth (1894–1939) or other such cultural figures, is as much of a construction as the recent erection in Chernivtsi of a statue to the Austro-Hungarian emperor, Francis Joseph (reign 1848–1916), at the initiative of Arsenii Yatseniuk, later to become prime minister (Unian 2009); there has been discussion about repeating this gesture in Lviv (Pavliv 2012). Spurred on by touristic considerations as well as political strategies of Europeanization, western Ukraine's appeal to its Habsburg legacy may be viewed not so much as an "invented tradition" but rather as a tactically chosen legacy and a selective appropriation of a chapter in the past (Risch 2011).

Whereas Soviet power created homogeneity throughout Ukraine, independence has produced a fragmentation that is reflected in the affirmation of regional legacies over all-embracing metanarratives. Liudmyla Males (2007, 17–19) has proposed a four-part classification of regional identity on historical principles: *gubernskaia*, the romanticization of tsarist times and Russian elites; Soviet, with an accent on paternalism and an appeal to labor; patriotic, highlighting Ukrainian independence; and municipal, emphasizing everydayness. It could prove difficult, however, to connect these historical types of identity to specific clearly defined regions, as the types may often overlap and cut across regions. It has been argued too that "ethnicity, language, per-capita GDP, class, income education and gender" are less likely than historical experience to affect voting behavior and preferences (Katchanovski 2006); and the burden of evidence suggests that, inasmuch as historical experiences differ, the ensuing legacies will differ as well.

Ukrainian national legacies and myths

Although there are few broadly accepted common legacies from the pre-Soviet period, two founding dogmas for Ukrainian national identity can be analyzed; both can be put forward as legacies, though their articulation and their status in public consciousness make it more appropriate to define them as myths. The first of these legacies is the Kyivan myth, the thesis that the

Kyivan principality was a proto-Ukrainian state. As Jaroslaw Pelenski (1992, 3) writes, the “contest for the inheritance of Kievan Rus’ has represented one of the oldest bones of contention in the history of Russian–Ukrainian cultural and political relations.” As such, this legacy or myth is an affirmation of Ukrainian specificity, the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian experience and of the Ukrainian people; it even proposes a reversal of conventional historical chronology whereby Ukrainians are, in a sense, the ancestors of Russians rather than vice versa. Whereas Russian imperial historians, such as Vasillii Kliuchevskii (1841–1911), rejected this thesis entirely, and Soviet historiography sought to establish a compromise by claiming that ancient Kyivan Rus was the forefather of all three East Slavic peoples (Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians—with a dominant role assigned to Russians), Ukrainians have remained attached to their version of Kyivan history. Not only does this version attribute pride of place to Ukraine, it also provides a prototype of statehood demonstrating that the present Ukrainian state has deep roots and a venerable ancestry. Mykhailo Hrushevskiy’s peerless status in contemporary Ukraine may be due, in part, to the fact that he was among the most ardent defenders of the Kyivan thesis.

The second common legacy is the Cossack myth, the thesis that the prototype of the Ukrainian is a free man, endowed with personal dignity and ever ready to defend his freedom. As such, the Cossack serves as a radical contrast to the Russian serf and the subjugated Polish peasant. Moreover, the Cossack is not only a historical figure but also constitutes a dominant literary and artistic topos (Kappeler 2014). According to John Armstrong, Ukrainian national ideology invests considerably more in the Cossack myth than in the Kyivan issue, although the historian who has produced the classical version of the Cossack topos, Dmytro Doroshenko (1882–1951), does not enjoy Hrushevskiy’s popularity (Armstrong 1990, 4). Not only does this myth project a heroic ideal that runs counter to stereotypes of the Ukrainian as victim and subjected, it makes a historical case about statehood: Cossack struggles are seen as attempts at establishing an independent Ukrainian state against Poland and Russia (Armstrong 1990, 4). Serhii Plokyh (2012) has deconstructed the mythopoeic origins of the Cossack myth. This has not prevented the myth from functioning as a key element in Ukrainian identity, a legacy shared by all nationally conscious Ukrainians. Simplification and popularization of the Cossack myth has also contributed to its acceptance across different regions. However, even this common legacy is subject to fragmentation. The twists and turns of Cossack history, resulting today in the competing existence of Russian Cossacks, have not led to the abandonment of the

Cossack myth but rather have endowed it with regional specificities: Zaporizhzhia stands out as a Cossack region, as well as the area now called Luhansk and Donetsk, largely colonized by Cossacks in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; ironically, the Cossack movement is also widespread in Galicia, where it has no historical roots. Such developments confirm the suggestion enunciated here that a competing, though perhaps not contradictory trend in some parts of Ukraine has been the regionalization of history and the dehistoricization of space (Gaidai 2014). It is an open question whether this is an attempt to salvage or to suppress legacies, as if fragmenting history and seeking nonhistorical communalities would allow one to escape the past.

As was suggested at the outset, among the historical legacies that define contemporary Ukraine it is ideational legacies that may have the strongest hold. Primary among these is the complex of beliefs and values that make up the broad category of “romantic nationalism” (Bilenky 2012; Hroch 2007). Omeljan Pritsak (1992, ix), the first Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University and founder of its Ukrainian Research Institute, writes that “Romanticism elevated folklore and the vernacular to the rank of the only true literary creation, thus giving birth to modern Ukrainian national culture.” A key component of this romantic nationalism is the belief in the unique and sacred nature of the national language that defines a people. An offshoot of the German *Sturm und Drang* movement of the late eighteenth century, the linguistic component of romantic nationalism dictates that a people’s spirit can only be expressed in its own tongue. It is unlikely that many Ukrainians read Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), the father of this doctrine. However, Herderian doctrines and, indeed, other aspects of romantic nationalism were translated onto Ukrainian soil by such cultural figures as the Polish bard Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855), whose statue still graces the square named after him in Lviv. Tomasz Kamusella (2005 and 2009) has argued that every Slavic nation has sought to found its eponymous language, and Ukraine provides a striking confirmation of his thesis. By extension, the doctrine maintains that it is language that constitutes the correct borders of the state to which a nation, i.e., a linguistic people, aspires (Arndt cited in Kamusella 2009, epigraph).

In the interwar period of the twentieth century, in some circles, and notably in western Ukraine under Polish rule and in exile, Ukrainian romantic nationalism veered toward what scholars have called “integral nationalism,” the belief in the nation as a supreme value and an appeal to an emotionally conceived idea of solidarity and struggle. However, even the

leading exponent of this ideology, Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973), stressed adherence to a pure national language as the marker of Ukrainian identity in the absence of a state (Armstrong 1990, 13–14). This belief in the identity between the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian nation and, ultimately, the Ukrainian state is the romantic legacy that continues to drive Ukrainian nationalism today. Referring to this as “the Ukrainian national revival,” as some scholars still do, may not be historically accurate, as the values underpinning this legacy are, in fact, quite modern, but they are so thoroughly rooted in Ukrainian consciousness that the very notion of “revival” has itself been incorporated into the legacy (Magocsi 2002c).

The belief in the coincidence between language, nation and state is not particular to Ukraine; many, perhaps most, European states implicitly share this belief, though there is a growing tendency to problematize it in the name of multiculturalism and linguistic pluralism. Obviously, the strict adherence to the heritage of romantic nationalism among many Ukrainians conflicts with the Soviet legacy that gives only lip service to indigenous national languages such as Ukrainian. This heritage is also incompatible with the earlier Russian imperial record of rejecting the existence of a separate Ukrainian tongue, and with Russification, intensified in the Soviet period, of a large part of Ukraine. The vision of the importance of speaking Ukrainian in order to be considered a real Ukrainian is prevalent in western Ukraine: for example, according to the project survey (Survey 2013), 96.6 percent in Ternopil'ska oblast consider it very important or fairly important, while 93.3 percent do so in Lviv'ska oblast and 89.4 percent in Ivano-Frankiv'ska oblast. Overall, throughout the country as a whole, however, only 61 percent attach a similar importance to knowing the sole official language. This clash of conflicting legacies lies behind the crisis in Ukraine which started in 2013–2014.

The legacy of the national statehood experience of 1917–1920 is also present in contemporary Ukraine. In fact, the modern national flag, coat of arms and anthem were used for the first time as state symbols in the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR, 1918–1920), being a part of older (both “real” and “invented”) vernacular traditions. Also for the first time Ukrainian became the state language in the UNR. The Ukrainian State (headed by the hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi), which existed in 1918, and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (1918–1919) also adopted a blue-and-yellow flag. As formally the UNR tradition continued in exile, on August 24, 1992, its last president, Mykola Plaviuk (1925–2012), officially handed the presidential insignia (including the cross of Ivan Mazepa, the stamp and the flag) to the first president of independent Ukraine, Leonid

Kravchuk. This act was meant to confirm the modern Ukrainian state being a successor state of the 1917–1920 state-building process.

Post-Soviet Ukraine has sought to anchor its unity (and, incidentally, the office of president) outside the framework of the Soviet past by resurrecting the figure of Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, a key figure in the state-building efforts of 1917–1920. Beyond the monuments to Hrushevskiy mentioned above, his portrait appears on the 50 hryvnia banknote as well as in government offices, and the street leading to the Verkhovna Rada in Kyiv is named after him. Hrushevskiy's own political leanings, as a social revolutionary, should give him non-nationalist credibility, though in fact they do not do so; the cult of Hrushevskiy highlights rather his ethnocentric vision of Ukrainian history, as opposed to the alternative view of those who favor a territorial and multicultural conception of national history and identity (Plokhyy 2011). As the *Region, Nation and Beyond* survey (Survey 2013) indicates, the legacy of Hrushevskiy is accepted, to a larger or smaller degree, throughout most of Ukraine. For example, 96.2 percent of the population consider that he played a rather positive or very positive role in history. Only four other historical figures, namely the first Kyivan Christian ruler, Volodymyr Velykyi (958–1015), Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, the writer Taras Shevchenko, and the dissident and politician Viacheslav Chornovil (1937–1999) (though this last example should be treated with caution as a possible “false positive”), enjoy similar levels of support (97.1 percent, 96 percent, 98 percent and 95.8 percent, respectively) (Survey 2013). The editing and publishing of historical and literary writings of the prominent figures of the 1917–1920 period such as Mykhailo Hrushevskiy and Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951), and their introduction in the secondary schools' programs, have contributed to the rising prominence of the period of national statehood in the popular consciousness since 1991. The publication of Hrushevskiy's concise collection of works in fifty volumes (which started in 2002) has also contributed to his symbolical centrality in the historical canon.

Interestingly enough, all the political formations of the 1917–1920 period (the Ukrainian Central Council, the Hetman State, and the Directorate) are included as equal parts into the contemporary canon of national history in spite of their divergent political and social programs and the conflicting relations between them. The celebration of the anniversary of the Union Act (*Akt Zhuky*), which proclaimed the unification of the Ukrainian People's Republic with the Western Ukrainian People's Republic in 1919, became an important symbolic foundational event of the modern Ukrainian state. To mark the anniversary, on January 22, 1990, more than

half a million people with blue-and-yellow flags united into a human chain sprawling from Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv to Kyiv (more than 500 km away), copying an earlier Baltic example—the “Baltic Way” of 1989. In 1999, National Day of Unification/Zluka Day became an official holiday in Ukraine.

Memory

The interest in memory studies in the West came into prominence as of the 1970s with numerous publications about collective memory, most importantly by Pierre Nora (1978), and with the English translation of Maurice Halbwachs’s classic posthumous work (1980; first published in 1950). Nora (1978, 398) defined collective memory as “the memory or the aggregate of memories, conscious or not, of an experience lived through and/or transformed into myth by a living community, of whose identity the sense of the past constitutes an integral part.”¹ Notwithstanding a rapid expansion of memory studies spanning across several disciplines over the last decades, the definition of memory and its types remains elusive and polysemous. Broadly speaking, collective memory encompasses the uses of the past for the purposes of the present which shape the “social frameworks” organizing individual memories and serve a community-building function. The appropriation of the past is always selective reflecting Ernest Renan’s ([1882] 1992) famous argument that nations selectively forget the inconvenient events of the past or selectively remember. At the same time, national myths, silences, simplifications and political uses of history and normative conceptions of identity came under the attack of proponents of a critical “reworking of the past.”

The last decade has seen a drastic rise in scholarly, political and civil society interest in memory studies in Ukraine. Similar to historical legacies discussed above, the sphere of memory has been characterized by often conflicting tendencies over the post-Soviet period: attempts to define a common national historical narrative and collective memory, aiming to consolidate the Ukrainian people and the state, but also the consolidation of regional and local historical narratives and memories, reflecting regional

¹ “Le souvenir ou l’ensemble de souvenirs, conscients ou non, d’une expérience vécue et/ou mythifiée par une collectivité vivante de l’identité dans laquelle le sentiment du passé fait partie intégrante” (our translation).

and local particularities and political agendas. Another Soviet legacy, in addition to those discussed in the previous section, is that the state still attempts to play a dominant and sometimes exclusive role in shaping the field of memory (widely understood as national memory) and in controlling the perceptions of the past. *Polityka pamiati* (the politics of memory), orchestrated by the state, aims to consolidate national memory and to build a stronger nation-state by defining national heroes and antiheroes, important historical events, dates and personalities, which are then affirmed in national legislation, history manuals, monuments, toponyms, public holidays, state awards, films, museum exhibitions and commemorations. As shown in the next section, the official efforts of central state authorities to inculcate a shared vision of the past and national memory have had only a limited success, being continuously challenged by a variety of other memory entrepreneurs, including oblast and local authorities that have the power to decide on the construction of monuments and plaques, on the renaming of streets and public buildings and on local commemorations and ceremonies, as well as civil society.

The instrumentalization of collective memories and historical narratives for political purposes has become more pronounced as of the second decade of independence. Modest and low-key celebrations of some public holidays at the national and local levels during the first decade of independence, both of Soviet holidays and those related to Ukrainian independence, have been succeeded by megaconcerts with the participation of celebrities, pompous parades, commemorations and marches used by memory entrepreneurs of different types to win political dividends later on (Kasianov 2018).

In search of a uniting national memory

Ukraine is often seen as a battleground of different political beliefs and narratives shaped by divergent historical legacies. The Ukrainian émigré scholar Ivan L. Rudnytsky (1919–1984) (1987, 94), in an essay written in the late Soviet period, identified four major trends in the development of modern Ukrainian social and political thought: the democratic-populist, the conservative, the communist and the integral-nationalist. Rudnytsky (1987, 121–122) argued that “the most portentous issue in the future evolution of Ukrainian thought will be the problem of a synthesis of antagonistic political-ideological trends”; however, he envisioned the synthesis not as “the reduction of antagonistic trends to a single unitary formula” but as “a process of mutual adjustment,” which would translate into “an

inclusive vision of history, embracing all the facets of the nation's past, even those which in their own time were irreconcilably opposed to each other." Rudnytsky's conclusions are pertinent to independent Ukraine, which has been defined according to some contemporary historians by two conflicting narratives or myths, the nationalist one which has become the official narrative of the state and the Soviet Russian (post-Soviet) one (Portnov 2013; Zaitsev 2010). The main issues of contention have been the inclusion of "the nationalist movement [OUN and UPA] into the general history of Ukraine" (Portnov 2013), the Holodomor and the interpretation of World War II.

Ukrainian politicians, scholars and experts have been preoccupied by the deformed and incomplete nature of national memory, due to the Soviet heritage, and have seen the need for a common national memory for the future of the Ukrainian state, which has to overcome existing controversies and divided memories and to erect a pantheon of common national heroes and traditions. State research and policy institutions have accordingly defined the main goals of the official memory policies. Yulia Zernii, the deputy head of the National Institute of Strategic Studies, stated that "the struggle for the memory of Ukrainians is a struggle for the future of the Ukrainian state, the nation, the memory of which was traumatized by forced amnesia, imperial-Soviet stereotypes and an interrupted experience of transmission of historical knowledge" ("Forum" 2009, 21). In a similar vein, an analytic note by the National Institute for Strategic Studies (National Institute n.d.) defines "the state memory policy [*derzhavna polityka pamiaty*]" as "a set of formal representations of the historical past, commemorative policies and practices aimed at the creation of the historical memory of the national community. However, given *the incomplete nature of the process of nation building in Ukraine* and dynamic social changes, the question of the definition of the conceptual foundations of the state memory policy, namely the objectives, priorities, means and methods of its implementation, is important" (ibid.); emphasis in and translation of the text are ours). From the above statements, it is clear that the deficient nature of Ukrainian identity and nation building can be found in failed de-Sovietization. Zernii concludes that "the success of the Ukrainian national project" consists in the "deconstruction of imperial-Soviet schemes" of history, which deny Ukrainian independence ("Forum" 2009, 19).

The official efforts to promote the de-Sovietization of public space were insignificant (beyond western Ukraine) prior to the 2013–2014 popular protests, the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine. A study of the names of main streets in 20,000 cities, towns and villages,

carried out in 2012, showed that there were twenty times more Soviet names than names associated with independent Ukraine (Lastoŭski, Kazakievich, and Balachkaitse 2010; Males 2014; *Ukrainska Pravda/Istorychna Pravda* 2012). The situation was similar with regard to the monuments to Lenin beyond western Ukraine. The ultimate fight against Soviet heritage took place following the Euromaidan protests, with the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of a series of “decommunization” laws in April 2015 that were developed by another state research institution, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory.

Until the recent destruction of Lenin monuments, the number of Lenin statues outnumbered by far those of any other historical figure. In 1991, Ukraine had the second highest number (after the Russian Federation) of Soviet monuments: 42,900 out of 53,500 historical monuments commemorated the “Great Patriotic War,” while 5,015 celebrated Lenin (Chobit 1992, 12). There were clear regional differences in ways of dealing with communist monuments: from complete destruction in western Ukraine, and selective removal in central regions, to no action at all in southern and eastern Ukraine. For decades, any discussion of the Soviet heritage was avoided and no president was able to form a coherent policy on the Soviet heritage in monumental art. The first attempts substantially to revise historical policy occurred after the Orange Revolution under the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko (presidency 2005–2010). In 2007, Yushchenko issued a decree to remove monuments of people involved in organizing the Holodomor and political repression. Nationalistic forces invoked this decree as a legal ground for dismantling Lenin statues, although the decree listed no specific names and Lenin had died in 1924, before the Holodomor and mass repression had occurred. Nearly 2,800 monuments to Soviet statesmen, including Lenin, were removed from the State Register in 2009. This meant that the state relinquished its responsibility for the upkeep of those monuments. Henceforth, their fate depended entirely on local authorities. The result was that the ambivalence of the official politics of memory has made Lenin statues the main object of vandalism in Ukraine.

The Euromaidan protests radically changed the situation. The destruction of the monuments became a symbol of the struggle with the Yanukovych regime, and of a break with both the Soviet Union and Russia. On December 8, 2013, Kyiv’s centrally located Lenin statue was demolished. The “Leninfall,” as journalists called it, took place mainly in central Ukraine. In one day alone, on February 22, 2014, more than a hundred Lenin monuments were demolished in Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhy-

tomyr, Cherkasy, Poltava and Chernihiv. After the removal of the Lenin statues, empty pedestals became places of commemoration for those who died during the Euromaidan protests and the conflict in Donbas. The pedestals were painted in the colors of the national flag, and decorated with flowers and candles and sometimes with images of a symbolical Ukrainian fighter (see Images 3.1 and 3.2).

Images 3.1 and 3.2. The statue of Lenin in Kalynivka, in Vinnytska oblast (Autumn 2012), and the same pedestal decorated by national symbols and a depiction of a Euromaidan fighter after the “Leninfall” (May 2014)



Source: Photograph by Oleksandra Gaidai

In the eastern and southern regions, where the opposition to the Euromaidan protests was strongest, the destruction of Lenin monuments was slower than in central regions. The destruction acquired even more symbolic value on the territories of the military conflict in eastern Ukraine that started in April 2014 (see Figure 3.1 below). On August 15, 2014, a Lenin monument was destroyed in the frontline city of Mariupol by those demonstrating support for the Ukrainian state. The destruction of monuments in eastern Ukraine has been controversial due to the mixed orientations of the population. The first attempt to destroy the Lenin statue in Kharkiv, which was the tallest in Ukraine, took place on February 22, 2014. It was unsuccessful because of the opposition of pro-Yanukovych forces. The statue became the uniting symbol for the separatist pro-Russian movement of the city, and “the defense of Lenin” served as an excuse for two attempts to seize power at the local level, similarly to what had occurred in the nearby Donbas region. The defeat of the pro-Russian forces in Kharkiv and the tangible support from Minister for Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov (who is originally from Kharkiv), as well as from the head of the regional administration, Ihor Baluta (appointed by the post-Yanukovych ruling elite in Kyiv), resulted in the demolition of Lenin’s statue on September 28, 2014. The driving force behind the demolition was a revolutionary group

connected to football fans and to the Azov volunteer military battalion, many of whose leaders are from Kharkiv. However, the active support of the population, most importantly of the younger generation, was as important as elsewhere (Masliichuk 2014). It is noteworthy that the permission to demolish the monument by the Kharkiv head of the regional administration was issued just a few minutes before the actual destruction, while the city mayor had remained strongly opposed. The toppling was endorsed by the central government. Smaller statues of Lenin were vandalized in Kharkiv and in the region both before and after the demolition of the “biggest boss.”

Figure 3.1. Toppled Lenin statues in Ukraine since November 2013 (as of March 21, 2016)



Source: Wikipedia (n.d.)

Thus a common national memory has been constructed by condemning, ousting and delegitimizing the Soviet narrative and replacing it with memory and narratives about the heroism and suffering of the Ukrainian nation. The common narrative has also been defined on the basis of figures who are viewed as national symbols throughout the country. The uniting pantheon of heroes usually includes the Soviet Ukrainian canon consisting of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Ivan Franko (1856–1916), Lesia Ukrainka (1871–1913) and Taras Shevchenko, joined after independence

by Mykhailo Hrushevskiy (see the other two sections in this chapter). The suffering of the Ukrainian people during the Holodomor has become a defining narrative in the construction of a common memory (Kasianov 2010). Most recently, the Euromaidan and victims of the conflict in Donbas have become the symbols and martyrs of modern Ukraine, aiming to unite the country in the fight against corruption and foreign aggression.

Official efforts to manage the memory field

The revival of memory that was erased or distorted during Soviet times started in the late 1980s. This included the reexportation from the west of the nationalist history narrative constructed by the Ukrainian diaspora about the OUN and UPA, the Holodomor and other Soviet crimes (Kasianov 2010; Liebich and Myshlovska 2013; Yekelchuk 2011). During the same period, a quick dismantling of the Soviet heritage (monuments, street names and so on) took place in western Ukraine, endorsed by the decisions of local authorities. During the first decade of independence, Presidents Leonid Kravchuk (presidency 1991–1994) and, especially, Leonid Kuchma (presidency 1994–2004) achieved unity insofar as they avoided taking a position on controversial issues and personalities such as OUN and UPA, Bandera, Lenin or Joseph Stalin (1878–1953). Indeed, Kuchma completely omitted the Ukrainian nationalists who played the role of “others” in the official Soviet historical narrative. However, in contrast to the Soviet propaganda, he never mentioned the collaboration of the Ukrainian nationalists with the Nazi regime. At the same time, in order to respond to the concerns of the population in eastern and southern Ukraine, Kuchma supplemented the national narrative with the revival of elements of Soviet memory, most importantly the memory connected to suffering and victory in World War II, even though he did so by highlighting the “heroic deeds” of the Ukrainians who were in the Soviet Army. In 1999, he reinstituted the Day of the Soviet Army (February 23), under the new name of the “Day of the Defenders of the Motherland.” The Day of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (December 6), introduced by a decree of the parliament in 1993, has not been widely accepted or celebrated by the population.

In 2000, a law “On the Immortalization of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945” defined the Day of Victory as “the day of triumph of the immortal act of bravery of the people—victors over fascism, countrywide memory about the struggle for freedom and independence of the Fatherland” (Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy 2000a). This Soviet-inspired narrative, however, has experienced some transformation. The cult of the

“heroes of the Great Patriotic War,” systematically promoted during the Soviet period, was turned into Ukrainian official commemoration practices, inasmuch as Kuchma focused on the Ukrainian Soviet soldiers who died in World War II (“the Great Patriotic War”). Moreover, the victory was seen as a contribution to the independence of the Fatherland. Another stipulation of the law introduces “the Ukrainian people” as an independent actor in the war. It mentions that the victory has an educational purpose related to “the heroic battle and labor traditions of the Ukrainian people during the Great Patriotic War” (Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy 2000a). In 2001, Kuchma also introduced the Day of Partisan Glory on September 22.

The Kuchma regime became actively engaged in efforts to reconcile Ukrainian and Polish historical memory. The most difficult issues were the Polish–Ukrainian War of 1918–1919 following the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Volhynia conflict of 1943. The compromise achieved was the acknowledgment that both nations suffered, instead of putting the blame on one side. Polish president Alexander Kwaśniewski (presidency 1995–2005) and Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma held a reconciliation ceremony during the inauguration of a monument to the victims of the massacre, Poles and Ukrainians, in Pavlivka, Volhynia, on July 11, 2003, on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the tragic event. As discussed in the previous section, however, the Volhynia massacre continues to be at the center of tensions between Ukrainian and Polish scholars and politicians (Motyka 2013).

During the second decade of independence, *polityka pamiaty* became a new subtheme in history studies. Official legislation, new institutions, national and international conferences, publications, university courses and museum exhibitions on the topic inundated the public sphere. The bibliography list on the politics of memory by Ukrainian authors on the website of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory has more than 200 entries (see <http://www.memory.gov.ua>); a great majority of these were written as of the 2000s. The enhanced public attention to the topic of national memory started under the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, who positioned himself as a pro-Ukrainian and pro-Western president vis-à-vis his predecessors.

Yushchenko pushed controversial issues of historical memory, kept under the carpet by his predecessors, to the top of the political agenda. These issues included the recognition by Parliament in 2006 of the Holodomor as a genocide against the Ukrainian people, the official recognition of the OUN and UPA as fighters for the independence of Ukraine, and the recognition of OUN and UPA leaders Roman Shukhevych (1907–

1950) and Stepan Bandera as “Heroes of Ukraine” in 2007 and 2010, respectively, as well as recognition of the Holocaust (though the role of Ukrainians in the Holocaust was not discussed) and of the deportation of Crimean Tatars. The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory was created in 2006 not as an independent institute but as a state-mandated institution subordinate to the Cabinet of Ministers. Yushchenko was the first president who introduced elements of other counternarratives into the mythologized discourse of the Great Patriotic War. He tried to shift the discursive framework by stressing the common European experience of this war and by gradually replacing the Soviet term “Great Patriotic War” with the term “World War II.” The result of Yushchenko’s *polityka pamiaty* was a deep polarization of Ukrainian society (Hrytsak 2013, 242). The top-down memorial initiatives, implemented in a prescriptive manner, met with different responses from local elites, including sabotage, bargaining, reinterpretation of the meaning, along with formal complying (Zhurzhenko 2011). The only enduring side of his politics concerns the memory of the Holodomor (Hrytsak 2013, 237). Monuments and commemorative signs dedicated to the Holodomor are now widely spread over the entire country, including in western Ukraine, which did not experience the famine directly. The number of monuments and commemorative signs to the Holodomor was 4,452 in 2008, and 800 more monuments and signs were planned (“Dovidka” 2008), which would make the Holodomor the most commemorated event in the history of independent Ukraine (Kasianov 2010).

At the same time, it would be mistaken to consider that Yushchenko managed to oust the Soviet version of the past. He did not succumb to the pressure of some nationalistic groups to abolish the celebration of victory in World War II. The Day of Partisan Glory was preserved under Yushchenko as well. Along with instituting the celebration of October 14 as the day of the foundation of the UPA in 2005, he introduced the “Day of Ukraine’s Liberation from Fascist Invaders” in 2009, which emphasized the suffering of Ukraine under occupation and its considerable role in the victory over Nazism. These holidays are still celebrated at the official level. On Victory Day and the days of the liberation of cities and towns from the Nazi occupation, secondary schools in central and eastern Ukraine organize festive concerts and other commemorative performances and activities. Mostly these performances are rooted in the Soviet tradition, in which World War II memory was intertwined with entertainment. One of the most popular motifs in such concerts is a story of the separation of loving couples at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in 1941 and their reunification in 1945. The songs and poems performed at the con-

certs were mostly created during the period from the 1960s to the 1980s; they are as a rule lyrical in character and typically include the themes of true friendship in the trenches, maternal love, and loss (Pluzhnyk 2014; Center–Culture and Art 2011; “Stsenarii” n.d.; “Stsenarii” 2007; Kharkiv Regional Universal Scientific Library 2005; “Zberezhemo” 2005).

Subsequently, some of the commemoration practices introduced by Yushchenko were continued under his successor, Viktor Yanukovych (presidency 2010–2014). The latter continued the tradition of participating in the commemoration of Holodomor anniversaries as from the beginning of his presidency (Ukrainska Pravda 2010). Holodomor commemorations united politicians of different ideological strands (Zerkalo nedeli 2012). At the same time, Yanukovych continued the tradition of politicization in the sphere of commemorations initiated by his predecessor. For example, an amendment to the law “On the Immortalization of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945” about flying the red flag alongside the national flag on Victory Day in 2011 echoed a Russian legislative initiative from 2007 (Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy 2011). In Lviv, this was seen as a pro-Russian provocation (Myshchenko 2011). Hence, in 2012, Lviv regional council (inspired by local members of the Svoboda Party) banned the use of Soviet, communist and Nazi symbols, including red flags and St. George ribbons,² on official buildings and in mass rallies on the territory of Lvivska oblast. The 2011 amendment was later abrogated by the Constitutional Court as unconstitutional. More recently, the memory politics of President Petro Poroshenko (presidency 2014–2019) have largely followed in the footsteps of Yushchenko.

The regional dimensions of memory politics

While the content of school education remains largely controlled and defined by central state authorities, local authorities can take decisions on many elements of memory politics, such as the erection of monuments of local importance, the renaming of streets, the institution of local holidays,

² Dating from imperial times, this symbol was reborn in Russia in 2001 when the St. George Order was reestablished. In 2005, the agency RIA Novosti launched a project featuring the free distribution of ribbons of orange and black color on the eve of Victory Day, as an expression of respect to veterans and a way of paying honor to the dead. Officially, the project was proclaimed to be unconnected with any political parties or movements, but in reality the ribbons were distributed by members of pro-Kremlin organizations.

and stipends for or the contents of local celebrations. This provides some space for regional memory in addition to the official policy dictated from Kyiv. The relative liberty to define local practices of commemoration has also been leveraged by local politicians to achieve their political goals. Thus, commemorations of Stepan Bandera in western Ukraine now coexist with the commemoration of Catherine II and the Russian imperial past in Odesa.

The official efforts to define and control the politics of memory are constantly challenged by the syncretic or parallel versions of memory at the local and individual levels. In western Ukraine, almost every village, town and city has a monument or at least a symbolic grave with a cross to the “fighters for freedom of Ukraine” (*Sichovi striltsi*, the OUN and UPA). In early 2014, there were forty-six monuments (full-size monuments and busts), hundreds of streets, and fourteen plaques dedicated to the OUN leader Stepan Bandera in the region. First the monuments were erected in Lvivska, Ivano-Frankivska and Ternopil'ska oblasts; later they spread to Rivnenska and Volyn'ska oblasts. The monumentalization of Bandera intensified after 2010 in response to the abrogation of his status as Hero of Ukraine under Yanukovich (Liebich and Myshlovska 2014).

The Lviv city council adopted its own calendar of important events for when the national flag is officially flown, which considerably differed from the national calendar, in 2010 (“Lvivska” 2010). The list included the restoration of the Ukrainian state (by the OUN) on June 30, the days dedicated to victims of political repression and of famines (the third Sunday of May and the fourth Saturday of November, respectively), and the day of the Ukrainian Army (October 14). The only Soviet holiday on the list is the Day of Victory (May 9); however, as mentioned above, as of 2011 it was now to be commemorated not as a day of victory but as a day of mourning. The calendar also includes May 8 as the end of World War II in Europe. Thus the Great Patriotic War narrative has become Europeanized at the local level, while it has become Ukrainianized in central and eastern Ukraine. Between 2011 and 2014, the city councils of Lviv, Lutsk, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk adopted decisions abolishing the use of Soviet and communist symbols on the territory of the cities. In most cases, this move was initiated by representatives of the Svoboda Party.

At the same time, the monuments to the victims of World War II remain intact in western Ukraine (albeit often repainted in the national blue and yellow colors), and modest official and unofficial commemorative practices are preserved as May 9 remains an official public holiday throughout Ukraine. If Bandera monuments are located in the vicinity of monuments to the victims of World War II (for example, in the villages

of Velykosilky and Serednii Bereziv in western Ukraine), flowers are laid on both monuments on important holidays. There are also “forgotten” or invisible, less obviously political historical monuments such as the imposing monument to Adam Mickiewicz in downtown Lviv, or monuments of Soviet realist art depicting workers, animals and nature. The public space of Lviv has also been occupied over the last two decades by other apolitical monuments, for example, a monument to a backpack and another to a chimney sweep.

While the first decade of independence was marked by post-Soviet ambiguity, when both the central state power and local elites used Soviet-style narratives along with narratives of national revival, the Orange Revolution was a factor that contributed to ending the post-Soviet ambivalence, thus provoking the polarization of society. The Orange Revolution as a popular movement, with its slogans of Europeanization, the fight against corruption, against the falsification of votes and against the power of oligarchs, posed a threat to the prominent clans of the post-Soviet elites. The local elites in eastern Ukraine and Crimea tried to preserve their monopoly on power by means of nostalgic Soviet clichés (on the popular level associated with the “stability” and social security that had been lost after 1991), and by means of the enemy image embodied by “nationalist radicals” or “aggressive external forces.” The memorial actions of the local elites became an instrument for creating such enemy images and for negative stereotyping.

On May 9, 2005, in Sevastopol, under the banner “NATO is the enemy of the Slavs” (“Fotofakt” 2005, 1; for more on memorial culture in Sevastopol, see Qualls 2009), there was a protest meeting against the participation of 300 American sailors from the US military ship *Carny* in the commemorative events. Some commemorative forms were an expression of the east Ukrainian local elites’ leaning toward Russia and its *Russkii mir* project, and of a sort of local resistance to the nationalizing state memorial policy. Such rhetoric was typical of numerous common celebrations of Victory Day, together with Russian “neighbors,” in the border areas of Ukraine. This long-lasting Soviet tradition highlighted issues of economic and cultural partnership, along with the “indissoluble friendship” of the nations of the USSR, as one of the sources of victory. For example, in 2006 in Kharkiv the city mayor and member of the Party of Regions, Mykhailo Dobkin, invited a delegation of the Russian State Council to celebrate Victory Day together, and declared Kharkiv to be the “capital of Ukrainian–Russian friendship” (Kharkov 2006). Another of his initiatives from 2008 was the screening of well-known Soviet films in the cinemas

of Kharkiv, with 32,000 pupils from secondary schools being expected to watch them (Ekhanova 2008). In 2008 in the town of Milove, the most easterly point of Ukraine in the Luhansk region, where the liberation of Ukraine from Nazi occupation started in 1943, common celebrations together with neighboring Chortkove of the Rostov region in Russia were organized, in which many young people were forced to take part. At this event, high officials from both regions were present, and much of their speeches was dedicated to decrying the “rehabilitation of OUN-UPA” and the “depreciation of the Soviet people’s role in the Victory” (Derkach 2008, 1–2).

Further expression of the resistance of local elites in the east of Ukraine and Crimea was seen in the erection of several new monuments dedicated to “UPA victims” (Grachova 2008). In 2007, the communists in Crimea put up the monument “A Stab in the Back” “in memory of the Soviet people, victims who perished at the hands of fascist collaborators from OUN-UPA and other collaborators.” In 2009, on the eve of Victory Day, the monument “to the victims of OUN-UPA” was put up in Young Guard Square in Luhansk (sponsored and initiated by the regional administration). Similar monuments and memorial plaques, though less well known, were erected in Svatove (2008, Luhanska oblast), Oleksandriia (2001, Rivnenska oblast), Shalyhine (2008, Sumska oblast) and Ulianove (2008, Sumska oblast). All these commemorated Soviet activists and specialists sent to western Ukraine who died in confrontation with the nationalist guerilla forces. These monuments presented the figures of innocent martyrs and echoed traditional late Soviet monuments to the victims of fascism. Their symbolic language left no space for discussion about this page of history or for national reconciliation; their focus was simply on the image of a sheer (and presumably innocent) victim.

In the east of Ukraine, the use of red flags on administrative buildings and the use of St. George ribbons in various ceremonies became widespread during Yanukovych’s presidency. On May 9, 2012, a mass meeting took place in Luhansk, with nearly 5,000 people wearing St. George ribbons. In Poltava, the participants in commemorations brought state Ukrainian flags, flags of Poltava, flags of the Communist and Socialist Parties, of the Communist Party of the USSR, and nearly fifty “flags of victory” (in memory of the red flag raised by the Soviet Army on the Reichstag in Berlin on April 30, 1945), thus manifesting a variety of different identities and political projects in post-Soviet society. In Zaporizhzhia, there were many people in stylized military Soviet uniforms, and the “flags of victory” were also present. In Zaporizhzhia, Simferopol, Chernihiv and

other cities, religious representatives took an active part in the commemorations. In Khmelnytskyi in 2012, a new museum was opened in memory of Volodymyr Vaiser (1921–1943), a Hero of the Soviet Union, who was officially recognized during the Soviet period in spite of his Jewish identity. In Sumy, one of the major points of commemoration was at the common grave of soldiers from the First Polish Army acting as a part of the Soviet Army during World War II (Korrespondent.net 2012). Another form of commemoration, namely “the immortal regiment [*bessmertnyi polk*],” was borrowed from Russia in 2013. People were asked to bring photos of relatives who perished in the war to the mass rallies and ceremonies. This initiative was designed in Russia to evoke personal experience of the war and living bonds with the past, but ultimately it highlighted the collective identity and idea of intergenerational continuity with Soviet times. The organization of this initiative was later appropriated by official party or state structures and became massive in Russia. However, in Ukraine this tradition did not become widespread.

The symbolic identification of Donbas after 1991 has been determined by diverse and sometimes competing narratives. The nationalizing trend in its identification is present through the narrative of the Ukrainian Cossacks, mentioned above. As a further example, one important Cossack object in the Donetsk region is Savur-Mohyla, a hill that is mythologized as a burial place of the legendary Cossack Savur, who fell in battle against nomads (Didova 1979; Nepomniashchaia and Zikrach 2012; Prudnikov 1983); at the same time, this hill was an important site of World War II battles, and the grandiose memorial there was constructed in memory of Soviet soldiers in 1967. Another important narrative of regional identity concerns Soviet industrialization that resulted in the image of Donbas as a region of hard physical labor, strikingly embodied in the memorial landscape (Garmash 1978). The high status of miners and their corresponding social benefits during the Soviet period stimulated the growth of the idea of the special character of Donbas and its superiority over similar industrial regions abroad, especially in the capitalist countries (Bogdanov et al. 1967). During the Soviet period, the notion of “Donbas” was essentialized and discursively expanded to include the whole regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, in spite of the fact that the Donets coal basin occupies only part of the territories, the rest being predominantly agricultural.

After 1991, the memorial landscape of the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk remained highly Sovietized, and tourist guides have included the monuments to Soviet state leaders along with the new tourist attractions such as restaurants, city sculptures and resorts. At the same time, the

landscape has become more diversified in the last two decades, which is reflected in the array of monuments erected in the city of Donetsk. The national version of the past is represented by the monuments to the poet and dissident, Vasyl Stus (1938–1985), the victims of the Chornobyl nuclear disaster (1986), and the victims of political repression in the Soviet period. The local version includes monuments to the Olympic champion Serhii Bubka (b. 1963), a copy of the Merzalov Palm produced by a local artisan in 1895, which won a *grand-prix* at the 1900 Paris World Exhibition (and which also appears on the emblem of Donbas), and a monument to a Welsh businessman who was the founder of the city, John Hughes (1814–1889). There are monuments which can be considered as apolitical, including one to soldiers who served abroad (*voiny-internatsionalisty*), another to a female and maternal figure, or one to the musical group the Beatles, and another to anonymous “hero-saviors [*heroi spasateli*]” (Donbass-info.com n.d.). Therefore, over the last two decades Donetsk has constructed its own regional memory of the past that is starting to break away from the Soviet narrative.

After the Orange Revolution, contrasting Donbas to other regions, especially to Galicia, became quite widespread. Even in the academic literature, Donbas was claimed to be much more developed, “modernized,” pragmatic and technocratic in contrast to the “agrarian,” “underdeveloped” and “romanticist” Galicia (Mamutov 2007; Ragozin 2006). A well-known Donetsk political scientist, Nikolai Ragozin (2006, 95–120), argued in 2006 that Galicia was a region sharply distinct from the rest of Ukraine, with a less educated population and a higher level of unemployment, and with an inclination to savage nationalism and intolerance.

Memory politics beyond the state

As was shown above, the state at the central or local levels plays a key role in memorialization and memory politics in Ukraine. The memory agenda is also driven by political parties, civil society organizations, universities and the media. Often this is linked to the political sphere, so that what appear as actions beyond the state are, in fact, extensions of the fight for political power and influence. Support for the commemoration of nationalist leaders of the past is the focal point of the right-wing Svoboda Party (Liebich and Myshlovska 2014). Celebration of the victory in the Great Patriotic War has been a fundamental practice of the Communist Party. The Great Patriotic War myth was later picked up by the Party of Regions. The clashes over memory and the ambiguity of memory politics in Ukraine sharply distinguish the country from some other post-Soviet countries,

especially Russia itself, where the state was largely successful in creating a sort of solid unified narrative of the past (Gudkov 2005; Kudriashov 2010).

The direct influence of Russian propaganda on forms of World War II commemoration was also obvious right after the Orange Revolution. In 2006 in Ukraine, the St. George ribbon became widely popularized by members of pro-Russian organizations, such as Rodina, Donetskaia respublika, Russkoiazychnaia Ukraina, Donbasskaia Rus, Russkii blok, Sevastopol–Krym–Rossiia and others. The Party of Regions and its members also supported and used this symbol. It became popular in regions with more pro-Russian orientation. The biggest ribbon ever (as long as 300 m) was presented on May 8, 2010, in Sevastopol. But when in 2013, in Cherkasy, a local veterans' organization proposed a St. George ribbon landscape design project for the mall in the city center, it provoked a wave of discontent. The city council explained that it was only one among many projects (Nova doba 2013).

Supporters of the Soviet Russian version of the past often mirror the actions of the nationalist camp, in negative terms. A museum to the victims of the Orange Revolution in Luhansk was a response to the Museum of Soviet Occupation in Kyiv, and the supporters of autonomy in the regions Luhansk and Donetsk first organized themselves in ways which largely resembled the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv (Ukrainska Pravda 2014). As in the official sphere, the topics of the Great Patriotic War and the OUN and UPA are central in civil society mobilization. There are such initiatives as the *Memory Book of Ukraine, 1941–1945*, the mission of which is “the preservation of memory about those who died while defending their native land” (Memory Book n.d.). It is an online database run by scholars and activists from different regions of Ukraine, started in 2008, which collects information on the participants of the Great Patriotic War. The *Memory Book* can be seen as a response to the *National Book of Memory of the Victims of Holodomor, 1932–1933*, a major project of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory published, in nineteen volumes, in 2008.

The International Anti-Fascist Front, an organization linked to a member of parliament from the Party of Regions, Vadym Kolisnichenko (following the change of power in Ukraine in 2014, Kolesnichenko moved to Crimea and accepted Russian citizenship), was launched on the occasion of “the 65th anniversary of Victory, symbolizing the unity of generations and the pertinence of the fight against neo-fascism and neo-Nazism in today's world” (National Institute n.d.). The organization has published several brochures revealing “the crimes of OUN and UPA” (Unian 2011).

Besides the political parties' influence on memory policy there are some other important actors, such as veterans' organizations, churches, local museums and other cultural institutions. Many institutions which, during the Soviet period, commemorated such Soviet heroes as the Young Guard,³ Zoia Kosmodemianskaia and other glorified individuals, are still very active. Some old institutions of paramilitary education that are active in war commemoration are now supported by the Orthodox Church.⁴ The activity of organizations such as Plast is supported by the more "Ukrainian-oriented" Autocephalous Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate, and by the Greek Catholic Church.

Business elites have also proved to be important actors in the promotion of regional versions of the past. One example is the active participation of the Kharkiv business elites in the project "Euroregion Slobozhanshchyna"⁵ promoting transborder cooperation between the Kharkiv region of Ukraine and the Belgorod region of Russia (Zhurzhenko 2004). As Zhurzhenko has shown, these were Kharkiv elites who were more eager to cooperate with the neighboring Russian regions, and who tried to promote the image of Kharkiv as a "capital of Ukrainian–Russian cooperation." According to Zhurzhenko (2004, 504), the notion of "Slobozhanshchyna" promotes a number of divergent meanings, such as "a glorious Cossack past with its democratic traditions, a peaceful character of hardworking Ukrainian peasants, 'multiculturalist' traditions and ethnic tolerance, a historical experience of coexistence and cooperation of Russians and Ukrainians, a settlement mentality representing liberal and individualistic attitudes, the merchants' prosperity and 'capitalist spirit' of Kharkiv."

³ The Young Guard, one of the prominent Soviet myths of the Great Patriotic War, is especially widely commemorated in the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk (see "Zberezheho" 2005).

⁴ See, for example, the cases of paramilitary clubs named after Vasilii Margelov, famous Hero of the USSR, in different regions of Ukraine (Kharkiv 2011) and in a village in Dnipropetrovska oblast ("Sviashchennyk" 2014). In both cases, they are supported by local priests of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. A number of similar paramilitary clubs named after Margelov exist in different post-Soviet countries.

⁵ Historically, Slobozhanshchyna comprised the territories of today's Kharkiv region and some parts of the Luhansk, Donetsk and Sumy regions of Ukraine, as well as parts of the Belgorod, Kursk and Voronezh regions of Russia. See more about the construct of "Slobozhanshchyna" in the historical imagination in Kravchenko (2010).

International organizations as actors in the memory field are active in Ukraine as well. The implementation of a more sensitive approach toward the history of ethnic minorities in Ukraine is carried out by several international organizations, such as the Anne Frank House and the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), as well as by local institutions, such as the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies, the association of history teachers Nova Doba, the Institute for Judaic Studies, the Jewish Foundation of Ukraine, the Tkuma Ukrainian Institute for Holocaust Studies. Several important teachers' guides and recommendations have been issued (Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies 2010 and 2012), and some have been translated and adapted for local situations (Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies 2009). One of the most important institutions inspiring the building of a European-oriented civil society through civic education and the transformation of history courses at schools is the teachers' association Nova Doba in Lviv (www.novadoba.org.ua). It promotes public history for the building of a multiethnic and multiconfessional society, for education in tolerance and for an active struggle for human rights. The textbooks for civic education developed by Nova Doba proclaim the need to acknowledge the historical guilt of one's own nation. Another important institution is the international foundation Mutual Understanding and Tolerance, which inspires international projects aimed at a dialogical model of memory work (*travail de mémoire*) between the young generations of different countries, as well as between generations inside the country. This organization is focused on the topics of World War II, Nazi and Soviet crimes. It should be highlighted that all these initiatives are mostly financed either from outside the country or by business elites, and that the Ukrainian state itself has not been active in such initiatives so far (Podolskyi 2009).

A great degree of regional variety of commemoration and monumentalization has developed in Ukraine over the last twenty years. The commemorative space has combined in a dynamic way the Soviet and nationalist narratives. Donetsk is less Soviet than popularly presented, and the monuments to the victims in the Great Patriotic War are calmly respected in western Ukraine. Regional practices have also been greatly influenced by the state-led efforts to forge a common national memory. The practice of commemorating the Holodomor has become widely accepted.

The Euromaidan protests and the conflict in eastern Ukraine have redefined the meaning of being Ukrainian and of national symbols, and have led to the fastest de-Sovietization in the entire post-Soviet period, manifested, for example, in the speedy "Leninfall" discussed above. Stepan

Bandera has become one of the symbols of the Euromaidan protests, and the name of *banderivets*, once a Soviet invective, has been adopted by Ukrainian nationalists as a valid self-identification. The “Heavenly Hundred [*Nebesna Sotnia*]” protesters who were killed in February 2014 on the Euromaidan, and the Ukrainian soldiers fallen in the Donbas conflict, are venerated as martyrs for the Ukrainian cause and as new heroes. At the same time, the death of many within the army ranks and within the civilian population in Donbas has produced a social consensus about the war as a tragedy first of all. In this perspective, the Soviet legacy of “celebrating” victory in World War II as a triumph has become outdated, and May 9, 2014, was marked by a completely different atmosphere. The commemoration was not a celebration, and it alluded to the tragedy of the dead more than to the joy of victory. A relatively new symbol of commemoration was invented, instead of the St. George ribbon—the red poppy that is rooted in the European symbolic space of commemoration of World War I. There was no parade in Kyiv in 2014, in contrast to Russia showing its newest arms as an expression of its military power. President Putin also symbolically visited Sevastopol for the first time after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and, in his greetings, he made a link between the “Great Victory over Fascism” and the “reunification” of the Crimea with Russia. In Lviv, the commemoration embraced only some dozens of veterans and the same number of communists. The violent events of 2014 strengthened national memory in Ukraine, and especially Soviet traditions have been questioned. It will be difficult, however, to establish a consensus over common national memory in the different regions of Ukraine.

Attitudes

The *Region, Nation and Beyond* survey (Survey 2013) has given us the possibility of defining where respondents tended to place the Ukrainian past on the eve of the Euromaidan Revolution. The purpose of this section is to reconstruct cross-regional patterns regarding respondents’ general interest in history and their attitudes toward the past on the basis of data collected in the project survey, as a complement to the discussion of legacies and memories in the previous sections. This will be done by looking first at how Ukrainians, meaning Ukrainian citizens, define their identity in international or national terms and then, as a counterpoint, by inquiring into the interest that they display in local or regional history. As further indications of attitudes to the historical past, the earlier discussion will be

complemented by looking at survey answers to the question of which holidays Ukrainians celebrate and which are the holidays that unite or divide them. Finally, this section considers Ukrainians' views of historical figures, those who are seen as important, those who are seen as heroes or villains, and the way in which these figures are commemorated in monuments and street names, as well as Ukrainians' views of historical events.

Since the imaginative geographic split of Europe and the invention of "Eastern Europe" was related to the western European intellectual and ideological agenda of the Enlightenment, the discussions of who belongs where and on what principles has never stopped. "Just as a new center of the Enlightenment superseded the old centers of the Renaissance, the old lands of barbarism and backwardness in the north were ... displaced to the east. East and west were suddenly defined by 'opposition and adjacency'" (Wolff 1994, 5). As a result, the eastern part of Europe has a long tradition of ideological debates about the geographical and civilizational location of its societies between an imagined "West" or "Europe" and an "East" or "Slavic community" or, alternatively, an "East Slavic community." These discussions were first limited to the level of elites (re)shaping their political and national projects but later reached the level of mass politics. Those purely imaginative boundaries became real in the twentieth century, and their discursive frameworks were often used in propaganda and armed conflicts.

Modern Ukrainian national identity developed in a polycentric space. Some authors argue that, in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, reflections on a relation to Europe were, in the Ukrainian case, repeatedly intertwined with considerations of Ukraine's relations with Russia. Therefore, the European idea took its place as an antidote not to Ukrainian nationalism but rather to the Russian nationalistic imagination with pan-Slavic overtones. Thus, the logic of the interaction with other political actors, first of all with pan-Russian nationalism, forced Ukrainian nationalists to be "Westernizers" rather than "Slavophiles" (Riabchuk 2000; Sereda 2014). During the Soviet period, the myth about the unity of the three Eastern Slavic nations—Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians—was one of the core elements of Soviet propaganda and nationality politics. After Ukraine's independence, the debate about the roots of Ukrainian society flared up again with new strength and reached its culmination during the Euromaidan protests.

Respondents to the project survey (Survey 2013) were asked to situate Ukraine's past as part of European history, as part of the East Slav community, or as unique. One should stress that defining Ukrainian history as unique is not necessarily a rejection of both wider options but might also be

viewed as in opposition either to the European or to the East Slavic option.⁶ Situating Ukrainian history within the East Slavic community received the strongest support, with 49.4 percent; it was followed by a belief in the uniqueness of Ukraine's history, with 35.2 percent. Only a small minority of respondents (15.4 percent) located Ukraine's history within a wider European community. A possible explanation for such separation from European history could be the fact that one of the main sources of respondents' knowledge of the past is secondary school education. Traditionally, history lessons in the Soviet and post-Soviet education system were divided into the history of the USSR ("our" history) and world history ("their" [capitalist] history). Ukrainian secondary and higher education inherited this Soviet scheme, which influences respondents' perception of the civilizational localization of Ukraine's past (Kravchenko 2004).

Maps for survey questions 31.1–31.3 clearly demonstrate that neither a "container" approach, where the nation-state is seen as synonymous with society, nor a "macroregional approach," dividing Ukraine into four or five macroregions (most often east, west, south, center or north), can be used as a valid explanation of respondents' support for one or another of the three options. Statistically significant regional differences are found but they cannot be attributed to any specific macroregion. These maps provide an image of a colorful patchwork with a slight tendency for Galicia and Volhynia to oppose other parts of Ukraine. As data demonstrate, dividing lines might run within the same oblast. Support for the pro-European and nativist version of the past is stronger in big cities (500,000 to one million inhabitants), whereas dwellers in metropolitan areas, which are predominantly located in the east and south (over one million inhabitants), or in smaller cities (50,000 to 200,000 inhabitants), are more inclined to support the notion of an East Slavic community (for details of the statistical analysis, see mapsukraine.ch).

Regionally, the strongest supporters of the Europeaness of Ukrainian history live in Galicia and Volhynia, followed by Chernivetska, Sumska, Kirovohradska and Zaporizka oblasts, which represent different regions of Ukraine. Looking at socio-demographic variables, the pro-European orientation is stronger among newcomers, the young, the well-educated and those with high income. It is also stronger among those who self-identify

⁶ See more about the interrelation of East Slav and European identities, along with the self-perception as "unique" in the case of Slobozhanshchyna (on the data from the Kharkiv region), in Musiezdov (2012).

as Ukrainians by (ethnic) nationality, those who are Ukrainian-speaking or bilingual, as well as among religious people who go to church every week and those whose confession is Greek Catholic or Protestant.

The view of Ukrainian history as being part of an East Slavic community has strongest support in Crimea, Donbas, Odeska, Kharkivska and Vinnytska oblasts, which represent three different macroregions. This view also prevails among older people who have lived in the same location for over fifty years, among the less educated with a smaller income, among those who declare themselves Russian by nationality and by native language, among the less religious (who never or very rarely go to church), and among Orthodox believers (Moscow Patriarchate or without affiliation). A strong fraction of nativists, i.e., those who believe in the uniqueness of Ukrainian history, can be found in Galicia, as well as in Mykolaivska, Cherkaska, Chernivetska and Chernihivska oblasts, representing three different macroregions. This idea is more popular among people who are young, well-educated, who have a lower income but describe their material conditions as good, who are religious (who go to church more than once a week), who belong to the Roman or Greek Catholic Church, and who are Ukrainian by nationality and language.

The survey also assesses the level of interest in local or regional history. Respondents were asked to evaluate their interest on a 5-point scale. The general interest in local history appears to be relatively high (the mean value varies between 3.3 and 4.1). People who live in Chernihivska, Lvivska, Kyivska, Rivnenska, Ternopil'ska, Vinnytska and Odeska oblasts show the highest interest, while the lowest interest is seen in Khmelnytska, Luhanska, Poltav'ska and Kirovohradska oblasts. Here again, no visible macroregional patterns can be found and the main division lines run within the regions, rather than between them. Looking for causes that stimulate interest in local history, the influence of a number of socio-demographic variables was examined, and three groups of factors were discovered. The first group is connected to identification issues. A regression analysis shows that the strongest predictors of an interest in local history are Ukrainian and European identities and the Ukrainian language of the respondents. The second group can be attributed to conditions of life. A higher interest in local history is demonstrated by dwellers in big cities (500,000 to one million inhabitants), but not by dwellers in metropolitan areas (over one million inhabitants), respondents with higher education, those who work as managers or specialized workers and whose subjective material condition is good or very good. Variables of gender or type of job (public or state-owned versus the private sector) do not have any influence. To develop and

sustain their interest in local history as a part of their lifestyle, people need to have additional resources. Finally, the third important factor is time—either biological (older people are more interested in local history) or to do with a sense of rootedness (those who live longer in a locality demonstrate greater interest in its history).

In summary, it can be said that differences in respondents' view of Ukraine's past and in their interest in local history can be attributed to socio-economic conditions and to self-identifications, rather than to macro-regional factors.

The sacralization of national time

Holidays are the nodal points of social groups as they activate all the structural elements of group identification—knowledge, attitudes and practices. The existence of a fixed holiday calendar helps one to establish stronger social bonds within a celebrating community and underlines that community's distinctiveness and uniqueness. The function of any holiday is to sustain the invisible intergroup boundary and to encode differences between the celebrating and noncelebrating groups (whether ethnic/national, regional or religious). For this reason, national governments pay great attention to the establishment and reproduction of a state calendar. As discussed in the previous section, at the same time local communities may introduce their own locally recognized holidays which complement or, in some cases, undermine the existing state calendar.

The survey provides the possibility of identifying which holidays are perceived as important and which are celebrated in each region of Ukraine, as well as identifying which socio-demographic factors can be predictive of them. Respondents were given a list of twelve holidays, including five ex-Soviet holidays: February 23 (Defenders of the Motherland Day), March 8 (Women's Day), May 1 (May Day), May 9 (Victory Day), and November 7 (the Great October Revolution Day). The list also included five holidays commemorating the Ukrainian national narratives: January 22 (National Day of Unification/Zluka Day), March 9 (Shevchenko's birthday), June 28 (Constitution Day), August 24 (Independence Day), and the fourth Sunday of November (Holodomor Memorial Day). Respondents were asked to name all the holidays that they celebrate or commemorate. The survey listed June 30 (the Proclamation of Independence of Ukraine in 1941 in Lviv) as a sixth Ukrainian holiday, which is a local, west Ukrainian and rather nationalistic holiday. This provides a good example of respon-

dents' bias or data inaccuracy in answering closed list questions. Located on the table between Constitution and Independence Days, it led to the result that the greatest scores are found in Luhanska (indicated by 11 percent) and Donetska (9 percent) oblasts. As a case of methodological bias, this holiday was eliminated from further analysis.

As Table 3.1 (in the appendix to this chapter) illustrates, respondents' support of the main holidays partially reflects patterns imposed by official historical discourses and media, and partially undermines them. All attempts by the government to institutionalize National Day of Unification, or Zluka Day (January 22) as an important symbolic marker of the Ukrainian state have failed. It is recognized as a holiday only by a small minority of Ukrainian citizens (4.6 percent), whereas Great October Revolution Day (the most marginalized Soviet holiday) is still celebrated by twice as many respondents. At the same time, efforts to exclude the Great October Revolution Day from the Ukrainian holiday calendar can be considered successful. Just over a decade ago (in 2002), 51 percent of respondents recognized it as a holiday (Razumkov Center 2002).

Among those Soviet holidays which were incorporated into the Ukrainian official historical narratives, the most popular is Women's Day. Nearly everyone (86 percent) in Ukraine now celebrates this holiday. If the standard deviation values are compared, the highest level of disagreement among respondents concerns Independence Day, May Day and Defenders of the Motherland Day. At the same time, further analysis demonstrates that, even though the purpose of calendar change and official historical discourses in Ukraine was to try to forge a new, single, shared vision of the past based on both Soviet and Ukrainian selected national historical models, this aim has failed because new Ukrainian holidays remain strongly underinstitutionalized.

Two indices were computed for five Soviet holidays and five Ukrainian holidays by summing up their scores. Hence, if a respondent celebrates all five Soviet (or all five Ukrainian) holidays, he/she scores 5, and if just one, he/she scores 1. The comparative means of these indexes demonstrate that Soviet holidays are much more rooted in the practices of the inhabitants of Ukraine (mean = 2.9) than the Ukrainian holidays (mean = 1.0). The average Ukrainian inhabitant celebrates three Soviet holidays—Defenders of the Motherland Day, Women's Day and Victory Day—and only one Ukrainian holiday, Independence Day. The following illustrations (Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 below) show the regional variance of both indexes. As can be seen, Ukrainian holidays are celebrated mostly in Galicia, Volhynia and central Ukraine (although it is difficult to draw clear-cut division lines).

At the same time, Soviet holidays dominate all over Ukraine; the only exception is Galicia (see also Maps for survey questions 25.1–25.12).

Figure 3.2. Ukrainian holidays index by oblast



Figure 3.3. Soviet holidays index by oblast



Note: Compiled by Viktoriia Sereda

Furthermore, a regression analysis was made to find which independent variables make an impact on the formation of each of the extracted indices (saved as variables). For this purpose, nine variables representing basic demographics (the size of city, the number of years and number of generations that a respondent has been living in his/her city/village, gender, age, education, income, nationality, mother tongue and level of religiosity) were selected. Among those respondents who focus on the celebration of Soviet holidays, the main predictors were: ethnic identity (Russian), age (old people), level of religiosity (low), education (primary) and income (lower). This pattern prevails among people who have lived in their city/village for longer than forty years but are the first generation there. Those for whom Ukrainian holidays are important are young people, Ukrainian by nationality, with a high level of religiosity, who live in a village and have higher education. Thus, there are two distinct groups of respondents, with little overlap or intersection.

Heroes of the national past

Yet another important role of holidays is that they create a space for the interconnection of visual symbols, rituals and places of memory. Often state and regional holidays are connected with a cult of heroes, which presupposes the practice of attendance at monuments on the occasion of various commemorative rituals. Many experts agree that Ukrainian society does not have an integrated commemorative space. These conflicting places of memory often remain at the level of peaceful coexistence, but in some instances (especially during electoral campaigns), they may give rise to open conflict, frequently referred to as the “war of monuments.” In spite of a stereotypical perception, these symbolic memory battles take place not only on an interregional level but also, more often, within the same urban or rural spaces (Portnov 2008).

For deeper analysis of the issue, the research team selected the six most controversial historical personalities who represent Ukrainian nationalist metanarratives (namely Bandera and Ivan Mazepa [1639–1709]), national-democratic metanarratives (Hrushevskiy), Soviet metanarratives (Lenin and Stalin), and Russian Imperial metanarratives (Catherine II); then the level of respondents’ support for the idea of erection (or preservation, if already standing) of a monument to the listed historical personalities was tested (Table 3.3 in the appendix to this chapter). The survey results make clear that no historical personality manages to attract sup-

port of much over 40 percent. Therefore, one may conclude that none of the listed historical metanarratives has a dominant position in Ukrainian society. Greater support for such historical figures as Shevchenko or Khmelnytskyi (Table 3.4 in the appendix to this chapter) can rather be attributed to their simultaneous inclusion within several different models of the past (Imperial Russian, Soviet Ukrainian and National Ukrainian).

Among the historical personalities for whom there is least support are Stalin (8.1 percent), Catherine II (15.9 percent) and Bandera (17.2 percent). They embody three different models of the past. At the same time, this does not mean that all three figures are equally rejected in all regions of Ukraine. Higher support for Stalin, Lenin and Catherine II is found in five oblasts (Khersonska, Kharkivka, Odeska, Luhanska and Dnipropetrovska); this support also coincides with lower support for Bandera, Mazepa and Hrushevskyyi. And vice versa, strong support for Bandera, Mazepa and Hrushevskyyi in Galicia and Volhynia coincides with the lowest support for Stalin, Lenin, Catherine II and their monuments. The most localized was the Bandera cult, and the least localized that of Hrushevskyyi (here the main exception was Crimea, with only 3.9 percent of support for Hrushevskyyi) (see Table 3.5 in the appendix to this chapter).

As appears from data analysis as well as from media maps (Radio Svoboda 2013; Tereshchuk 2010), Ukrainian citizens often live in a social space filled by mutually exclusive or controversial historical symbols. Unfortunately, this plurality of symbolic markers does not so much stimulate an internal discussion about controversial issues regarding Ukraine's past, but rather fragments local dwellers into segregated groups celebrating their own versions of the past.

In the process of symbolic demarcation of intergroup boundaries, history (and images of the past) plays a very important role. At the same time, these boundaries are constructed not only through a positive association with a historical narrative, but also through negative attitudes. Analyzing the historical identity of a certain group, one should look at both "heroes" and "villains" or negative historical personages. Here too, the survey data helps us to identify representations of the past prevailing in the historical memory of the inhabitants of Ukraine. One can also estimate whether official historical discourses about particular historical figures have had any impact on respondents' historical competence and preferences.

In the survey, respondents had to choose three personalities who played the most significant role in the history of Ukraine, from a list of sixteen historical figures, and respondents then had to rate their attitude to these figures on a 5-point scale (where 1 and 2 denote negative, 3 denotes

neutral, and 4 and 5 denote positive attitudes). A survey table compares the frequency of selection of each personality with the mean value on the attitude scale. Not surprisingly, the two most frequently named figures were Shevchenko (60 percent) and Khmelnytskyi (55 percent). In addition, a quarter of respondents chose Volodymyr Velykyi or Stalin as important personalities; Hrushevskyi also appears in the rating. It is clear from the survey that, in the respondents' opinion, the most important role in the history of Ukraine was played by Ukrainian and/or Soviet personalities. All personalities who represent other nations, such as Peter I, Catherine II, John Paul II (Pope, 1978–2005) or Józeph Piłsudski (1867–1935), seem to be marginal.

A comparison of the mean values of respondents' attitudes to the given personalities reveals that only two figures were considered as negative: Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931) and Stalin. Seven figures were judged as clearly positive (with a mean over 4.0): Shevchenko, Volodymyr Velykyi, Hrushevskyi, Chornovil, Khmelnytskyi, John Paul II, and Peter I. It is remarkable that Khmelnytskyi, on an attitude scale, scored only fifth (with a mean of 4.4). The other seven personalities scored close to 3.0: Mazepa, Catherine II, Piłsudski, Bandera, Lenin, Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971), and Kravchuk. This does not necessarily mean that respondents identify them as neutral (3 being a neutral or "zero" position), but rather that these figures elicit controversy and differing regional attitudes, as is evident from a comparison of standard deviation measurements (see Maps for survey questions 35.1–35.16).

Table 3.5 (in the appendix to this chapter) illustrates the regional division of mean values attributed to each historical personality. Piłsudski and John Paul II were excluded from this analysis due to the low number of responses. The highest regional dispersion concerns Bandera (standard deviation = 1.65) and Lenin (standard deviation = 1.41), who symbolize two competing models of the historical past, Ukrainian nationalist and Soviet, respectively. They are followed by Kravchuk (standard deviation = 1.34), who represents recent Ukrainian history, and Catherine II (standard deviation = 1.32), who represents the history of the Russian Empire. Khrushchev (standard deviation = 1.32), Stalin (standard deviation = 1.30), and Gorbachev (standard deviation = 1.29) represent Soviet history. And finally, Mazepa (standard deviation = 1.17) is a figure representing Ukrainian history, rehabilitated after the collapse of the Soviet regime.

If one compares, in regional perspective, personages who were included and those who were excluded from the country's past by respondents, one finds clear patterns (see Maps for survey questions 34.1–34.16).

First of all, historical figures are to be found who are commonly accepted or rejected in all regions; these are the key markers for historical identity shared by all inhabitants of Ukraine. At the same time, there are a number of heroes, identified in each region, who become flashpoints for disunity: among them are Khmelnytskyi, Mazepa, Bandera, Lenin, Gorbachev, Kravchuk and Catherine II. Despite all attempts at the (re)codification of historical personalities in the official discourses of Ukrainian presidents, many of these figures still signify contested terrain at the regional level.

As one might expect, in Ukraine the naming of streets and squares has played a crucial role in the symbolic codification of urban space. (Re)naming requires much less effort and fewer resources than the erection of a monument; at the same time, street names are well embedded in everyday practices of urban dwellers who find themselves recurrently referring to street names when filling out bureaucratic forms, asking a bus driver to stop at some place, explaining a location and so on. At the same time, as some studies and media maps (www.texty.org.ua) illustrate, the process of street renaming in Ukraine has had a rather limited scope, affecting a restricted number of settlements prior to the “decommunization” laws.

The survey also examined Ukrainians’ attitudes to processes of street renaming. Respondents were asked to assess their opinion about street renaming both in their settlement and in other cities of Ukraine, on a 5-point scale (1 denoting strong support, and 5 denoting complete disagreement). One may note a generally negative attitude to the process of street renaming (both at the level of local community and at the all-Ukrainian level) that unites inhabitants of Ukraine, irrespective of their regional location. Practically everywhere their answers cluster around the positions “neither yes, nor no” or “partially disagree,” with a slight tendency on the part of inhabitants of western Ukraine and Chernihivska oblast to lean closer to the first option, and a slight tendency on the part of inhabitants of the other oblasts to lean closer to the second. The regression analysis reveals that, out of ten socio-demographic factors, the main predictor of such leaning would seem to be the Ukrainian language (see also Table 3.6 in the appendix to this chapter).

Regional representations of the past

In the previous section, we examined which personalities were selected by the inhabitants of various regions of Ukraine for the elaboration of a model of their “own history,” one which would be suitable for them. The same social mechanisms are involved in the assessment of historical periods

and events (Table 3.7 in the appendix to this chapter). The sociological survey provides a possibility to compare which events/periods were perceived as important by respondents and to look for possible regional patterns. Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of fifteen listed historical events/periods for the history of Ukraine, on a 5-point scale.

The top five most important events are events/periods that (with the exception of Ukraine's independence) lie at the intersection of Ukrainian, Russian Imperial and Soviet metanarratives. Therefore, their importance should be interpreted as cumulative rather than integrating; in other words, respondents do not choose the same event for the same reasons. At the bottom of the list are entities which have influenced only a part of the territories of Ukraine: the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the UPA.

As can be seen from the survey, the most divisive question was the one about the importance of the UPA. Next in the list are the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Austro-Hungarian and the Russian Empires—three states to which some parts of Ukraine belonged in the past. One might assume that inhabitants of regions which did not belong to those states might be either uninformed or skeptical about their influence on the history of Ukraine, but other tables on regional division and the corresponding maps (for survey questions 41.2, 41.6 and 41.7) demonstrate that this hypothesis proves to be wrong.

In general, no clear-cut pattern can be found in cross-regional comparison of respondents' attitudes toward the majority of the listed events (see Maps for survey questions 41.1–41.15). The only exception is the question about Ukraine's independence (see Figure 3.4 below). Here it can be seen that the importance of this event for the history of Ukraine gradually diminishes moving from the west to the east and southeast of Ukraine.

In addition to the general analysis of respondents' attitudes toward the main periods or key events in the history of Ukraine, the research team picked three issues which cause the most controversy in public debates and which serve as important instruments of political mobilization: the Holodomor, World War II and the UPA. Our research can show the impact of public campaigns on the shaping of memory processes. If one looks at the level of importance attributed by respondents to the Holodomor, one can see that it is considered important, but definitely not to the same extent as a central historical event (with its sixth position in the rating). At the same time, Yushchenko's campaign did succeed in making

Figure 3.4. Regional division of attitudes toward the importance of Ukraine's independence for the history of Ukraine (Map for survey question 41.15)



some inroads in public opinion. Respondents were asked whether they recognize the Holodomor as a genocide or not; data show that an overwhelming majority (70.5 percent) gave a positive response.

If one looks at the regional division of respondents' attitudes, one can see quite a clear regional pattern (see Figure 3.5 below): Galicia, Volhynia and the western part of central Ukraine demonstrate the strongest support for the statement that the Holodomor was a genocide; meanwhile Donbas and Crimea, together with Kharkivska and Odeska oblasts, show the weakest support. What is striking about this map is that recognition of the Holodomor is strongest in those oblasts which either did not experience it at all or experienced it to a lesser extent. This demonstrates that the event is strongly connected to the national myth, rather than to living memory. Another explanation could be that the notion of genocide (as carried out by some external force) does not correspond to the memories of the actual eye-witnesses who experienced the immediate violence primarily from the local perpetrators and had no chance to reflect about the broader context of the tragedy because the topic of famine was absent from school curricula before 1991.

Figure 3.5. Regional division of respondents' support for the Holodomor being recognized as a genocide (Map for survey question 36)




At the same time, one should take into consideration the limits of malleability in historical memory insofar as it is affected by institutional and individual factors. Regional divisions also correspond to the regional media discourses which were instrumentalized by local political elites in order to oppose the attempts of the Yushchenko government to impose certain representations of the past (Sereda 2013). As discussed in other sections of this chapter, the central government may propose certain initiatives, but local elites, in cooperation with local communities, have many instruments with which to undermine or even completely reject them. In Kharkivska and Odeska oblasts, these strategies of resistance went so far as to vandalize the monuments commemorating the Holodomor.

Looking at the socio-demographic profile of respondents who supported the recognition of the Holodomor as a genocide, the strongest predictors are language (86.3 percent Ukrainian-speaking, 59.7 percent bilingual and only 46.3 percent Russian-speaking respondents were in support of this recognition), nationality (75 percent Ukrainians and only 45 percent Russians were in support), level of religiosity (84.3 percent who visit church every week, as compared to 59.1 percent who never go to

church, were in support), and belonging to a certain church (96.5 percent Greek Catholic, 86 percent Roman Catholic and Autocephalous, 85 percent Orthodox Kyivan Patriarchate and 58 percent Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate believers were in support). Less critical influence was exerted by such factors as higher education, age (middle age), place of residence (village or smaller city), and lower income (which probably corresponds to place of residence).

The survey also tested respondents' attitudes both to the recognition of UPA veterans and to the name used to designate the 1939–1945 war. The first question read: "In your opinion, what is the correct name of the war with Nazi Germany?" A majority of respondents (60 percent) preferred to call it the Great Patriotic War, 30 percent preferred to call it World War II, 5 percent preferred to call it the Soviet–German war, and another 5 percent had problems with the attribution of any of those names. Since the first two options collected 90 percent of answers between them, they will be examined here. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 below demonstrate the regional division of respondents' support for each of these two options.

**Figure 3.6. Regional division of respondents' support for the "Great Patriotic War" option
(Map for survey question 37.1)**



**Figure 3.7. Regional division of respondents' support for the "World War II" option
(Map for survey question 37.2)**




From Figures 3.6 and 3.7 it can be seen that usage of the Soviet term “Great Patriotic War” evokes much more polarization at the regional level; it enjoys the lowest support in Galicia and the greatest in southern Ukraine. Support for the term “World War II” has more intraregional variety, though it is a bit stronger in Galicia. Socio-demographic analysis shows that dwellers in big cities are more inclined to support the “World War II” option and less the “Great Patriotic War” option. A similar trend can be observed for the younger versus the older generations, the highly educated versus the poorly educated, and rich versus poor people. Consequently, younger people who have studied in the Ukrainian educational system and those who, because of their location or financial means, have better access to information sources, use the term “World War II.” Support for this option is also stronger among ethnic Ukrainians (31.4 percent Ukrainians, as compared to 22.9 percent Russians), among Ukrainian-speaking respondents (35 percent Ukrainian speakers, as compared to 22.6 percent Russian speakers), among religious people (38.2 percent of those who go to church every week, as compared to 29.6 percent of those who never go), and among those who belong to the Roman Catholic (48.6 percent) or the Greek Catholic and Protestant denominations (46 per-

cent); in comparison, only 24.8 percent of Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate believers support this option.

Later, respondents were asked to assess their support for the recognition of the OUN-UPA as fighters for Ukraine's independence, on a 5-point scale (where 1 means support and 5 means no support). Only one-third of respondents (32.5 percent) supported this recognition, while 47.5 percent were against it and 20 percent were indecisive. If one compares this result with the regional distribution of respondents' attitudes (see Figure 3.8 below), one may notice that support for the OUN-UPA is limited mainly to Galicia and Volhynia.

Figure 3.8. Regional division of respondents' rejection of UPA recognition
(Map for survey question 38)



As with support for the “World War II” option, support for the OUN-UPA is stronger among the young (35 percent younger as compared to 28.6 percent older respondents), the well-educated (36 percent with a higher education as compared to 26 percent with only a primary education), and richer people (48 percent with good as compared to 25 percent with bad material conditions). This support for the OUN-UPA is also stronger in medium-sized cities and in the countryside, but smaller in cities with over one million dwellers (41.6 percent who live in a city with between 500,000

and one million inhabitants and 42.6 percent who live in a village, as compared to 23.5 percent who live in a city with over one million inhabitants). At the same time, the main distinctions are found along national and religious lines: 37 percent of Ukrainians share this support, as compared to only 7.3 percent of Russians; 51 percent of Ukrainian speakers share this support, as compared to only 7.3 percent of Russian speakers; 90.5 percent of Greek Catholic believers share this support, as do 62.5 percent of Ukrainian Autocephalous believers, 45 percent of Orthodox Kyiv Patriarchate believers and 43 percent of Roman Catholic believers, as compared to 22 percent of Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate believers; and 66 percent of those who attend church once a week share this support, as compared to 22 percent of those who never attend church.

Factors that shape attitudes to the past

Evaluation of the effects of regionalism on Ukrainians' attitudes toward history demonstrates that, with some exceptions, dividing lines run within the regions rather than between them. Differences in respondents' attitudes toward the history of Ukraine can first of all be attributed to their self-identifications. In a majority of cases, among the main predictors were respondents' mother tongue, nationality, religious identity, level of religiosity and, to a lesser extent, their socio-economic conditions (residence, level of education and income), rather than macroregional factors. Also observable is an intergenerational split.

The cross-regional comparison at the oblast level reveals that the only outliers in the attitudes toward Ukraine's past are the three Galician oblasts; in several instances, two Volhynian oblasts also follow similar patterns. Inhabitants of the rest of Ukraine do not demonstrate a clear-cut support for any one particular model of Ukraine's past. Their attitudes are more ambivalent, as Soviet Ukrainian, Russian Imperial and Ukrainian nationalist representations of the past coexist in different proportions. In some cases, they might produce sharp conflicts (often instrumentalized by local elites) and, in others, peaceful coexistence or even hybridization. At the same time, the Ukrainian nationalist past promoted by the official historical discourses remains underinstitutionalized and uninternalized. As a result, none of the historical metanarratives can be considered as dominant within the whole territory of Ukraine or as unifying factors for all its citizens.

Conclusions

This chapter has explored numerous ways in which regionalism and division lines are more nuanced, blurred and overlapping than the way they are presented in political and popular discourse. It has found that, while the public sphere is presented as a battle between different regionally embedded versions of the past, the nationalist, Soviet and other versions of the past continue to coexist in many different forms in independent Ukraine and are constantly being challenged and transformed by new narratives.

The chapter has shown the dynamic nature of the national and regional rethinking and reconstruction of the past due to the processes of simultaneous nationalization and regionalization of memories and attitudes. During independence, the commemoration of the Holodomor became a nationwide remembrance of a national tragedy. Similarly, Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, the author of a popular multivolume history of Ukraine and the chairperson of the Ukrainian Central Council created in 1917, joined the national pantheon of heroes and is in high esteem throughout the country. At the same time, regions have actively reinvented their local pasts. Western Ukraine has rediscovered, mythologized and even commercialized its Austro-Hungarian past, and has increasingly commemorated and glorified controversial interwar nationalist leaders. Eastern and southern Ukraine has reinterpreted the Russian imperial past (with elements of Western influence) and has readapted (often in a nationalized form) the celebration of the “glorious victory” over Nazism on May 9. The chapter has also shown that political ambitions and interests have often been behind processes and rituals of remembering.

The regional level has also provided a space for protest against the memory politics of Kyiv and other regions. Western Ukraine has responded to the increasingly bombastic celebrations of the Great Patriotic War in the east with the declaration of May 9 as the day of sorrow. Several monuments and commemorative signs to the “victims of Ukrainian nationalists” have been put up in eastern and southern Ukraine, in protest at the glorification and heroization of Stepan Bandera and other nationalist leaders in western Ukraine and at the national level under Yushchenko. The fervor of the Euromaidan Revolution has swept away parts of the Soviet past in central and eastern Ukraine, encapsulated in the massive “Leninfall.” The new heroes of the Euromaidan and of military conflict in eastern Ukraine have partially replaced the fallen Soviet past. One needs to wait until the space for dialogue and alternative narratives reopens again.

ANNEXES

Table 3.1. Respondents' attitudes to the main holidays

Holiday	percent
1. January 22 (National Day of Unification/Zluka Day)	4.6
2. February 23 (Defenders of the Motherland Day)	69.0
3. March 8 (Women's Day)	86.1
4. March 9 (Shevchenko's birthday)	12.6
5. May 1 (May Day)	46.4
6. May 9 (Victory Day)	75.0
7. City/village Day	49.8
8. June 28 (Ukrainian Constitution Day)	25.2
9. August 24 (Independence Day)	47.3
10. November 7 (Great October Revolution Day)	11.2
11. Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Famines (fourth Saturday of November)	15.2

Table 3.2. Main national holidays of the Soviet Union and of Ukraine
(Table adapted from Wanner 1998, 151)

The Soviet calendar		The Ukrainian calendar (as of 2005)	
Holiday	Date	Holiday	Date
New Year	January 1	New Year*	January 1
		Christmas	January 7–8
		National Day of Unification/Zluka Day	January 22
Soviet Army Day	February 23	<i>Defenders of the Motherland Day**</i>	February 23
Women's Day	March 8	Women's Day	March 8
		Shevchenko celebrations	March 9
		Easter	March/April
May Day	May 1–2	May Day	May 1–2

The Soviet calendar		The Ukrainian calendar (as of 2005)	
Holiday	Date	Holiday	Date
Victory Day	May 9	Victory Day	May 9
		Mother's Day	May, second Sunday
		Ukrainian Constitution Day	June 28
		Independence Day	August 24
Soviet Constitution Day	October 7	-	-
Great October Revolution Day	November 7	<i>Day of Social Harmony</i>	November 7
		Day of National Unity	November 22
		Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Famines	November, fourth Saturday
		<i>Referendum Day</i>	December 1
		Ukrainian Army Day	December 6

* **Bold** indicates holidays on which people in Ukraine have a free day

** *Italics* indicate Soviet holidays reintroduced under a different name

Table 3.3. Regional distribution of positive answers to the question: "Would you agree to the erection (or preservation) of a (or the) monument to ..." (percent)

Oblast	Stalin	Lenin	Catherine II	Bandera	Mazepa	Hrushevskyi
Crimea	1.6	11.4	24.7	0	2.7	3.9
Vinnnytska	4.2	40.3	15.3	8.3	13.0	56.5
Volynska	5.4	7.7	10.0	33.8	36.9	61.5
Dnipropetrovska	12.5	30.9	24.8	8.9	21.3	32.7
Donetska	9.3	31.7	8.9	1.6	3.2	17.3
Zhytomyrska	8.3	20.8	10.7	17.3	36.3	58.3
Zakarpatska	11.3	13.1	8.1	16.9	10.6	48.1
Zaporizka	9.9	36.6	16.5	8.2	12.3	32.5

Oblast	Stalin	Lenin	Catherine II	Bandera	Mazepa	Hrushevskyi
Ivano-Frankivska	0.6	0.6	1.7	79.4	63.9	68.9
Kyivska	6.6	14.0	14.5	23.1	39.3	56.2
Kirovohradska	6.1	13.7	27.5	11.5	26.7	32.1
Luhanska	15.9	37.1	27.8	1.3	9.6	19.9
Lvivska	0.3	2.1	3.3	82.1	63.0	80.0
Mykolaivska	8.4	24.7	13.0	1.9	8.4	30.5
Odeska	12.5	50.8	41.9	1.3	7.6	24.4
Poltavska	5.5	33.5	4.5	4.5	13.5	33.5
Rivnenska	1.4	5.5	2.8	46.2	45.5	63.4
Sumska	13.5	18.6	14.1	3.8	25.6	34.0
Ternopil'ska	0.7	0	0	69.4	55.6	65.3
Kharkivska	22.0	34.4	20.9	7.7	14.0	26.7
Khersonska	11.1	41.0	27.8	4.9	23.6	27.8
Khmeln'ytska	2.3	24.4	8.0	11.9	33.0	51.7
Cherkaska	6.9	28.2	6.9	9.8	13.8	26.4
Chernivetska	0	0	4.3	13.7	26.5	44.4
Chernihivska	8.7	30.2	30.9	0	37.6	55.7
Total	8.1	24.8	15.9	17.2	24.2	40.1

Table 3.4. Frequencies of selection of each personality and mean values of respondents' attitudes

Rating	Frequency	Rating	Mean	Std. deviation
1. Shevchenko	60.2 percent	1. Shevchenko	4.5615	.55878
2. Khmelnytskyi	54.8 percent	2. Volodymyr Velykyi	4.4922	.60605
3. Volodymyr Velykyi	26.8 percent	3. Hrushevskyi	4.4597	.64637
4. Stalin	26.3 percent	4. Chornovil	4.4281	.65274

5. Hrushevskiy	20.7 percent	5. Khmelnytskyi	4.4060	.62329
6. Lenin	19.4 percent	6. Pope John Paul II	4.3368	.89455
7. Gorbachev	16.2 percent	7. Peter I	4.1244	.98858
8. Chornovil	14.0 percent	8. Mazepa	3.9226	1.17593
9. Kravchuk	13.0 percent	9. Catherine II	3.6712	1.32734
10. Bandera	12.7 percent	10. Piłsudski	3.3846	1.50214
11. Mazepa	11.6 percent	11. Bandera	3.2925	1.65854
12. Peter I	7.0 percent	12. Lenin	3.1548	1.41304
13. Khrushchev	6.7 percent	13. Khrushchev	3.1468	1.32155
14. Catherine II	6.2 percent	14. Kravchuk	3.1463	1.38451
15. Pope John Paul II	1.6 percent	15. Gorbachev	2.1963	1.29795
16. Piłsudski	0.2 percent	16. Stalin	2.0805	1.30665

Table 3.5. Regional division of mean values attributed to each historical personality

Oblast	35.1 Volo- dymyr Velykyi	35.2 Khmel- nytskyi	35.3 Mazepa	35.4 Shev- chenko	35.5 Hrushev- skyi	35.10 Chornovil
Crimea	4.7	4.3	2.5	4.6	=	4.0
Vinnitska	4.6	4.4	3.7	4.7	4.6	4.3
Volynska	4.7	4.8	4.6	4.8	4.7	4.7
Dnipropetrovska	4.4	4.4	3.8	4.63	4.5	4.6
Donetska	4.3	4.5	3.9	4.5	4.5	4.2
Zhytomyrska	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.6	4.4	4.4
Zakarpatska	4.1	4.3	-	4.4	4.4	4.5
Zaporizka	4.5	4.3	3.8	4.6	4.5	4.4
Ivano-Frankivska	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.9	4.7	4.8
Kyivska	4.3	4.4	4.2	4.6	4.6	4.4

Oblast	35.1 Volo- dymyr Velykyi	35.2 Khmel- nytskyi	35.3 Mazepa	35.4 Shev- chenko	35.5 Hrushev- skyi	35.10 Chornovil
Kirovohradska	4.9	4.8	4.9	4.8	4.8	-
Luhanska	4.5	4.4	3.3	4.5	4.5	-
Lvivska	4.7	4.5	4.6	4.8	4.7	4.8
Mykolaivska	4.6	4.6	3.4	4.5	4.8	4.9
Odeska	4.4	4.3	3.0	4.3	4.2	4.1
Poltavska	4.5	4.3	3.7	4.6	4.4	4.3
Rivnenska	4.7	4.4	4.3	4.6	4.5	4.8
Sumska	4.4	4.4	3.7	4.5	4.3	4.3
Ternopilska	4.6	4.5	-	4.9	4.9	4.8
Kharkivska	4.5	4.4	3.1	4.4	4.0	-
Khersonska	4.7	4.6	3.9	4.6	4.5	-
Khmelnyska	4.1	4.3	3.9	4.4	4.2	3.8
Cherkaska	4.2	4.2	3.7	4.3	4.1	4.1
Chernivetska	4.5	4.3	4.4	4.2	4.5	3.9
Chernihivska	4.5	4.5	3.6	4.5	4.4	3.9
Total	4.5	4.4	3.9	4.6	4.5	4.4

*in empty cells the number of cases was too small (fewer than 15 cases) to obtain statistically meaningful information

Table 3.5 (continued). Regional division of mean values attributed to each historical personality

Oblast	35.6 Lenin	35.7 Stalin	35.8 Bandera	35.9 Khrush- chev	35.11 Gorba- chev	35.12 Krav- chuk	35.13 Peter I	35.16 Catherine II
Crimea	2.9	1.8	1.4	1.8	2.1	2.8	4.2	4.2
Vinnytska	3.9	1.8	3.6	-	1.8	2.6	-	-
Volynska	-	1.7	3.8	4.4	-	3.0	-	-

Oblast	35.6 Lenin	35.7 Stalin	35.8 Bandera	35.9 Khrush- chev	35.11 Gorba- chev	35.12 Krav- chuk	35.13 Peter I	35.16 Catherine II
Dnipropetrovska	3.8	2.4	3.2	3.7	2.2	3.6	4.2	4.0
Donetska	3.4	2.6	1.4	3.6	2.0	3.2	4.3	4.3
Zhytomyrska	2.8	1.4	-	3.5	2.6	3.5	-	-
Zakarpatska	2.3	1.5	3.3	-	2.3	3.8	-	-
Zaporizka	3.5	1.8	2.3	-	2.3	2.5	4.2	3.7
Ivano-Frankivska	1.5	1.2	4.7	-	-	4.3	-	-
Kyivska	2.9	1.7	3.7	-	2.5	3.7	-	-
Kirovohradska	2.8	2.3	-	-	2.7	-	4.8	-
Luhanska	4.1	2.9	1.8	3.3	1.7	2.6	4.6	4.0
Lvivska	1.1	1.1	4.7	-	3.9	-	-	-
Mykolaivska	3.7	2.3	1.3	-	1.7	3.2	-	-
Odeska	3.5	2.9	-	3.6	1.9	3.4	4.1	4.0
Poltavska	3.3	1.8	-	-	2.1	-	4.1	-
Rivnenska	-	1.5	4.5	-	-	-	-	-
Sumska	3.3	2.4	-	-	2.2	-	4.1	-
Ternopil'ska	1.3	1.2	4.6	-	3.6	-	-	-
Kharkiv'ska	3.1	2.8	2.3	3.1	1.8	2.4	4.3	3.6
Kherson'ska	3.2	1.7	-	-	-	2.8	-	3.5
Khmelnitska	3.3	1.7	2.2	3.5	2.7	3.5	-	-
Cherkaska	3.2	1.6	2.2	3.9	2.4	3.4	-	-
Chernivetska	2.4	1.8	-	-	3.2	3.6	-	-
Chernihiv'ska	3.0	2.5	-	-	2.7	3.5	-	-
Total	3.2	2.1	3.3	3.1	2.2	3.1	4.1	3.7

*in empty cells the number of cases was too small (fewer than 15 cases) to obtain statistically meaningful information

Table 3.6. Regional distribution of respondents' positive attitudes to street renaming (mean)

Oblast	Your city/village	Other cities of Ukraine
Crimea	3.9	3.9
Vinnyska	3.6	3.6
Volynska	3.4	3.4
Dnipropetrovska	4.0	3.9
Donetska	4.2	4.1
Zhytomyrska	3.9	3.8
Zakarpatska	3.2	3.1
Zaporizka	3.9	3.9
Ivano-Frankivska	3.4	3.0
Kyivska	3.9	3.5
Kirovohradska	3.7	3.7
Luhanska	4.1	4.1
Lvivska	3.1	3.0
Mykolaivska	4.2	4.0
Odeska	3.9	3.9
Poltavska	3.9	3.7
Rivnenska	3.3	3.4
Sumska	3.5	3.5
Ternopil'ska	3.0	2.8
Kharkiv'ska	4.1	4.1
Kherson'ska	3.6	3.7
Khmelnitska	3.7	3.5
Cherkaska	4.1	4.0
Chernivetska	3.2	3.2
Chernihiv'ska	3.3	3.2
Total	3.7	3.7

Table 3.7. Mean values of importance attributed to the listed historical events/periods

Rating	Mean	Rating	Std. deviation
1. Great Patriotic War/World War II	4.5	1. Kyivska Rus	0.8
2. Kyivska Rus	4.4	2. Ukrainian Cossackdom	0.8
3. Ukrainian Cossackdom	4.4	3. Great Patriotic War/World War II	0.9
4. Ukraine's independence	4.4	4. Ukrainian national revival in the nineteenth century	0.9
5. USSR	4.1	5. Ukraine's independence	0.9
6. Holodomor 1932–1933	4.1	6. Pereiaslav Treaty	1.0
7. Pereiaslav Treaty	4.1	7. USSR	1.0
8. Ukrainian national revival in the nineteenth century	4.1	8. Ukrainian Peoples' Republic (UNR)	1.0
9. Ukrainian Peoples' Republic (UNR)	4.0	9. Famine of 1932–1933	1.1
10. Holocaust	3.9	10. Mazepa's uprising against Peter I	1.1
11. Russian Empire	3.7	11. Holocaust	1.1
12. Mazepa's uprising against Peter I	3.7	12. Russian Empire	1.1
13. Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)	3.4	13. Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth	1.1
14. Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth	3.4	14. Austro-Hungarian Empire	1.2
15. Austro-Hungarian Empire	3.2	15. Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)	1.3

Table 3.8a. Regional division of mean values attributed to each historical period/event, per oblast

Oblast	Kyivan Rus	Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth	Ukrainian Cossackdom	Pereiaslav Treaty	Mazepa's uprising	Austro-Hungarian Empire	Russian Empire
Crimea	4.3	3.4	3.7	3.9	3.2	3.1	3.9
Vinnytska	4.4	3.2	4.5	4.2	3.4	2.8	3.3
Volynska	4.7	4.2	4.7	4.2	3.9	3.6	3.7
Dnipropetrovska	4.4	3.5	4.4	4.2	3.7	3.2	3.9
Donetska	4.5	3.4	4.3	4.1	3.5	3.0	4.1
Zhytomyrska	4.3	4.0	4.5	4.1	4.0	3.7	4.0
Zakarpatska	4.4	3.4	4.4	4.0	3.6	2.9	3.8
Zaporizka	4.5	3.0	4.6	4.2	3.3	2.8	3.9
Ivano-Frankivska	4.6	3.8	4.7	4.0	4.4	3.9	3.5
Kyivska	4.4	3.5	4.6	4.3	3.8	3.3	3.7
Kirovohradska	4.5	4.1	4.6	4.3	4.0	3.3	3.8
Luhanska	4.3	3.7	4.4	4.1	3.6	3.6	4.0
Lvivska	4.5	3.4	4.7	3.8	4.1	3.2	2.9
Mykolaivska	4.0	2.5	4.0	3.9	3.3	2.4	3.6
Odeska	4.6	3.3	4.4	4.5	3.2	2.9	4.1
Poltavska	4.6	3.4	4.5	4.3	3.8	2.9	3.5
Rivnenska	4.4	3.9	4.5	4.0	4.1	3.8	3.8
Sumska	4.5	3.6	4.1	4.1	3.9	3.8	3.7
Ternopil'ska	4.3	3.3	4.6	3.7	4.1	3.2	3.0
Kharkivska	4.3	2.9	4.2	4.2	3.2	2.4	3.6
Khersonska	4.6	3.9	4.6	4.6	4.0	3.7	4.2
Khmelnyska	4.3	2.9	4.5	3.5	2.9	2.8	3.8
Cherkaska	4.5	3.3	4.5	3.8	3.1	2.8	3.3

Oblast	Kyivan Rus	Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth	Ukrainian Cossackdom	Pereiaslav Treaty	Mazepa's uprising	Austro-Hungarian Empire	Russian Empire
Chernivetska	4.2	3.5	4.3	4.1	3.9	3.7	3.6
Chernihivska	4.4	3.5	4.5	4.1	3.8	2.8	3.5
Total	4.4	3.4	4.4	4.1	3.7	3.1	3.7

Table 3.8b. (continued). Regional division of mean values attributed to each historical period/event

Oblast	Ukrainian national revival	UNR	USSR	Holodomor	WWII	Holocaust	UPA	Ukraine's Independence
Crimea	3.5	3.5	4.1	4.3	4.8	4.3	2.4	3.8
Vinnytska	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.3	3.6	2.7	4.5
Volynska	3.9	4.2	4.4	4.5	4.7	4.1	4.4	4.8
Dnipropetrovska	4.1	4.1	4.4	4.2	4.5	4.0	3.5	4.2
Donetska	4.0	4.0	4.3	3.7	4.6	3.8	2.8	4.3
Zhytomyrska	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.6	4.1	3.8	4.5
Zakarpatska	4.1	4.0	3.9	4.3	4.3	4.1	3.3	4.2
Zaporizka	4.0	3.9	4.3	4.0	4.7	4.0	2.8	4.1
Ivano-Frankivska	4.6	4.6	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.8	4.7	4.8
Kyivska	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.2	3.8	4.6
Kirovohradska	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.6	3.7	4.2
Luhanska	4.0	3.9	4.3	4.1	4.5	3.9	3.5	4.1
Lvivska	4.4	4.4	3.2	4.1	4.0	3.7	4.6	4.9
Mykolaivska	3.8	4.1	4.5	4.0	4.6	4.0	2.4	3.5
Odeska	3.9	3.8	4.4	3.7	4.7	3.6	2.7	3.9
Poltavska	3.8	3.7	4.1	4.6	4.7	4.0	3.5	4.1
Rivnenska	4.3	4.3	3.9	4.5	4.5	3.9	4.1	4.6

Oblast	Ukrainian national revival	UNR	USSR	Holodo- mor	WWII	Holo- caust	UPA	Ukraine's Indepen- dence
Sumska	4.1	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.5	3.9	3.4	4.2
Ternopil'ska	4.4	4.4	3.2	3.8	3.9	3.2	4.5	4.9
Kharkiv'ska	3.4	3.4	4.2	3.9	4.8	3.8	2.7	4.1
Kherson'ska	4.1	4.1	4.5	4.3	4.8	4.2	3.3	4.3
Khmeln'ytska	4.0	4.0	4.2	3.2	3.5	2.9	2.9	4.6
Cherkaska	4.0	3.9	4.4	4.1	4.4	3.8	3.0	4.5
Chernivets'ka	3.9	3.9	3.8	4.3	4.6	4.3	3.8	4.6
Chernihiv'ska	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.0	4.2	3.7	3.3	4.4
Total	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.5	3.9	3.4	4.3

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4. Language(s) in the Ukrainian Regions: Historical Roots and the Current Situation

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The ideological and pragmatic framework of the history of modern Ukrainian

SERHII VAKULENKO

Some two hundred years ago, the very use of the term “Ukrainian language” would have puzzled most educated readers even in Ukraine itself. Indeed, its oldest known records all come from foreigners. The French traveler Albert Jouvin de Rochefort (c. 1640–c. 1710) (1672, 258) seems to have been the first to refer to what he called *langue Vkraine*. After him, the Austrian Slovene Janez Žiga Valentin Popovič, a.k.a. Johann Siegmund Valentin Popowitsch (1705–1774) (later to become the first professor of German at the University of Vienna), while describing “the dialect of the Ukrainian Cossacks” as an “ancient and authentic” Slavonic tongue (Popowitsch 1750, 303), resorted to the German expression *Ukrainische Mundart* (304) to name it. Several years later, the Russian polymath Mykhailo Lomonosov (1711–1765) (1755, 51) mentioned Ukrainian (*ukrainskoi*), next to Muscovite and Northern, as one of the main Russian dialects. In Ukraine, it appears that Izmail Sreznevskii (1812–1880) (1833, 19), Russian by origin but whose contribution to the development of the Ukrainian literary movement cannot be overestimated, was the first to use the collocation “Ukrainian language [*yazyk ukrainskii*]” in the preface to the first part of his collection *Zaporozhskaia starina* (Zaporozhian antiquities, 1833–1838).

Throughout the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, however, the name “Ukrainian” had to compete with a number of other designations. In Russia, the official name of this dialect/language was “Little Russian [*malorusskii*],” in Poland and in Austria “Ruthenian [*ruskyi*, *ruski* or *Ruthenisch*].” Many local intellectuals, including first-rate figures like Mykhailo Maksymovych (1804–1873), Panteleimon Kulish (1819–1897), Ivan Vahylevych

(1811–1866) or Yakiv Holovatskyi (1814–1888), tried to impose instead the designation “Southern Russian [*yuzhnorusskii* or *poludnevoruskyi*].” At that time, the Austrian–Russian border ran across Ukrainian territory: Galicia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia belonged to the Habsburg Empire, while other Ukrainian lands were in the possession of the Romanov Empire. The name “Southern Russian” was coined, indeed, to embrace what was known both as “Little Russian” on one side of the border and as “Ruthenian” on the other side, but its utter artificiality prevented it from entering popular usage. It was the term “Ukrainian” that finally prevailed. In the Russian-ruled part of the country, this happened in the last third of the nineteenth century. In the Austrian-ruled part, namely in Galicia and Bukovyna, it obtained the same status in the first decades of the twentieth century (official usage switched to it in 1916). Transcarpathia was the last gradually to adopt this name (not without hesitations), in the 1930s, when it was an autonomous province within the interwar Czechoslovakia.

The relative recency of the name “Ukrainian” contributed to the illusion—and facilitated the pretense on the part of its adversaries—that the Ukrainian language itself was an artificial product of late invention. As far as its origin is concerned, it may be safely argued that Ukrainian is no less ancient than any other living Slavic language. Ironically, however, as long as the country preserved its territorial unity under the scepter of the Kyivan Princes (until 1240), its literary language was not the local vernacular but what is now called Church Slavonic. Later, when more and more genuine native elements found their way into the written records, the people speaking basically the same vernacular was divided between a number of states (Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Moldavia, and the Ottoman, Habsburg and Romanov Empires). Due to these political vicissitudes, the speakers of the language were for a long time facing rather diverse situations in different parts of the country, which makes it quite difficult to establish an integrated periodization of their linguistic history. Along very general lines, however, the three main phases may be distinguished (see Table 4.1).

During the “preliminary” period, the presence of the local vernacular elements in written production was on the whole rather insignificant, amounting to involuntary interferential mistakes in what was generally conceived to be as pure Church Slavonic as possible. Notwithstanding the remoteness of this epoch, some of the crucial choices made at that time proved to have long-lasting effects, partly felt until today. To wit, the adoption of a foreign tongue (albeit a rather closely cognate and thus relatively understandable one) as a vehicle of religion and higher culture ushered in a custom of having a deep contrast between the linguistic make-up proper

Table 4.1. Overall periodization of the history of literary Ukrainian

Period	Dates	Literary language(s)
Preliminary	Late tenth to late thirteenth centuries	Church Slavonic with a varying admixture of local vernacular elements, depending on genre
Old	Early fourteenth to early eighteenth centuries	Vernacular-based “lay” language with a varying admixture of Church Slavonic and Polish elements, depending on genre; along with Church Slavonic in the liturgy, Polish, Romanian and Hungarian in administration, Latin in administration and education
Modern	1798 to today	Vernacular-based language (with various dialectal backgrounds until 1945); along with Russian, German, Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Romanian as the official languages of the respective states

of the written texts and of everyday usage. The Cyrillic alphabet, imported together with Byzantine Christianity, resisted all attempts to replace it with a Latin-based one (especially vigorous in the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth), and is no longer under any real threat. The persistent use of lexical, morphological and phonetic Church Slavonicisms, only gradually diminishing with the course of time, has left some traces in the structure even of modern standard Ukrainian.

As of the beginning of the “old” period, the proportion of local and imported linguistic material in the written texts had greatly changed. Despite the genre-dependent variations (with a greater presence of Church Slavonicisms in the higher style and especially in the religious literature), the vernacular becomes, on the whole, the main structure-building component of the written language. Beginning with the sixteenth century, strong Polish influences are observable, affecting, apart from literary practices, also the everyday usage even of the commoners. Developmental parallels to Polish in the vernacular include common vocabulary, syntactic turns and set expressions. In the written language of the time, local elements were typically intermingled with Church Slavonic and Polish ones in varying proportions. The compromise nature of this language enabled it to serve the needs of both the Ukrainians and the Belarusians, especially until 1569, when these two peoples coexisted within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Its name was “Ruthenian [*ruska mova* or *ruskyi yazyk*],” first attested under the form *Rouskyi yazyk* in the 1261 entry of the *Vollhynian Chronicle* (Polnoe 1908, 851). Distinct from Russian (known at the time as “Musco-

vite”), this language achieved a high degree of versatility and stylistic perfection and occupied a vast range of genres including philosophy and theology. For example, in the writings of Ioanykii Galiatovskyi (c. 1620–1688) it had a linguistic guise capable of developing into a fully-fledged standard language of a mixed nature, a sort of compromise between the vernacular and the bookish legacy mainly consisting of Church Slavonic and Polish elements. Its popular designation, which is also used as a special term in the history of Ukrainian, was *prosta(ia) mova* or *prostyi yazyk* (lay language) as opposed to the Church Slavonic of the liturgical books and the elevated genres of ecclesiastical literature (Moser 2002). In the seventeenth century, it served, beside Polish and Latin, as a vehicle of higher culture in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, and equally as the language of administration. By the end of the “old” period, its distinctness from Belarusian (called “Lithuanian”) became patent and entered popular consciousness (Wakulenko 2010, 121–123). Another distinctive feature of that period was a widely spread polyglottism (Ruthenian, Church Slavonic, Polish, Latin and Greek) among the educated classes.

In the periodization suggested in Table 4.1 above, there is a conspicuous gap covering most of the eighteenth century. That was indeed a crucial period in the history of Ukrainian which profoundly influenced its later shape and destiny, although along rather negative lines. Due to a series of calamitous historical events, culminating in Ivan Mazepa’s (1639–1709) debacle at Poltava, “the Golden Age” (Ohienko 1918, 32) of Ukrainian literature, associated with the Baroque tradition of the Kyivan Academy, came to an abrupt end. The specific language which had largely served as its vehicle, the *prosta mova*, equally degenerated, losing many functional domains in which it had been used. Already by the turn of the eighteenth century, it came to be supplanted in the higher literary genres by the local variety of Church Slavonic, which subsequently evolved in the Russian-ruled part of the country (by that time comprising left-bank, Slobodian and southern Ukraine) into so-called “Slavo-Russian,” a compromise language combining elements of the ecclesiastical style with the Russian vernacular (see the title of Baibakov-Apollos 1794). In administrative usage, the traditional Ruthenian chancellery language was gradually dropped between 1720 and 1750. The standardization of Russian, with a noticeable admixture of Church Slavonicisms, achieved in Lomonosov’s grammar of 1757, made most educated Ukrainians in the Russian Empire adopt that language for literary use. Even Ukrainian autonomists like the anonymous author of the “History of the Rus or Little Russia” (see Borschak 1948) or Vasilii Kapnist (1758–1823) did not hesitate to write their works in it.

The almost complete dismantlement of printing in the Russian-ruled part of Ukraine (beginning with the 1720s) led to a situation, quite paradoxical for the Age of Enlightenment, in which what little original Ukrainian literary production there was could only exist in the form of manuscripts with very limited circulation and, accordingly, a very modest impact on language development (see Shevelov 1979, 706).

For all their importance, these developments within the Russian Empire were only part of what was happening to the Ukrainian language. In fact, the bulk of the most populous Ukrainian regions, i.e., right-bank Ukraine and the western provinces, remained under the sovereignty of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until the end of the eighteenth century. Transcarpathia had been an object of dispute between the Austrian Habsburgs and Transylvania from the 1540s to 1690. Austrian rule definitely prevailed there by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Bukovyna belonged to the Principality of Moldavia, itself a vassal of the Ottoman Porte, since 1514.

Among these lands, Moldavia was the place where the language situation was still less propitious to the Ukrainians than in Russia. Ruthenian, after having been for some time a major chancellery language in the principality (especially between 1354 and 1564 when its capital was situated in Siret and in Suceava, bordering the Ukrainian ethnic territory), was gradually losing ground to Romanian and became completely ousted from the public domain by the turn of the eighteenth century. Besides, it had never been noticeably used in the higher literary genres monopolized by Church Slavonic. Due to a prolonged decay in their intellectual and cultural life, by the end of the “old” period the Ruthenians of Moldavia had found themselves in a condition which Stepan Smal-Stotskyi (1897, 10) pointedly characterized as a “dense murk of ignorance.” Although a new phase was ushered in when Bukovyna became an Austrian province in 1775, it took a long time before the local Ukrainians developed palpable signs of a cultural and linguistic renaissance.

For the largest part of the Ukrainian lands which belonged to the Polish crown, a major turning point was the year 1696 when the Warsaw Diet definitively abolished the official use of Ruthenian, decreeing that “a scribe at a provincial court” must “write in Polish, not in Ruthenian” (Coæquatio 1860, 418 [f. 863]). The status of Ruthenian was thereby seriously impaired, as it was only maintained to some degree in cultural functions by the Greek Catholic and the Orthodox Churches. The decline of the previous writing tradition was, however, less sharp in this region, although the printed literary output was on the whole far inferior to that of the seventeenth century both in quantity and quality (Shevelov 1979, 702).

Ukraine between the Romanov and the Habsburg Empires

This configuration changed substantially in 1772, when Poland had to cede large portions of its territory to its more powerful neighbors, including the province of eastern Galicia populated predominantly by Ukrainians, which became part of the Habsburg Empire. After the subsequent partitions of Poland in 1792 and 1795, first right-bank Ukraine and then western Podillia and Volhynia were annexed by Tsarist Russia, while the Kholm (in Polish, Chełm) land, with a considerable proportion of the Ukrainian population, was attributed, among other territories, to the Habsburg Empire.

In Transcarpathia, with the stabilization of Austrian rule by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the political circumstances became more propitious for cultural development. The literary activity initiated in that region in the seventeenth century was further stimulated by the introduction of printing, the first book of local origin coming off the press in 1698. Throughout the eighteenth century, however, most items were published outside of Transcarpathia, in the Slovak town of Trnava. Despite the pressure coming from Latin and German in the context of education, a modest overall progress in the use of a vernacular-tinged language of the *prosta mova*-type could be observed. In particular, the establishment of higher religious schools, first in Mukachevo and then in Uzhhorod, contributed to the nurturing of Church Slavonic and (partly) of local Ruthenian among the Greek Catholic clergy. Here, in contrast to all other Ukrainian regions, a modest upward rather than a downward trend in the use of Ruthenian was observable.

With minor adjustments (affecting primarily the Kholm land, which passed over to Russia in 1815), the division of Ukrainian territory between the two empires remained in place until World War I. This led to a gradual homogenization of the external circumstances for the use of Ukrainian, both in the bigger part of the Ukrainian lands held by Russia and in the smaller western part governed by the Habsburg Empire. Notwithstanding the regional differences discussed above, by the end of the eighteenth century the language situation in all Ukrainian regions was characterized by the predominance of foreign languages in the higher domains of social life. The languages' regional repartition is summarized in Table 4.2.

Ukrainian was to some extent competing with its stronger rivals only in the spheres of education, religion and literature, although even there it clearly held a lower rank (rudimentary instruction, sermons addressed to the commoners, low literary genres and so on). By contrast, the Ukrainian

Table 4.2. Position of Ukrainian with respect to the dominant languages in various Ukrainian regions by the end of the eighteenth century

	Languages of administration	Languages of the church	Languages of the upper classes	Languages of education	Languages for literary use
Left-bank and southern Ukraine	Russian	Church Slavonic and Slavo-Russian	Russian	Russian and Latin	Russian
Right-bank Ukraine, Volhynia, and Podillia	Russian	Church Slavonic and Polish	Polish and Russian	Polish, Russian and Latin	Polish and Russian
Galicia	German and Polish	Church Slavonic and Polish	Polish and German	Polish, German, Latin and Church Slavonic	Polish, German and Church Slavonic
Bukovyna	German	Church Slavonic and Romanian	German	German	German
Transcarpathia	German and Latin	Church Slavonic	Hungarian	German, Latin and Church Slavonic	Church Slavonic, Latin and Hungarian

vernacular was the everyday language of the lower classes and partly of the middle classes, associated with private and personal life, intimacy and familiarity. This diglossic or sometimes triglossic situation was in need of adjustment to ensure smoother communication within the societies concerned. In view of its disadvantageous starting point, Ukrainian seemed to be doomed to further marginalization and perhaps disappearance, especially as its main alternatives, Russian and Polish, were cognate languages, relatively easy to learn and to identify oneself with.

This marginalization of Ukrainian as a language of higher culture and civilization was reflected in the preface to the *Grammar of the Little Russian Dialect* by Oleksii Pavlovskiy (the first printed Ukrainian grammar, published in 1818, although written two decades earlier), where it was called “a language neither dead nor living” (Pavlovskii 1818, iv). Applied to the

period in question, this observation might seem rather strange. Indeed, the Ukrainian vernacular was then the only living idiom spoken by the majority of the rural population throughout the Ukrainian regions. Its area was expanding, as the annexation of the northern littoral of the Black and Azov Seas by the Russian Empire in 1774–1791 and of Bessarabia in 1812 had opened the way for the colonization of these sparsely inhabited territories by new settlers, among whom the Ukrainians prevailed.

Moreover, Ukrainian was in use in urban areas as well: Grigorii Daniilevskii (1866, 298) quotes the words of a certain Timofei Selivanov, who, on coming to Kharkiv in 1807, found the teachers in the local schools “jabbering Ukrainian with the pupils.” Only the newly arrived seminary graduates, including himself, “imposed speaking Russian upon them by the order of the authorities.” Pavlovskyi’s remark could then only refer to the microscopic presence of Ukrainian in the world of letters.

The cleft between the vernacular used by the local population in everyday communication and the language of written documents and printed matter, as well as that of the educated classes, had thus become obvious by the turn of the nineteenth century, creating a tension that required a solution on the plane of language planning.

Contrary to what could have been expected as the most probable outcome—the definite relegation of Ukrainian to the status of provincial parlance and the adoption of dominant languages as vehicles of standard communication—the actual course of events took a different turn. What had been a vague mass of dialects without a common name by the mid-eighteenth century became a fully-fledged standard language in the 1920s, despite the failure of aspirations to achieve a consistent nationhood for the Ukrainian people.

Rationalist and Romantic models of language planning

The standardization of Ukrainian was the result of sustained efforts based on a consistent ideology underlying linguistic attitudes. In fact, the eighteenth century saw the birth of two mutually opposed basic models of language standardization, the rationalist model and the Romantic one, the former in line with the language theory of Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714–1780) and the latter in line with that of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). According to Dirk Geeraerts (2003), a pioneer of this approach to the study of language planning, the two models differ along three main criteria: their “linguistic-philosophical basis,” their “conception of standardization” and their “conception of language variation.” Geeraerts

summarized the essence of the divergence between the two models in a table (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3. The essential features of the rationalist and Romantic models of language standardization according to Geeraerts (2003, 40)

	The rationalist model	The Romantic model
Linguistic-philosophical basis	Language as a medium of communication	Language as a medium of expression
Conception of standardization	A democratic ideal: Standard language as a neutral medium of social participation	Anti-ideological criticism: Standard language as a medium of social exclusion
Conception of language variation	Language variation as an impediment to emancipation	Language variation as expressing different identities

Geeraerts (2003, 27) admits that his models are “to some extent abstract, general, perhaps even simplistic” and can only serve as idealized cognitive reference points. Nevertheless, he cites the language policy of revolutionary France, with its stress on the generality and uniformity of the standard language, its emancipatory function and its condemnation of local dialects as a typical example of the rationalist attitude toward language (see Geeraerts 2003, 30–34). In short, according to the rationalist model, a common standard, eliminating both the territorial and the social language variation, was regarded as a means to ensure equal participation in public life by all citizens.

Both the Romanov and the Habsburg Empires were of course quite distant in their ideologies from the French Republic. The emancipatory and egalitarian component of French rationalist doctrine occupied no place on their respective agendas. Furthermore, the overall objectives of the language policies practiced on either side of the Russian–Austrian border were not identical.

In Russia, however, the stress lay on the communicational generality of the standard language, corresponding to the rationalist attitude with respect to Geeraerts’ first criterion. Characteristically, Ukrainian authors of “universal” or “rationalist” grammars of Russian from the beginning of the nineteenth century did not fail to underscore this crucial ideological point. For example, a Kharkiv college teacher, Ivan Ornatovskiy (1810, 38), described the common written language of the Empire, which he

called by turns “Slavo-Russian [*slaviano-ruskii*]” or “Russian [*rossiiskii*],” as being “universal [*vseobshchii*],” even if only “used by the most educated people in the society.” Notably he did not identify this language with Great Russian, placing the latter at the same level as dialects like Little Russian, White Russian and “Lower” Russian (*nizovskoe narechie*), the latter being the dialect of the lower reaches of the Don (28). In a similar vein, Illia Tymkovskiy (1773–1853) (1811, 46), a professor at the University of Kharkiv, claimed that “our purified language” had resulted from a fusion of the most potent dialects of Novgorod, Moscow and Kyiv, being elaborated in its varieties “through common usage parallel to the growth and the changes of the social order.” In the course of time, a special term—“common Russian [*obshcherusskii yazyk*]”—was even coined in order better to assert the umbrella character of this standard language (see Shevelov 1994, 20–26). Its earliest known attestation dates back to 1845 (Biletskyi-Nosenko 1966, 14).

While reintroducing their language into the sphere of literature, Ukrainians in the Russian Empire used arguments in its support which ran contrary to the ideology of serving the easiest and farthest-reaching communication. Amvrosii Metlinskyi (1814–1870) (1850, 62), a professor at the Universities of Kharkiv and Kyiv as well as a leading Romantic poet, theorized in the following way: “Language springs from man’s craving to manifest his consciousness in the outer world.” Or else he pointed up this priority of the expressive function in a more poetical formulation: “The sound of language is an incarnation of thought, and thought is the voice of the soul” (61). It is interesting to note, also with respect to Geeraerts’ two other criteria, that the reasoning of the pioneers of the new Ukrainian literature was congruous with the paradigmatic Romantic stance. The domination of Russian resulted, from their point of view, in the social exclusion and marginalization of speakers of Ukrainian. Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko (1778–1843) (1833, 5) suggested ironically: “There still remain in the world some Orthodox Christians capable and fond of reading in our language. Not everything must serve the Muscovites, something might also be set aside for us, so that we should have ... let’s say, not a complete, but at least a humble knowledge ... of certain things, because you imagine that we are ... so-so ... lagging far behind you.” As for language variation, the French push to do away with patois (see Geeraerts 2003, 31–33) found its perfect opposite in Oleksii Pavlovskiy’s (1818, 113–114) defense of linguistic multiplicity: “The question is posed: ‘Does one need to maintain various dialects, of which there is such abundance in every language? Or should one doom them

to oblivion?’ I answer resolutely: ‘All dialects, whatever their number, should be maintained in whatever language, and even more so in our own native tongue.’” The substantiation of this response had an unmistakable Romantic tinge: “*Speech, or language, is a sublime gift bestowed upon men by the generosity of God’s wisdom. A dialect is a wonderful modification of that gift, representing a notion of its infinitude adapted to our capacities. To neglect the dialects means to ungratefully disdain a path leading our intellect to an understanding of this notion, to say nothing of the fact that this path is similar to ... Ariadne’s thread in the labyrinth of manifold knowledge*” (114; italics in the original).

The Ukrainian case thus fits quite well into what Geeraerts defined as the “romantic” model of language standardization. However, Geeraerts himself avoided giving a concrete positive example of such a model being put into practice. Instead, he illustrated it with modern criticism directed at the oppressive role of English as a globalization tool (see Geeraerts 2003, 38–39). In this perspective, supranational English is accused of being an instrument of discrimination, privileging certain social groups to the detriment of others. In the end, according to Geeraerts, it serves to destroy smaller languages and, by the same token, cultures, bearers of mankind’s diversity.

Geeraerts (2003, 43–49) dwells on the interaction between the two basic models during the nationalist era and comes to the conclusion that the current postmodern awareness, while relativizing the ideological claims advanced in the past, tends to accept some type of functional differentiation between languages. Multilingualism, or rather diglossia or even polyglossia, is thus seen as a way to reconcile, albeit not altogether unproblematically, both the universalist purport of the rationalist model and the concern for cultural identity and integrity implied by the Romantic model. Accordingly, the global language is associated with such “secondary domains” as higher education and political life, while the local languages are supposed to serve the “primary domains” of the more private or emotional aspects of human existence (51).

As far as Russian-ruled Ukraine is concerned, its starting point at the turn of the nineteenth century was essentially where Geeraerts arrives at in his discussion of the postmodern stance: a diglossic situation with the Russian standard language being used in public life, education and other spheres, and the Ukrainian vernacular confined to primordial, personal and intimate communicative needs. It is, however, exactly this situation that became not a solution but a source of tensions in the sphere of inter-language relations.

While the official spheres of communication were dominated by standard Russian, a compromise language elaborated in the eighteenth century by saturating the artificial “Slavo-Russian” language with elements of the living vernacular, a similar path of development was closed to Ukrainian, which had to move along different lines in order to offer a viable alternative at least in the field of belles lettres (see Lysychenko 2011, 48–49). The remarkable vitality demonstrated by Ukrainian during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, despite many vicissitudes, arose indeed from the basic choice in favor of the Romantic principle of sticking as closely as possible to the language of the popular masses (see Moser 2000, 144).

In his frequently cited advocacy of Ukrainian, Sreznevskii (1834, 134), after affirming that it is an independent language and not a dialect of Russian or Polish, proceeded to a eulogy of its intrinsic virtues, calling it “one of the richest Slavic idioms ... hardly inferior, for example, to Bohemian in profusion of words and expressions, to Polish in picturesqueness, or Serbian in agreeable tone.” This language, according to him, even “without having been refined, already compares with cultivated languages in syntactic flexibility and richness.” A language with such properties certainly deserved an attempt to turn it into a fully-fledged vehicle of literature and culture on the basis of what it already had achieved. Indeed, Sreznevskii (1834, 134–135) envisaged two possible outcomes concerning its future, which he presented in the form of a question: “But can it [Ukrainian] or should it continue its development in the present circumstances to become a language of literature and subsequently of the society, as it partly used to be formerly, or is its fate to remain forever a language of common people, to suffer permanent distortions, to fade and languish little by little amid the thicket of other languages, and disappear in the long run from the face of the earth without leaving a trace or a remembrance?” Sreznevskii’s own prediction (1834, 135) was cautiously optimistic: he believed that Ukrainian could have a hope of achieving “literary glory” despite the fact that it was only making its first steps toward that end. However, the three key adjectives that he used in characterizing this language, namely “*poetic*,” “*melodic*” and “*vivid*” (134; italics in the original), would prefigure its fate for many decades to come, such that Ukrainian was basically confined to the field of belles lettres, without significant access to more “serious” genres or to the linguistic practices of “society.”

If the actual reintroduction of the Ukrainian language into literary life was initiated in Russian-ruled Ukraine, and more exactly in its eastern part, with Kharkiv and Poltava as its main centers, that was not a matter of chance. In contradistinction to right-bank Ukraine, where the elites were

at that time heavily Polonized, left-bank Ukraine did possess its own educated class, consisting mainly of local gentry and nobility (many of them former Cossack dignitaries), that maintained a good command of Ukrainian, was open to new ideas coming from the West, and thus became the first driving force of national renaissance (see Doroshenko 1933, 286–287 and 290–291).

The institutionalization of the Ukrainian language

The routine view of the history of modern standard Ukrainian is based on the idea that Ivan Kotliarevskyi (1769–1838) was its “initiator [*zachy-natel*]” and Taras Shevchenko (1814–1861) its “establisher [*osnovopolozhnyk*].” This simplistic but pervasive interpretation does not hold even for the Russian-ruled part of Ukraine, as it disregards the crucial contributions made by the so-called Kharkiv School of Romantics and by the first Ukrainian prose writer, Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko (see Lysychenko 2011, 33 and 38). The idea’s origins are relatively recent and date back to the middle of the twentieth century. The literary critic Illia Stebun (1911–2005) (1939a, 3; 1939b, 9 and 19) seems to have been the first to apply the term “establisher” to Shevchenko with respect to both modern Ukrainian literature and language. At that time, however, the terminology was yet unsettled, wavering between a number of synonyms: alongside “establisher,” other terms like “creator [*tvorets*]” or “originator [*rodonachalnyk*]” (see Levchenko 1939, 330; Rusanivskyi 1939, 29; Stebun 1939b, 9) were equally used. An express distinction between Kotliarevskyi as “initiator” and Shevchenko as “establisher,” probably first worded as such in Soviet Ukraine by Fedir Medvediev (1948, 14), was soon made canonical by Ivan Bilodid (1951, 19–20) in his “Introduction” opening the celebrated *A Course in Modern Literary Ukrainian*, edited by Leonid Bulakhovskyi in 1951. As Yevhen Rehushevskyi (2000) has shown, the underlying reasons were of an ideological nature: the cursory remark of Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) (1976, 489) concerning the necessity of publishing an explanatory dictionary of “the *contemporary* (from Pushkin to Gorky) Russian language” (italics in the original) having been taken at its face value, Aleksandr Pushkin (1799–1837) was granted the title of the “establisher” of that language. Within the Soviet intellectual paradigm, the “establishment” of Ukrainian had to be placed at a later date, and thus Shevchenko was chosen for that role, instead of Kotliarevskyi, whose *Aeneid* (1798) had been published one year before Pushkin was born.

Among professional linguists, Vasyl Vashchenko (1940) was the first one to call Shevchenko the “establisher” of standard Ukrainian. His most pertinent argument was based on the correct claim that Shevchenko’s predecessors, including Kotliarevskiy (and, for that matter, also Kvitka-Osnovianenko), heavily relied on their native dialects without aspiring to form a common standard language for the entirety of Ukrainians. By contrast, Shevchenko, “instead of copying dialectal particularities of speech, selects from all dialects what is best, most typical, generally known, commonly used” (Vashchenko 1940, 58). According to Vashchenko (1940, 59), such a “synthesis of all dialects lays a foundation into which all other elements organically entwine themselves, creating a standard language.”

No matter whether the literary works reposed on one dialect or on a synthesis of several dialects, the inevitable vernacular tint implied by this writing manner brought about a serious peril, especially palpable in a bilingual society, of appearing rustic and thus functionally subordinate (see Lysychenko 2011, 57–58). One of the most notable figures in Ukrainian intellectual life, Mykola Kostomarov (1817–1885) (1882, 891), reflected this aspect in his characterization of the “old-time Little Russian gentleman,” who was prone “to regard the contempt for all things rustic as a mark of his own high learning, and even to boast that, being himself a learned person, he does not understand what the rustic says in his clownish dialect.” For all his sympathy with the Ukrainian cause, Kostomarov considered himself a realist. He claimed that Ukrainian literature should remain rustic in its scope, at least for the time being, and warned against overhasty attempts “to make Little Russian somehow resemble languages possessing a fully-fledged literature and scholarship for a long time” (*ibid.*, 896). In an earlier letter to Hryhorii Danilevskiy (1829–1890), dated 1854, Kostomarov (1903, 66–67) had claimed that the Ukrainian dialect should be developed to a degree in order to express the “people’s past and present way of life and especially the works of the people’s fantasy,” but dismissed “the unreasonable and impracticable desire to impart to Ukrainian literature a scope that would completely exclude our common Russian language.” A complete emancipation of Ukrainian as a fully functional standard language in the circumstances obtaining in the Russian Empire seemed an unrealistic demand even to its ardent supporters. At best, it could lay claim to certain niches, first and foremost in *belles lettres* of a not too sophisticated sort.

In Habsburg-ruled Galicia and Bukovyna, the general framework for the use of languages was quite different. German-speaking Austrians, the dominant nation in the Habsburg Empire, were only a small minority

among a dozen peoples constituting the empire's population, some of whom had their own literary traditions of long standing. The imposition of German as the only official and learned language in this state would have been an impracticable task. Therefore, much more room was left for the local languages in each province, including Ruthenian. Of course, its starting positions were rather weak, as it had to compete first and foremost with Polish, a language of unquestionable rank and prestige. While promoting their native language, the Ruthenian intellectuals did not appeal to its intrinsic beauty and perfection but rather recurred to the argument of dignity. In the "Disquisition about the Ruthenian Tongue" by Ivan Mohylnytskyi (1777–1831), the first earnest plea among the Galicians for the rights of the Ukrainian language initially published in a Polish translation, this strategy is quite obvious. According to the author, "both the Ruthenian language and the Ruthenian nation are a primary branch of Slavdom," and this language "still survives and will survive in the mouth of the Ruthenian nation beside other languages of the Slavic race" (Mogilnicki 1829, 61). Apart from its equal status with other Slavic languages (in the first place Polish and Muscovite), Ruthenian can pride itself on its glorious history: "In the Ruthenian lands subordinated to the Polish crown, Ruthenian was not only the language of common people, but also of the government, used at the court of the Grand Dukes of Lithuania and of noble Ruthenian families" (ibid., 62).

Instead of nurturing vernacular Romantic poetry, the leading Galician figures in language planning for Ruthenian, most of whom were clergymen, concentrated on implanting the language in schools, church administration and public life. In the absence of competition with Russian, they tried at first to embark on a road of compromise between Church Slavonic and local vernacular in corpus planning, largely repeating the evolution of Russian in the eighteenth century. This led to the emergence of a bookish language variety cultivated by the local Russophiles, and ironically called by its opponents *yazychiie*, "gobbledygook" (see Moser 2004; Verkh-ratskyi 1903), which heavily marked the language situation in the Austrian-ruled part of Ukraine throughout the nineteenth century.

The first programmatic attempt to introduce a vernacular-based literary language in Galicia is dated 1837, when the so-called "Ruthenian Triad," consisting of Markiian Shashkevych (1811–1843), Yakiv Holovatskyi and Ivan Vahylevych, published their celebrated anthology *The Naiad of the Dniester*. However, it met with strong opposition from the ecclesiastic authorities and failed to produce an immediate decisive effect (Kolesa 1924, 18). The ascendancy of the vernacular-based language only

became perceptible in Galicia in the 1860s (Svientsitskyi 1917, 29). This language reposed on the relatively archaic Dniester dialect, with some elements from other neighboring dialects of Galicia. Therefore, it noticeably differed from the one used in the Russian-ruled part of Ukraine. The latter was instead based on the recently formed southeastern dialects of a synthetic and innovative nature.

The two initial foci of the Ukrainian linguistic renaissance were thus Russian-ruled left-bank Ukraine and Austrian-ruled Galicia. The other Russian-ruled regions of Ukraine (right-bank, Volhynia and southern Ukraine) followed the left-bank model of development, while Bukovyna went in the footsteps of Galicia (in both cases it happened with some delay). The differences in language-planning processes between the two regions are reflected in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4. Differences in language-planning processes between the Russian-ruled and the Austrian-ruled parts of Ukraine

Russian-ruled Ukraine	Austrian-ruled Ukraine
Local gentry and nobility as chief promoters of the linguistic renaissance	Greek Catholic clergy as the chief promoter of the linguistic renaissance
Earlier “vernacular turn” (1798)	Later “vernacular turn” (the 1860s)
Lower proportion of Church Slavonicisms in the written language	Higher proportion of Church Slavonicisms in the written language
Negative attitude to Russianisms; neutrality toward Polishisms	Negative attitude to Polishisms; neutrality toward Russianisms
Inadvertent use of Russianisms	Inadvertent use of Polishisms
Innovative southeastern dialectal foundations	Standard language essentially based on the archaic Dniester dialect
Admittedly “purer” language	Admittedly more multifunctional language

In Bukovyna, the first attempts to introduce the vernacular into literary practice came from authors like Yuri Fedkovych and Sydir Vorobkevych in the 1860s (Dobrzhanskyi 1999, 130–136). Nonetheless, the Russo-ophile-supported “gobbledygook” continued to predominate there for the ensuing twenty-five years. Since the mid-1880s, however, the ethnocentric movement of the so-called “nativists [*narodovtsi*]” triumphed in the most

influential organizations of the Bukovynian Ukrainians, which switched to the vernacular-based language. The local press, including the influential *Bukovyna* newspaper, followed suit (Dobrzhanskyi 1999, 187–198; Kolytylo 2002, 72–74).

The situation in Transcarpathia was different even as compared to Galicia and Bukovyna. If the “vernacular turn” was delayed in Galicia due to the relative weakness of the Romantic language-planning ideology, with *The Naiad of the Dniester* as its only notable manifestation (Shevelov 1966, 27–28), the prominent Transcarpathian awakeners of the mid-nineteenth century Oleksander Dukhnovych (1803–1865) and Adolf Dobrianskyi (1817–1901) failed altogether to accept the ideas of Romanticism (Ferents 2005, 112–113). Only the historical fiction by Anatolii Kralytskyi (1835–1894) can be regarded as a belated echo of this literary current in Transcarpathia (Padiak 2010, 77 and 80–81). As a result, the earlier desultory attempts to introduce the local vernacular into writing practices had no continuation, and a variety of either “gobbledygook” or of standard Russian, as far as the latter could be mastered by the local Russophiles, dominated the intellectual scene until the turn of the twentieth century (Ferents 2005, 115; Padiak 2010, 105).

The politically motivated bans of the Ukrainian language in 1863 and 1876

A major political development that ushered in a new agenda in language planning for Ukrainian was the 1863 ban on its use in public and in print, imposed in Russia by Interior Minister Petr Valuev (Lemke 1904, 302–304). It was reinforced in the 1876 “Conclusions of a Special Meeting with the Objective of Stopping the Ukrainophile Propaganda,” amended and signed by Emperor Alexander II in the German resort of Bad-Ems (Savchenko 1930, 381–383), and therefore known under the name *Emskyi ukas* (Danylenko 2010; Remy 2007, 2016). Valuev’s ministerial circular contained two mutually contradictory theses. On the one hand, it peremptorily asserted that “a separate Little Russian language has never existed, does not exist, and cannot exist” (Lemke 1904, 303). On the other hand, it expressed concern over the fact that an alarming urge had appeared to spread literacy among the uneducated masses by providing them with elementary readers, primers, grammars and geography textbooks in this allegedly nonexistent language (302). The idiom spoken by the commoners in “southern Russia” was granted the status of a Russian dialect, albeit one corrupted under Polish influence. Moreover, the circular claimed that

“common Russian” was more intelligible to the Little Russians than “the so-called Ukrainian language” invented for their sake “by some Little Russians and especially by Poles” (303). The Russian authorities tried hereby to block the use of Ukrainian outside the field of belles lettres and to prevent its upgrading to a vehicle of communication beyond the scope of rustic themes.

Especially the second, severer interdiction of Ukrainian in 1876, which made it impossible to publish original or translated works of fiction and to stage performances or recitals in the language (Savchenko 1930, 381), had an adverse effect on its position in the Russian Empire. At the same time, it had a momentous beneficial side effect. Publishing activities became concentrated in Galicia and later also in Bukovyna. Authors from the Russian-ruled regions became massively present in the local periodicals and on the book market. As a result, a process of mutual adjustment of the written language began. It was carried out both subconsciously, due to a flow of reciprocal borrowings from one language variety to the other, and consciously, especially in the course of an open linguistic discussion between the representatives of both camps that took place in the Galician press in 1891–1892 (Shevelov 1966, 61–69). Although a complete homogenization of language could not be achieved in the conditions of a country divided between two different states, some progress was nonetheless made, and, most importantly, the very issue of linguistic unity appeared on the Ukrainian list of top priorities.

Competition between eastern and western dialects

After the invalidation of the ban on Ukrainian in Russia in 1905, the language finally found its way into the press and partly also into public life, including some aspects of education. Its rapid expansion had to prop itself up on the achievements of the previous period. In practice, this meant that the Galician and Bukovynian journalistic and scholarly language was extensively transplanted to the Russian-ruled part of the country. This gave rise to another especially animated linguistic discussion between 1907 and 1913 (Shevelov 1966, 84–92; Shevelov 1986, 122–124; Tryfonov 2000). Its actual initiator was the fiction writer Ivan Nechui-Levytskyi (1838–1918), a staunch opponent of the Galician language and style. His insistence on the need to keep as close as possible to the living vernacular of central Ukraine played up a contrast between the two varieties that became a psychological commonplace: the language of the Russian-ruled part of the country was primarily associated with all things rustic, while the

written language of Galicia and Bukovyna differed from it by its urbane and versatile character. The general feeling was, anyway, in favor of a compromise between the eastern and the western usage. The Galicians were on the whole readier to make concessions and to admit the intrinsic superiority of the eastern variety. Oleksander Kolessa (1867–1945) (1924, 30), himself a Galician, expressed this attitude quite unequivocally:

It is not a matter of chance, but a historical necessity that the biggest and most uniform *southeastern group of dialects*, this vigorous and powerfully expanding idiom, which ... has conserved the purest type of the Ukrainian language and, developing itself at the fastest pace in the direction indicated by physiological propensity, embodies the highest degree of phonological evolution, that this euphonic, gentle and structurally well-endowed dialect ... *rose to the dignity of a standard language*. (Italics in the original).

On the other side, the reasonable easterners were equally disposed to accept what the west had to offer. Vasyl Mova (1842–1891), a Kuban Cossack by origin, reflected this attitude as early as 1883, recognizing the progress achieved by the Galicians in developing the journalistic and scientific style in Ukrainian. In his view, eastern fiction writing could serve the Galicians by providing them with “raw and primal linguistic material for a literary and scientific refinement of our speech,” which could subsequently also be put to use in belles lettres. As a result, “we would exert on them, as well as they on us, a stimulating influence, very useful for the national cause” (quoted in Vozniak 1928, 27).

The impact of statehood and autonomy on language

This mutually stimulating interaction between the two regions during several decades made it possible for Ukrainian to serve as the official language of a series of short-lived independent Ukrainian states that came into being in the period of political turmoil of 1918–1920, following World War I (Danylevska 2009, 54–73). A critical threshold was thus crossed: after these events the autonomous status of Ukrainian (as a language and not a dialect) never came into doubt in serious discourse. A linguistic criterion was used to define the borders of the Ukrainian state, which was supposed to include territories with a predominance of Ukrainian-speaking population. Accordingly, in a series of international talks held during this period, the Ukrainian side laid claim on some areas that were historically

and administratively linked to Belarus, Poland and Russia, but made virtually no real attempts to incorporate southern Bessarabia except for its easternmost part (Boiechko, Hanzha and Zakharchuk 1994, 12–43).

After the definitive defeat of the Ukrainian striving for independence in 1920, the territory of the country was divided up between four neighboring states. In Galicia, incorporated by Poland, the situation of Ukrainian deteriorated as compared to the Austrian era; whereas in Volhynia, which also became part of Poland, its situation did not change perceptibly from what had been the case under Russian rule. Similarly, among the territories that became part of Romania, Ukrainian suffered a clear regress in the formerly Austrian Bukovyna, while in the northern and southern counties of Bessarabia, formerly part of the Russian Empire, there was no tangible alteration to its legal status, which continued to be close to nonexistent. Both in Bukovyna and in Galicia, the local Ukrainians acted in “the spirit of the Habsburg monarchy” (Kolotylo 2002, 76), and mainly relied on juridical procedures and public discussions to defend their language rights (for example, Dombchevskyi 1934).

Far more interesting were the developments in Transcarpathia. After having experienced several decades of forceful Magyarization following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the local population felt “a call of the blood” in 1918–1919 (Ferents 2005, 121), choosing to identify itself with Ukraine. Attributed to the new—and fairly democratic—state of Czechoslovakia by the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, this province found itself for the first time in history in a situation relatively favorable for its national advancement. Within less than two decades, it reiterated at an accelerated pace the vicissitudes of the struggle for linguistic emancipation that the rest of Ukraine had gone through during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The competition involved a pro-Ukrainian, a pro-Ruthenian (autochthonous) and a pro-Russian movement (Danyliuk 2013, 193–194; Magocsi 2004, 94–97), and concerned the entirety of issues previously debated between the Russian-ruled and the Austrian-ruled parts of Ukraine, including the status of Ukrainian as either a language or a dialect, the expediency of adhering to one common standard or of creating a local standard, and the relative advantages of etymological and phonetic orthographies. The vernacular turn, however, finally arrived here too with the publication of Ruthenian grammars by Avhustyn Voloshyn (1874–1945) (1919) and Ivan Pankevych (1887–1958) (1922). Just as elsewhere, this inaugurated a potent drive toward taking up the common Ukrainian standard for literary usage. It culminated in the adoption of Ukrainian as the official language of Carpathian Ukraine in March 1939, on the eve of the

Hungarian invasion that put an end to the existence of this ephemeral independent state (Kuras 1994, 242).

The most momentous processes were taking place in Soviet Ukraine. Although the striving for independence in 1918–1920 was not successful, one of its results was that the new Soviet regime had to recognize the necessity of satisfying to some extent the national and language rights of the Ukrainians. Although the Communist Party's political doctrine refrained from using the notion of "official language," Ukrainian became *de facto* a co-official language in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (Ukrainian SSR) alongside Russian. A crucial period for its furtherance and corpus planning was between 1925 and 1932 when the Communist Party favored the so-called policy of "Ukrainization" (Shevelov 1987, 118–145). The term "Ukrainization," as applied to Ukraine, does seem rather strange, but it reveals, among other things, the essence of the difficulties that the standardizers of Ukrainian were facing at the time. The almost absolute nonexistence of education in Ukrainian in the Russian-ruled lands until 1917 had created a situation in which numerous speakers of Ukrainian could only read and write in Russian. It is primarily to this audience that the language reference books issued in the 1920s and early 1930s, including such pivotal publications as the spelling rules of 1928 (Ukrainskyi pravopys 1929) or the guide to correct Ukrainian usage by Olena Kurylo (1890–?) (1925), were addressed. To combat many speakers' habit of patterning written Ukrainian on Russian, the practical linguists of the time programmatically relied on the living vernacular speech as a touchstone for telling proper from improper in language usage.

"Ukrainization" slackened by the turn of the 1930s and came to a definitive end in 1933. Symptomatically, one of the crucial publications that heralded its abolition was an article entitled "Against the 'Vernacularism' in Linguistics," in which the principle of basing modern standard Ukrainian exclusively on "the people's speech" was expressly denounced as "harmful" (Kahanovych 1930, 63). A symbolic change of the previous corpus-planning course was the adoption of new spelling rules in 1933, in which, maybe inadvertently but tellingly, quite a different criterion slipped in: "as ... accepted by the Soviet state organs" (Ukrainskyi pravopys 1933, 65). Thus a new course, and this time a long-lasting one, toward the "Sovietization" of Ukrainian was launched, which in practice implied a profound revision of previous corpus-planning efforts in the sense of bringing the very structure of Ukrainian as close as possible to Russian (Shevelov 1987, 174; compare Vakulenko 2009, 304–307). One of the noteworthy aspects of this new course, quite contrary to Ukrai-

nian language-planning tradition since Pavlovskiy, was a profoundly hostile attitude toward all types of dialectal elements (Plachynda 1989, 21). With the annexation of Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovyna and Bessarabia by the Soviet Union in 1939–1940 and of Transcarpathia in 1945, this tendency embraced almost the entirety of the Ukrainian ethnic territories.

Soviet language policy in the western and southwestern regions of Ukraine (1939–1991)

KATERYNA KARUNYK

World War II brought a series of changes to the Ukrainian borders: Galicia, Volhynia, northern Bukovyna, and northern and southern Bessarabia (the latter also called Budzhak) were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR. Galicia (including Tarnopolska,¹ Lvivska, Drohobytka² and Stanislavska³ oblasts) and Volhynia (Volynska and Rovenska⁴ oblasts) were officially annexed to Soviet Ukraine in November 1939, after the division of Polish territories following the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. Northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia were ceded by Romania to the USSR and legally became an integral part of Soviet Ukraine in August 1940. However, Soviet rule over these lands did not last long: in summer 1941, following the German aggression against the USSR, the Red Army quickly abandoned them. Galicia was included as a separate “district” in the German General Governorate, Volhynia formed part of the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, while Romania resumed possession of Bukovyna and Bessarabia. The Soviet Union reconquered these territories during 1944. In October 1944, the Red Army took possession of Transcarpathia, and on June 29, 1945, it officially became Soviet territory (Dovhanych 1999, 200–201).

The language situation in the various newly annexed regions differed distinctly; having belonged to different countries, they had dissimilar ethnic, historical and political backgrounds. The USSR treated the regions in a special way, and the language policy implemented there stood apart from the one implemented in the rest of Soviet Ukraine. This concerned

¹ On August 9, 1944, the city of Tarnopol was renamed to Ternopil.

² In 1959, Drohobytka oblast became part of Lvivska oblast.

³ On November 9, 1962, it was renamed to Ivano-Frankivska oblast.

⁴ Rovno was the city’s official name during Soviet rule. On June 11, 1991, it was renamed to Rivne (and the oblast, to Rivnenska).

both general rhetoric and the practical measures taken in such fields as education, culture and media.

Language policy towards the newly annexed territories in 1939–1941

For all its brevity, the period of 1939–1941 was of crucial importance, as the Soviet regime's approach to handling linguistic diversity in the newly annexed territories, with a population mostly unaccustomed to Russian, revealed itself for the first time. In many respects, it may be regarded as a prelude to the more consistent policies implemented in the postwar period.

The national and linguistic situation in the newly annexed regions was indeed quite challenging. The Polish census that took place in 1931 showed that the population of Galicia was mixed and included, apart from native speakers of Ukrainian (about 50 percent), large and influential groups of native speakers of Polish (about 40 percent) and native speakers of Yiddish and Hebrew (about 8 percent) that prevailed in urban areas. Volhynia offered a rather different picture regarding the distribution of languages: there were 69 percent native speakers of Ukrainian, 16 percent Polish and 10 percent Yiddish and Hebrew (Lozynskyi 2008, 125–126; compare Nedolska 1999, 101). In many urban areas, the Ukrainians and Jews outnumbered the native speakers of Polish (Lozynskyi 2008, 127–128). In the formerly Romanian regions, linguistic diversity was even greater. In northern Bukovyna, Ukrainian was the native language of about half of the total population, followed by Romanian (24 percent), Yiddish (11 percent), German (9 percent), Polish (4.5 percent) and Russian (slightly over 1 percent). In the Khotyn county of northern Bessarabia, the respective figures were 45 percent Ukrainian native speakers, 33 percent Romanian, 12 percent Russian and 9 percent Yiddish. Finally, in southern Bessarabia the most numerous linguistic group, native speakers of Russian, accounted for 25 percent of the total population, with other major languages being Romanian (23 percent), Bulgarian (21 percent), Ukrainian (14 percent), German (10 percent), Gagauz (4 percent) and Yiddish (3 percent). Policies of the Soviet authorities in the newly annexed lands were conditioned by historical factors: whereas Volhynia and Bessarabia had belonged to the Russian Empire for over a century until the end of World War I, Galicia and Bukovyna had been Austrian provinces and were therefore largely *terra incognita* for the Soviet rulers.

During the first months of the Soviet administration in 1939 and 1940, the national and linguistic policy in the regions seemed to differ from that which was being pursued at this time in the rest of Soviet Ukraine, where

a course toward Russification/Sovietization had been adopted beginning in the early 1930s. To win the minds of the new citizens, the Soviet authorities used democratic phraseology and pledged total equality for all ethnic groups and all languages (Radianska Bukovyna 1940, 1). The Soviet press insisted that the Polish government had compelled Ukrainians and other minorities to speak Polish (Kozlaniuk and Pelekhatyi 1939, 3; Pelekhatyi 1939, 3) and stressed the fact that the “native” language (often unspecified) had been forbidden in Bukovyna and Bessarabia under Romanian rule (Belousova 1941, 2; Leninska molod 1940a, 2; Radianska Bukovyna 1940, 1).

With respect to language policy, the Ukrainian population became the main target group of Soviet propaganda. The Ukrainians were now promised broad language rights and possibilities for being educated in their mother tongue (Hapii 1949, 45). The Soviet propaganda even went so far as to claim that Ukrainian was the official language in the Ukrainian SSR: “The Soviet authorities and the Communist Party provided all the conditions for the blossoming of a truly popular Ukrainian Soviet culture. The Ukrainian language is official” (Komunist 1939, 1; compare Leninska molod 1940b, 1; Radianska Bukovyna 1940, 1). The western Ukrainians were led to believe that the Ukrainian language legally had an official status in all the administrative bodies in Soviet Ukraine (Rudnytska 1958, 91). This rhetoric contrasted with the mainstream Soviet practice, which tended to avoid the notion of “official language,” even for Russian, in accordance with the conviction of Lenin (1972, 73) that there should be “no compulsory official language.” The USSR Constitution of 1936⁵ only mentioned two terms: “the language of a Union republic or of an autonomous republic” and “native language.” It is true that the Ukrainian party leadership sometimes would apply the term *official* to the Ukrainian language in their documents intended for internal usage (around 1937), but the republic’s new constitution, passed on January 30, 1937, disregarded this issue altogether (Yefimenko 2001, 44–45; Konstytutsiia 1937).

Thus the Soviet authorities seemed initially to favor the Ukrainian language, with the exception of southern Bessarabia where Russian was given a special preference from the start. While in Volhynia, Galicia, Bukovyna and northern Bessarabia, the newly established regional and district Soviet newspapers were published in Ukrainian, in southern Bessarabia the local

⁵ Exceptionally, stipulations about official languages were included in the constitutions of the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republics. The languages of the titular nationalities had the status of being the official languages in their respective republics until 1977.

press came out solely in Russian. At the same time, some communist periodicals also appeared in Polish, Romanian and Yiddish (Mick 2014, 153; Romanenko 2013, 137) in place of the abolished “bourgeois” ones.

In the field of education, similar tendencies were observed, although with some differences. In the former Polish territories, Ukrainian was introduced as the main language of instruction in schools of all levels; however, some room was also left for education in Polish (Boreisha 1941, 3). Besides, Russian schools (previously nonexistent) were also founded, and the learning of Russian was made compulsory in all schools (Rudnytska 1958, 91). In Chernivetska oblast, comprising the formerly Romanian regions of northern Bukovyna and northern Bessarabia, in 1941 most schools (458) offered education in Ukrainian, with other languages of instruction being Moldavian⁶ (in 149 schools), Russian (15 schools), Yiddish (12 schools) and Polish (2 schools) (Luchytskyi 1941, 45). In southern Bessarabia, despite the overall domination of Russian, about one-quarter of all schools operated in Ukrainian, while Moldavian and Yiddish were also present to some extent (Belousova 1941, 2). A distinctive feature of this process of rapid Ukrainization of the educational system in the newly annexed regions was the relocation of a large number of people from other parts of Soviet Ukraine: during 1940–1941, nearly 20,000 schoolteachers from eastern Ukraine were delegated to the western provinces (Kholevchuk and Vynnyk 1990, 165). One reason for this was the shortage of qualified personnel (Vyshniakova 1962, 46). Even more important, however, was the Soviet authorities’ distrust of the local people, especially of the educated classes. Newcomers became present in all public spheres of life. Some of them, for example, those employed on the editorial staff of newspapers, had a good mastery of Ukrainian, while many others were practically unable to speak it and used Russian instead; a large part of them, especially in the administration, were in fact ethnic Russians (Leskiv 2008, 6 and 8; Rudnytska 1958, 92).

Soviet films, widely propagated and diffused even in rural areas with the help of mobile projectors, were almost exclusively in Russian (Ivasiuta et al. 1956, 131; Rudnytska 1958, 92). Different languages were used in the theaters: there were state-funded professional troupes performing not only in Ukrainian and Russian, but also in Yiddish and Polish (Ivasiuta et

⁶ The Soviet authorities made a point of calling “Moldavian” the people and the language which were referred to as “Romanian” in Romania.

al. 1956, 142). Amateur theatricals were widely popular as well, and it is noteworthy that even in Budzhak they preferred the Ukrainian repertoire (Belousov 1941, 4; Leonidov 1941, 4).

Despite the proclaimed equality of languages, it was clear that the social status of Polish and Romanian decreased drastically as compared to the previous period. For some reason, certain minorities obtained no language rights at all: whereas the Jews of Budzhak were granted the possibility to study in Yiddish, the more numerous Bulgarians, as well as the Gagauz, were completely ignored in this respect.

Another development impacting ethnic and linguistic diversity in the new territories was the forced resettlement of some minorities. In compliance with a secret protocol accompanying the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, nearly all the Germans of Bukovyna and southern Bessarabia (accounting for about one-tenth of the whole population of these regions) underwent a compulsory resettlement to the so-called “Greater German Reich” in 1940 (Fostii 2005, 88–89; Lebedenko and Tychyna 1998, 11 and 21; Tuluş 2011). Besides, over 200,000 Poles and Jews were deported in 1939–1941 from the western Ukrainian lands to the north and east of Soviet Russia as well as to Kazakhstan (see Lozynskyi 2005, 192; compare Snyder 2003, 159).

In sum, the main concern of the Soviet authorities was to implant the Russian language in the new regions, first and foremost by relocating Russian speakers from Soviet Russia and eastern Ukraine to there. Russian was made a compulsory subject in the curriculum, and new schools with instruction fully in Russian were founded (this tendency was strongest in Budzhak). In western oblasts, Ukrainian was promoted to a considerable extent to earn the political loyalty of the largest ethnic group among the local population. For other ethnic minorities, a tacit hierarchy was established: the language rights of some of them (for example, Poles, Moldavians and Jews) were recognized and tolerated, while those of others (for example, Bulgarians and Gagauz) were ignored. Finally, Germans were seen as undesirable and subject to expulsion.

World War II and the early postwar period

The language situation in the Ukrainian territories under the German, Romanian and Hungarian occupation in 1941–1944 remains an underinvestigated subject. On the whole, it can be argued that the Germans tolerated and sometimes even supported various cultural, editorial and educational initiatives of the local population both in Ukrainian and in Russian

(with a predominance of the former language). In Galicia and Volhynia, German, Ukrainian and Polish were in use in various domains of public life. The Romanians had some indulgence for Russian, for example, in Odesa, but in Bukovyna and Bessarabia, it was their resolute belief that only Romanian should reign supreme. For instance, the authorities in Chernivtsi took measures expressly to forbid the use of Ukrainian and Yiddish in public places like shops, streets, schools and offices (Kurylo 1967, 218 and 222).

As discussed in the previous section, Transcarpathia had developed a rather pronounced Ukrainian linguistic identity while it was part of the interwar Czechoslovakia, and Ukrainian was established as the official language of this autonomous province in November 1938 (Hanchyn 1993, 28). Under Hungarian occupation, the situation changed dramatically. The Hungarian authorities were hostile to all things Ukrainian and supported instead the “Ruthenian” current, which programmatically insisted on creating a new independent standard language on the basis of the local dialects, but in reality heavily lent on the Russian prerevolutionary tradition. This new language, baptized “Hungaro-Ruthenian [*uhrorusskii yazyk* in Ruthenian and *magyarorosz nyelv* in Hungarian],” was made co-official in the province beside the predominant Hungarian. Among the minorities, only the language rights of the local Germans were respected to some extent, while the Romanians and Slovaks were deprived of opportunities to have schooling in their native languages. As for the Jews, one of the most numerous ethnic groups in the region at that time (about 13 percent of the population), the majority of them fell victim to mass reprisals and extermination by the Nazis (Vehesh and Fedynets 2010, 663–668; Tyvodar 2010, 18).

During the war, the population suffered severe losses also in Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovyna and Bessarabia. In particular, hundreds of thousands of Jews either fled or were exterminated. After the reannexation of western oblasts by the Soviet troops, 745,000 Poles and 30,000 Jews were resettled to Poland in 1944–1947 (Lozynskyi 2008, 147–148). With the return of Soviet rule, many Ukrainian intellectuals from Galicia and Volhynia escaped to the west. Both Romanian and Ukrainian elites from Bukovyna fled mainly to Romania (Herehova 1997, 239). Conversely, 323,000 ethnic Ukrainians were resettled to western oblasts of Soviet Ukraine from Poland (Kramar 2011, 115). Some other sources specify that 482,661 Ukrainians were resettled to the Soviet Union from Poland between 1944 and 1946 (Snyder 2003, 194). Besides, numerous migrants from all parts of the USSR arrived and settled in these oblasts, mostly

in the urban areas. During the period of 1945–1948 alone, over 100,000 persons moved to Lvivska oblast from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Lozynskyi 2005, 195). In Transcarpathia, the number of Czechs, Slovaks and Germans decreased significantly as compared to 1938. At the end of World War II, the ethnic structure of the population of this region became as follows: Ukrainians made up about 74 percent, Hungarians about 19 percent, Czechs and Slovaks about 1.9 percent, Romanians about 1.7 percent, Russians about 1.7 percent and Jews about 1 percent (Tyvodar 2010, 20).

Thus, in all the regions under investigation except for southern Bessarabia, by 1945 there was a clear majority of native speakers of Ukrainian, albeit with significant ethnic minorities. The positions of Polish and Yiddish on the linguistic scene were seriously undermined due to the population losses and resettlement of Poles and Jews (Nedolska 1999, 106). This would have made Galicia and Volhynia nearly monolingual, were it not for the vigorous measures taken by the Soviet authorities to assure the introduction of Russian in official usage and in public life.

Just as in 1939–1940, in the postwar period the Soviet propaganda in the periodical press, especially in southern Bessarabia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia, stressed the linguistic discrimination of the local population by foreign rulers. Curiously, one Bessarabian publication claimed that the “German and Romanian bandits” had closed the school in the village of Satu-Nou near Reni and that “not only men and women but also children were forbidden to speak Moldavian” (Fedorov 1945, 3). Far more often, anyway, the topic of Ukrainians being hindered from using their native language either by Romanians (Horobets 1944, 3) or by Hungarians (*Zakarpatska pravda* 1945, 1) came to the fore. By contrast, the Soviet regime was represented in the same publications as guaranteeing complete freedom of expression in whichever language.

In reality, however, there existed a hierarchy of ethnic groups with respect to language rights, which changed somewhat as compared to the period of 1939–1941. The Poles fell into an intermediate category between ignored and undesirable (to which their massive resettlement to Poland bears witness). There were other groups who suffered a similar fate: tens of thousands of Transcarpathian Hungarians and Germans were put to forced labor and/or deported to Siberia, Kazakhstan and Donbas (Vidnianskyi 2005), and nearly 30,000 Volhynian Czechs were repatriated to Czechoslovakia in 1947 (Borshchevych 2008; Kotyhorenko 2011, 467).

The language of the press in the postwar period

The status of a particular group was reflected in whether or not it was recognized as important enough to have a newspaper published in its own language. As during the 1939–1941 period discussed above, most oblast and district newspapers in Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia came out in Ukrainian (see Szporluk 1979, 86). In Volhynia, they were printed in Ukrainian only (Vyshniakova 1962, 40–41). In Galicia, the situation was similar, although Lvivska oblast also had a daily newspaper in Russian, *Lvovskaia pravda*, established in 1946 (Szporluk 1979, 83). A Polish-language daily, *Czerwony Sztandar*, reestablished in 1944, was discontinued in 1950 (Skachkov et al. 1965, 149; Szporluk 1979, 83–84), despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of Poles remained in western oblasts even after the resettlement. No periodical press was available in Yiddish any longer, except for the short-lived Kyiv-based literary magazine *Der Stern* (1947–1948) (Skachkov et al. 1965, 21).

In Bukovyna, the oblast newspaper *Radianska Bukovyna* had a parallel edition in Moldavian under the title *Bucovina sovietică*, which became independent and was renamed to *Zorile Bucovinei* in 1967. The district newspapers of Bukovyna were issued in Ukrainian, but in localities where ethnic Romanians were present in large numbers there also existed Moldavian versions of them (in Storozhynets, Hlyboka and Novoselytsia), all being published since 1957. In Hertsa and the surrounding villages, almost exclusively populated by Romanians, the district newspaper *Steagul roșu* was published in Latin script in 1945–1951 (perceived as “Romanian”), and in Cyrillic script after that (following the switch to “Moldavian”).

In Transcarpathia, the oblast newspaper *Zakarpatska pravda* (*Zakarpatskaia pravda*) (established in 1944) had two parallel editions, in Ukrainian and in Russian. There was another newspaper, *Zakarpatskaia Ukraina* (1944–1948), which was the first Russian-language daily in western Ukraine with a press run of 10,000 copies (Szporluk 1979, 83). Later it was renamed to *Sovetskoie Zakarpatie* (1948–1959). Starting in 1945, a Hungarian version of *Zakarpatska pravda* was published under the title *Kárpáti Igaz Szó*. Until 1967, it was identical in content with the Ukrainian version; thereafter it had an independent status. In districts densely populated by Hungarians, local newspapers were available in their language: *Veres Zászló* was circulated in Berehovo district from 1945, with a parallel Ukrainian edition *Chervonyi prapor* as of 1955; *Vohni komunizmu* was published in Uzhhorod district from 1949, with a parallel Hungarian version (*A kommunizmus fényei*) as of 1957; and *Prapor komunizmu* was

published in Irshava and Vynohradiv with a parallel Hungarian edition, *A kommunizmus Zászlaja*, as of 1957. Finally, a bilingual Ukrainian and Moldavian *Druzhba* was issued in Tiachiv district from 1946, although the number of ethnic Romanians there was less than 10,000 (Bidzilia 2001, 43–49).

In Budzhak, all of the local newspapers came out in Russian from 1944; however, in contrast to the 1939–1941 period, the oblast newspaper *Pridunaiskaia pravda* also had a parallel Ukrainian edition, *Prydunaiska pravda*, in 1952–1954. After the unification of Izmailska and Odeska oblasts in 1954, there were two oblast-level newspapers: *Chornomorska komuna* in Ukrainian and *Znamia kommunizma* in Russian. Some district newspapers that were originally issued in Russian later obtained parallel Moldavian versions: in Reni (from 1948), Suvorovo (1949–1958) and Borodino (1957–1962). In Izmail, two local newspapers published in Russian, *Pridunaiskaia pravda* and *Pridunaiskaia zaria*, had parallel Moldavian editions in 1959–1963 and 1962–1963, respectively (Skachkov et al. 1965, 173, 178 and 180). In other districts, there were also Bulgarian parallel versions of newspapers in Russian: in Artsyz (1948–1955), Bolhrad (1948–1962), Nova Ivanivka (1949–1958) and Tarutyne (1949–1959) (Skachkov et al. 1965, 172, 176–177 and 181). In Izmail, the municipal newspaper *Sovetskii Izmail (Radianskyi Izmail)*, which replaced *Pridunaiskaia pravda* in 1965, circulated both in Russian and Ukrainian. In the late 1970s, the share of Russians and Ukrainians in the city's population was about 55 percent and 30 percent, respectively (Tychyna et al. 1995, 34). Paradoxically, in some other localities where Ukrainians were more numerous than Russians, the local newspapers came out in Russian only. The most eloquent example is from the Tatarbunary district of Odeska oblast: although in the late 1970s its population consisted of 72 percent Ukrainians, 10 percent Bulgarians, 10 percent Moldavians and only about 7 percent Russians (Tychyna et al. 1995, 34), the local newspaper *Kolkhoznaia pravda* came out in Russian only.

The presence of Russian in the local press, being strongest in Budzhak, was also considerable in Transcarpathia and in Lvivska oblast. The underlying reasons in the three regions were, however, rather different. In Budzhak, due to the absence of a clear ethnic majority, the Soviet authorities pursued a resolute course toward Russification—the sooner the better—from the very start. In Transcarpathia, a similar goal was set (albeit with less insistence), making use of the local Russophile tradition going back to the nineteenth century and partly nurtured by the former Czechoslovak and Hungarian authorities during the previous

twenty-five years. Finally, in Lviv, the intellectual center of Galicia, it was important to affirm the positions of both the Russian language and culture. That is why this city received the largest number of Russian settlers (including the military), and it was rather natural to have a newspaper published for them in their native language (see Szporluk 1979, 83).

Languages in education in the postwar period

A new wave of schoolteachers from eastern Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union were relocated to all the regions under consideration during the early postwar period. In particular, about 300 teachers came to Transcarpathia in 1945–1946 (Novikov 1985, 52), and 823 to Chernivetska oblast by the end of 1944. Many of them either spoke Ukrainian rather poorly or did not know it at all (Herehova 1997, 239–240). Among other things, the newcomers had to teach the locals the “right” variety of Ukrainian, standardized in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s, which included many direct borrowings from Russian, unfamiliar in the western provinces (Ivaniuk 1990, 28). This even provoked a reaction from the underground Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which in 1946–1949 circulated a clandestine pamphlet on the principles of Ukrainian national ideology in education, addressed to the teachers who had arrived from eastern Ukraine. This publication drew particular attention to the question of Russification, which impacted on both status and corpus planning of Ukrainian (see Hryshko 1958, 157–159; Ishchuk 2012; OUN 1948; Stasiuk 2006, 138–140). In southern Bessarabia, the problem of discrepancy between the Ukrainian language varieties did not exist, as local Ukrainians had not had the chance to develop their own standard. Anyhow, the region received 400 teachers relocated from other parts of Ukraine and the Soviet Union in 1950 alone (Lebedenko and Tychyna 2000, 102; Tychyna et al. 1995, 30). The relocation of teachers made it possible quickly to start teaching Russian at all levels in all the newly incorporated regions.

Schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction numerically prevailed in all regions under consideration, with the exception of Budzhak. In Galicia and Volhynia, their predominance was absolute: during the 1945–1946 academic year, there were 5,635 of them, compared to 67 schools where teaching was carried out in Polish, 27 where teaching was in Russian, one where it was in Czech and one where it was in Yiddish (Kotyhorenko 2011, 473). By 1947, after the mass population transfers in 1944–1946, the number of schools for minorities fell drastically: only five schools

remained for the Poles, while instruction in Czech and in Yiddish was altogether discontinued. The extant schools for the Poles were located in Lviv (3) and in Stanislav (one) in 1949–1950 (Zbirnyk 1949, 13; Zbirnyk 1950, 26–27). Their number gradually went down to two in Lviv by the end of the 1980s, and they started to teach some subjects in Russian (Lozynskyi 2005, 245).

In Chernivetska oblast, the distribution of schools by language of instruction during the academic year 1944–1945 was as follows: 373 with Ukrainian as the language of instruction, 96 with Moldavian, nine with Russian, two with Polish and one with Yiddish. The instruction in Yiddish was discontinued a year later, and in Polish three years later. After that, the number of schools offering instruction in Ukrainian, Moldavian and Russian constantly increased. In the academic year 1949–1950, there were 426 schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction, 111 with Moldavian and 26 with Russian (Herehova 1997, 238). Later on, the number of Ukrainian and Moldavian schools decreased. In the academic year 1989–1990, 296 schools provided instruction in Ukrainian, 85 in Moldavian, 25 in Russian, and 15 were classified as “mixed” or “inter-ethnic,” with parallel classes in two of the three languages in question (see Filippchuk 1990, 177; Stolbunova 1990, 143). Most Russian schools (20) were located in the city of Chernivtsi, mostly downtown, and they had on average more pupils than other schools (24,347 in total). At the same time Ukrainian schools (21) were typically situated on the outskirts of Chernivtsi and were smaller in size. They instructed only 15,599 pupils. The three Moldavian schools in the city had 693 pupils altogether (Buzynska and Tarnovetska 1990, 9).

In Transcarpathia, during the academic year 1945–1946 most schools offered instruction in Ukrainian (644 schools) and in Hungarian (99 schools). Other languages were represented on a more modest scale: there were seven Russian schools, seven Romanian schools and one Slovak school (Khymynets et al. 2009, 219–220). Education in Slovak was discontinued in 1947. The other four languages retained their positions with some modifications. By 1957–1958, the number of schools with Russian as the language of instruction tripled to twenty-one (Khymynets et al. 2009, 224). Although this figure actually declined to fourteen in the following years (Khymynets et al. 2009, 225), Russian schools were larger than other schools (with 900 pupils on average in each school in 1982), and they were situated in urban areas. The number of Moldavian schools increased to twelve in 1957, but declined to eleven in 1967 (Khymynets et al. 2009, 220 and 227) and then to nine in 1989 (Zakon 1989, 3). As for Hungarian,

after reaching one hundred in 1957 (Khymynets et al. 2009, 220), the number of schools decreased to sixty-seven in 1972 (Kuras 1994, 396) and then to fifty-five in 1989 (Zakon 1989, 3). Instead, “mixed” schools with two or three languages of instruction in parallel classes were opened. There were twenty-eight such schools in 1972 (Kuras 1994, 396) and forty-five in 1989 (Zakon 1989, 3). On the whole, Ukrainian was always prevalent as the language of instruction in this region: there were 681 Ukrainian schools in 1957 (Vehesh and Fedynets 2010, 678), 591 in 1982 (Khymynets et al. 2009, 225) and 563 in 1989 (Zakon 1989, 3). In the administrative center of this oblast, Uzhhorod, the situation differed in favor of Russian: in 1989, 15,000 ethnic Russians residing in the city had five schools with Russian as the language of instruction, as well as one bilingual Russian and Ukrainian school, at their disposal. In comparison, there was only one school with Hungarian as the language of instruction for around 10,000 Uzhhorod Hungarians, while the 76,000 Ukrainians had eight schools (Ilitskii 1989, 4).

In Budzhak in the academic year 1945–1946, the figures for schools by language of instruction were as follows: 151 schools with Russian as the language of instruction, 145 with Ukrainian and 27 with Moldavian. This could create an illusion of quasi-parity between Russian and Ukrainian. In reality, however, instruction in Russian predominated in urban areas and in larger schools, while Ukrainian was more often prevalent in small village schools. As a result, in 1945 the total number of pupils receiving education in Russian was 48,483, while in Ukrainian it was only 23,036. Moldavian-language schools, although mostly located in rural areas, were the largest on average and taught 9,526 pupils in all (Khlivnenko 1968, 334). The ethnic composition of this region changed perceptibly during the period under consideration: in 1989, the region had a Ukrainian relative majority of 34 percent, while the share of Moldavians had fallen to 12 percent. The other two major groups, Russians and Bulgarians, retained their positions and constituted around 25 percent and 21 percent of the population, respectively. Nonetheless, the numerical superiority of Russian schools over those with other languages of instruction steadily augmented: in 1989, there were 133 schools with Russian as the language of instruction, 54 with Ukrainian and 17 with Moldavian (Tychyna et al. 1995, 30). Education in Bulgarian and in Gagauz was not available in Budzhak at all throughout the Soviet period. This is especially striking in the case of Bulgarian, as the total number of its speakers (around 140,000) should have entitled them to some educational rights by the usual standards of Soviet nationality policy. Apparently the authori-

ties were determined to suppress the unique ethnic diversity of this region by vigorously supporting the dominant language and culture: Russian. The Bulgarians, a Slavonic people with a language rather close to Russian, were regarded as most liable to identify themselves with the dominant language and culture in the absence of solid ties with their historical motherland.

In schools with Russian as the language of instruction, Ukrainian definitely ceased to be a compulsory subject as of the academic year 1959–1960 (earlier attempts to this effect date back to 1955). Pupils were exempted from learning it “on the parents’ request.” This practice gradually became more and more widespread. By 1987, even in a western city like Uzhhorod, about 10 percent of the total number of pupils with Russian as the language of instruction refused to learn Ukrainian (*Zakarpatskaia pravda* 1989, 3). As early as 1947, the teaching of both Ukrainian language and literature had been abolished in schools with Hungarian, Moldavian and Polish languages of instruction. By contrast, Russian was a mandatory subject in all schools throughout Soviet Ukraine, irrespective of the language of instruction. As a result, most members of ethnic minorities were unable to communicate in Ukrainian, and typically used Russian in communication with other groups. For example, in the territories of Budzhak populated by Bulgarians and Gagauz, the Ukrainian language was almost completely absent until 1989 (Honchar 2012, 76).

The existing schools for ethnic minorities were often elementary or so-called incomplete secondary schools (with seven years of instruction), and they were mostly located in rural areas. On the contrary, complete secondary schools, located in urban areas and especially in the administrative centers, mostly offered instruction either in Ukrainian or in Russian. For example, in 1945 there were only 17 secondary schools in Budzhak (13 with Russian as the language of instruction and four with Ukrainian), out of the total of 340. The rest were elementary and incomplete secondary schools, including 158 with Russian as the language of instruction, 139 with Ukrainian and 26 with Moldavian (see Khlivnenko 1968, 334). At the same time, the Transcarpathian Hungarians had eighty-three elementary and sixteen incomplete secondary schools with Hungarian as the language of instruction (Khymynets et al. 2009, 158). In 1953, one Moldavian and four Hungarian complete secondary schools were created in Transcarpathia (Vehesh and Fedynets 2010, 350). In the academic year 1966–1967, there were three secondary and eight incomplete secondary schools with Moldavian as the language of instruction (Khymynets et al. 2009, 227). Urban secondary schools with Russian as the language of instruc-

tion enjoyed a higher prestige than the Ukrainian ones. A well-known linguist, Mykhailo Kocherhan (2012, 109), recollects in his memoirs that the inhabitants of the Galician city of Drohobych had a “pleasant surprise” in the 1960s, when the rector of the local pedagogical institute, Anatolii Chernenko, sent his sons to study in an ordinary school with instruction in Ukrainian, closest to his home, because “otherwise the children of superiors attended Russian schools.”

The situation in higher education differed greatly as compared to secondary schools. Even in such western regions as Volhynia, Galicia, Transcarpathia and Bukovyna, Ukrainian was used as the language of instruction only partially. The reasons are obvious: on the one hand, there were many Russian-speaking lecturers who had been sent to the region from other parts of the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, some teachers had to switch to Russian in order to avoid being labeled as “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” and thus to escape political repression. Many students also came from other regions. In 1946, there were about 8,000 students in all institutions of higher education in the city of Lviv, among whom 55 percent were ethnic Ukrainians, 28 percent Russians and 5 percent Jews (Leskiv 2008, 10). In the Chernivtsi Medical Institute, the enrollment of locals for the first year of study grew from 15 in 1945 to 143 in 1952, but even then they only accounted for half of the total number. In the University of Chernivtsi during the academic year 1944–1945, only 13 out of 468 students were locals. In 1947, the locals constituted 17 percent of the new enrollment, and in 1952 their number increased to 60 percent (Bazhan 2007, 351). By the end of the 1940s, the Russian language prevailed noticeably in the universities (Leskiv 2008, 10).

In 1953, soon after the death of Joseph Stalin (1878–1953), this problem was discussed on the regional level in Bukovyna, Galicia and Volhynia, with a strong push toward more intensive use of Ukrainian in higher education institutions (Bazhan 2007, 341 and 346–356). However, the situation did not change radically, as the concession to allow more Ukrainian in higher education was rather a political maneuver than a serious change in language policy (Hryshko 1958, 170–171). Still, some lecturers continued to give their courses in Ukrainian, and the universities of Lviv, Chernivtsi and Uzhhorod partly preserved Ukrainian as the language of instruction outside of the humanities (Shevchuk 2006, 99). The overall picture in 1953 can be illustrated by examples from Lviv: in the Institute of Trade and Economics, all fifty-six subjects were taught in Russian, and in the Institute of Forestry, only four out of forty-one subjects were taught in Ukrainian. Out of 412 lecturers at the Lviv Polytechnic

Institute, only 15 held their courses in Ukrainian, while 49 lecturers out of 295 did so at the University of Lviv (Kuras 1994, 320). Of the forty-eight ethnic Ukrainian lecturers at the Chernivtsi Medical Institute, only thirteen held their courses in Ukrainian (Bazhan 2007, 351). The domination of Russian was maintained later as well. For instance at the turn of the 1970s, Oleksander Ustenko, rector of the Pedagogical Institute in Ivano-Frankivsk, the administrative center of an oblast populated by 98 per cent ethnic Ukrainians, used Russian, almost exclusively, when in office (Kocherhan 2012, 147).

The possibilities for higher education in the native languages of ethnic minorities were limited, being confined to the study of the minorities' own languages and literatures. A Faculty of Hungarian Philology was opened at the Mukachevo Pedagogic Institute in 1953, only to be discontinued the next year. Ten years later, in 1963, a major in Hungarian was offered at the University of Uzhhorod, and in 1965 a separate Department of Hungarian was set up there (Vehesh and Fedynets 2010, 353). A Section of Moldavian Philology was created in 1954 at the Chernivtsi Pedagogic Institute, and two years later it was affiliated with the Faculty of Foreign Languages at the University of Chernivtsi. A Department of Moldavian was established at this university in 1971 (Zhernovei 2011, 321). In 1951–1956, there also existed a Section of Moldavian at the Izmail Pedagogic Institute (Lebedenko and Tychyna 2000, 102). At the very end of the Soviet era, in 1988, the Institute began offering minors in Bulgarian (Lebedenko and Tychyna 2000, 111; Tychyna et al. 1995, 46). Ukrainian was not privileged at this Institute either: a Section of Ukrainian Philology was created at Izmail as late as 1983 (Tychyna et al. 1995, 32).

Languages in culture and the media in the postwar period

In the field of culture, the first postwar years were marked by a massive removal of books in Polish, Hungarian, Czech, Romanian and other “bourgeois” foreign languages from public libraries. The same applied to books in Ukrainian published before the advent of Soviet rule (see Dovhanych 1999, 86–87; Kusyi 2008, 424). Instead, the libraries were filled with communist ideological publications, mostly in Russian. In this way, it was planned that the population would get more and more accustomed to reading in Russian.

By contrast, most state-run theaters performed in Ukrainian. They were based in Volhynia (Lutsik and Rivne), Galicia (Chortkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kolomyia, Lviv and Ternopil), Bukovyna (Chernivtsi), Trans-

carpathia (Uzhhorod) and Budzhak (Izmail). A Russian drama theater existed in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi (in Budzhak), but it was transferred to Mukachevo in Transcarpathia in 1947. A year later the Izmail Ukrainian Drama Theater also moved from Budzhak to Vinnytsia, while the whole troupe of the Kamianets-Podilskyi Russian Drama Theater came to Izmail in 1950. The “Ruthenian” theater in Transcarpathia, inherited from the epoch of Hungarian rule, was dissolved just after the war (Padiak 2010, 142). The stationary Polish Theater of Lviv moved to Katowice in Poland in 1945. An amateur troupe known under the name of the Polish People’s Theater then began functioning in 1958 (Mazepa 2014). Jewish theaters performed after the war in Lviv and Chernivtsi but had to be closed for lack of spectators in 1947 and 1950, respectively (Pidopryhora 2009, 413; Stepanchykova 2003, 37 and 50). The Russian Drama Theater, administered by the Soviet Army, was relocated from Odesa to Lviv in 1954. There were no professional Hungarian or Romanian theaters. Yet in towns like Khust and Berehovo, where Hungarians were settled compactly, amateur theatricals thrived; for example, a Hungarian amateur operetta theater enjoyed substantial popularity in Berehovo (Lustih 1959, 3). A sociological survey conducted by the Rylskyi Institute of Arts, Folklore Studies and Ethnology in 1989 revealed that most Ukrainians, Poles, Russians and Hungarians preferred to attend theater performances in their native languages, while members of other ethnic minorities easily accepted plays either in Russian or Ukrainian (Radianska Volyn 1989, 3). These preferences reflected the situation at the time: Ukrainians, Poles, Russians and Hungarians were accustomed to performances in their native languages, while other minorities—Jews, Moldavians and Bulgarians—could attend only Russian or Ukrainian plays.

Romanians and Hungarians were offered some radio and television programs in their native languages, provided by local stations in Uzhhorod (Zakarpatska pravda 1963, 4; Zakarpatska pravda 1972, 4), Odesa (Radianskyi Izmail 1975a, 4; Radianskyi Izmail 1975b, 4) and Chernivtsi (Radianska Bukovyna 1965, 4; Radianska Bukovyna 1975, 4). For example, Moldavian programs on the Chernivtsi local television filled 60 to 100 minutes per week on average. The same amount of time was allocated to Hungarian-language programs on Uzhhorod TV, and additionally Hungarians had had the possibility of receiving TV channels from Hungary since the late 1950s. A lecturer from Uzhhorod University once even stressed that, among Hungarian schoolchildren, “many watch TV programs only in Hungarian” instead of reading books in Russian (Symulyk 1972, 4). Ukrainians had at their disposal two TV channels broadcasting

from Kyiv both in Ukrainian and Russian. Wasyl Veryha (1972, 15–21) failed to determine the exact proportion of Ukrainian and Russian on Soviet Ukrainian TV, as it was impossible to identify the language of approximately one-third of the programs. In any case his examination of the distribution of languages in about 80 percent of the Kyiv transmissions in 1969 gave the following results: 22 percent were broadcast in Ukrainian, and 57 percent in Russian (Veryha 1972, 20).

The census of 1989: The results of the Soviet language policy

The main lines of the language policy introduced after World War II in the newly incorporated regions, and implemented until Stalin's death in 1953, underwent no significant modifications under the subsequent Soviet leaders, Nikita Khrushchev (in power 1953–1964), Leonid Brezhnev (in power 1964–1982), Yuri Andropov (in power 1982–1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (in power 1984–1985). This policy was aimed at controlling and diminishing the linguistic diversity of the territories in question. As a result, the formerly dominant languages (especially Polish, but also Hungarian and Romanian) largely lost their prestige and were marginalized. The presence of other traditional languages, such as Yiddish and in certain areas also German, became insignificant. Instead, Russian was strongly promoted by the state in various domains of public life (especially in higher education and in administration). An opposition between Russian as the language of power and Ukrainian as the language of the people developed, and became a crucial source of tension on the linguistic scene.

For all that, Russian could not unconditionally prevail in its competition with Ukrainian. The data from the 1989 census,⁷ which took place at the very end of the period under consideration, is quite eloquent in this respect. In Volhynia, where the percentage of ethnic Russians was rather modest (4.4 percent), almost 6 percent among them indicated Ukrainian as their native language, compared to the less than 1 percent of ethnic Ukrainians who indicated Russian as their native language (for the latter group, it may be assumed that most of them were settlers from other regions of the country). In Galicia, the overall picture was similar for ethnic Ukrainians, less than 1 percent of whom indicated Russian as their native language, but slightly different for ethnic Russians; the latter

⁷ Further calculations in this section are based on the all-union census of 1989 (Natsionalnyi 1991, 78–81 and 84–85).

constituted 5.3 percent of the population, among whom 3.6 percent indicated Ukrainian as their native language. Moreover, the situation in Galicia was not as homogeneous as in Volhynia, as the three Galician oblasts had varying percentages of ethnic Russian population (2.3 percent in Ternopil'ska oblast, 4 percent in Ivano-Frankiv'ska oblast and 7 percent in Lviv'ska oblast) and these oblasts, accordingly, had varying proportions of Russians who indicated Ukrainian as their native language (7.6 percent, 4 percent and 2.9 percent, respectively). The correlation between the share of ethnic Russians and the degree of their maintenance of their mother tongue is obvious. Furthermore, it must be taken into consideration that the presence of Russian in education, culture and the press was strongest in Lviv. In Transcarpathia, the situation was practically identical with that in Ivano-Frankiv'ska oblast, both for ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians. Yet in Bukovyna, with 71 percent ethnic Ukrainians and 6.7 percent ethnic Russians, the figures were different: the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians who indicated Russian as their native language and of ethnic Russians who indicated Ukrainian as their native language was almost equal (2.6 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively). As compared to the data for the whole of Ukraine in 1989 (with 12.3 percent linguistically Russified Ukrainians and 1.6 percent Ukrainized Russians), western regions quite clearly stood out as those where the positions of Ukrainian were the strongest.

By contrast, in Odeska oblast, 26 percent of ethnic Ukrainians indicated Russian as their native language, whereas only 1 percent of ethnic Russians indicated Ukrainian as their native language. In Budzhak, the adoption of Russian was still more pronounced, partly due to the relatively feeble presence of ethnic Ukrainians in this region (34.4 percent), and partly as a result of the local language policy resolutely promoting Russian.

As for the smaller minorities, the situation in 1989 was varied. Among the Poles of Ukraine (219,179 in total), two-thirds indicated Ukrainian as their native language, 20.3 percent indicated Russian and only 12.5 percent Polish. However, in Lviv'ska oblast, where the Polish population (26,876 persons) had some possibility of maintaining their ethnic identity due to the existing institutions in the fields of education and culture, 48 percent indicated Polish as their native language, 45 percent indicated Ukrainian and 7 percent Russian. Another minority with a very low degree of language maintenance were the Jews, numbering 486,326 in the whole of Ukraine. Only 7.1 percent of them indicated Yiddish as their native language. In contrast to the Poles, however, they tended to adopt Russian, with almost 91 percent identifying it as their native language (as compared

to barely 2 percent identifying Ukrainian). In Lvivska oblast, which had 14,240 ethnic Jews, the distribution of languages indicated as native by Jews was close to the national average: 10 percent Yiddish, 87 percent Russian and 3 percent Ukrainian. The maintenance of Yiddish was somewhat stronger only in Bukovyna (27 percent of the local Jews indicated it as their native language), but even there Russian obviously predominated: 71 percent of Jews claimed it as their native language. By contrast, the status of Ukrainian was marginal, with only 1 percent of Jews in Chernivetska oblast indicating it as their native language.

The situation with the Hungarian and Romanian minorities was quite different. Among the Hungarians, concentrated in Transcarpathia, 97 percent indicated Hungarian as their native language (as compared to only 2 percent indicating Ukrainian and 0.6 percent Russian). The Romanians also evidenced a high degree of language maintenance. In Transcarpathia, as many as 98 percent of them indicated Romanian as their native language (as compared to only 0.7 percent indicating Ukrainian and 0.5 percent Russian). However, the respective figures for the Bukovynian Romanians differed rather sharply: 53 percent of them claimed to be native speakers of Romanian, 12 percent of Ukrainian and 3 percent of Russian. An interesting point about the census results for Bukovynian Romanians is that 32 percent of them were classified under the heading "other languages" with respect to their mother tongue (as the categories provided for in the census only included the following: "language of own nationality," Ukrainian, Russian, and "other languages"). It may be safely assumed, though, that this "other language" in their case was Moldavian (as the Soviet authorities insisted on calling Romanian).⁸ This means that the native language maintenance for the Bukovynian Romanians was high, reaching 85 percent when the two numbers are summed. The inhabitants of Chernivetska oblast who identified themselves as Moldavians (concentrated in northern Bessarabia) fared even better, with 95 percent of them indicating Moldavian as their native language as compared to only 2.5 percent indicating Ukrainian and about 2 percent Russian. By contrast, in Odeska oblast, including Budzhak, the degree of language maintenance by the Moldavians was lower (79 percent); instead, 15 percent of them claimed to speak Russian, and 5 percent Ukrainian as their native language.

⁸ Indeed, "Moldavian" was the official name of the language taught in the Bukovynian schools for the Romanian minority.

The Bulgarians of Odeska oblast offer an interesting comparison to the Transcarpathian Hungarians. The total number of both ethnic minorities was similar: around 166,000 Bulgarians in Odeska oblast (including 140,000 in Budzhak), and around 156,000 Hungarians in Transcarpathia. Both were settled compactly in the respective regions, and had a foreign state in which their native languages served as official (although the ties of Bulgarians with their historical motherland were weaker). A sharp difference between them was that the Hungarians were granted some language rights in various spheres of public life, whereas the Bulgarians could only use their native dialect at home and in informal communication. As a result, the degree of native language maintenance among the Bulgarians was somewhat lower (82 percent), while 17 percent of them considered their native language to be Russian, and 1 percent Ukrainian.

The pattern of settlement and related historical vicissitudes also had a considerable impact. The small Gagauz group in Budzhak (around 27,000), deprived of any language rights in the public sphere, had the advantage of compact settlement bordering an area with a Gagauz majority in neighboring Moldova. As a result, 84 percent of them maintained Gagauz as their native language (while 13 percent of them indicated that it was Russian and 0.6 percent that it was Ukrainian). The Czechs, settled dispersedly in southern Volhynia and northern Galicia, far away from their historical motherland, numbered around 40,000 in 1945. By 1947 more than three-quarters of them had been repatriated. The tiny remaining community could hardly maintain knowledge of their language; and by 1989, only 36 percent of them indicated Czech as their native language, whereas 32 percent indicated Russian and 31 percent Ukrainian.

Bilingualism and multilingualism is another crucial element in these traditionally multiethnic regions. While the former dominant languages (Polish, Hungarian and Romanian) had been constantly losing ground, Russian became the most widespread second language fluently spoken by the majority of the population. In 1989, in Volhynia 61 percent of ethnic Ukrainians claimed to be fluent speakers of Russian as a non-native language; in Galicia the corresponding figure was 55 percent (reaching 59 percent in Lvivska oblast). Furthermore, 59 percent of ethnic Ukrainians claimed to master Russian as their second language in Transcarpathia, 60 percent in Bukovyna and northern Bessarabia, and 51 percent in Odeska oblast (including Budzhak). As for ethnic Russians, despite the fact that they were a minority, a good command of Ukrainian was less

frequent among them as compared to the command of Russian among ethnic Ukrainians: 51 percent of ethnic Russians claimed to have a good command of Ukrainian in Galicia, 50 percent did so in Volhynia, 44 percent in Transcarpathia, 44 percent in Bukovyna and northern Bessarabia, and only 24 percent in Odeska oblast (including Budzhak). These figures mirror the dominant position of Russian as a de facto official language of the state. In Budzhak, it was also the native language of a majority of inhabitants.

This disproportion was even more accentuated in the case of national minorities who did not learn Ukrainian at school. Among the Hungarians in predominantly Ukrainian-speaking Transcarpathia, only 11 percent claimed to be fluent speakers of Ukrainian, while 42 percent claimed fluency in Russian. For the Transcarpathian Romanians, the respective figures were still more eloquent: 3 percent and 51 percent, respectively. In Bukovyna, however, mastery of Ukrainian among the Romanians was more common than in Transcarpathia: 7.5 percent claimed to be fluent in Ukrainian (as compared to 50 percent claiming to be fluent speakers of Russian). Among the northern Bessarabians who identified themselves as Moldavians, 12.6 percent had a good command of Ukrainian, and 57 percent a good command of Russian. In Odeska oblast (including Budzhak), knowledge of Ukrainian among the Moldavians came to 9 percent, and of Russian, to 59 percent. Among the Bulgarians and the Gagauz, who mostly attended schools with Russian as the language of instruction, the proportion of fluent Russian speakers was the highest: 71 percent and 70 percent, respectively. The knowledge of Ukrainian among these two minorities was relatively insignificant: 3 percent and about 1 percent, respectively.

The hierarchy of languages reflected in the above figures, with Russian occupying the highest status, Ukrainian being optional, and native languages, including Ukrainian, being maintained largely as a matter of personal choice, had been kept immutable from the first postwar years until the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* (1985–1991). The language policy pursued in the newly incorporated regions obviously had the same aim: the creation of a bilingual situation, in which fluency in Russian would be a social necessity and the knowledge of other languages a superfluity. In the long run, it was planned that Russian would completely dominate the scene. However, this policy was carried out at a varying pace in the different regions under consideration. The progress of Russification was most evident in Budzhak, followed by Chernivetska oblast (and especially the city of Chernivtsi), albeit with a large time lag. In western oblasts (Volhynia, Galicia and Transcarpathia), the positions of Ukrainian were

stronger. However, Russifying pressures were also intense in Lviv and in the urban centers of Transcarpathia. The ethnic minorities (Hungarians, Moldavians, Romanians, Bulgarians and others) adopted Russian as their main language in the process of social integration, which also served as an instrument of Russification.

The revival of languages since the late 1980s

The process of relative democratization under Gorbachev, introducing some elements of freedom of speech and substantially reducing censorship, very soon made it clear that virtually no group, except for ethnic Russians, was satisfied with the previous language policy. The inhabitants of western and southwestern regions took the lead in Ukraine in demanding better respect for their language rights. The oblast and district newspapers served as a platform for voicing the grievances and the demands of each group. Remarkable in this respect were the years 1988–1989, when a broad discussion around a new language bill (officially presented to the parliament in September 1989, and adopted on October 28, 1989) took place in Soviet Ukraine. At the same time, new public organizations started to arise. The most powerful among them, the Taras Shevchenko Society for the Ukrainian Language, was launched in June 1988 in Lviv, and very soon branches of this organization appeared in Volhynia (in October 1988), Transcarpathia (in January 1989), Bukovyna (in February 1989), Ternopil'ska oblast (in March 1989) and Ivano-Frankiv'ska oblast (in April 1989). Its declared aim was the promotion of Ukrainian first and foremost in the public sphere.

Similar processes were observable among the ethnic minorities: a society for Polish culture was founded in Lviv'ska oblast in 1988, followed by a society for Hungarian culture in Transcarpathia and by the George Coșbuc Social and Cultural Society of the Transcarpathian Romanians in 1989, the Mihai Eminescu Society for Romanian Culture, and the Steinbarg Society for Jewish Culture (Hasiuk 1995, 153; Kotyhorenko 2008, 513) in Bukovyna the same year. A Jewish association also appeared in Lviv in 1988 and in Ivano-Frankivsk in 1990. In 1990, the Jews of Lviv started their own newspaper, *Shofar*, in Russian, with a page in Yiddish (Kazeiak 2007). In Chernivtsi they have published a Yiddish-language newspaper, *Chernovitser bleter*, since 1991.

Although the Cyril and Methodius Society of Bulgarians was registered in Bolhrad in 1989, the revival of the ethnic groups in Budzhak was on the whole slower. Still, in January 1989 the Izmail district newspaper

Leninskii put produced a monthly issue with a page in Bulgarian entitled “Rodna rech.” In July 1990, “Rodna krai,” a Bulgarian-language supplement to the Odeska oblast newspaper *Znamia kommunizma*, started to come out (*Znamia kommunizma* 1990, 3). Beginning in 1987, Bulgarian became an optional subject in thirty schools, and in 1991 it was introduced as a compulsory subject in forty-five schools (Kisse 2006, 213).

In Transcarpathia, the Rusyn movement developed at the very end of the 1980s. It claimed that the local East Slav population was neither Ukrainian nor Ruthenian in the traditional sense of the word. The traditional ethnonymic adjective *ruskyi* was changed to *rusynskyi*. Hereby, the Transcarpathian Rusyns claimed to be a separate Slavic people, distinct not only from the eastern Ukrainians, but also from the Galicians and Bukovynians who for a long time had called themselves *rusyny* and their own language *ruska mova*. In February 1990, they founded a cultural and educational society of the Carpathian Rusyns, which pursued political more often than cultural aims, pleading, in particular, for an autonomous status for Transcarpathia. The society’s position was criticized by several regional institutions (Myshanych 2012, 4–5 and 46–47).

The Law on Languages of 1989 marked a turning point in language policy, inaugurating a series of processes that culminated in the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1991. After the law’s adoption, the correlation between languages substantially changed in favor of Ukrainian, both legally and in practice. The languages of national minorities (except for Russian) also gained ground. Ukrainian was made the official language of the republic, to be used in all spheres of public life, and became a compulsory subject in all educational institutions. Russian ranked among the “languages of other ethnicities,” although it still had a privileged treatment in the text of the law. In particular, it was granted the status of “the language of interethnic communication between the peoples of the USSR.” State support was pledged to other ethnic languages both in education and in mass media (Materialy 1991, 3–5 and 8–11). The active participation of western regions in furthering the law’s most crucial points was instrumental in their final approval. The main purpose of the Law on Languages was to reverse the situation existing at the end of the Soviet era. The very fact of its adoption indicates that the Soviet language policy in the regions integrated into Soviet Ukraine after the war failed to achieve the results envisaged by its architects. The hidden tensions that it had been creating throughout the Soviet period came to the surface in the late 1980s, thus ushering in a new era in the development of most languages found in Ukraine.

The current language situation: Polarization between west and east/south?

JULIANE BESTERS-DILGER

The current language situation in Ukraine is characterized by the notorious language conflict between Ukrainian and Russian. According to the constitution adopted in 1996, Ukrainian is the only state language. It has been promoted since independence in 1991 but to a variable extent under different presidents (see Besters-Dilger 2011). Leonid Kravchuk (presidency 1991–1994) and Viktor Yushchenko (presidency 2005–2010) were those heads of state who fostered the Ukrainian language most, whereas Leonid Kuchma (presidency 1994–2004) had a rather indifferent position. Although the latter acknowledged that “one of the most important parameters of the state is the state language” and that “in Ukraine this is naturally Ukrainian” (Kuchma 2004, 358; the book was published only after the end of his presidential term), he wavered between a pro-Ukrainian and a pro-Russian stance. When Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions came to power in March 2010, the situation changed, especially after the implementation of the law “On the Principles of the State Language Policy” (OPSLP) signed by President Yanukovych in August 2012. The law introduced the status of “regional languages” used in courts, schools and state administration in the administrative units where national minorities constitute more than 10 percent of the population. International organizations such as the OSCE and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe criticized the law for promoting and supporting only Russian as a “regional language” in thirteen oblasts where around 59 percent of the population of Ukraine live, and for not fostering other minority languages and the state language, Ukrainian. This is most noticeable in the areas of media and education—the two linguistic domains where state policy and laws have a direct impact. After Russia’s occupation of Crimea in March 2014 and the beginning of conflict in eastern Ukraine the same year, the situation was characterized by the demand of Russia and its protégé regions in eastern Ukraine to introduce Russian as the second state language and to transform Ukraine into a federal state in which eastern Ukrainian oblasts would have a high degree of autonomy from Kyiv. It is remarkable how high the language question is on the agenda of both sides. Immediately after the removal of Yanukovych from power, on February 23, 2014, the Ukrainian parliament decided, with an overwhelming majority, to repeal the pro-Russian law OPSLP; this decision

of the parliament, however, was not signed by the acting president Oleksandr Turchynov, and thus the OPSLP remains in force. On the separatists' side, the self-proclaimed and ephemeral mayor of Sloviansk, Viacheslav Ponomariov, called on April 18, 2014, for all suspects, and especially those speaking Ukrainian, to be reported to the authorities.

The data gathering for this project took place in 2013, and therefore the events unfolding in Ukraine as of 2014 could not be taken into account. The questions asked in this section concern whether the results of the focus group discussions (FGDs) and the survey carried out in March 2013 in the framework of the *Region, Nation and Beyond* project show changes in language policy under Yushchenko and Yanukovych, or whether they rather document a stable language situation; and whether the polarization between west and east/south is as strong as some researchers (and also Russian politicians) claim.

First, this section concentrates on the situation in the education system and the changes which occurred during the period 2005–2013. In this regard, twelve focus group discussions with school teachers of Ukrainian language and literature are analyzed. They were carried out in twelve cities (Chernihiv, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Lutsk, Odesa, Simferopol, Uzhhorod and Zhytomyr). The interview results may be contextualized with findings from the survey. The questionnaire contained fourteen questions concerning language (questions 47 and 49–61). Some of the 2013 survey results are compared with those of other polls, especially of a similar nationwide representative survey organized in December 2006 (Besters-Dilger 2009, 367–396) that reflects the situation during Yushchenko's presidency.

Teachers on changes in the education system and the status of the Ukrainian language

Teachers of Ukrainian language and literature constitute the most important professional group who are concerned with and who impart attitudes toward the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture. Additionally, they monitor attitudes of the Ministry of Education, of parents and of pupils toward Ukrainian, and thus the changes in attitude over the last years. Therefore their opinions and observations are particularly interesting.

It is of particular interest whether the teachers of Ukrainian language and literature registered any changes in the education system under Yanukovych. The changes which occurred during the years 2010–2013 concerning language(s) were the following:

- Under Yushchenko, it was planned that from 2010 Ukrainian will be the only language in which the entrance examination to institutions of higher education [called *Zovnishnie nezalezhne otsiniuvannia* (ZNO)] could be passed. In 2010, Minister of Education Dmytro Tabachnyk revoked this plan and continued to allow languages of minorities as well, and “first of all Russian.” The number of pupils taking the exam in other languages than Ukrainian, and first of all in Russian, increased from around 17 percent in 2011 and 20 percent in 2012 to around 25 percent in 2013 (Ipress 2013). An exam in Ukrainian language and literature, however, remains mandatory.⁹
- In 2011, the subject Russian language was included on the list of ZNO exams. The choice of ZNO subjects depends on the concentration chosen for study at university level.
- In 2012, the Ministry of Education developed new school curricula from the fifth up to the ninth grades, according to which the number of weekly lessons for the subject Ukrainian language was reduced to two per week¹⁰ (Onyshchenko 2012; TSN 2012), which was less than for English and Russian.
- According to the 2012 school curricula, the number of weekly lessons for the subject Ukrainian literature was also reduced (Onyshchenko 2012; TSN 2012).
- According to the same curricula, the subject Ukrainian history was integrated into the general subject History (Onyshchenko 2012; TSN 2012).
- For the first time since independence, the share of pupils who studied in Ukrainian diminished from 82.2 percent to 81.9 percent in the 2011–2012 academic year (Rukh dobrovoltsiv 2012).¹¹
- In 2013, the Ministry of Education removed the term “state language” from nearly all documents concerning school education and replaced it by “mother tongue” (Zerkalo nedeli 2013).

⁹ The rule is that one of the exams in at most four (often three) subjects must be taken in Ukrainian language and literature.

¹⁰ The number of Ukrainian language lessons per week depends on the age of the pupils. In the last two grades (under Tabachnyk, the tenth and the eleventh grades), there was only one lesson per week (Ministerstvo osvity Ukrainy 2012).

¹¹ There is no newer report, which is regrettable because the OPSLP law has led to a perceptible decrease in the number of Ukrainian schools and classes.

On the basis of the focus group discussions, it can be asserted in general that “Soviet attitudes” are still very much alive not only among teachers but also among parents. Teachers remember the Soviet times when teaching was much easier and teachers and children were not challenged by new topics and new schoolbooks every year. They link Russian to their own childhood and adolescence, when they all learned it, some of them in parallel with Ukrainian. Many teachers say: “We have been educated with Russian, we are accustomed to Russian, why shouldn’t Russian be taught in every region?” Even in western Ukraine, many teachers are convinced that Russian is a necessary discipline and explain this by giving the reason that in the Soviet state Russian was the dominant language. A second argument in favor of Russian is often linked to Russian literature; according to the teachers, it is better to read it in the original language rather than in translation. The general attitude toward Russian is very tolerant, also in western Ukraine. All teachers agree that Russian plays an important role in Ukraine. Some teachers admit that teachers themselves still have “post-Soviet brains” (FGD in Odesa) and need to change their consciousness. Some teachers, even in the west, switch during the FGDs between Ukrainian and Russian or make “Russian” mistakes in Ukrainian.

There are parents who speak only Russian and refuse to accept Ukrainian, even in western Ukraine. This also concerns parents speaking a minority language and using Russian as a common language with their children. The reasons why parents want schools with Russian as the language of instruction for their children include the following: first, because they are unable to help their children to do homework in Ukrainian (FGD in Odesa); second, because they fear a certain alienation between themselves and their children if the latter go to a Ukrainian-language school; and third, because they are convinced that Russian opens up better career opportunities. Teachers agree with this and say that the parents’ will counts. However, parents sometimes decide against the will of their children who are more interested in Ukrainian than their parents are.

In contrast to other western European languages like German or French, English has a very high reputation among parents and pupils (on English, see also below). Parents even pay for private English lessons for their children. In western Ukraine, children sometimes learn English from kindergarten or at least from the first class. Some western Ukrainian teachers consider that only Ukrainian and English need to be taught at school, and not Russian (or Russian as an optional subject), while others find Russian indispensable. According to the teachers, here again it is up to

the parents to decide. But the problem is that often there are not enough teachers of English; then Russian is taught as a “foreign language.”

Nearly all teachers agree that the ZNO in Ukrainian language and literature, introduced by Minister of Education Ivan Vakarchuk in 2008, has played an important role in strengthening Ukrainian in the education system. Parents want their children to learn Ukrainian because the related exam grants access to higher education and an academic career. Some teachers only regret that the ZNO is the same for all: for those who had two lessons per week (one for Ukrainian language and one for Ukrainian literature) and for those who had six lessons per week. According to the teachers, the number of weekly lessons for Ukrainian language and literature, which was reduced in 2012, is too low in order to prepare the children properly for the exam. Some teachers are convinced that a good command of Ukrainian is necessary for the study of philology or journalism, but not of physics, geography, mathematics or engineering. In their view, the ZNO in Ukrainian language and literature should be simplified for students of science and engineering.

Teachers agree that there is a change for the better concerning the prestige of the Ukrainian language. During the Soviet era, Russian had a higher prestige; now Ukrainian has caught up. One can hear Ukrainian more often in western Ukraine, and even in the south (for example, in Odesa), in the center and the north, than was the case in Soviet times. In kindergartens and schools, children and pupils speak (good) Ukrainian, also during breaks and after school (in western Ukraine). Western Ukrainian teachers observe that, if they have to say something in Russian, they now translate from Ukrainian; earlier, it was just the opposite (FGD in Chernivtsi).

According to the teachers, in order to stabilize this development, the environment outside school—encompassing computer programs, mass media, songs (including those for children), books (especially for children) and festivals—must change and become Ukrainian. Teachers also hold that school directors should constantly speak Ukrainian and demonstrate their esteem for the language. As for their own profession, they claim that teachers of Ukrainian should not stop speaking Ukrainian after lessons. If parents do not speak Ukrainian themselves, their attitude toward the language is of utmost importance for their children’s behavior.

At the same time, the initial enthusiasm of many citizens for learning Ukrainian or indeed for switching to Ukrainian as their language of daily communication has diminished. Especially the growing interest in the Ukrainian language which could be observed in central, northern, eastern

and southern Ukraine since independence, and again reinforced in 2005, has been decreasing after the implementation of the OPSLP law, even in some western regions (FGD in Uzhhorod).

Another element which decreases the prestige of the Ukrainian language is the use of *surzhyk* (a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian) by many pupils and by the population in general (in Odesa, Chernivtsi and other cities). People may think that they are speaking Ukrainian, but they are not able to discern between Ukrainian and Russian. Russian-speaking Ukrainians often scoff at this incapacity. A negative factor is also that “Ukrainians are afraid of their own language” (FGD in Odesa) and so they automatically switch to Russian in specific situations (for example, in court). It seems that the Ukrainian-speaking population is itself not always convinced of the prestige of its language.

Teachers are aware that the attitude toward Ukrainian has changed on the political level during recent years. The estimation of the Ministry of Education under Yanukovych is in general negative, as the teaching program for Ukrainian language and literature changes every year. The ministry has removed many highly appreciated Ukrainian writers from the program. Its civil servants have no experience in teaching Ukrainian language and literature to minorities, for example. The ministry has reduced the number of Ukrainian language and literature lessons, so that it is lower than for English, Russian and minority languages. This is seen by some teachers as an attempt to decrease the prestige of Ukrainian. Also the fact that classes are divided into groups for English lessons but not for Ukrainian ones (sometimes comprising up to thirty-eight pupils) demonstrates the negative attitude of the ministry toward Ukrainian.

Furthermore, there is a problem with the availability of Ukrainian textbooks. After more than twenty years since independence, teaching material is still quantitatively and qualitatively poor, and the supply of the textbooks does not correspond to the program.

Under former president Yanukovych, politicians (including deputies and the prime minister) provided a bad linguistic example: on television, they talked mainly in Russian. Yanukovych’s knowledge of Ukrainian was poor. According to the teachers, all civil servants should take an examination in Ukrainian, and if they do not pass it, they should leave the civil service (see also the discussion below and Table 4.7).

Concerning language policy, the teachers are generally not satisfied: “Earlier they made great efforts for Ukrainian, but then they invented ‘bilingualism’” (FGD in Chernivtsi). The claim that all Ukrainian citizens should be bilingual in Russian and Ukrainian is linked to the OPSLP law.

Some teachers express explicit opposition toward this politically favored bilingualism and call Russian a foreign language like all the others (FGD in Uzhhorod), while others claim that Russian has a right to exist in Ukraine and say that bilingualism is a fact (also FGD in Uzhhorod). Several teachers are convinced that it is inadequate to make Russian–Ukrainian bilingualism obligatory for all citizens, because many minorities with their own languages live in Ukraine. The overall opinion is that there should be only one language on the state level, but that people can communicate in whatever language they want. Since Ukrainian is the only state language, it is the state’s responsibility to control the use of Ukrainian and to develop a corresponding language policy.

Finally, the FGDs in representative cities of four macroregions, namely Lviv (west), Chernihiv (north), Odesa (south) and Donetsk (east), are compared in more detail, taking into account the answers to two questions. The first question is: “Have there been changes in teaching the Ukrainian language in your region during the last ten years?” The second question asked is: “How can the status of the Ukrainian language be raised?”

In Lviv, there were no important changes during this period; the position of Ukrainian is stable. In Chernihiv, the introduction of the ZNO in Ukrainian language and literature in 2008 dramatically increased interest in Ukrainian. Parents who earlier had systematically excused their children from Ukrainian lessons stopped doing so. This fact is also reported in Uzhhorod and other regions. People speaking Ukrainian on public transportation are no longer considered to be provincial. Even pupils ask their teachers why they have more English than Ukrainian lessons per week and demand more Ukrainian lessons in order to pass the ZNO. Among the pupils, there are Ukrainian patriots who have started to speak Ukrainian exclusively, even during breaks and outside school, and who aim to convince others to follow them. The attitude toward Ukrainian has dramatically changed for the better. Although they are not numerous, there are some people who consciously decide to speak Ukrainian.

In Odesa, teachers have to create teaching materials themselves because textbooks are either in short supply or are too academic, not being adapted to the pupils’ level of knowledge. On the administrative level, the attitude toward Ukrainian changed a bit when documentation in Ukrainian was introduced; people started to acknowledge the significance of Ukrainian and to get used to the language. However, when the OPSLP law entered into force, all changes in favor of Ukrainian in the administration were rapidly reversed. Children talked in Ukrainian only during the

lessons, and often interspersed their speech with Russian words; so what they spoke is *surzhyk*. Nevertheless, some children defended the Ukrainian language as the state language even after the OPSLP law came into force. One can observe the first indications of national pride. During the 2012–2013 academic year, parents were forced to decide whether their child, until then attending a Ukrainian-language school, should from now on go to a Ukrainian or to a Russian class. The results were quite different: some parents wanted to deregister their children from Ukrainian-language classes when the OPSLP law came into force; however later they decided to do what the majority did—and thus left their children in Ukrainian-language classes. In other Ukrainian schools, sometimes against the will of the children, the majority of the parents voted for Russian, while in another school, the parents voted for Ukrainian.

In Donetsk, the OPSLP law had a direct consequence: many parents deregistered their children from Ukrainian-language schools and sent them to Russian-language ones. At the time of the FGDs, all universities in the city taught in Russian only, and Ukrainian-speaking students had linguistic problems at university. Earlier, until 2010, parents chose Ukrainian because they did not want to risk career disadvantages for their children; in 2013, the only reason to learn Ukrainian was to pass the ZNO and then to forget it as quickly as possible. Even pupils of the first grade ask: “Why do we need that language?” They are well informed about the OPSLP law which, according to them, makes knowledge of Ukrainian absolutely superfluous. Thirty-six Ukrainian-language schools have been closed down and, against the will of the parents, no Ukrainian classes have been opened in Russian-language schools.

In response to the second question, “How can the status of the Ukrainian language be raised?,” teachers in Lviv are convinced that requiring a good knowledge of Ukrainian when hiring personnel would raise the status of Ukrainian. Teachers should be more active and found out-of-school study groups, for example, focused on Ukrainian folklore or literature. In Chernihiv, teachers try to enhance a patriotic consciousness and to make clear that being a citizen of Ukraine also means respecting the Ukrainian language. The question of how appreciation for Ukrainian can be strengthened with only two lessons of Ukrainian per week is hotly debated. Teachers also think that it is important to offer additional out-of-school courses. They express serious criticism of the politicians who speak Russian and of advertisements and speakers on television whose Ukrainian is ripe with Russian words. To their mind, high-ranking civil servants should take a language examination. The government is not able to communi-

cate with the Ukrainian people on an adequate linguistic level. The Baltic states could serve as an example: those who do not speak the state language cannot get citizenship. Even Russia has introduced a language exam for civil servants.

In Odesa, teachers think that teachers and parents serve as role models for children, so their attitude toward Ukrainian is extremely important. Television in Ukrainian has had rather a negative impact so far because children take over a lot of linguistic mistakes from it. In Donetsk, teachers are convinced that the first step must be to repeal the OPSLP law, which in fact is still in force. As the second step, the number of Ukrainian lessons per week must increase. The main problem, however, is that, after leaving school, children do not encounter a Ukrainian-language environment: there are no mass media or books in Ukrainian. In particular, the dominance of the Russian language on television for children must be abolished.

When the FGDs, and particularly the four examples discussed above, are compared, it can be asserted that there have not been real changes in the linguistic situation in the education system in western and eastern Ukraine. More precisely, whereas the situation in the west remained stable, the phase of Ukrainization under Yushchenko did not leave permanent traces in the east. These traces were quickly removed after 2010, and especially after the adoption of the OPSLP law. It is no coincidence that, just after the repeal of this law by the parliament, demonstrations under the pretext of defending the Russian language began in eastern Ukraine in early 2014 and continued even after interim president Oleksandr Turchynov revoked this repeal. In the south, the Ukrainization of the education system was partially successful by awakening national pride and interest in Ukrainian among pupils, but it will be difficult to preserve these results, partly because parents are strongly oriented toward Russia and Russian. Very much depends on the individual school or teacher. In Chernihiv, the Ukrainization policy was apparently rather successful in the education system, and it seems to have aroused a new interest in Ukrainian, although the oblast is one of the most “Russified” regions in the north (see below).

The most important means of supporting the Ukrainian language in the education system is the ZNO. However, some differences can be observed: whereas in Donetsk pupils learn Ukrainian only in order to pass the ZNO, and shortly afterward tend to forget it, in Chernihiv the basis seems to be more stable. So the linguistic development of the education system of the north (and also of the center) is probably the strongest.

Mother tongue and bilingualism

When analyzing the results of the *Region, Nation and Beyond* survey (Survey 2013), question 1 of the survey, broaching the central topic of the whole project, always has to be considered: namely, concerning the region where the respondent lives. This point is linked to every other survey question concerning language, which allowed us to generate a limited number of results about the language situation in every region. Some of the most interesting outcomes will be presented here.

**Table 4.5. Mother tongue (*ridna mova*) in different regions
(in percentage; survey questions 1 and 53)**

Region/oblast ¹	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainian and Russian	Ukrainian +1 ²	Russian +1	Other	Surzhyk	DA ³
West								
1. Volynska	93.1	0.8	3.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0	0
2. Rivnenska	93.8	0.7	2.1	0	0	0	0	3.4
3. Lvivska	96.1	1.8	1.5	0.3	0	0	0	0.3
4. Ivano-Frankivska	98.9	0.6	0	0.6	0	0	0	0
5. Ternopilska	97.9	0.7	0.7	0	0	0	0	0.7
6. Chernivetska	60.7	5.1	1.7	4.3	0	26.5	0	1.7
7. Zakarpatska	88.8	1.3	5.6	1.9	0.6	0.6	1.3	0
North								
8. Kyivska	83.5	4.5	10.7	0.4	0	0.8	0	0
9. City of Kyiv	66.3	9.2	23.7	0.3	0.3	0	0.3	0

¹² In statistics, it is customary to cluster the Ukrainian regions into five “macroregions”: west (1–7), north (8–12), center (13–17), east (18–22) and south (23–27). The data is available at <http://www.uaregio.org/>.

¹³ “Ukrainian + 1” means “Ukrainian plus another language (but not Russian).” Correspondingly, “Russian + 1” means “Russian plus another language (but not Ukrainian).”

¹⁴ “DA” means “Difficult to Answer.”

Region/oblast ¹	Ukrainian	Russian	Ukrainian and Russian	Ukrainian +1 ²	Russian +1	Other	Surzhyk	DA ³
10. Chernihivska	49	4.7	43	0.7	0	0	1.3	1.3
11. Zhytomyrska	83.3	2.4	12.5	0	0.6	0	1.2	0
12. Sumska	52.6	5.1	35.3	0	1.3	0.6	5.1	0
Center								
13. Vinnytska	88.9	5.6	5.1	0	0.5	0	0	0
14. Khmelnytska	86.4	1.1	10.8	0.6	0	1.1	0	0
15. Kirovohradska	38.2	6.1	51.1	2.3	1.5	0	0	0.8
16. Cherkaska	82.8	5.2	9.8	0	0.6	0	1.1	0.6
17. Poltavska	69.5	11.5	16	0	0.5	0.5	1	1
East								
18. Dnipro-petrovska	39.8	26.2	32.7	0	0.4	0.7	0.2	0
19. Kharkivska	16.8	37.5	41.9	0.3	0.6	0	2.5	0.6
20. Zaporizka	18.1	30.5	42.8	0	0.4	0.4	6.6	1.2
21. Donetska	10.9	47.7	37.6	0	0.7	2.3	0.7	0.4
22. Luhanska	4.0	53.6	34.8	0	1.3	0	4.0	2.3
South								
23. Mykolaivska	18.2	38.3	39	0	3.9	0	0	0.6
24. Odeska	20.8	29.4	32.7	1.3	10.6	4.6	0.7	0
25. Khersonska	46.5	16	34.7	0	0	2.1	0	0.7
26. Crimea	7.8	65.9	14.5	0	2	9	0.4	0.4
27. City of Sevastopol	2	86.3	9.8	0	2	0	0	0
Total	50.9	21.2	23.2	0.4	1.1	1.6	1.1	0.5

The survey question “Which language is your mother tongue?” has been asked many times in different surveys. Among others, this question is regularly posed in the nationwide censuses. There is a stereotype that in the west, and partially in the north and the center, Ukrainian is the dominant mother tongue, whereas in the east and the south Russian dominates. The historical reasons for the repartition of these two languages include the early conquest of the eastern part of Ukraine by Russia, the late integration of the west into the Soviet Union, and the Soviet settlement policy, especially in the Donbas.¹⁵

The regional differentiation demonstrated in Table 4.5 corroborates this stereotype: the western regions (1–7) declare Ukrainian to be the dominant mother tongue. Some of the central (13–17) and northern (8–12) regions (Kyivska oblast, the city of Kyiv, Zhytomyrska, Vinnytska, Khmelnytska, Cherkaska and Poltavska oblasts) even show a higher percentage of Ukrainian mother tongue than the western region of Chernivtsi, which has a high percentage of minorities. In exactly fifteen out of twenty-seven regions, Ukrainian, and only Ukrainian, is the dominant mother tongue in the sense that it reaches more than 50 percent. But one must be aware that the designation “mother tongue [*ridna mova*]” does not automatically mean that the respondent learned this language first or speaks it well (or at all); it is rather the language to which the individual feels a certain loyalty.¹⁶

The loyalty toward Russian as the only mother tongue is strongest in three regions (more than 50 percent), but it is significantly weaker than the loyalty toward Ukrainian in the west: in Crimea, Luhanska oblast and the city of Sevastopol. In all censuses, including the 2013 survey analyzed in the present volume, Crimea has a predominantly ethnic Russian population (in Crimea 56.5 percent, and in Sevastopol 76.5 percent) and therefore also a high share of Russian mother tongue. Russian dominates in both the private and public spheres there. Luhanska oblast is an interesting case: with “merely” 34.1 percent identifying themselves as Russians, loy-

¹⁵ One should distinguish between direct immigration from Russia and the Soviet Union and the resettlement of people from eastern to western Ukraine after World War II.

¹⁶ One of the last surveys carried out in Kyiv with a limited number of respondents can be cited as an example (Sokolova 2013, 46). It makes clear that the indicated mother tongue does not coincide with the language a person prefers to speak: 50 percent of respondents say that (only) Ukrainian is their mother tongue, but just 17.57 percent prefer to speak it. The figures for Russian are different: those who declare it to be their only mother tongue also prefer to speak it.

alty toward the Russian language exceeds 50 percent. Luhanska oblast is also one of the only two regions (together with Donetsk oblast) which became more Russian and less Ukrainian between the last two Ukrainian censuses, which took place in 1989 and 2001.¹⁷ That means that the number of people who declared Russian to be their mother tongue rose, whereas in all other regions it diminished.

However, it is difficult to compare the results of the 2013 survey, for example, to the 2001 census results, which contained only the following three questions concerning the “language characteristics” of respondents:

- (a) Mother tongue
- (b) If your mother tongue is not Ukrainian, indicate if you speak Ukrainian fluently (yes/no)
- (c) Another language you speak fluently (free answer)

The option “more than one mother tongue” was not provided in the 2001 census. But the 2013 survey results can be compared with the representative survey of December 2006, which showed that 55.5 percent considered Ukrainian as their mother tongue, 32 percent Russian, 11.1 percent both Ukrainian and Russian, and 2 percent other languages (Besters-Dilger 2009, 389). First, when the 2006 and the 2013 results are contrasted, one can clearly see that the number of people with only one mother tongue has diminished. The option “more than one mother tongue” is a highly relevant answer for many citizens of Ukraine. The number of individuals who selected this option is even higher than of those who selected the “only Russian” option. Second, compared to 2006, in 2013 there were around 5 percent fewer people in Ukraine who declared Ukrainian to be their only mother tongue, and around 11 percent fewer people who called Russian their only mother tongue.

That the number of people with two mother tongues is rising has already been confirmed by a poll of the Razumkov Center, carried out in October 2008, which showed that between 2006 and 2008 the number of people naming two languages as their mother tongues had been constantly growing (according to the findings of the Center, from 15.6 percent in

¹⁷ See www.ukrstat.gov.ua for details. The figures for *ridna mova* in Luhanska oblast were: Russian 63.9 percent in 1989, and 68.8 percent in 2001; Ukrainian 34 percent in 1989, and 30 percent in 2001. In Donetsk oblast, the figures were as follows: Russian 67.7 percent in 1989, and 74.9 percent in 2001; Ukrainian 30.6 percent in 1989, and 24.1 percent in 2001.

2006 to 28.7 percent in 2008), and that the center, the south and the east of Ukraine are concerned by this development, but not the west. However, in opposition to what has been said above, according to the same survey by the Razumkov Center, Ukrainian “lost” around 7.7 percent of native speakers between 2006 and 2008, while Russian lost only 4.7 percent.¹⁸ In the center and the south, the double mother tongue option increased to the detriment of Ukrainian as the only mother tongue, and in the east, more to the detriment of Russian (Razumkov Center 2008).

Even if the detailed results of the Razumkov Center do not fully coincide with the 2013 survey, one outcome is clear: one can speak about a growth of bilingualism, meaning loyalty toward two different languages, Ukrainian and Russian. This development is at the expense of Ukrainian and Russian monolingualism. Bilingualism is rising, as is probably a double linguistic identity.

The assumption that bilingualism is growing is supported by the answers to questions 52 and 57. The answers to the question “What is your attitude toward the Ukrainian–Russian bilingualism in Ukraine?” (question 52) show that the west and some northern and central regions (Kyivska, Zhytomyrska, Vinnytska, Khmelnytska and Poltavska oblasts) have a negative attitude toward Ukrainian–Russian bilingualism, and want to see Ukrainian as the dominant language in Ukraine. But sixteen oblasts are in favor of bilingualism. Additionally, in response to the question “What is your level of mastery of Ukrainian, Russian and English?” (question 57), 78.9 percent of the population claim to master the Ukrainian language well or even on an excellent level, including 67.1 percent of the population in the east and 70.3 percent in the south. Taking these results into account, one is surprised by the aggressive tone toward the Ukrainian language in eastern and southern Ukraine (for quotations, see Besters-Dilger 2012).

¹⁸ Zalizniak (2012), who carried out a survey in Kyiv and compared the results of surveys in 2006 and 2012, came to a similar conclusion: the number of people who declared only Ukrainian as their mother tongue diminished by 18 percent (from 63 percent in 2006 to 45 percent in 2012), and the number of those who said that Russian is their only mother tongue diminished by 10 percent (from 31 percent in 2006 to 21 percent in 2012). The number of people with two mother tongues increased sevenfold (from 6 to 41 percent). Zalizniak assumes that in 2001 people wanted to support independent Ukraine by declaring Ukrainian their only mother tongue. This was not necessary anymore in 2012.

Russian as a second state language

In this section, the answers to an extremely topical question, “Do you agree that Russian should be a state language as well as Ukrainian?” (question 51), are analyzed. At first glance, a high percentage of bilingual citizens and the wish to have a second state language are not necessarily closely connected. One may even consider that a highly bilingual population does not need two state languages, because all education and administrative documentation can be conducted in one language which every citizen masters. The claim for two state languages is rather a claim on the part of those who are not bilingual (and who do not master the state language) or who understand the language question as a political means: it unites those who are not able (or do not wish) to communicate in Ukrainian and/or those who see the political future of Ukraine in close connection with Russia; the refusal to accept Russian as a second state language coincides with the wish to have an independent Ukrainian state (possibly integrated into the European Union) (see below).

Table 4.6. Attitude toward Russian as a second state language
(in percentage, survey questions 1 and 51)

Region	I do not agree	I rather do not agree	I rather agree	I agree	DA
West					
1. Volynska	66.2	25.4	1.5	5.4	1.5
2. Rivnenska	65.5	17.2	2.1	3.4	11.7
3. Lvivska	90	4.8	1.5	1.8	1.8
4. Ivano-Frankivska	90	7.2	0.6	1.1	1.1
5. Ternopil'ska	95.1	3.5	0	0	1.4
6. Chernivets'ka	19.7	42.7	7.7	6	23.9
7. Zakarpats'ka	51.9	9.4	18.1	5.6	15
North					
8. Kyiv'ska	61.2	17.8	7.4	7.9	5.8
9. City of Kyiv	49.9	22.3	10	12.5	5.3

Region	I do not agree	I rather do not agree	I rather agree	I agree	DA
10. Chernihivska	20.8	24.8	24.8	22.1	7.4
11. Zhytomyrska	53	23.2	11.9	6.5	5.4
12. Sumska	17.9	28.8	28.8	14.1	10.3
Center					
13. Vinnytska	47.2	35.6	3.7	8.3	5.1
14. Khmelnytska	69.3	15.9	5.7	4	5.1
15. Kirovohradska	26	13	41.2	18.3	1.5
16. Cherkaska	36.2	33.3	16.1	10.3	4
17. Poltavska	49	27.5	12	4.5	7
East					
18. Dnipropetrovska	26.2	15.4	26.2	27.3	4.9
19. Kharkivska	5	3.6	27.3	53.7	10.5
20. Zaporizka	16.5	12.8	19.8	49.8	1.2
21. Donetska	3	6.1	13.7	73.8	3.4
22. Luhanska	2.6	7.6	32.1	48	9.6
South					
23. Mykolaivska	16.9	11	16.9	47.4	7.8
24. Odeska	4.3	7.6	25.7	57.8	4.6
25. Khersonska	29.2	17.4	16	28.5	9
26. Crimea	1.6	5.5	20.8	63.5	8.6
27. City of Sevastopol	0	3.9	15.7	78.4	2
Total	34.4	14.8	15.9	28.8	6.1

The regional differentiation confirms that all five regions with more than 50 percent of the population who agree to have Russian as a second state

language lie in the east and the south: Crimea (including the city of Sevastopol), Donetsk, Odeska and Kharkivska oblasts. There are again some interesting results in some regions: one-quarter of the respondents in Chernivetska oblast, a region with a comparatively low percentage of people who declare Ukrainian their only mother tongue and a high share of non-Ukrainian and non-Russian mother tongue (see Table 4.5), find it difficult to answer the question of whether Ukraine should have two state languages or not. The share of defenders of one single state language, Ukrainian, is also comparably low in this oblast. It seems that the experience with many minority languages makes people more sensitive to that question and more hesitant to adopt a firm position. In the center and the north, a negative attitude toward a second state language prevails, with two exceptions: Chernihivska and Kirovohradska oblasts. Both are regions with a high percentage of bilingual population (see Table 4.5). So the attitude toward one (Ukrainian) or two state languages seems to be linked to the loyalty toward one (Ukrainian) or two mother tongues. Those who declare Russian to be their only mother tongue favor per se two state languages. From many sources, it became clear that the Russian-speaking population in eastern and southern Ukraine understands having a second state language, Russian, as an entitlement to use Russian only and to exclude Ukrainian from all public and private domains. This is reflected in the FGD of Donetsk.

In eastern and southern Ukraine, all oblasts prefer two state languages, with one exception: Khersonska oblast. As seen from Table 4.5, the latter oblast also has the highest percentage of inhabitants with Ukrainian mother tongue in the east and south macroregions. This again confirms the hypothesis that there is a correlation between Ukrainian as the only mother tongue and the refusal of a second state language.

The question about the link between the region of a respondent, his/her mother tongue and the demand to have Russian as a second state language will be treated below in more detail. In total, the negative attitude toward two state languages (the answers "I do not agree" and "I rather do not agree") dominates (with 49.2 percent, as compared to 44.7 percent who agree or rather agree),¹⁹ but the difference is not very big.

¹⁹ A survey carried out by the Razumkov Center in May 2005 showed different results: the negative attitude had 35.9 percent, while the positive attitude had 56.2 percent. See the next footnote.

According to the survey of December 2006 (Besters-Dilger 2009, 375), only 24.8 percent voted for two state languages with equal rights.²⁰ Slightly more respondents preferred the option “Ukrainian is the state language, and Russian enjoys the same rights as languages of other minorities” (26 percent). All in all, 70.9 percent voted for “Ukrainian as the only state language” (with different options for the use of Russian) in December 2006. Since there were no differentiated options in the 2013 survey, it is risky to assume a “growing acceptance of Russian as a second state language.” Very much depends on the formulation of the question, and the quantity and quality of the preformulated answers.²¹

The language competence of civil servants

The most surprising results concern the questions “Do you agree that every civil servant should master Ukrainian, Russian, and English?” (question 56) and “Do you agree that in your region the following languages should be compulsory school subjects: Ukrainian, Russian, and English?”

²⁰ The same proposition, “Both languages should be official languages in Ukraine,” polled by the Razumkov Center (2012) at the beginning of June 2012, was supported by 23.9 percent (as compared to 37 percent in December 2005), which is similar to the results of the 2006 survey. Also in this case, there were different options. In the Razumkov poll, the “winner,” with 43.6 percent, was the proposition “Ukrainian should be the only state and official language, Russian can be used on a colloquial level as well as the languages of other national minorities” (as compared to 35 percent in December 2005). The results of the Razumkov poll suggest that there has been a shift in opinion from “two state languages” to “Ukrainian as the only state language” between 2005 and 2012. In total, 68.6 percent voted in June 2012 for “Ukrainian as the only state language,” which is again similar to the poll of December 2006. Another survey, carried out in Kyiv (Zalizniak 2013, 91), arrived at the same conclusions: between 2001 and 2012, acceptance of the option “Both languages should be state languages having equal rights” went down from 26.8 to 6.1 percent and support for the proposition “Ukrainian as the only state language” (with different options for Russian) increased from 69 to 83.4 percent.

²¹ For example, Maiboroda (2008, 144–146) offered four options, distinct from those proposed in December 2006 and in the Razumkov surveys in 2005 and 2012, as answers to this question. Therefore, his results are hardly comparable to those presented here. According to him, 53.6 percent totally agree and 19 percent rather agree with the statement “Ukrainian should be the only state language, but all citizens should have the right to freely use the language they want,” and 30.8 percent totally agree and 17.9 percent rather agree with the proposition “Russian should have the status of a second state language.” In total, that comes to more than 100 percent.

(question 60). The answers to these two questions are summarized in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 (see below). In both cases, the answers are reduced to the most positive and the most negative categories for each of the three languages. Categories “I rather agree,” “I rather do not agree” and “Difficult to answer” will not be taken into account.

Table 4.7. Requested language competence of civil servants
(in percentage, survey questions 1 and 56)

Region	Ukrainian I agree	Ukrainian I do not agree	Russian I agree	Russian I do not agree	English I agree	English I do not agree
West						
1. Volynska	97.7	0	57.7	10.8	61.5	2.3
2. Rivnenska	89	0	36.6	20	51.7	6.2
3. Lvivska	100	0	17.6	17.6	27.6	5.8
4. Ivano-Frankivska	98.3	0	33.9	17.2	43.3	9.4
5. Ternopil'ska	95.8	0	4.9	14.6	16.7	12.5
6. Chernivets'ka	82.1	0	14.5	17.9	15.4	13.7
7. Zakarpats'ka	91.9	0	21.9	12.5	11.3	21.9
North						
8. Kyiv'ska	98.3	0	65.7	3.7	44.6	10.3
9. City of Kyiv	96.4	0	66.3	1.7	46.5	5.6
10. Chernihiv'ska	82.6	0	58.4	4.7	57	6.7
11. Zhytomyr'ska	91.7	0.6	41.7	11.9	40.5	13.1
12. Sum'ska	69.2	0	53.2	1.9	17.3	10.9
Center						
13. Vinnyts'ka	97.7	0	40.7	10.6	9.7	25.9
14. Khmelnyts'ka	97.2	0	30.1	1.7	31.3	4
15. Kirovohrads'ka	56.5	0	38.9	1.5	11.5	19.1

Region	Ukrainian I agree	Ukrainian I do not agree	Russian I agree	Russian I do not agree	English I agree	English I do not agree
16. Cherkaska	87.4	0	47.7	2.3	39.1	11.5
17. Poltavska	94	0	62.5	3	35.5	20.5
East						
18. Dnipropetrovska	83	0.4	65.5	2.2	39.6	6.9
19. Kharkivska	81.8	0	77.1	1.4	33.9	15.7
20. Zaporizka	87.7	0	77.4	1.2	24.7	17.3
21. Donetska	76.3	0.4	72.4	0.4	33.3	7.7
22. Luhanska	76.8	1	78.1	2	41.1	6.3
South						
23. Mykolaivska	89	0	77.3	0	40.3	3.2
24. Odeska	76.6	0	65	0.3	20.8	16.8
25. Khersonska	90.3	0	64.6	1.4	27.8	9.7
26. Crimea	76.5	0.8	75.3	0.4	54.9	5.5
27. City of Sevastopol	80.4	2	80.4	2	64.7	3.9
Total	86.4	0.2	56.5	5.1	34.6	10.6

The survey of December 2006 was the first which asked about an obligatory Ukrainian language test for all civil servants. The proposition was supported by 50.9 percent of respondents and rejected by 34.5 percent. Now, knowledge of Ukrainian is a broadly formulated requirement for civil servants. This is a positive sign for the future of the Ukrainian language. Even in Crimea, the proposition was widely supported in March 2013 when the survey was conducted. The regional differentiation concerns much more the knowledge of Russian by civil servants. As one could expect, in the seven western regions (1–7) and in only two central and northern regions (Vinnytska and Zhytomyrska oblasts), it is acceptable for more than 10 percent of respondents that a civil servant does not master Russian. But for most people in Ukraine, a civil servant without Russian is unthinkable.

Command of English is seen as an important asset in many regions with no clear geographical pattern of preference. The importance of English in the west (clearly higher than Russian) and the high acceptance of English in Crimea are remarkable. In all macroregions, except the west, Russian is more important than English.

Languages as school subjects

Concerning compulsory languages at school, the regional differentiation is remarkable: Ukrainian language as an obligatory school subject is preferred by more than two-thirds (66 percent) of the population in all regions, with only two exceptions, the city of Sevastopol (49 percent) and Kirovohradska oblast (52.7 percent). The latter oblast (15) is an exceptional region since it is also the only territorial unit where more than 50 percent of the respondents are against English; Russian also has a very low acceptance rate (13.7 percent). In total, the acceptance of English as a compulsory school subject is higher than that of Russian (see Table 4.8 below).

Table 4.8. Compulsory language subjects at school (in percentage, survey questions 1 and 60)

Region	Ukrainian I agree	Ukrainian I do not agree	Russian I agree	Russian I do not agree	English I agree	English I do not agree
West						
1. Volynska	90.8	0.8	43.8	11.5	63.8	2.3
2. Rivnenska	82.8	0.7	24.8	14.5	55.9	9
3. Lvivska	99.4	0	5.8	35.2	44.2	5.2
4. Ivano-Frankivska	97.2	0	9.4	22.2	50	0.6
5. Ternopil'ska	97.9	0	7.6	26.4	32.6	12.5
6. Chernivets'ka	81.2	0	10.3	12	16.2	6
7. Zakarpatska	91.9	0	22.5	16.3	49.4	13.1
North						
8. Kyiv'ska	89.7	0	53.7	5.8	57.4	10.3
9. City of Kyiv	90.5	0	51.8	5	59.9	3.6

Region	Ukrainian I agree	Ukrainian I do not agree	Russian I agree	Russian I do not agree	English I agree	English I do not agree
10. Chernihivska	81.9	0	57.7	2	64.4	2
11. Zhytomyrska	90.5	0.6	23.2	14.3	44.6	7.7
12. Sumska	71.8	0	54.5	1.9	59.6	8.3
Center						
13. Vinnytska	82.4	0	40.7	9.3	43.1	5.6
14. Khmelnytska	96	0	26.1	13.1	32.4	8
15. Kirovohradska	52.7	1.5	13.7	12.2	8.4	50.4
16. Cherkaska	86.8	0	64.4	1.7	71.8	1.7
17. Poltavska	87.5	0	47	5.5	57.5	4.5
East						
18. Dnipropetrovska	80.1	0.7	62.2	3.4	62.4	9.2
19. Kharkivska	87.6	0.6	85.1	0.8	73.6	1.7
20. Zaporizka	75.3	0.8	70.4	1.2	51	15.6
21. Donetsk	83.2	0.5	83.2	0	73.4	1.2
22. Luhanska	77.2	0.3	80.8	0.3	73.8	0.3
South						
23. Mykolaivska	84.4	0	77.3	0	76.6	0
24. Odeska	66.3	0	62	0.7	48.5	3.3
25. Khersonska	91.7	0	62.5	0	63.2	8.3
26. Crimea	70.2	3.5	78.4	0	69.8	3.5
27. City of Sevastopol	49	13.7	72.5	0	52.9	17.6
Total	83.4	0.5	52.9	7.2	57.2	6.4

This corresponds to a similar but less pronounced result of the December 2006 survey, where the respondents agreed that “In general secondary

schools, it is obligatory to study as separate subjects” a) Ukrainian (83.7 percent); b) Russian (60.3 percent); and c) English (61.1 percent) (Besters-Dilger 2009, 387). Since only 4 percent of Ukrainians seem to speak English at an acceptable level (Razumkov Center 2013), the high marks for English express rather a desire than a reality. English is the key to working abroad, which is the dream of 40 percent of the population of Ukraine (Razumkov Center 2013).

The overall picture is of a preference for a school where three languages (Ukrainian, English and Russian) are taught as mandatory subjects in thirteen out of twenty-seven regions. In eight regions, only Ukrainian is supported by a majority. Ukrainian and English are preferred in four regions (Volynska, Rivnenska, Ivano-Frankivska and Poltavaska oblasts); Ukrainian and Russian are preferred in one (Odeska oblast), and Russian and English in one (the city of Sevastopol). In none of the western regions does Russian find a majority of supporters (more than 50 percent) as a compulsory school subject, as the preferred combination in the west is Ukrainian and English or only Ukrainian. This is also true for the northern and central regions comprising Zhytomyrska, Vinnytska, Khmelnytska, Kirovohradska and Poltavaska oblasts. So only in fifteen regions is Russian considered an important compulsory subject by more than half of the population.

The correlation between region, mother tongue (survey question 53), and attitude toward Russian as a second state language (survey question 51)

For a more refined analysis of the survey, it is necessary to take into account not only combinations of two items from the questionnaire (one of which is always survey question 1), but also to link three of them together (including survey question 1). Due to space constraints, our analysis is limited to the answers to two such combined questions. The first is: “What is the interdependence between region, mother tongue [question 53] and the attitude toward Russian as a second state language [question 51]?” The second question, which also combines three items of the questionnaire, is: “What is the interdependence between region, mother tongue and the vision of the political future of Ukraine?”

The answers to the first question show a strong interdependence between questions 53 and 51. In the entire country, 81.3 percent of people who declare Ukrainian their only mother tongue vote against Russian as a second state language (60.6 percent say “I do not agree,” and 20.7 per-

cent “I rather do not agree”), whereas 86.8 percent of people with Russian as their only mother tongue agree to Russian as a second state language (65.3 percent say “I agree,” and 21.5 percent “I rather agree”). 74 percent of respondents with two mother tongues also want to see Russian as a second state language (43.7 percent say “I agree,” and 30.3 percent “I rather agree”). There are some interesting differences between the regions: in some oblasts, people with Ukrainian as mother tongue are very tolerant toward Russian as a second state language, with a majority supporting it (in Crimea, Donetsk, Odeska and Kharkivska oblasts). It is apparently daily life in a Russian-speaking environment that makes Russian as second state language more acceptable in these regions than is the case in the west. At the same time, there are two regions where the majority of people with only Russian as mother tongue vote against Russian as a second state language (Poltavska and Ternopil'ska oblasts). For both “exceptional” groups, the low number of respondents has to be taken into account.

*Correlations between region, mother tongue (survey question 53), and vision of the future of Ukraine (survey question 24)*²²

The second question (“What is the interdependence between region, mother tongue and the vision of the political future of Ukraine [question 24]?”) has become very topical during recent months. Question 24 offers a wide range of future scenarios: a fully independent and bloc-free Ukraine (option 1), Ukraine and Russia in a union (option 2), Ukraine as a member of the EU (option 3), Ukraine in a union with Central and Eastern Europe (option 4), and Ukraine disintegrating into different states (option 5).

If Ukraine as a whole is considered, people with Ukrainian as their only mother tongue (50.9 percent) prefer options 1 (17.8 percent) and 3 (16.5 percent). People with Russian as their only mother tongue (21.2 percent) clearly prefer option 2 (9.5 percent). People who declare both Ukrainian and Russian as their mother tongues (23.2 percent) also prefer option 2 (7.9 percent), closely followed by option 1 (5.2 percent). For all three groups, the vision of Ukraine disintegrating into several states (option 5) is the least supported option.

²² See also Zalizniak (2009), who finds a correlation between mother tongue and political orientation.

Some regions stand out because the respondents with Ukrainian as their only mother tongue prefer option 2 or see it at least on a par with options 1 or 3. This is the case in Crimea, Donetska, Odeska and Kharkivska oblasts, and the city of Sevastopol. So the impression is confirmed that Ukrainians living in a region dominated by the Russian language (which they probably use themselves in all linguistic domains) support the idea of a Russian–Ukrainian union, even if their mother tongue is Ukrainian. In other regions, people with Russian as their only mother tongue do not prefer option 2, but rather options 1 or 3: Vinnytska, Lvivska, Rivnenska, Sumska, Ternopil'ska and Khmelnytska oblasts. In general (apart from Rivnenska and Ternopil'ska oblasts), it is option 1, an independent Ukraine, which seems more attractive than option 3 (membership in the EU). But since the numbers of respondents are quite low, the representativeness of these dissenting opinions is not guaranteed. One result, however, is clear: adherence to the EU is not a desirable future perspective for people with Russian as their only mother tongue; only one-tenth of them opt for it (Ukraine-wide, the figure is 2.2 percent out of a total 21.2 percent of the population who consider Russian as their only mother tongue).

There are indications that, independently of the region, the values linked to the European Union (a market economy, freedom of the press, the rule of law and democracy) are more desirable not only for people with Ukrainian as mother tongue, but in general for younger people and those with a higher education (Sotsiolohichna 2013, 8, 11 and 14). This could mean that ethno-linguistic characteristics will be less important in defining political orientations in the future.

A new linguistic map of Ukraine?

If the results of the FGDs and of the 2013 survey are compared with those of December 2006, the general tendencies remain the same. The west considers Ukrainian its mother tongue; the east and the south, Russian. In general, the stereotype that the west is pro-Ukrainian, while the east and the south are pro-Russian, has been supported by the data. But the FGDs concerning the education system made clear that this picture is too simple and should be contextualized by a qualitative statement: the west adopts a very tolerant attitude toward Russian, whereas the east generally rejects the Ukrainian language (see also Besters-Dilger 2012). The attitude of the south (Odesa) toward Ukrainian is apparently slightly less negative. The interesting regions lie in the north and the center: at least in 2013, when

the FGDs took place, the policy of Ukrainization had left clear traces in the school system of the regions.

Therefore, the division into five macroregions must be revised: at least concerning the language question, the frontiers between some of them are fading away.²³ The most interesting macroregions are the north and the center, because they waver, for example, between a more pro-Ukrainian position and a preference for two state languages. Kyivska oblast, the city of Kyiv, Zhytomyrska, Vinnytska, Khmelnytska, Cherkaska and Poltavska oblasts are characterized by a high percentage of those with Ukrainian as mother tongue. The same regions plus Sumska oblast are in favor of one state language, Ukrainian. Zhytomyrska and Vinnytska oblasts share the same opinion as the west concerning the low importance of Russian for civil servants. In Zhytomyrska, Vinnytska, Khmelnytska, Kirovohradska and Poltavska oblasts, Russian is not supported by a majority as a compulsory school subject. All in all, Zhytomyrska and Vinnytska oblasts have the strongest tendency to adhere to the west, while Kirovohradska and especially Chernihivska oblasts seem to be the most pro-Russian regions in this area.

Two governmental measures had a high impact on the linguistic situation in the education system: the introduction of the ZNO Ukrainian language and literature in 2008, and the OPSLP law with concomitant measures in 2012. It seems that the consequences of the latter were less perceptible in the north and the center than in the east and the south.

The acceptance of Ukrainian as the state language, as a symbol of the Ukrainian state, is growing, also in the east and the south. The proposition that a civil servant must master Ukrainian is supported by 86.4 percent of the population and enjoys the support of a broad majority in all regions (including the east and the south). English is widely accepted in Ukraine as a school subject, and 4.3 percent of the survey respondents consider it more important than Russian. Only the south and the east give preference to Russian, as compared to English (see Table 4.8).

On the one hand, there is a clear correlation between respondents' mother tongue being Ukrainian and their refusal of the proposition to have Russian as a second state language. On the other hand, respondents with

²³ Even projects based on the sharp contrast between Lviv and Donetsk, as typical representatives of the west and the east, arrive at the conclusion that the differences are diminishing over time (see, for example, Hrytsak, Portnov and Susak 2007, especially *materialy* in Hrytsak, Portnov and Susak 2007 [question 9.1, 302–303, question 13.15, 307–308, and question 20, 312]).

Russian as their only mother tongue or with two mother tongues want to see Russian as a second state language. Another correlation exists between mother tongue and visions of the political future of Ukraine: respondents declaring Ukrainian to be their only mother tongue prefer an independent state or adhesion to the European Union, whereas people declaring Russian to be their mother tongue favor a union with Russia.

Conclusions

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The history of the Ukrainian language has always been one of competition with apparently stronger rivals, varying in the course of time and depending on the region concerned (Church Slavonic, Polish, Latin, Hungarian, Russian, German, Romanian and Czech). In written and literary usage, the language has had many ups and downs, including relative heydays in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when a bookish variety of it served as a chancellery language in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and in the Principality of Moldavia, and in the seventeenth century, when it flourished as a vehicle of Baroque literature. On the other hand, the language suffered a deep decline across the bulk of the Ukrainian lands during the eighteenth century, being relegated (especially within the Russian Empire) to the status of rustic parlance.

The revival of the language in the Russian-ruled eastern part of the country began in the early nineteenth century and followed what is sometimes called a Romantic model of language planning, reposing on a massive exploitation of material offered by the living vernacular. The literary language thus constructed had a remarkable vitality and force of expression, but could scarcely avoid bearing a stamp of rusticity and low prestige. By contrast, in the Austrian-ruled western part of Ukraine, the Romantic tendencies were much weaker, and the continuity in relation to the previous bookish tradition much stronger. The vernacular turn came there at a later time (in the 1860s in Galicia, in the 1880s in Bukovyna and in the 1920s in Transcarpathia). On the other hand, the domains in which Ukrainian was used were much more diversified in the west, where they included, apart from belles lettres, education, jurisprudence, science and the periodical press. As a result, the western variety was perceived as more prestigious and sophisticated. A process of homogenization of the

two varieties began in the 1880s and reached its logical conclusion in the 1920s, when a common modern language standard for Ukrainian was developed in Soviet Ukraine. In the 1930s, however, a sharp reversal in the policy of the Communist Party introduced a new course toward Russification, which deeply affected both the status of and corpus planning for Ukrainian.

After incorporating Galicia, Volhynia, northern Bukovyna, southern Bessarabia (Budzhak) and Transcarpathia into Soviet Ukraine in 1939–1945, the Soviet authorities implemented there the same language policy as elsewhere, albeit with slight differences: the Ukrainians had their language rights promoted, with schools, the periodical press, theaters and so on functioning in Ukrainian; the status of the languages which were dominant within the former metropolitan states (Polish in Galicia, Romanian/Moldavian in Bukovyna and Budzhak, and Hungarian in Transcarpathia) was supported or tolerated to some extent too. Considerable numbers of Russians moved to the newly incorporated regions, bringing with them their language, which was massively promoted on the official level.

The general tendencies of Soviet language policy in Ukraine were unchanging from the mid-1940s to the mid-1980s. Their essence was that the knowledge of Russian should be obligatory, and the knowledge of Ukrainian and other languages optional. The mechanisms employed to achieve this goal were the promotion of Ukrainian–Russian bilingualism (accompanied by Hungarian–Russian and Moldavian–Russian bilingualism in the western regions), a constant stress on the importance of the Russian language, which was a compulsory subject in all educational institutions, and the predominance of Russian in higher education. As a result, westerners became accustomed to Ukrainian–Russian bilingualism, to a stronger position and higher prestige of Russian and to its obligatory learning. All this has contributed to the creation of popular stereotypes about the indispensability of Russian as a vehicle of culture, education and science.

However, opposition to this policy in the western regions, both organized (on the part of the clandestine Ukrainian guerrillas) and spontaneous, was strong. Due to this factor and to the relative shortness of the period of Soviet rule (less than fifty years), the local population could maintain its Ukrainian linguistic identity better than elsewhere in Ukraine (the same applies to minorities such as Hungarians or Romanians). With the advent of Gorbachev's liberalization in the late 1980s, westerners were the first to claim a restitution and full recognition of their language rights in a move that led to a deep reversal of the formerly practiced policies.

After 1991, the Ukrainian language was understood as one of the fundamental elements of Ukrainian ethnic identity. Two out of four presidents (Kravchuk and Yushchenko) attempted to orient their language policy toward Ukrainization. The linguistic domains where Ukrainian gained a relatively firm position are the education system and, to a lesser extent, administration; in the area of the media, the attempts to foster Ukrainian were more or less reversed under President Yanukovych. The stance of the fifth president, Petro Poroshenko, on the language question was ultimately articulated in September 2017, when he expressed his support for the promotion of Ukrainian in education and other public spheres while granting language rights to the minorities. But even after more than two decades of independence, stereotypes of Soviet times concerning the high value of Russian and its role as vehicle of culture, education and science are widespread among teachers and parents, even in western Ukraine. The Ukrainian language has caught up among the younger generation—also in the north, center and south, but much less so in the east.

An important result of the project is that the old Soviet idea concerning Russian–Ukrainian bilingualism has gained in importance. It is not by chance that the renewed promotion of this idea gathered momentum under Yanukovych. A growing bilingualism, at least in the sense of a loyalty toward the two languages, Ukrainian and Russian, can be observed. All polls show that the number of people claiming to have two mother tongues is growing. But contrary to the former (Soviet and, under Yanukovych, post-Soviet) intention to provide a privileged position for Russian as compared to Ukrainian and to make Ukrainians accept Russian as their “second mother tongue,” it is knowledge of the Ukrainian language among predominantly Russian-speaking people which is today more widespread than, for example, a decade ago. More than two-thirds of the population in the east and the south claim to master Ukrainian on a good or excellent level. There is also a growing acceptance of Ukrainian as an important symbol of the Ukrainian state.

At the same time, the idea of a nation-state based on an ethnic definition of the nation, widespread in the west and in some northern and central regions, will not prevail all over the country. Although the fighting in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (now called “Ukraine’s far east”) has sharpened national Ukrainian identity, it is not likely that the idea of Ukrainian monolingualism will be accepted in the east (even in “Ukraine’s near east,” i.e., the eastern regions besides Donetsk and Luhansk) or in the south in the foreseeable future. Therefore, a future Ukrainian language policy has to take into account both tasks: an efficient implementation of the Ukrai-

nian language (as the only state language) in official domains, and a continued acceptance of and support for the minorities' languages as well. The latter is also one of the requirements, formulated by the European Council, for a rapprochement with the European Union.

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5. Literary Mediascapes in Ukraine

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The term “mediascape” was coined by Arjun Appadurai (1990, 9) and refers to the production and dissemination of cultural contents as well as the images of the world created by the media. In relation to Ukraine, the notion of “literary mediascapes” seems to be particularly apt because an exclusive focus on a national canon of literature would not capture the complexities of Ukrainian literature.

In Ukraine, there is certainly a regional topography of the literary field (Hofmann 2014, 2016). After the breakdown of the Soviet book trade, the market became highly fragmented; regional publishers and local bookshops prevailed. Not only historical memory but also the very concept of “Ukrainian literature” split up into many fragments with their specific preferences for values, styles and genres (Rewakowicz 2010). Even today, books that can be bought in Poltava or Kharkiv may not be available in Lviv or Lutsk. Regional narratives have thrived and have led to the construction of spatial myths, as can be seen, for instance, in Yurii Andrukhovych’s essays “Carpathologica Cosmophilica” or “Mala intimna urbanistika.” In a sense, this tendency mirrors the Ukrainian literary field in the nineteenth century. In this historical period of consolidation, Ukrainian authors were active in Poltava, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Chernivtsi and, most notably, in St. Petersburg. During the Soviet times, Ukrainian literary institutions were centralized in Kyiv. The official association of Ukrainian writers, *Spilka pysmennykh Ukrainy* (SPU), with its patriotic and socialist taste, claimed to be the guiding force of Ukrainian literature. The SPU was dominated by writers of the so-called “generation of the sixties” who started to challenge Stalinist literary culture but eventually ended up administrating Soviet

Ukrainian literature and its institutions. Only after the Chornobyl nuclear disaster did the SPU gain new sympathies and some authority because of the critical voices of some of its members.

After 1991, authors, editors and critics reemphasized the regional diversity of Ukrainian literature. The publishing sector was strongly influenced by personal contacts between local writers and publishers. Most Ukrainian-language publishers are concentrated in western Ukraine: Kalvaria, Vydavnytstvo Staroho Leva and Piramida in Lviv, and Lilea-NV and Klasyka in Ivano-Frankivsk. In Kyiv, the publishing companies Fakt and Osnova were established. Also the former émigré publisher Smoloskyp moved back to the capital from abroad. The rather highbrow literary publisher Folio and the popular distribution network Family Leisure Club (Klub simeinoho dozvillia) operate in Kharkiv.

At the same time, several literary journals managed to reach out to readers beyond the place of their publication. *Kurier Kryvbasu* was founded in Kryvii Rih in 1994; its first editor-in-chief, Hryhorii Huseinov, is still in charge of the journal. Since 2003, *Kurier Kryvbasu* has featured a supplement, the newsletter *Literatura plius*, edited by the independent Association of Ukrainian Writers (AUP). *Kurier Kryvbasu* is published at irregular intervals and had a rather amateur design during its first years of publication. However, its appearance soon improved and the journal established itself as an important source of contemporary and new Ukrainian literature.

Suchasnist started in 1961 as a literary journal in the Ukrainian émigré culture, and migrated to Kyiv in 1992. The first issue that was published in Ukraine created a scandal: it featured Andrukhovych's novel *Rekreatsii*, which challenged traditional literary taste in Soviet Ukraine on all levels. At the same time, *Rekreatsii* marks the beginning of a postcolonial discourse in Ukraine, as Marko Pavlyshyn (1993, 117) has aptly pointed out.

The Kyivan journal *Krytyka* was founded in the 1990s by Harvard professor George G. Grabowicz and follows the intellectual model of the *New York Review of Books*. *Krytyka* features mostly historical, sociological and literary articles, focusing on current topics. Among its authors are not only leading Ukrainian intellectuals like Yaroslav Hrytsak or Mykola Riabchuk, but also famous Western scholars. Some journal issues have focused on debates over topics such as Ukraine and Europe, Lviv as a cultural phenomenon, Ukrainian politics of memory, the Orange Revolution or the Euromaidan. *Krytyka* also publishes poetry and prose by contemporary Ukrainian authors.

Like *Krytyka*, the journal *Yi*, based in Lviv, tries to bring a European perspective to Ukrainian culture. *Yi* started in Soviet Ukraine as a “*samvydav*” publication, and has managed to evolve into one of the most professional literary journals in Ukraine, with significant financial support from the German Heinrich Böll-Stiftung; the journal is headed by Taras Vozniak. In recent years, it has published monothematic issues on topics such as youth culture, ten years of Ukrainian independence and terrorism. *Krytyka* and *Yi* are not only literary journals but also successfully run publishing houses.

The share of Russian-language publications in print media grew steadily throughout the 1990s. There was a massive import from Russia, where the production of print media was cheaper than in Ukraine (the relatively high taxation of print media in Ukraine was partly changed only after the Euromaidan). In some regions of Ukraine, even school textbooks were printed in Russia. Moreover, it was lucrative for Ukrainian publishers to have Russian-language books and journals on their backlist. Paradoxically, after 1991 the production of books, journals and newspapers in Ukrainian shrank faster than in Russian. This development was caused by the abolition of subsidies in the cultural sphere by the dwindling Ukrainian state. In contrast to Russia or Poland, the new political elites in Ukraine neglected culture as an aspect of development.

One of the most important regional features of Ukrainian literature is the so-called “Stanislaviv phenomenon.”¹ The Stanislaviv phenomenon with its aesthetics is closely related to the debate on postmodernism in Ukraine. The phrase was coined in 1992 by Volodymyr Yeshkilyev, who became its spokesman in the following years. The Stanislaviv phenomenon was not geographically limited to Ivano-Frankivsk (Stanislav), but also included the city of Lviv and made up a lot of what is called Galician literature in the 1990s. This literary movement was characterized by an orientation toward the idea of central Europe and a longing for an alternative culture beyond Soviet traditions. Famously, the association BuBaBu had great success not only because of its literary achievements but because of its appearances at local festivals such as Chervona ruta, Vyvykh, Zoloti homony, Obereha, Impreza, Alternatyva or Apokalipsys (Neborak 2003, 13). LuHoSad is another prominent group of poets from Lviv. They

¹ Stanislaviv was the name of Ivano-Frankivsk before 1962; before that, it was also referred to as Stanisław or Stanisławów.

became popular not only as authors but also because they collaborated with rock and pop musicians (such as Mertvyi piven or Plach Yeremii). Following the example of BuBaBu, new poetic associations (Miuna Tuha and Psy sviatoho Yura), literary journals (*Cherver*, *Pereval* and *Pleroma*), anthologies (*Psy Sviatoho Yura*, *Kaizervald* and *Ukraina irredenta*) and festivals (Vyvykh) were organized. A tendency toward self-canonization in anthologies and journals can be observed in most regional literary movements in the 1990s (BuBaBu, LuHoSad, and Chervona fira in Kharkiv with Serhii Zhadan and others). Even today, the literary agency Discursus and the rock-vaudeville band KoraLLi offer a one-month grant for writers-in-residence. Authors are encouraged to keep the Stanislaviv phenomenon alive by residing, writing and lecturing in the city of Ivano-Frankivsk, including free consumption in local art cafés. The writers-in-residence are obliged to publish weekly in the local magazine *Halyskyi korespondent*, on the internet platform *Zaxid.net*, on the homepage of the literature club Marusia or the *Zhyttia* page on the internet portal *Ukrainska Pravda* (Reader's Friend 2013).

In the city of Uzhhorod, a number of literary groups such as Nataiemna vecheria, Kulturne ukrainske bratstvo, Rizni liudi, Nastroevist and NLO (Neformalne Literaturne Obednaniia) have emerged. The latter eventually transformed itself into the Asambleia mytsiv Rotonda.

The Zhytomyr school of prose, led by Volodymyr Danylenko, turns neither to western Europe nor to Russia but rather looks at the spiritual heritage with its soul, naturalness, religiousness and myths. It may be labeled to a certain degree as a nativist prose (Hnatiuk 2006, 442f.), and it promotes a Ukrainian version of magical realism (as in the cases of Valerii Shevchuk or Viacheslav Medvid).² Former progressive Soviet writers, especially reformers from the generation of the 1960s, continue to work on the education of the "people." This ideology is rooted in the movement called Prosvita that goes back to the end of the nineteenth century, with its programmatic slogans of "villageness [*khutorianstvo*]" by Panteleimon Kulish and "literature for domestic use [*literatura dlia*

² The name goes back to the anthology *Vecheria na dvanadtsiat person: Zhytomyrska prozova shkola*, edited by Danylenko in 1997; the programmatic text by Danylenko, "Zolota zhyla ukrainskoi prozy," can be found in that anthology. Mykola Sulyma (2006, 374) writes that this "literature school" was created with the help of anthologies and of the dissertation by Volodymyr Danylenko.

domashnoho vzhytku]” by Mykola Kostomarov. Aesthetically, the Zhytomyr school favored realistic writing and put an emphasis on the didactic dimension. In Soviet times this understanding of literature was merged with the doctrine of Socialist Realism. This kind of literature was labeled “*testamentarno-rustykalnyi dyskurs*” (Yeshkilyev 1998b, 99f.; 1998d, 108f.) and had an afterlife in the 1990s.

A further interesting phenomenon is the literary group STAN in Luhansk. In 2007, Konstantin Skorkin (b. 1978), Yaroslav Minkin (b. 1984) and Elena Zaslavskaia (b. 1977) edited an anthology with the title *Perevorot*. In the Introduction, they claim ambitiously that Luhansk has become the new literary capital of Ukraine. According to its members, STAN is a “creative cluster,” a “brand” that unites writers from the eastern periphery of Ukraine. Writers from the group reclaimed public space in Luhansk by dressing up as soldiers. They “captured” trams and performed their poetry in the carriage. After the outbreak of the war in Donbas, Zaslavskaia backed the separatists and lauded the warlord “Motorola” (i.e. Arsen Pavlov) in a poem. In 2015, she was awarded the International Esenin-prize in Moscow.

As a response to the tragic events in Donbas, Liubko Deresh organized the literature festival V Izoliatsii (In Isolation)³ in Donetsk in 2014. The main topic of the festival was the interaction between language and violence. The event aimed to counterbalance anti-Ukrainian attitudes with literary and political debates. Besides literature, there were musical and theater performances and workshops with prominent authors like Yurii Vynnychuk, Oksana Zabuzhko, Vasyl Shkliar, Andrii Kurkov, Volodymyr Yeshkilev and Irena Karpa.

However, in 2015 an ominous-sounding Writers’ Union of the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) (Soiuz pisatelei [LNR]), with Gleb Bobrov at its top, was established. This group organized a “round table” with Russian writers who supported the newly emerged DNR and LNR. From Donbas, the writers Fedor Berezin, Mikhail Belozеров, Vladislav Rusanov, Alexandr Gobrov and Georgii Savitskii participated in

³ The literature festival took place in the “Izoliatsiia [Isolation]” Center – a nonprofit platform for contemporary culture, founded in 2010 on the territory of a former insulation materials factory in Donetsk. On June 9, 2014, the territory was seized by the militia of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR). Subsequently, the center moved to Kyiv. See more at <http://izolyatsia.org/en/>.

the discussion. The Luhansk Writer's Union was founded on the basis of a fantasy fan club that had existed for twelve years under the leadership of Fedor Berezin. He maintained: "Now it is not the time to write about flowers and butterflies. Literature must not be amorphous but has to take clear positions in the fight of the good against the evil. Every author has to have a clear civic position which he defends."⁴

There has been an active literary movement in Crimea as well, namely the so-called Crimean Club (Krymskii klub), which was founded by Igor Sidorenko, alias Sid, and Anna Brazhkina, in Moscow in 1995. The founding of the club was preceded by three Bosphoran poetic forums (1993–1995) held on Crimea and on Tuzla Island. Since 1998 one of the club's main activities has been to promote contemporary Ukrainian literature. Another area of interest is the "poetical creations" of Crimea in world literature. In May and June 1999 the Southern Accent Literary Festival took place in Moscow, with representatives of both Ukrainian and Russian literatures. Sid lives mainly in Moscow but maintains close ties with cultural movements in Ukraine and on the peninsula. In reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea, Sid edited, together with the New York poet Mikhail Aizenberg, the anthology *Nashkrym*, published in New York in 2014. *Nashkrym* is a collection of poetry written in Russian by over 120 authors from all over the world (see <http://nkpoetry.com/>). The anthology's title mocks the Russian patriotic slogan *Krym nash* and inverts its signification: thus Crimea as a text belongs not to Russian but to world literature. The *Nashkrym* project highlights the claim that geopoetics should be a counterpart to geopolitics. However, several voices have criticized the anthology to the effect that it would rather justify than criticize the annexation. Nevertheless, the project underscored the idea that Crimea is located on the global axis of art: "*Axis aestheticus mundi Tauricam transit* [the aesthetic axis of the world crosses Crimea]" was the slogan of the Club of Crimea, of the actions of the Bosphorus forum and of the geopoetic anthology *Nashkrym*.

Before 2014 there were joint activities on the part of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian writers. Translations and common readings were organized, and Crimean Tatar writers were included in representative anthologies and

⁴ Focus group discussion with teachers in Donetsk, September, 13, 2013. Interviewer: Victoria Sereda.

textbooks of Ukrainian literature for higher educational institutions.⁵ Such activities have increased since the annexation of Crimea⁶ and in 2015 a center for the language and literature of Crimean Tatars was founded at the Taras Shevchenko University in Kyiv.⁷

Literary festivals are an important part of the Ukrainian mediascape. Literature is not only read or sold but also performed, in poetry slams or concerts. Andrukhovych performs his poetry with the music group Karbido; Serhii Zhadan reads and raps his texts with the group Sobaki v Kosmose. Besides book fairs such as the Book Publishers' Forum in Lviv or Barykada in Kyiv, there is a variety of festivals, for instance in Kyiv (Gogol-Fest), Chernivtsi (Meridian), Kharkiv (Iohansen-Fest), Huliai Pole (Makhno Fest) and Drohobych (Schulz-Fest). The international poetry festival Kyivski Lavry has existed since 2006. Its organizer, the poet and editor of the magazine *Sho (Шо)* Aleksandr Kabanov, enjoys a high reputation throughout the post-Soviet space. More than 400 poets, novelists, musicians and literary critics have participated in this international festival. Among its Ukrainian award winners are Serhii Zhadan, Boris Khersonskii and Andrii Liubka.

Informal cultural associations have emerged in lofts and former industrial buildings: Fabryka Povydlia in Lviv, Chainaia fabryka in Odesa, Izo-liatsiia in Donetsk (existing until 2014), the Pharmaceutic Factory of the Arabesk Theatre in Kharkiv, 10 Workshops in Luhansk (existing until 2014), and the Yakiv Greter art center on the territory of a mechanics factory in Kyiv.

⁵ For more on this, see Kandym 2003 and Bazyrov 2008.


⁶ See, for example, "The Ukrainian pupils will study the Crimean Tatar literature," <http://en.reporter-ua.ru/the-ukrainian-pupils-will-study-the-crimean-tatar-literature.html>, or "Kyiv University to teach Crimean Tatar language and literature," <http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1402928702>, <http://krymsos.com/news/krimskotatarska-literatura-ni-zhiva-ni-mertva/>.

⁷ <http://philology.knu.ua/node/1244>.

Reading habits in Ukraine

The *Region, Nation and Beyond* survey (Survey 2013) reveals a generally low intensity of book consumption in Ukraine. The cultural capital of reading is more or less evenly distributed among different literary genres, with two notable exceptions. Fantasy is especially popular among younger readers, and classical literature is mostly read by the older generation, over sixty (see Figure 5.1 below).

Figure 5.1. Age and preferred genres of readers in Ukraine




Source: Survey (2013)

It is hardly surprising that the preference for classical literature is dominant among readers with a higher education. However, the less “highbrow” fantasy genre is also quite popular among this group (see Figure 5.2 below).


The regional distribution of reading practices shows that the average measures of reading culture (the number of hours spent on reading per week, the number of books read during the last year as well as the size of home library) are higher in the east and Donbas compared to other regions. As can be seen from Figure 5.3 below, the share of declared non-readers is the highest in western and southern Ukraine, while the east and Donbas regions have the highest ratio of respondents who have read at least three books during the last year.

Figure 5.2. Education and preferred genres of readers in Ukraine



Source: Survey (2013)

Figure 5.3. Answers to the survey question "How many books have you read during the last year?"




Source: Survey (2013)

The survey suggests that the western Ukrainian auto-stereotype of being the most cultured region of Ukraine might need revision. The leading position of eastern Ukraine in terms of reading practices may well have to do with the persistence of the concept of *kulturnost* that was introduced in the 1930s in the Soviet Union. *Kulturnost* meant not only decent behavior and clothing but also the deliberate consumption of cultural goods like books, theater plays and paintings (Volkov 1999).

However, there is no clear east–west pattern in this case. The highest percentages of declared nonreaders are in Chernivetska (47.9 percent), Mykolaivska (45.5 percent), Zakarpatska (39.4 percent) and Khersonska (38.2 percent) oblasts, as well as in the city of Sevastopol (41.2 percent), while the lowest percentages are in Vinnytska (22.2 percent), Sumska (19.9 percent) and Zaporizka (20.2 percent) oblasts (see Figure 5.4 below).

Figure 5.4. The percentage of respondents admitting to not reading books at all (distribution by oblast)



Source: Survey (2013)

The *Region, Nation and Beyond* survey (2013) also asked a question about the languages in which people prefer to read. Ukrainian, Russian and other European languages were offered as choices. The survey results show that

English, French, German and Polish can be excluded from the choices as they are hardly used in Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, among these languages, the highest—yet still very low rate in reading—is in English: only 4.2 percent of the respondents answered that they read books in English.

Although one could expect that Polish plays a considerable role throughout the country, and especially in western Ukraine, only 1.5 percent read in Polish. In Crimea, almost none of the respondents read Polish. The biggest share of readers able to read in Polish is found in western Ukraine: over 10 percent in Ternopil'ska, almost 8 percent in Ivano-Frankiv'ska and around 6 percent in Lviv'ska oblasts. In contrast, although situated in western Ukraine and with roots in the European multicultural tradition, the Chernivtsi region contains hardly more Polish readers than does Crimea.

Ukrainian- and Russian-language reading cultures overlap in Ukraine. As the survey data show, books in Ukrainian are more likely to be read in Galicia, but at the same time books in Russian are popular across Ukraine

Figure 5.5. Reading of books in Ukrainian
(mean on the scale between 1=never and 5=all the time)



Source: Survey (2013)

Figure 5.6. Reading of books in Russian
(mean on the scale between 1=never and 5=all the time)




Source: Survey (2013)

(see Figures 5.5 and 5.6 above). The language situation in Ukraine's reading culture differs from the situation with regard to the spoken language. In the central and eastern regions, the phenomenon of bilingualism is widely spread (approximately 35 percent in Luhanska and Donetska oblasts and 51 percent in Kirovohradska oblast read in both Ukrainian and Russian).

The biggest share of those reading books in Ukrainian is found in Ivano-Frankivska oblast, which may be an echo of the Stanislaviv phenomenon of self-fashioning. There is a well-established Ukrainian reading culture in the central region as well (see Figure 5.5 above).

The strongholds of Russian reading culture are Sevastopol, Odeska oblast and the southeastern regions of Ukraine. However, Russian books are also popular in the rest of Ukraine (see Figure 5.5 above). This result can be explained by the specifics of the Russian-language book market and the easy accessibility of cheap books from Russia in Ukraine. Figure 5.7 below illustrates the macroregional patterns of reading preferences on the part of respondents in Russian and Ukrainian.

Figure 5.7. Macroregional patterns of reading preferences in Russian and Ukrainian




Source: Survey (2013)

Obviously, in the north the situation is more balanced: there, around 40 percent of inhabitants read often in both Ukrainian and Russian. In the center, books in Russian are read around 10 percent more frequently than those in Ukrainian. In the western part, around 60 percent read usually in Ukrainian, while around 40 percent read in Russian. In the south and in the east, the gap between the preferences for reading in Ukrainian and in Russian is even higher, but opposite to the rest of the country: approximately two-thirds of the population usually choose to read books in Russian, while around 19 percent prefer to read in Ukrainian.

If the use of both languages in the capital of Ukraine and in the administrative capital of Crimea (see Figure 5.8 below) is compared, the situation is more balanced in Kyiv: Ukrainian is regularly and often used in reading by 44.6 percent of the respondents, while Russian is used by 64.7 percent. Thus Russian is even more common in Ukraine's capital than it is in Simferopol, where Russian serves as the preferred reading language for 56.9 percent of respondents. Interestingly, while the number of people who rarely read in either of these languages is rather low in Kyiv, it is very high with regards to Ukrainian in Simferopol: 70.5 percent say they never read in it. Only around 2 percent of Simferopol's inhabitants often read books

in Ukrainian. In contrast, every third respondent from Kyiv mostly reads books in Ukrainian.

Figure 5.8. Answers to the survey question “How often do you read in the following languages ...?” in Kyiv and Simferopol



Source: Survey (2013)

It is intriguing to compare the results of the *Region, Nation and Beyond* survey (2013) with a national survey conducted by the Research and Branding Group in May 2011. One question asked in the latter survey was whether the language of a book could be a reason for not buying the book (see Table 5.1 below).

Table 5.1. Is there any language in which a book is published which may be the reason not to purchase it?

	West	Center	Southeast	Ukraine
Yes	23.2	19.3	34.2	27.3
No	72.4	78.1	62.1	69.2
Difficult to answer	4.4	2.6	3.7	3.5

Source: Research and Branding Group (2011)

It appears that, for 70 percent of the population, the language of a book does not matter; at the same time, it does matter more in the southeast

than in the center and the west. This corresponds to the 2013 survey result that over two-thirds of residents of Simferopol do not read books in Ukrainian, which can be interpreted as a deliberate exclusion.

Actors in the Ukrainian literary field: Schoolteachers and young writers

Language choice is a politically loaded matter in Ukraine, especially in the field of literature. The use of the Ukrainian language for creative work is still often understood as a commitment to Ukraine and a statement against imperial, Soviet, post-Soviet and neoimperial Russia. This attitude can be noticed in the focus group discussions with teachers of Ukrainian literature and language,⁸ as well as in the interviews with young Ukrainian authors.⁹ At the same time, many respondents often pay lip service toward a tolerant attitude in language matters, sometimes even explicitly advocating multiculturalism. Under these circumstances, the sociological interpretation of individual judgments about language choice becomes a complex and delicate matter.

The tendencies in the focus group interviews may be compared with the reaction of writers to the question about whether Ukrainian should be the only language for literature in Ukraine. Pavlo Korobchuk, a poet, novelist and musician from Lutsk, living in Kyiv, states that Ukrainian literature consists of authors writing in Ukrainian. He refers here to an essay by Serhii Zhadan (2013). Korobchuk contradicts Zhadan, saying that poets writing in Russian “cannot be counted as part of the Ukrainian creative

⁸ Fifteen focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in the framework of the *Region, Nation and Beyond* project in thirteen oblast centers of Ukraine: Lviv, Lutsk, Uzhhorod, Zhytomyr, Chernivtsi, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Simferopol and Cherkasy, in 2012–2013. An average length of a FGD was 1.5–2 hours. The audiofiles, transcripts and original documentation of the FGDs are kept in the archive of St. Gallen University (Switzerland) and at the Center for Urban History of East Central Europe (Lviv, Ukraine).

⁹ Ten expert in-depth interviews with young Ukrainian writers based in different regions of Ukraine were conducted in 2013 in the framework of the *Region, Nation and Beyond* project. The audiofiles, transcripts and original documentation of the FGDs are kept in the archive of St. Gallen University (Switzerland) and at the Center for Urban History of East Central Europe (Lviv, Ukraine).

literature field as ... the language of a writer determines his nationality".¹⁰ In the essay mentioned by Korobchuk, Zhadan (2013) likens the claim that high-brow Ukrainian culture must necessarily rely on the Ukrainian language to the mindset of a "ghetto" where many people feel comfortable:

I've always thought that literature, as a living and dynamic organism, is able to offer new opportunities for understanding and cooperation within our country. In particular, the possibility of linguistic understanding when writing in Russian does not automatically reject "our authenticity" of Andrii Kurkov, Boris Khersonskii or Alexander Kabanov. I really think we should consider everything written in different languages in this country as Ukrainian literature.

He criticizes the hermetic closure of this puristic literature scene, its distance from everything outside its borders, its static nature and the lack of serious "irritations" from inside. The use of the Ukrainian language becomes a sign of belonging to the "ghetto with an exclusive entrance and no exit." Ukrainian literature, Zhadan states, is understood as a literature for Ukrainian consumption serving, first of all, ideological and not aesthetic questions.

Furthermore, Zhadan criticizes the perception that "Ukrainianness" is a phenomenon residing in the language. According to him, this concept is outdated, as it ignores the changes that have taken place during the last century, as well as the reality of the Crimea and Donbas that do not fit into this concept because of their "non-Ukrainian languageness." It turns out, he concludes, that Ukrainian literature is not congruent with Ukraine.

Consequently, Zhadan includes Russian authors in the canon of contemporary Ukrainian literature, reminding us of the dynamics of literature and its power to suggest new possibilities of understanding. Zhadan, who himself writes his prose and poetry in Ukrainian, challenges the dominant narrative of Ukrainian literature by pleading for a break with the language-centric model of a monocultural national identity.

Recently (since the Euromaidan and the Russian intervention), literary contacts and mutual translations between writers in Ukraine using Ukrainian or Russian as their means of expression have increased (as in the cases of Serhii Zhadan/Anastasia Afanaseva, or Maria Kianovska/Boris Khersonskii, Zhadan, Oleksii Chupa, and Marharyta Surzhenko).

¹⁰ Interview with Pavlo Korobchuk, March 22, 2014. Interviewer: Kateryna Tyahlo.

Writers, intellectuals and journalists are more and more visible, taking up prominent positions in Ukrainian public opinion, acting as interpreters and defining a new space of communication in the often polarized mediascapes of both languages.

In conclusion, there is a complex picture here concerning language use in the sphere of literature: around two-thirds of the respondents have a preference toward either Ukrainian or Russian, declining to read in the other language. The interviewed writers mostly position themselves as Ukrainian intellectuals who tend to stick to the attitude that Ukrainian should be the standard language of the country's literary production—and they are even ready to assimilate on this basis. For them, Russian is not foreign but different, and this difference can also be used for artistic and self-developing experiments by translating Ukrainian poetry into Russian. Serhii Zhadan is an example of a critical voice concerning the linguistic dominance of Ukrainian. Given the ambiguity found in the east of Ukraine, it is impossible to speak of a language division in the country; rather, there is a divergence of views on mono- and bilingualism.

Regional preferences for individual authors

Contrary to the east–west divide in language preferences, there are also unifying tendencies in the social construction of the literary canon in Ukraine. As Table 5.2 below shows, when asked about the knowledge of listed authors, people all over the country are well aware of some canonical authors, such as Taras Shevchenko (1814–1861), who is known by 98 percent of the population, followed by Lesia Ukrainka (1871–1913), known by 90 percent, and Ivan Franko (1856–1916), known by 84 percent. The Ukrainian–Russian author Nikolai Gogol (1809–1852) is mentioned by 83 percent.

Among the well-known authors there are also Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi (1864–1913) and Panas Myrnyi (1849–1920), with approximately 70 percent each, as well as Oles Honchar (1918–1995) and Pavlo Zahrebelnyi (1924–2009), with around 55 percent each. The five best known authors (Shevchenko, Ukrainka, Franko, Gogol and Kotliarevskyi) may be called the classics; the works of these authors have been part of the school curriculum since Soviet times.

The five least known authors (known by less than 15 percent) are Oksana Zabuzhko, Ulas Samchuk, Yuri Andrukhovych, Yevhen Malaniuk and Andrii Kurkov. This is a rather surprising ranking, as Zabuzhko, Andrukhovych and Kurkov have a broad international reputation. Together

Table 5.2. Knowledge of and attitudes to authors

Which of the following authors do you...	Know	Like	Don't like
Taras Shevchenko	97.9	79.5	3.1
Lesia Ukrainka	90.0	57.9	5.3
Ivan Franko	84.3	46.4	6.6
Nikolai Gogol	82.5	57.4	4.1
Ivan Kotliarevskyi	71.0	34.2	5.8
Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi	70.2	31.5	5.9
Panas Myrnyi	67.1	29.1	6.3
Oles Honchar	56.9	26.9	4.3
Maksym Rylskyi	56.2	23.5	5.5
Pavlo Zahrebelnyi	53.4	26.2	4.8
Lina Kostenko	47.4	25.8	3.2
Vasyl Stus	38.1	14.5	3.7
Panteleimon Kulish	37.5	14.2	3.5
Vasyl Stefanyk	35.0	11.3	3.6
Ivan Drach	32.0	8.6	4.9
Volodymyr Vynnychenko	28.8	9.1	2.9
Oleksandr Oles	24.1	8.6	2.6
Serhii Zhadan	14.3	3.6	2.1
Les Poderevianskyi	13.4	3.6	3.0
Oksana Zabuzhko	13.1	4.2	2.3
Ulas Samchuk	12.2	3.8	1.7
Yurii Andrukhovych	12.1	3.6	1.7
Yevhen Malaniuk	11.2	3.2	1.7
Andrii Kurkov	7.9	2.6	1.7
None of them	0.6	6.4	68.6

Source: Survey (2013)

with Serhii Zhadan, they form the inner canon of the most famous contemporary Ukrainian authors. Kurkov's novels have been translated into several languages. Internationally, he is considered a bestselling contemporary author from Ukraine.¹¹ It is remarkable that among the least known authors are the émigré poets Yevhen Malaniuk, who has been rediscovered in independent Ukraine after his condemnation in the Soviet Union, and Ulas Samchuk, who aspired to receive the Nobel Prize during the postwar period.

While Shevchenko is known and revered almost everywhere (in three regions, indeed, by 100 percent of respondents, in Crimea by a remarkable 92 percent and in Donetska oblast by 95 percent), and Andrii Kurkov is known almost nowhere (with the lowest rate, 0 percent, being found in Sevastopol, and the highest, 11 percent, in Lvivska and Donetska oblasts), knowledge about other authors varies across regions.

Ivan Franko achieves almost as high a percentage, in terms of respondents' knowledge, as Shevchenko does in Lvivska (98 percent), Zakarpatska (95 percent) and Volynska oblasts (95 percent). He is apparently a literary "star" in western Ukraine and in Kyiv (90 percent); while he registers the lowest level of recognition in Sevastopol (41 percent) and Crimea.

Even compared to other Russian-speaking regions, Crimea presents a different picture: in Donetsk and Kharkiv, Franko is known by over two-thirds of the population, and in Odesa by almost 90 percent, while in Crimea he is known by less than half of the population. A similar situation can be observed with regard to Ivan Kotliarevskyi. He is known most in Volynska oblast, with 92 percent, and Zakarpatska oblast, with 84 percent; while in Crimea (31 percent) and Sevastopol (45 percent), not even half of the represented population know his name.

Looking at the ranking of contemporary authors, the division is very much comparable. Oksana Zabuzhko is known by almost 30 percent in Lvivska oblast, by 20 percent in Kyiv and by barely 3 percent in Crimea. Yuri Andrukhovych is known by over 20 percent in western Ukraine, by almost 14 percent in Kyiv and by just 4 percent in Crimea. The peninsula seems to be the most ignorant of Ukrainian authors from all epochs, thus forming the biggest possible contrast to western Ukraine.

Surprisingly, Serhii Zhadan, an author from eastern Ukraine, is best known in western Ukraine: by 20 percent in Volynska oblast and by almost 17 percent in Lvivska oblast, while in Donetska oblast he is known by about 17 percent—and in Kharkivska oblast, where the author himself is living, he

¹¹ An interesting portrait of Kurkov is that written by Higuchi (2014).

is known by only 7 percent. Andrii Kurkov is known by around 10 percent in Donetska oblast, in Lvivska oblast, in Kyiv and in Kyivska oblast.

As Donetska, Kharkivska, Dnipropetrovska, Odeska and Mykolaivska oblasts and Crimea apparently do not display homogeneous knowledge rates of Ukrainian authors, the question arises of how to define “eastern” and “southern” Ukraine. It is important to keep in mind that the regional centers and the regions themselves do not necessarily form a homogeneous space. The given list of authors in the questionnaire consisted of twenty-four positions. A factor analysis was conducted in order to decrease the number of units of observation and to explore latent variables (see Table 5.3 below).

Table 5.3. Factor analysis of the list of authors

Rotated Component Matrix(a)	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III
List of writers known by respondents	New school canon	Contemporary writers	Nineteenth-century classics
Panteleimon Kulish	0.69		
Vasyl Stefanyk	0.679		
Vasyl Stus	0.648		
Lina Kostenko	0.63		
Ivan Drach	0.626		
Volodymyr Vynnychenko	0.623		
Pavlo Zahrebelnyi	0.568		
Panas Myrnyi	0.537		
Ivan Kotliarevskyi	0.532		
Oles Honchar	0.532		
Maksym Rylskyi	0.523		
Oleksandr Oles	0.489		
Andrii Kurkov		0.749	
Yurii Andrukhovych		0.748	
Oksana Zabuzhko		0.699	
Yevhen Malaniuk		0.672	

Rotated Component Matrix(a)	Factor I	Factor II	Factor III
Serhii Zhadan		0.662	
Ulas Samchuk		0.656	
Les Poderevianskyi		0.643	
Ivan Franko			0.66
Lesia Ukrainka			0.642
Taras Shevchenko			0.594
Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi			0.585
Nikolai Gogol			0.51
Total Variance explained, percentage	34.54	11.23	5.02
Cronbach Alpha reliability test	0.87	0.833	0.649
Average strength ¹	4.06	2.72	5.42
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization Rotation converged in eight iterations			

When applied to the question of the authors whom respondents know, the analysis produces three factors. The first one unites the writers who were introduced into the school canon of Ukrainian literature both in Soviet times (Rylskyi and Honchar) and post-Soviet times (Vynnychenko, Stefanyk and Oles), with a predominance of dissident writers (Drach, Stus and Kostenko). Therefore this factor can be labeled the “new school canon.” The second factor covers contemporary Ukrainian writers (Kurkov, Andrukhovych, Zabuzhko and Zhadan) as well as twentieth-century diaspora authors (Samchuk and Malaniuk). Finally, the third factor includes nineteenth-century “classical” writers. On a scale between 1 and 7, the third factor appeared to be the strongest, while the second factor was the weakest. However, the strength of the factor covering contemporary writers was higher among the younger generation (those below 35), respondents with a higher income, and inhabitants of the western part of Ukraine. The popularity of all three factors was bigger among respondents

¹² On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 = very weak, 4 = medium, and 7 = very strong.

with a higher education and among speakers of Ukrainian. Moreover, all the factors correlated positively with Ukrainian and European identity—and negatively with Russian.

The question “Which author’s works do you like?” complements the question about which authors are known in different regions of Ukraine. Almost all the authors on the list appear to be less well liked in the southern region and in Donbas—with the exception of Nikolai Gogol. The contemporary Ukrainian writers are at the bottom of this list, enjoying slightly higher popularity in the west, north and center of Ukraine. The only exception to this is Andrii Kurkov, whose popularity is the highest in Donbas (albeit still only 4.06 percent). As can be seen, while respondents from the eastern region express similar preferences to those from the west, center and north, Ukrainian writers are less popular in the south and in Donbas, with the exception of Russian-language authors such as Kurkov and Gogol.

Table 5.4. Answers to the survey question “Which author’s works do you like?”

Authors whom respondents like, percentage	Ukraine	West	Center	North	South	East	Donbas
Taras Shevchenko	79.5	80.68	85.38	82.01	77.02	81.16	68.95
Lesia Ukrainka	57.9	63.27	69.20	64.21	48.29	54.42	44.96
Nikolai Gogol	57.4	39.64	61.50	54.33	65.97	67.36	60.37
Ivan Franko	46.4	58.54	60.60	49.39	34.81	41.48	28.85
Ivan Kotliarevskyi	34.2	36.24	48.66	39.89	20.99	33.97	23.29
Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi	31.5	31.84	46.32	36.44	23.20	29.02	21.09
Panas Myrnyi	29.1	29.44	44.20	32.90	20.33	28.07	19.00
Oles Honchar	26.9	25.87	33.15	27.12	23.98	31.59	18.89
Pavlo Zahrebelnyi	26.2	26.87	34.60	32.71	19.01	27.31	14.83
Lina Kostenko	25.8	42.21	31.70	29.26	10.17	19.22	16.69
Maksym Rylskyi	23.5	22.89	34.26	28.70	16.57	22.84	14.72
Vasyl Stus	14.5	24.21	20.31	16.31	6.30	7.99	9.27

Authors whom respondents like, percentage	Ukraine	West	Center	North	South	East	Donbas
Panteleimon Kulish	14.2	23.13	18.30	18.36	5.75	8.85	8.00
Vasyl Stefanyk	11.3	21.64	12.50	12.49	4.97	7.61	5.33
Volodymyr Vynnychenko	9.1	14.43	15.18	10.07	2.76	4.47	6.14
Ivan Drach	8.6	13.68	12.05	9.69	4.09	6.85	3.48
Oleksandr Oles	8.6	16.75	9.93	8.11	4.53	5.99	3.59
Oksana Zabuzhko	4.2	7.05	5.02	5.13	2.10	3.43	1.39
Ulas Samchuk	3.8	10.95	3.35	3.26	1.10	1.05	0.93
Yurii Andrukhovych	3.6	6.80	3.91	3.91	0.99	2.66	2.55
Serhii Zhadan	3.6	3.48	5.36	3.45	2.21	4.00	2.90
Les Poderevianskyi	3.6	4.89	4.13	6.15	1.99	2.47	1.16
Yevhen Malaniuk	3.2	6.47	5.02	3.26	0.77	1.52	0.93
Andrii Kurkov	2.6	3.90	2.34	2.98	1.10	0.95	4.06
None of them	6.4	7.13	5.69	3.45	7.18	6.18	9.50

Source: Survey (2013)

When looking at the top three most liked authors in each oblast, interesting tendencies can be observed (see Figure 5.9 below).

While Shevchenko is very popular in every oblast (scoring from 41.9 percent in Chernivetska oblast to 93.2 percent in Khmelnytska oblast),¹³ Lesia Ukrainka also unites the literary preferences of Ukrainians (ranking as one of the three most preferred authors in twenty-two oblasts out of twenty-five, from 42.6 percent in Donetsk oblast to 85.6 percent in Khmelnytska oblast). There are also two figures who stand out in local terms: Pavlo Zahrebelnyi, in Chernivetska oblast, and Ivan Kotliarevskyi, in Poltava

¹³ Shevchenko's popularity and importance is analyzed in depth in Alwart 2012.

Figure 5.9. The three most popular¹⁵ authors in Ukraine per oblast (Survey 2013)

Source: Survey (2013)

oblast (both of them had very close ties with their regions). Interestingly, in this rating two authors form distinct macroregions: “Franko-land” (mostly coinciding with western Ukraine) and “Gogol-land” (encompassing most of central, eastern and southern Ukraine). While both writers were popularized in Soviet times and are widely promoted in popular culture,¹⁵ today Franko and Gogol are often seen as the symbols of different models of Ukrainian identity: namely the “Ukrainocentric” model and the “little Russian [*malorossiiskaia*]” model, respectively.

¹⁴ That is, the authors whom most of the respondents chose as the one they like.

¹⁵ Among the examples that might be given, two annual cultural festivals are especially worth mentioning: the Franko-fest in Nahuievychi (the poet’s birthplace, in Lvivska oblast) and the Gogol-fest in Kyiv. For further details, see <https://www.facebook.com/franko.festival/> and <http://www.gogolfest.org.ua/>, respectively.

Conclusion

The literary mediascapes in Ukraine are shaped by several discourses. There is the tradition of a bilingual book market in all Ukrainian regions. Russian-language books are still bought and read everywhere in Ukraine. This situation is challenged by a normative discourse voiced especially by a younger generation of authors and publishers. A significant share of literary agents calls for an endorsement of a distinct Ukrainian literary culture that relies exclusively on the use of the Ukrainian language.

However, there are alternative viewpoints, as in the case of Serhii Zhadan who warns against the “ghetto” of a monolingual Ukrainian literature and calls for an open multicultural system. Zhadan’s claim can be substantiated by looking back on Ukrainian literary history: Shevchenko wrote his poetry in Ukrainian and his prose in Russian, Gogol in his early prose used a variety of Russian permeated with Ukrainian lexical and grammatical elements, Franko published his works in four different languages, while contemporary writers like Andrii Kurkov and Boris Khersonskii understand themselves as Ukrainian authors writing in Russian.

Shevchenko remains probably the most important uniting factor in Ukrainian culture; he is equally popular in all Ukrainian regions. The second most read and well liked author is Lesia Ukrainka, particularly in the west, north and center. Gogol plays an important role in the center and the east, but there is no clear-cut rejection of canonical Ukrainian authors in these regions. In general, Ukraine remains united by the canon of Ukrainian writers who were popularized in the Soviet Ukrainian narrative.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, Ukraine also saw the regionalization and fragmentation of book publishing and distribution as well as the emergence of regional canons of authors. Furthermore, the factor analysis of the list of authors shows that the preference for certain authors does not follow a language pattern. The reading culture in Ukraine displays an asymmetry: there is a clear preference for Russian in the east and the south, whereas a far-reaching bilingualism can be observed in the center. The literary mediascapes in Ukraine do not have distinct borderlines. Instead, there is a continuum of cultural preferences that are shaped by educational canons, reading habits and political considerations.

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6. Religion and the Cultural Geography of Ukraine¹

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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and even more so after the Euro-maidan protests, religion has regained a central position in political and daily life in Ukraine. The recent increased presence of religion in the public sphere challenges assumptions that Ukraine is divided into a European-oriented west and a pro-Russian east, buttressed by a Catholic–Orthodox division that contributes to creating “two Ukraines.” A vision of Ukraine that draws on religiously induced tensions, fractures, and divisions is often articulated in conjunction with the foreboding example of the Serbian–Croatian conflict as a potential parallel outcome of the separatist tensions in Ukraine.

Religion does indeed intersect with the formation of regions to the extent that it plays a vital role in processes of forging attachments to place and allegiances to particular groups. Forms of religious practice have the potential to connect a person to a specific place by transforming space into place and group membership into group identity. Religious groups influence to varying degrees the intensity with which these attachments to place are experienced and how the contours of group allegiances or antagonisms are defined. For these and other reasons, religion merits our attention.

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Contrary to what one might expect, however, religion in Ukraine does not contribute in a significant way to advancing regionalism, understood as a political principle premised on achieving a greater degree of political autonomy for a substate structure. Religion also does not particularly help define regions throughout most of Ukraine. As has been the historic pattern, the attachments religious groups forge in Ukraine are once again increasingly on local, national and transnational levels, with the significant difference that they are now articulated within a context of growing religious pluralism and diversity. This chapter traces how religion has historically been an agent of localization, tying believers to their place of residence as religious practices acted as carriers of local cultural traditions. At the same time, religious institutions evolved into agents of nationhood, providing important institutional bases that helped define and advance Ukrainian nationhood. Over time, and certainly today, religion has emerged as a force underpinning nationality. It shapes inclinations and political orientations and influences social policies. Shared religious affiliation also connects some Ukrainians to other peoples and other places beyond state borders. Contrary to expectations, religion is not, however, a significant contributing factor in the creation of regionalism or regional identities. Rather, as it has in the past, religion continues to shape the cultural geography of Ukraine and to contribute to the cultural and political diversity found in Ukraine.

Religion and nationhood

Nationhood is based upon the degree to which various regions are successfully united into a whole that is imparted with meaning sufficient to generate allegiance to a particular ruling authority. Especially for more recently created nations, such as Ukraine, religion assumes a prominent role in processes of nation building when several dynamics are operative: when religion is the central element in a protonational mythology; when religion provides the emerging nation with its symbolic boundaries leading to the dissolution of earlier collectivities; when a community has lost other important identity markers, such as common language or shared territory; when an ethnic identity coincides with a religious affiliation; and, finally, when a nation has been deprived of political institutions, thereby leaving religious institutions as one of the few bases for nation building (Greenfeld 1992, 7). Religion has figured, and continues to figure, into each of these dynamics of nation building in Ukraine.

The first leaders of the Ukrainian national movement understood the significance of religion for strengthening Ukrainian national identity but they conceived of its usefulness in a variety of ways. The ethnographer Panteleimon Kulish argued that religion was an important domain of daily life in which the particularities of Ukrainian language, customs and beliefs were expressed and preserved.² Others viewed Orthodoxy, the main religious tradition in Ukraine, as counterproductive to the development of Ukrainian national consciousness because it was one of the central pillars of a common Ukrainian–Russian identity and reaffirmed the organic integration of Ukraine into the Russian Empire. However, for generations of Ukrainian nationalists, the writings of Mykola Mikhnovskyi (1873–1924) served as a primary frame of reference. He, like many others, believed that religion could provide the cultural underpinnings for nationhood but that the nation would only emerge sometime in the distant future because, as he wrote, “not only the Tsar-foreigner reigns over Ukraine but God himself has become an alien and does not speak Ukrainian” (quoted in Protsenko and Lisovyi 2000, 418).

National activists, similar to the elites of other stateless nations, sought to mobilize the masses by evoking oppression and the right to national self-determination and liberation, but they rarely reasoned in religious terms. Reflecting the political convictions of the period, as historian Ivan L. Rudnytsky (1987, 139) remarked, Ukrainian youth at the turn of the twentieth century had “Marx’s *Communist Manifesto* in one pocket and Shevchenko’s collected poems *Kobzar* in the other.” In other words, growing numbers of reformers at the time sought solutions to poverty and oppression in political, not religious, domains.

Globalization and increased communication not only led to the construction of “imagined communities” in the world’s most affluent centers but they also set in motion similar processes of nation building in the globe’s vast peripheries. If Ukraine was a peripheral borderland of Russia and Poland, those countries, in turn, were to a degree cultural peripheries of western Europe. A country or region’s claim to a more “advanced” and

² In a letter to Mykola Kostomarov (1817–1885) in 1846, Panteleimon Kulish (1819–1897) wrote: “Christianity should in no way dampen our striving to develop our own native resources, and not without reason a seed has been cast into the soul and has taken deep root already. The worst that can happen is the loss of our language and customs, and you say it is only important to us to be Christian.... Do not forget that an ordinary Ukrainian is a Christian as long as he keeps all customs and beliefs” (quoted in Luckyj 1991, 37).

“modern” status was predicated on comparisons to its more “backward” neighbors to the east. Ukrainians faced a stark set of alternatives: either to integrate into these modern nations or to transform into a nation. Not satisfied with the place allocated to Ukrainians in Russian and Polish nation-building projects and having preserved or rediscovered certain historical and cultural traditions, an elite (or, in the strict sense, a latent elite) opted to create a separate nation. This offered the promise of a status in the world that would not have been possible had Ukraine remained a peripheral region of neighboring countries.

The particular salience of religion in the transformation of a cultural identity into political aspirations for national independence can be traced to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church (UGCC).³ After the first partition of Poland in 1772, the eastern part of Galicia came under Austrian rule. The Greek Catholic hierarchy received the support and protection of the imperial government. The educational reforms of the Habsburg rulers Maria Theresa (1717–1780) and Joseph II (1741–1790) led to the formation of an intelligentsia educated by Greek Catholic clergy, who represented the Ukrainian population of Galicia. Under the relatively liberal rule of Austria, the Greek Catholic hierarchy (seminarians, priests, and bishops) flourished. The clergy conducted the initial “heritage-gathering” work that formed the cultural basis for the subsequent national movement.

Until the end of the nineteenth century, Greek Catholic clergy were the dominant public figures in Galicia. Although secular intelligentsia began to assume the leadership of the national movement beginning in the 1860s, many were from clerical families. Clergymen continued to be elected to the Galician Diet and the all-Austrian Parliament, and they remained extremely important at the local level. They provided critical institutional support for Ukrainian candidates in elections, often through the various religious, educational and cultural establishments they had founded (Himka 1988, 105–142).

Positioning the Greek Catholic Church as the guardian of Ukrainian-ness allowed the UGCC to advocate for the rejection of the three alternative models for national development that were prominent at the time, the Russophile, Polish, and Austrian–Rusyn models (Himka 1988). The

³ The Austro-Hungarian Empress Maria Theresa introduced the term “Greek Catholic” in the 1770s to distinguish the Byzantine Catholics from Roman Catholics.

UGCC favored *narodovstvo*, meaning a Herder-like celebration of the distinctiveness of peasant culture as a principle for developing the Ukrainian national movement. This, however, clashed with the myth of the Cossacks, another important element in the national cultural repertoire, which drew on images of chivalrous republics of free and patriotic, militarized rulers (Armstrong 1982, 78). The Cossacks assumed a leading role in restoring the Orthodox Church in Ukraine after the Union of Brest (1595–1596). Under the Cossacks' protection, Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem consecrated new Orthodox bishops in Kyiv in 1620. Cossacks were pivotal to the revival of the "Rus faith," and became the embodiment of a distinct identity within the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. A crucial element of the Cossack myth was their leading role in the wars of the seventeenth century, which were carried out using religious slogans to protect the "Native Orthodox Faith" and the "Cossack Church," implying that they stood against Catholic expansionism and potential Polonization.

Overall, the historical circumstances that created divided confessional allegiances among Ukrainians dictated that nation-building efforts maintain a degree of deliberate distance from religion. Many national leaders, such as Ivan Franko (1856–1916), considered religion a source of tension, rather than a reliable resource for nation building. In an article written in 1906, entitled "Galicia and Ukraine," Mykhailo Hrushevskiy (1866–1934) (1906, 494) warned his compatriots of the ominous example of the Serbs and Croats, two religiously divided "nations" that emerged from peoples with a common heritage. In the same article, Hrushevskiy identified regionalism, predicated on opposing religious allegiances, as a real and deadly threat to Ukrainian national development (*rozviti*). The solution he and others proposed was to embrace secularism as a fundamental political principle in the nation-building project.

Orthodoxy and the making of the Ukrainian nation

The impact of Kyivan Orthodoxy on ecclesiastical life in the State of Moscow, and later in the Russian Empire, has been the subject of extensive study. Cultural influences operating in the opposite direction, that is, of the Russian Church on the nineteenth-century Ukrainian peasantry, have not been similarly studied. There were attempts to eliminate disparities in religious life after the incorporation of the Kyivan metropolis into the Moscow Patriarchate in 1686. Unification led to the standardization of liturgical books, as well as to the erosion of organizational, architec-

tural, and other local aspects of religious culture, including, for example, the requirement that Ukrainian clergy no longer shave their beards so as to make them more like their Russian brethren. And yet, little is known about the real impact these reforms had on the spiritual life of the Ukrainian peasantry and on their self-perceptions. Mykhailo Hrushevskiy (1992, 153–157) claimed that the changes were of little importance. He argued that from the mid-nineteenth-century the Russian imperial government had pressed for the replacement of Ukrainian clergy with “Moscow elements.” This resulted in the abolition of traditional practices, such as lay-clerical councils electing priests and vernacular languages being used in sermons, which, Hrushevskiy suggested, alienated the peasantry from the clergy and negated the impact of the changes.⁴

Yet, much of the evidence challenges Hrushevskiy’s understanding. Paradoxically, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was neither completely absorbed into the Russian Church, nor did it stand apart from it as an alien body because of the immense influence that bishops and theologians from Ukraine wielded on Russian Orthodoxy. Stefan Yavorsky (1658–1722) was the first president of the Holy Synod, the governmental body in charge of policy for the Russian Church after the abolition of the Patriarchy by Peter the Great (1672–1725) in 1700. He was from Ukraine as was Teofan Prokopovych (1681–1736), one of the main ideologues of Peter’s religious “enlightenment.” Altogether, in the first half of the eighteenth century, about 70 percent of the leaders of the Orthodox Church were from Ukraine or Belarus. The result of this, Georges Florovsky (1979, 113) claimed, was that in terms of Orthodoxy “Kiev emerged victorious.”

Ukrainian clerics created an image of Rus that transcended political boundaries by linking Ukraine and Muscovy through religion, dynasty, land, and even people (Kohut 2003, 64). In effect, the Orthodox Church was the only important Ukrainian institution that was fully integrated into the Russian imperial system during the first half of the eighteenth century, and it did so to a remarkable extent on its own terms (Kohut 1988). This is why the Orthodox Church in Ukraine for much of its history cannot be considered a passive object of Russification, even though it represented a faith tradition that was widely shared among Ukrainians and Russians.

⁴ The widespread popular discontent with the church was depicted by novelist Ivan Nechui-Levytskyi (1838–1918) in “Scoundrel from Athon,” which was published in 1890. In the story, a priest, no longer able to relate to peasant believers, was forced to abandon Orthodoxy and join an Evangelical community.

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine retained the use of the Ukrainian language in lay affairs and subscribed to a whole system of property rights that were deeply rooted in local legal and social structures.

Memoirs of clergy from this time attest to the persistence of their allegiances to local communities (Hryhoruk 2009; Shuhaliova 2006). Oleksandr Lototskyi-Bilousenko (1966, 35) studied at a theological school in right-bank Ukraine in the late 1880s and wrote that, despite Russificatory efforts, Ukrainian was the sole language spoken among students there. Church historian Ivan Vlasovskiy ([1957] 1998, 287) put it more forcefully when he described theological schools as a real “hotbed of *Ukrainianness*.”

In short, initially Orthodoxy was not a factor in Ukrainian nation building or in the development of regionalism because it was an ineffective identity marker. It did not distinguish the new nation from Russia, the nation to which Ukrainians compared themselves, nor did it distinguish Ukrainian lands into regions. Rather, religion was a carrier of local traditions at the same time that Orthodoxy inserted Ukrainians into a far greater community of cobelievers, the character and contours of which were set to a significant degree by Ukrainians themselves.

The Polish factor had exceptional importance for Ukraine even after the eighteenth-century partition of Poland. Kimitaka Matsuzato (1998) claims that the Roman Catholic Church in the Ukrainian lands surpassed the Byzantine tradition in resources and influence until the early twentieth century. Roman Szporluk (2000) rightly argues that Russians and Ukrainians joined forces to prove that Ukrainian lands were not Polish. Ironically, as Szporluk (2000, 377) asserts, “it took some time before the Russians realized the Ukrainians also aimed to prove that the lands in question were not Russian either.” While Orthodoxy was quite useful in distancing Ukrainians from Poles, it was of little use in crafting a sense of Ukrainian-ness that separated Ukrainians from other eastern Slavs.

Even after the 1863–1864 uprising and the eventual abolition of Polish autonomy, nineteenth-century Ukraine was marked by a violent antagonism between Polish gentry and Ukrainian peasants, which was predicated on opposing confessional allegiances. When the *hlopomany*, or Ukrainian activists from Polonized families, declared a return to their “native nationality,” it was accompanied by a “return” to Eastern Orthodoxy from Roman Catholicism. Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908) and Tadei Rylskiy (1841–1902), the father of the famous Ukrainian poet Maksym Rylskiy, were counted among the *hlopomany*. At the time, for Ukrainians in left-bank Ukraine, Eastern Orthodoxy was considered an anti-Polish, anti-Jewish,

and later, an anti-Russian identity marker. In spite of the routine campaigns instigated by the St. Petersburg Holy Synod against Little Russia's "harmful peculiarity" in liturgy, rites, and devotions, all of which made Orthodox practice distinctive in Ukraine in the eyes of the peasantry, Orthodoxy was not understood as something imposed by Russians. Rather, it was embraced as a "native" faith tradition.⁵ In those provinces (*guberniias*) in the Russian Empire, where Orthodoxy was an important, if not decisive, demarcation line between Slavs and others, Orthodox peasants displayed high levels of religiosity and active participation in church services (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1. Number of Orthodox faithful per church building (mid-nineteenth century)

Province (<i>guberniia</i>)	Orthodox population per church building
Podilska	689
Volynska	839
Kyivska	1,201
Chernihivska	1,208
Kharkivska	1,611
Poltavska	1,628
Khersonska	2,075
Katerynoslavska	2,377
Tavriiska	2,840

Source: Departament Generalnogo Shtaba (1848, 1849a, 1849b, 1849c, 1850a, 1850b, 1850c, 1850d, 1851)

The differences in the vibrancy of religious life in the three southwestern *guberniias* (Kyivska, Volynska, and Podilska) even then contrasted with those of the three southern *guberniias* (Khersonska, Katerynoslavska, and

⁵ To illustrate the extent to which Orthodoxy was perceived as an authentic, native faith tradition, consider the minimal level of Russian influence on the daily lives of the Ukrainian peasantry at the time. According to the 1897 census, Russian speakers made up only 3.5 percent of the total population of Volynska province, 3.3 percent of Podilska province, and 5.9 percent of Kyivska province (Departament Generalnogo Shtaba 1897, viii).

Tavriiska), where religious life depended to a greater extent on the support of nobility and local authorities. As an observer of the period put it, “[V]ery many churches in the villages of Khersonska *guberniia* were built with the assistance of the authorities, who made every effort to awaken people’s religious feelings which, because of how far they lived from a parish, were rarely animated” (Departament Generalnogo Shtaba 1863, 592). In contrast, according to diocese records, churches in right-bank *guberniias* were usually built with funds from believers.⁶

Similarly, the initiative of the Most Holy Governing Synod to establish a network of parochial schools was greeted with strong popular approval in right-bank Ukraine, where schools, like parishes, were mainly supported by parishioners. In Kyiv diocese, during the 1895–1896 school year, village and *volost* communities provided more than three-quarters of the financing for parochial schools (“Otchet” 1897, 53–55). By the end of 1859, the number of schools in this diocese had increased tenfold, from 15 to 151 with 3,600 pupils. This contrasted sharply with the central Russian *guberniias*, where the process of building a network of parochial schools advanced much more slowly. There were only twelve schools with 244 pupils in Kostroma diocese in 1860. In Saratov diocese, there were only three with 176 pupils (Nikulin 1996, 224–225).

Although the Ukrainian peasantry had conflicts with priests over property matters, they readily donated money and labor to build and maintain churches. Most communities strove to have their own church, which parishioners decorated themselves. They considered their church a local attraction and a key source of pride for the community (Boikov and Dodonova 2014). Everyday piety and devotion to the church combined with a skeptical attitude toward the clergy in spite of the fact that the clergy often sided with the peasantry when it came to resisting institutional mandates. Orthodox believers in right-bank Ukraine consistently disparaged the Synod’s ritual innovations on the grounds that they contradicted “old customs” (Shuhaliova 2008). In continuing to practice folk traditions that

⁶ For example, among the Orthodox church buildings in Zhytomyr district [*uiezd*] in the last decade of the nineteenth century, fifty-one were built by parishioners; nine by parishioners with the support of the state treasury; six by parishioners together with landlords; eighteen by landlords; ten by assets of the state treasury; two by priests; two thanks to the church’s assets; one by parishioners together with a priest; and one by a merchant (no data on church wardens is available concerning forty-four church buildings) (“Deviatisotletie” 1892, 1–20).

drew on beliefs in supernatural forces, the peasantry often had the implicit support of local clergy, who sided with the peasantry over church leaders in matters of tradition. This allowed local, popular religious practices to remain meaningful and to continue to be useful in delineating sacred time and space from mundane life. However, it did so in locally variable ways and thereby informed the diverse cultural geography of Ukraine.

One of the reasons why local religious life remained so robust was that imperial efforts to undermine Polish and Jewish influence involved strengthening the position of the Orthodox Church (Steinberg and Coleman 2007). The authorities tried to involve as many Russians (*velykorosy*) in this project as possible by offering them additional payment and accommodations. Originally, the goal was to fight “Polish separatism” and “Jewish dominance,” but later state officials became concerned about Ukrainophilism as well (Shyp 1995, 27–28). The Pochaiv Monastery became a regional center because Father Superior Archimandrite Vitalii (Maksymenko) personally headed the Pochaiv branch of the Union of the Russian People. Parish priests ran local cells of the Union, whose members were predominantly peasants who embraced a localized Orthodox identity. Contrary to the expectations of officials in Saint Petersburg, the Russianness of Orthodoxy did not signal unity with Russians (*velykorosy*). Rather, Orthodoxy embodied an opposition to Poles, Jews, and especially to “people at the top.” Peasants joined the Union of the Russian People en masse hoping for redistribution of lands from the nobility to lessen their dependence on local authorities. Although founded to protect the monarchy, the Union turned into a peasant trade union that took an antagonistic stance toward one of the main pillars of the monarchy, landownership by the nobility and gentry (Omelianchuk 2005/2006, 156, 160). Antilandlord actions initiated or supported by Orthodox clergy during the Revolution of 1905–1907 were registered in all Ukrainian dioceses.⁷

This local Orthodox identity, which was distinct from an all-Russian one, became a contributing factor to aspirations to obtain a “national” church. Philosopher, church leader, and public figure Fr. Vasiliï Zenkovskyi (1995, 39) vividly recalled, “I came to the conclusion that the church’s Ukrainianness was very strong in rural areas, that within the

⁷ Soviet historiography tended to exaggerate the tensions between peasants and clergy. During the 1905–1907 Revolution, three-quarters of all violent peasant actions in right-bank Ukraine were directed against landlords, not clergy. One incident out of seventy was against prosperous covillagers and only one out of 200 was against priests (Khytrovska 2009).

church's Ukrainianness, there was a strong yearning for the expression of national character through religious [church] life." In other words, in Ukrainian lands of the Russian Empire, the very localness that the Russo-centric Orthodox Church fostered now took on the task of supporting and even justifying Ukrainian nationhood. Moreover, much of the peasantry envisioned nationhood in the form of an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Thus, by the dawn of the twentieth century, Orthodoxy had become a meaningful identification marker with formidable political implications. For many, it signified a localized identity based on local cultural traditions that differentiated the Ukrainian peasantry among themselves as well as from other ethno-confessional groups by infusing unique specificities into patterns of everyday life, worldviews, and perceptions of self and others. At the same time, as an institution, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), many of whose leaders were from Ukraine, loosely connected Ukrainians to a greater community of eastern Slavs. Yet, this pan-Slavic communion was experienced to a far greater degree by the clergy and nobility than it was by the peasantry. A third and equally important role opened up for Orthodoxy in the early twentieth century. Ukrainians increasingly envisioned Orthodoxy as an essential institutional support for Ukrainian nationhood and eventual political independence. Such was the relationship of religion to politics and cultural identities at the time of the Revolution of 1917.

Soviet secularization campaigns and the ongoing Ukrainization of Orthodoxy

Fortunes radically changed, of course, with the advent of the Soviet regime following the 1917 Revolution. This was a period of turbulence for the Orthodox Church, driven by contested pressures to reform, which left the church particularly vulnerable to the repressive tactics of the Soviet state. Soviet policies were designed to minimize the influence of all religious groups, but especially of Orthodoxy, on social and political life as well as on individual consciousness. Soviet projects to "modernize" its citizenry included erasing local attachments and the religious practices that supported them. The Soviet era also signaled a tremendous politicization of religion, no longer just in terms of church-state relations and expressions of religiosity in the public sphere, but also as a means for individual self-definition.

Already after two decades of Soviet rule, religion was no longer the primary component of Ukrainian peasant identity. The Stalinist modernization campaigns, which yielded famines that decimated the peasantry in certain regions of eastern Ukraine, also included severe antireligious campaigns that involved the repression of all religious groups. Soviet anti-religious policies met with regionally varying levels of resistance, giving the cultural geography of religious life new dimensions (Shternshis 2017; Zhuk 2017; Wanner 2012). Only at this time did the administration of the Russian Orthodox Church react to the threat it faced from within from ongoing Ukrainization. Especially after World War II, renewed attempts were instigated to reverse the trend of using the Ukrainian language in parish services, liturgical and prayer books, and church correspondence. Any religious literature deemed “nationalistic” was withdrawn from usage.

The annexation of western borderland regions to Soviet Ukraine during World War II introduced large numbers of active Greek Catholic communities to the Soviet population, changing the religious landscape in Soviet Ukraine dramatically (Hurkina 2014). The response of Soviet authorities was to ban the Greek Catholic Church in 1946, which drove it underground. Many priests and deacons were arrested. Others were forcibly reordained from the Greek Catholic Church to the Russian Orthodox Church, and some clergy were transferred outright to dioceses in Russia (Borshchevych 2000, 16–17). Popular religiosity fueled serious resistance to antireligious campaigns in Bukovyna, Zakarpattia, Volhynia, Podillia, and, especially, in Galicia, all regions annexed to Soviet Ukraine during World War II.

According to a directive from Moscow, during the antireligious campaign of Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) from 1958–1964, Soviet Ukrainian authorities were ordered to close half of all Orthodox Church buildings, a task they almost achieved. In Crimea, 70 percent of all churches had been closed by the end of 1964. In the eastern region of Zaporizhzhia, 91 percent were closed. However, in Zakarpattia, because of popular resistance, authorities managed to close a mere 17 percent, and in Ternopil 36 percent were closed (TsDAVO f.4648, op.1, sprava 433, ark.1). Especially strong resistance was launched in Galicia, where a clear Ukrainian identity combined with strong religious sentiments across a variety of religious groups. Ukrainian Catholic believers, as *irredenta*, vigorously protested but were nonetheless forced to “reunite” with the Russian Orthodox Church although they did not always become entirely assimilated within Orthodoxy in cultural and institutional terms.

Paradoxically, at the close of the antireligious campaign in 1964, Galicia became the region with the highest concentration of Orthodox parishes in the Soviet Union. In its effort to expunge the “remnants of Uniatism,” the Soviet regime pursued a somewhat different policy in western Ukraine as compared to other Slavic regions of the Soviet Union. To mitigate the “Uniate threat,” Soviet officials unintentionally kept the door open to the continued Ukrainization of Orthodoxy. Western Ukrainian bishops became the largest ethnic group within the Russian Orthodox Church (Mitrokhin and Timofeeva 1997, 15–19). By the mid-1970s, thirteen out of sixteen Orthodox leaders in Ukraine were ethnic Ukrainians. Nine of them were western Ukrainians and three of them were former Uniate priests. In 1965, the archbishop Mykolai (Yuryk) (1910–1984), a former Greek Catholic priest, headed the Lviv and Ternopil eparchy, the largest single eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church (Bociurkiw 1977, 83). This eparchy had more than 1,300 parishes, a significant share of the total 6,000 parishes in the USSR. In the mid-1980s, Western Ukrainians made up half of all students in Leningrad theological schools (Pavlov 1987, 42), which became a matter of concern for the Soviet authorities (Shkarovskii 2008, 199). This added up to the fact that in the second half of the twentieth century, the process of Ukrainizing Orthodoxy was ultimately spearheaded by former Greek Catholic priests who had converted to Orthodoxy.⁸


On the eve of the USSR’s collapse, there were about 4,000 Orthodox parishes in Ukraine, which constituted two-thirds of all Orthodox communities in the USSR, giving not just Ukrainian clergy but also believers in Ukraine as well a high representation within Orthodoxy. Even into the post-Soviet period, as late as 2014, Galicians constituted the largest regional group among Ukrainian Orthodox episcopacy.⁹ Among the 117 bishops of the three Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, 26 percent are Gali-

⁸ Two such examples of former Greek Catholic clergy who became leaders within Orthodoxy are Fr. Vasyl Romaniuk (1925–1995) and Fr. Volodymyr Yarema (1915–2000). They became Primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), respectively.

⁹ In July 2014, Metropolitan Volodymyr died. He had been the Primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate for twenty-two years. One year later, by August 2015, his successor, Metropolitan Onufrii (Berезovskyi), had ordained four bishops who were born in Bukoyvna, Kyiv, Volhynia, and Russia.


cians by birth, while 15 percent are from historical Volhynia (Volynska, Rivnenska, and Zhytomyrska oblasts), 14 percent from central Ukraine, 9 percent from Podillia, 9 percent from Donbas, 9 percent from southeast Ukraine, 6 percent from Bukovyna, 3 percent from Zakarpattia, and 9 percent were born outside Ukraine¹⁰ (see Diagrams 6.1–6.3 below).

Diagram 6.1. Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) by birthplace (seventy-five bishops)



Source: Data on governing and auxiliary bishops of UOC-MP, <http://orthodox.org.ua/category/1123/list>


Diagram 6.2. Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP) by birthplace (thirty-four bishops)



Source: Data on governing and auxiliary bishops of UOC-KP, <http://cerkva.info/uk/episkopat.html>

¹⁰ Almost all bishops of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church today have Galician roots, including the twenty-two out of forty-seven who were born in the Americas (Canada, the USA and Brazil).

Diagram 6.3. Bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) by birthplace (right bishops)



Source: Data on governing and auxiliary bishops of UAOC, http://patriarchia.org.ua/?page_id=110, and sites of dioceses

The emergence of multiple national churches in independent Ukraine

Not only were clergy disproportionately from western Ukraine, the number of religious organizations and communities were significantly higher there too. For example, in 1988, 56 percent of all religious organizations in Ukraine were centered in seven western oblasts, whereas only 5 percent of them were located in Donbas, although it had a far larger share of the population. Dnipropetrovska and Zaporizka oblasts each were home to 2 percent of the total number of religious organizations. Moreover, between 1988 and 1991, the number of religious communities in Lvivska oblast, which were already numerous, increased by 11.3 percent, while in Zakarpatska oblast their number increased by 10.7 percent, and in Ternopil'ska oblast by 9.5 percent. In those eastern oblasts that had been under Soviet rule for far longer, the growth in the number of new religious communities was much slower. In Zaporizka oblast during the same period the number of religious communities grew by 0.8 percent, while in Luhanska oblast their number increased by 1.6 percent, and in Dnipropetrovska oblast by 1.2 percent. In Chernivetska oblast, a western borderland oblast with the smallest population, 480 new religious organizations were created from 1988 to 1996, whereas in the most densely populated oblast, Donetsk, only 406 were established in the same period (Forma 1 1988–2015).

By the mid-1990s, 40 percent of all religious organizations in Ukraine were located in Lvivska, Ternopil'ska, Zakarpatska, and Ivano-Frankivska oblasts. These initial levels of growth soon began to even out. Whereas

by 1998 western Ukraine was responsible for 13 percent of the general growth in religious communities in Ukraine, Donbas and Dnipropetrovska oblast contributed 14.5 percent each. This remarkable and relatively rapid change can be explained by a shift in who assumed the power to make decisions concerning matters of religion. In the early years of Ukrainian independence, religious affairs were in the hands of Ukrainian nationalists. Soviet Ukraine's *nomenklatura* handed over decision-making in the realm of culture and religion to their temporary allies in exchange for possibilities to appropriate and reallocate former state property. Over time, religion became a political resource and the sponsorship of churches became a particularly attractive option for persons and groups striving to acquire or preserve positions of power. The number of registered religious institutions skyrocketed from 6,000 in 1988 to over 35,000 in 2013, remaking the landscape of post-Soviet Ukrainian cities, towns, and villages.

Vyacheslav Karpov (2010) defines desecularization as a process of countersecularization through which religion reasserts its influence either “from below” or “from above.” Desecularization from below is driven by activists and actors involved in grassroots movements representing religious communities. When actors and activists join forces to support the actions of religious and secular elites and leaders in positions of power and authority, desecularization from above occurs. The two models are ideal types that capture the prevailing patterns of countersecularization. The key point is that in the 1990s the dynamics of desecularization were propelled “from below” as well as “from above” and that is why they were so powerful and pervasive.

Table 6.2. Changes in the religious landscape after independence

Region (oblast)	Growth of religious organizations, 1988–2013 (times)	Church attendance (weekly and more often than weekly) (percent)
Lvivska	4.7	49.4
Ivano-Frankivska	4	40
Zakarpatska	2.9	39.4
Ternopil'ska	3.3	36.1
Chernivetska	3.2	27.3
Khmelnitska	8.1	20

Region (oblast)	Growth of religious organizations, 1988–2013 (times)	Church attendance (weekly and more often than weekly) (percent)
Volynska	5.8	19.5
Rivnenska	3.6	16.5
Zhytomyrska	6.4	16
Chernihivska	6.2	9
Odeska	7.3	7.6
Kyivska	9	7
Crimea	35.8	5.1
Kyiv	58	5
Poltavska	14.6	5
Zaporizka	20.1	4.9
Sumska	5.6	4.5
Vinnytska	4.9	4.7
Cherkaska	8.7	4
Dnipropetrovska	19.7	3.8
Mykolaivska	10.8	3
Donetska	10.2	2.5
Kharkivska	6.9	2.5
Khersonska	15.7	2.1
Luhanska	9.2	1.7
Kirovohradska	8.6	1.6

Source: Survey (2013) and Forma 1 (1988–2013)

Not only did religious institutions return in a powerful way as political actors to the public sphere in the 1990s, they began to color the urban landscape and even everyday life as well. Since the fall of the USSR, 7,400 religious buildings were built, and another 2,300 are under construction as of this writing. Dozens of statues of Christian saints were erected, along

with monuments to Pope John Paul II and countless memorial crosses devoted to the beginning of the Third Christian Millennium (Manuliak 2009; Zhurmii 2011). Everyday life for most Ukrainians has been affected by this embrace of religion, too. During the 2013 Lenten season, for example, the consumption of dairy products decreased by 20 percent, and of eggs and chicken meat by 10 percent, while the consumption of vegetables increased by 15–20 percent and of mushrooms by 30 percent, illustrating the extent to which broad sectors of the population began to observe dietary restrictions in advance of Easter (Kovalchuk 2013). Such significant shifts in consumption are disproportionately greater than the number of people who regularly attend church services.

This growing visibility and influence of religion paved the way for Orthodox issues to take center stage in sharp political debates in the Ukrainian polity, obliging the entire spectrum of parties and political leaders to articulate their own religious policies in response to the statements, appeals and memoranda that clergy of all denominations began to deliver on numerous social, moral and political issues of international significance.¹¹ At the same time, the churches in a remarkably single, unified voice articulated their opposition to such social issues as abortion and same-sex marriage, and began to effectively bend public policy to conform to their visions and values.

As the authority of religious groups was given greater voice in political and social matters, seismic shifts occurred in the religious landscape of Ukraine in the early 1990s. In many eastern European countries, a single Orthodox Church represents all the Orthodox faithful within its borders (for example, the Greek Orthodox Church, the Bulgarian Orthodox

¹¹ See, for example, the “Address of the Heads of the Ukrainian Christian Churches on the Seventieth Anniversary of the Great Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine,” December 29, 2003; “The Open Letter of the Leaders of the Ukrainian Christian Churches to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma about the Current Political Situation in Ukraine,” November 29, 2004; “The Address of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations to the Ukrainian People Concerning the Current Political Situation,” April 4, 2004; “The Christian Churches’ Experience of Building Civil Society: The Address of the Leaders of the Ukrainian Christian Churches to the Christians and All People of Good Will,” February 13, 2008; “The Address of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations to the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich,” April 21, 2011; “The Address of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations on the Occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Restoration of Ukrainian State Independence,” September 21, 2011.

Church and so on). After 1991, politicians, members of the intelligentsia and believers began, once again, to agitate for an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church.¹² The Russian Orthodox Church does not follow this nation-state model. In sharp contrast, it is an institution that draws on an imperial heritage to buttress its claims to serve all eastern Slavs, wherever they may be, including in Ukraine. Ultimately, the two most obvious options that emerged after 1991 for organizing Orthodox religious life became a state church that serves a particular nation or a broadly transnational church that enjoins Ukrainians in communion with other Slavs, most notably Russians and Belarusians.

Several Eastern Christian churches exist in Ukraine, and all of them consider themselves “national” churches. In addition to the Russian Orthodox Church, which since 1990 goes by the name of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) and is the only church in Ukraine that is canonically recognized by the Eastern Orthodox communion, there is also the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP). This church is led by Patriarch Filaret, who, up until 1992, was a Metropolitan bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church. Thereafter, he chose to found and lead an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church. He became patriarch of the Ukrainian Church in 1995, and was subsequently excommunicated from the Russian Orthodox Church in 1997. He has led the efforts to unite the more than 4,500 churches under his jurisdiction with the 12,000 churches in Ukraine under the Moscow Patriarchate.¹³ His goal has been to gain canonical recognition for a single, united independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church with its own patriarchate. This ongoing agenda has made this church one of the most politically engaged in Ukraine.

The two additional national churches are the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. The UAOC traces its origins to the Sobor of 1921 in Kyiv, when Ukraine declared its independence during the civil war after the February Revolution of 1917. During this period of fragile statehood, the UAOC was founded. The nascent Ukrainian state collapsed after three years, at which time Soviet Ukraine became a republic of the USSR. The UAOC was outlawed and repressed in the Soviet Union, although it thrived among immi-

¹² For a discussion of these efforts since independence, see Fagan and Shchipkov 2001, Krawchuk 1996 and Plokhly 1996.

¹³ All statistics are from 2011 (<http://risu.org.ua/en/index/reference>).

grants and war refugees in North America. Since its inception, the UAOC has undergone three “rebirths,” which culminated in the church gaining legal recognition in Ukraine in 1990. Prior to 1995, the church had more parishes among émigré communities abroad than it did in Ukraine. This is the smallest of the three Orthodox Churches in Ukraine with 1,200 out of the 18,000 total number of Orthodox parishes as of 2011 (<http://risu.org.ua/en/index/reference>).

The fourth national church is the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the largest Catholic Church with a Byzantine rite in full communion with the Holy See. Those affiliated with this church recognize the Pope’s authority, while subscribing to Orthodox rituals and practices, including allowing clergy to marry. As noted above, the church was created in 1596, when the Union of Brest marked a break with the Patriarch of Constantinople, and simultaneously brought parishes under the political rule of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and under papal authority. This “unification” earned the church its unofficial name “Uniate.”¹⁴ The UGCC has more adherents overall than the UAOC and is the dominant confession in three western oblasts (Lvivska, Ternopilska, and Ivano-Frankivska), with far smaller followings throughout the rest of the country. Like the UAOC, the UGCC flourished in diaspora communities around the world. For forty-three years it remained the largest banned religious community in the world, and today has approximately five million adherents in Ukraine alone. Both the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church position themselves, much as the Ukrainian diaspora always has, as anti-Soviet, and increasingly at times even anti-Russian, cornerstones of Ukrainian national identity.¹⁵

In summer 2008, the incumbent president, Viktor Yushchenko, held highly publicized meetings with Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople in an attempt to secure the unification and canonical recognition of Ukraine’s Orthodox churches into a single national church independent of the Moscow Patriarchate. Yushchenko and others were vigorous proponents of the UOC-KP’s rightful status as *the* Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

¹⁴ Much of western and central Ukraine was part of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth under the rule of Polish King Sigismund III (1587–1632). At the time of the Union of Brest, this region was heavily influenced by the Counter-Reformation (see Bociurkiw 1992).

¹⁵ Kuropas (1991) and Luciuk (2000) note the importance of religious participation for creating and maintaining a Ukrainian diaspora in the USA and Canada, respectively, that is politically influential on issues relating to Ukraine.

He argued that the schism among Ukrainian Orthodox churches is temporary and should be remedied. Protests about presidential meddling in religious affairs could be heard from the UOC-MP and from the major Protestant denominations, who saw their future, and specifically their future growth, as tied to an open religious field, which would not be dominated by a single Orthodox Church as it is in Russia (Wanner 2007).

Should the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine unite and come out from under the canonical jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church, overnight the Ukrainian Orthodox Church would have the most parishes of any Eastern Christian Church in the world, challenging the historic prominence of Moscow as the “Third Rome” (Kuzio 2000). Of course, the Russian Orthodox Church has historically championed its fundamental role in broadly defining and shaping Great Russian civilization and the concept of *Russkii mir* (Russian World), an argument that is used to support the continued political and religious unification of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus under a single state and under a single church (Tolz 1998, esp. 279). Old political structures uniting eastern Slavs have broken apart but the religious hierarchies remain in place, leaving open the possibility to recreate a parallel political structure to match the reach of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Since the collapse of the USSR, and radically accelerating since the Euromaidan protests, the fusion of religion and nationality has taken on new relevance. The power of religion in Ukraine to mobilize significant sectors of the population to force political change to move in a particular direction cannot be underestimated. Yet, it is critically important to note that the essential issue on an institutional level is whether these religious institutions should be national or transnational in orientation. None of the four most prominent religious institutions, including the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, envisions its future on a regional level, nor do they encourage their adherents to think of themselves as believers in a particular region. Rather, as argued above, all four churches espouse a national orientation.

Assessing religious life in Ukraine in the 21st century

The *Region, Nation and Beyond* survey (Survey 2013) reveals a small margin between the number of adherents of the UOC-MP and the UOC-KP. Of those surveyed, 18.8 percent stated that they identified with the UOC-KP, as compared to 22.3 percent identifying with the UOC-MP

(see Table 6.3 below). This contrasts sharply with the resources of these two institutions. The UOC-MP has 2.7 times more institutional establishments, than the UOC-KP, although it has only 3 percent more followers than the UOC-KP. Most Ukrainians understand a declaration of allegiance to the Kyiv, not the Moscow, Patriarchate as a declaration of loyalty to the Ukrainian nation, and increasingly to the Ukrainian state as well. The essential difference between these two institutions is the political vision they have for Ukraine, one oriented toward Ukrainian statehood, and the other offering a sense of communion with eastern Slavs, respecting the historic unification that the Russian Empire created, and which continues to endure primarily through the Russian Orthodox Church.

Table 6.3. Confessional allegiances


	Total	Percentage
UOC-MP	1,337	22.3
UOC-KP	1,126	18.8
UAOC	72	1.2
Just Orthodox	1,319	22
UGCC	453	7.6
Roman Catholic	35	0.6
Protestant and Evangelical	46	0.8
Jewish	3	0.1
Buddhist	1	0.0
Other	35	0.6
Believer, no confession	795	13.3
Nonbeliever, atheist	479	8.0
Hard to say	299	5.0
Total	6,000	100

Source: Survey (2013)

The sociological and ethnographic research conducted as part of the *Region, Nation and Beyond* project shows that only two decades after the


creation of an independent state with its own legislative policies religiosity in Ukraine can be characterized by four qualities: 1) high levels of belief are in evidence across the country, and are also comparable to a remarkable extent across denominations (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2 below); 2) high levels of belief, however understood and practiced, find expression in high levels of trust and positive assessments of the role of religious institutions in social and political life; 3) high levels of belief exist alongside significant numbers of believers who refuse to declare allegiance to a particular denomination, preferring instead to ally themselves with an Eastern Christian faith tradition and to self-identify as “just Orthodox” or simply as a “believer,” which thwarts the political utility of religious affiliation on a national, regional or local level; and 4) active religious practice in any form correlates with feelings of attachment to a particular place, the nature of which is primarily local or national but rarely regional. These results mean that religious beliefs and practices contribute toward processes of forging local and national identities, attachments, and political orientations but that they are not particularly effective, whether in historical or contemporary terms, in providing the underpinnings for regionally based identities and political projects.

Figure 6.1. Levels of belief in God and life after death by region



Source: Survey (2013)

Figure 6.2. Levels of religiosity by denomination




Source: Survey (2013)

Moreover, levels of religiosity, understood as the intensity of religious sentiment concerning such objects of belief as eternal life, the soul, the devil and the like, are highest among three of the most politicized and historically repressed groups, namely the Protestant denominations, the UGCC and Roman Catholics. The high levels of religiosity among Protestants and Roman Catholics, two significant minority religious groups, are offset by the fact that combined they only make up 1.4 percent of the population. So, proportionately speaking, the lower levels of religiosity exhibited by Orthodox believers are much more reflective of the Ukrainian population as a whole, suggesting that there is a good deal of similarity in terms of levels of religiosity among the believers who subscribe to one of the Orthodox denominations.


Importantly, Figure 6.3 does not account for the 13 percent of the population who self-declare as “believers without a confession.” Although levels of church attendance among UGCC believers are somewhat higher than among Orthodox believers, the levels among believers of the various Orthodox denominations are more or less comparable. The strongest positive predictors of an inclination to attend church are gender (being a woman), a sense of attachment to one’s place of residence, and a proclaimed feeling of patriotism toward Ukraine.

Figure 6.3. Church attendance by confession



Source: Survey (2013)

Figure 6.4. Predictors of church attendance



Source: Survey (2013)

High levels of professed belief translate into high levels of trust. A familiar pattern is in evidence here and elsewhere in that, because there is a higher proportion of “true believers” or “religious virtuosi” in western Ukraine, levels of trust in the church there are also higher. The percentage of believers in western Ukraine who claim to trust the church “entirely” are far higher compared to all other regions of Ukraine, which exhibit similar levels of trust. The levels of distrust are higher in the east but are otherwise comparable across Ukraine. The most notable finding is that the overwhelming majority of average respondents across Ukraine exhibit similar views and claim to “rather trust than not” the church to similar degrees (see Table 6.4).

Table 6.4. Trust in the church (percentage)

	West	Center	South	East
Trust entirely	39.0	21.4	19.9	14.7
Rather trust than not	43.9	44.2	44.4	35.4
Rather don't trust	7.7	16.5	16.3	15.3
Entirely distrust	2.3	7.9	6.9	23.7
Hard to say	7.2	10.1	12.5	10.9

Source: Razumkov Center (2013)¹⁶

Concerning the social role of the church, there is widespread agreement across Ukraine that the church does not play a negative role. These assessments are made independent of confessional allegiance. There is variability, however, in the levels of endorsement of the churches' role in solving social problems. Agreement that the church plays a positive role is far higher in western Ukraine as compared to eastern Ukraine, where a plethora of social problems is far more entrenched and the assessment on the part of the respondents that the church does not play a noticeable role

¹⁶ The regional division of Ukraine used in this survey carried out by the Razumkov Center in March 2013 was as follows: the west is made up of: Volynska, Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska, Lvivska, Rivnenska, Ternopil'ska, and Chernivetska oblasts; the south is made up of: the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Odeska, Khersonska, and Mykolaivska oblasts ; the east is made up of: Dnipropetrovska, Donetsk, Zaporizka, Luhanska, and Kharkivska oblasts; and the center is made up of: the city of Kyiv, Vinnytska, Zhytomyrska, Kyivska, Kirovohradska, Poltav'ska, Sum'ska, Khmelnytska, Cherkaska, and Chernihiv'ska oblasts.

in addressing such problems is higher¹⁷ (see Table 6.5). Across religious groups, respondents give remarkably similar assessments of the positive social role that their own church plays in Ukrainian society, with the caveat that the level of virtuosi in western Ukraine raises the levels of positive assessment among UGCC believers (see Table 6.6).

Table 6.5. Social role of the church

	West	Center	South	East
Church plays a positive role	74.8	42.5	61.3	38.8
Church doesn't play a noticeable role	16.0	42.1	26.9	41.3
Church plays a negative role	1.3	3.9	4.3	6.4
Other	1.3	2.8	0.7	0.6
Hard to say	6.6	8.8	6.9	12.8

Source: Razumkov Center (2013)

Table 6.6. Assessment of the role the church plays in society by denomination

	UOC-MP	UOC-KP	UGCC
Church plays a positive role	64.5	66.8	82.3
Church doesn't play a noticeable role	29.6	25.2	11.5
Church plays a negative role	1.8	1.4	0.0
Other	1.3	1.6	0.9
Hard to say	2.8	4.9	5.3

Source: Razumkov Center (2013)

¹⁷ The imbalance of social problems across Ukraine is revealed on multiple levels. For example, in 1999, Sevastopol had by far the highest number of abortions followed by Luhanska and Zaporizka oblasts. Ternopil'ska, Ivano-Frankiv'ska, and Rivnenska oblasts had the lowest number of abortions. In 2007, the number of HIV cases per hundred thousand was 3.5 in Zakarpatska oblast, 7 in Ivano-Frankiv'ska oblast, 7.4 in Chernivetska oblast, 78.2 in Dnipropetrov'ska oblast, 82.7 in Donetsk oblast, and 96.6 in Kherson'ska oblast. Similar patterns exist concerning suicide, AIDS, and criminality (Derzhavnyi komitet statystyky 2009, 340; Hromadska 2007, 12–13).

People perceive the church, to a considerable extent, to be a guardian of the poor and disadvantaged. The question asked by the survey was: “What do you think: Do churches in Ukraine stand up for the poor and disadvantaged? Or do they always defend the powerful and rich?” The responses were on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means full agreement with the first statement and 10 indicates full agreement with the second. There is considerable agreement in the assessment across regions and denominations of Ukraine that a significant factor contributing to the positive social role of the church is its willingness and ability to assist the least fortunate members of society (see Tables 6.7 and 6.8).

Table 6.7. Church as a defender of social justice (regional distribution)

West	Center	South	East
4.93	5.51	5.15	6.41

Source: Razumkov Center (2013)

Table 6.8. Church as a defender of social justice (denominational distribution)

UOC-MP	UOC-KP	UGCC
5.18	5.14	4.72

Source: Razumkov Center (2013)

Religion in many ways provides a forum where the obligations and responsibilities that individuals have to each other and to greater collectivities are articulated. Increasingly, a key means by which an individual can make a charitable contribution and raise their status is through sponsoring church buildings or by financially supporting religious institutions. Specifically how and why this is done is one of the factors that increasingly shapes the cultural geography of religious life. An ever-growing spectrum of religious pluralism all across Ukraine has placed pressure on the Orthodox Church to augment its presence in public life. This is particularly true in the Donbas where, for example, in 2014, 43 percent of all new religious organizations in Donetsk oblast belonged to Evangelical Protestants, compared to 48 percent belonging to Orthodox communities of all jurisdictions, including Old Believers and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad.

Political elites and members of the oligarchic class of southeastern Ukraine have begun to take religion seriously, and to consider Orthodoxy

under the auspices of the Moscow Patriarchate as the core of a regional identity that conflates elements of “all-Russian,” Soviet, and Cossack identities, avoiding the problematic elements of Ukrainian nationalist discourse.

Oligarchs from Donbas did their part to set the tenor of religious life by sponsoring churches. From 1992 to 1997, twenty-one sponsored churches were built in Donetsk oblast. In the following year, another thirteen churches were built, and in 1999, an additional forty-three churches were constructed. The most notable religious entrepreneur is the coal tycoon and billionaire Viktor Nusenkis. He established fifty Orthodox communities, thirty-five churches and fifteen prayer rooms directly on the premises of his company, Energo, and introduced compulsory liturgical services for his employees. Since Ukrainian independence, Nusenkis has sponsored the construction of 650 churches in Ukraine and Russia (Bessmertnyi 2011). He has tried to influence and even control the policy of the UOC-MP leadership, including an unsuccessful attempt in the summer of 2011 to oust the primate of the UOC-MP from the Kyiv Metropolitan throne (Skoropadskii 2011; Vysotskii 2011).

However, this legacy of oligarchic sponsorship in eastern Ukraine, when combined with a weak sense of affiliation to a specific denomination, means that there is little feeling of belonging to a particular parish community, and little sense that believers could or should take responsibility for maintaining a parish. Clerical attempts to make “ordinary people” financially responsible for maintaining church buildings have met with protests and resistance in Donbas.¹⁸

In contrast, in western Ukraine, there is a long-standing tradition of going house-to-house to collect funds for the maintenance of church buildings and of sponsoring specific fundraising campaigns prior to feasts to support local churches. These norms of parish behavior are clearly defined in church decrees and other documents of the UGCC. Although the attitudes and practices of local UGCC church life differ from those in Donbas, they also contrast with most other regions of Ukraine as well. As seen in Table 6.9 below, levels of individual financial support are far higher in the west, comprising Volynska, Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska, Lvivska, Rivnenska, Ternopil'ska, and Chernivetska oblasts. The rest of Ukraine exhibits comparably low levels of individual financial commitment to local religious life.

¹⁸ For instance, in 2011, miners in the town of Dimitrov in Donetsk oblast protested an appeal of the mine administration to transfer a portion of miners' daily wages to the construction of a local UOC-MP church. (<http://podrobnosti.ua/society/2011/06/16/775814.html>).

Even if one considers such issues across confessional groups, as done in Table 6.10, the most striking difference is the much lower levels whereby UGCC believers, as compared to other confessional groups, claim “never” to support the church and the higher levels with which members of the UGCC claim to support their church on a “regular basis.” However, if one considers the majority of average believers, who contribute “occasionally” or “during feasts” or “pay for sacraments, rituals or other services,” the level of support among all four churches is comparable. In short, regardless of confessional affiliation and place of residence, many religious behaviors and attitudes are similar across Ukraine.

Table 6.9. Do you support your church financially? (percentage)

	West	Center	South	East
Yes, on a regular basis	28.5	4.2	5.2	3.7
Yes, occasionally	41.7	24.5	29.4	29.2
Never	6.9	37.6	36.9	36.5
I make donations during the most important feasts and pay for sacraments, rituals, or other services as needed	22.6	33.6	28.1	30.4
No answer	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2

Source: Razumkov Center (2013)

Table 6.10. Do you support your church financially? (percentage)

	UOC-MP	UOC-KP	UGCC
Yes, on a regular basis	13.8	13.2	28.1
Yes, occasionally	38.4	35.3	42.1
Never	13.3	19.7	5.3
I make donations during the most important feasts and pay for sacraments, rituals, and other services	34.5	31.5	24.6
No answer	0.0	0.3	0.0

Source: Razumkov Center (2013)

In sum, sociological surveys conducted in 2013, just prior to the Euro-maidan protests, illustrate the extent to which the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians profess to be believers of some kind. These believers, totaling 71.9 percent of the population surveyed, are spread across the four “national” denominations and exhibit similar levels of intensity of belief and religious practice as measured by church attendance. The history of persecution among the UGCC, the majority of whose adherents live in western Ukraine, and Protestant believers, who are especially prominent in eastern Ukraine, have shaped the intensity of professed belief, giving these communities a greater proportion of ardent believers. Members of these communities add to the already high endorsement that most Ukrainians give to the positive role played by religion in the social life of the country.

Just Orthodox: The allegiance to nonallegiance

The ethnographic interviews conducted as part of the *Region, Nation and Beyond* project allow for the analysis of what particular categories mean to respondents. The most opaque and unique self-descriptor is the category of being “just Orthodox.” One-third of all believers in Ukraine, or 22 percent of all respondents interviewed within the *Region, Nation and Beyond* survey (Survey 2013), define themselves as “just Orthodox” and 13.3 percent as “believers without a confession,” meaning that they resist aligning themselves with a specific denomination. This reflects the fact that, although the choice of a particular confession and local parish might take on significance at the moment of a life cycle ritual, such as a baptism or funeral, a notable number of professed believers do not attach much importance to the jurisdiction of the churches they occasionally attend. Moreover, two-thirds of those who self-declare as “just Orthodox” attend church only during the most important feast days, and another 10 percent attend only once a year (see below). Most importantly, the “just Orthodox” category points to a larger dynamic that is operative in Ukrainian society today.

Those who claim to be “just Orthodox,” profess allegiance to a faith tradition and yet feel a negligible allegiance to a particular denomination or parish. Eastern Christianity is experienced in Ukraine by a large sector of the population, not just by those who overtly self-declare as “just Orthodox,” as an “ambient faith” (cf. Engelke 2012). Faith, as opposed to religion in the formal sense of the word, exists more easily alongside secularism, still a noticeable legacy from the Soviet period, which continues to shape religious practices and allegiances (Wanner 2014). “Ambient faith” is a mode

of being and a mode of belonging that centers on how faith is lived and experienced, as opposed to how religion is practiced. This characterizes the majority of the Ukrainian population who are, in fact, not churchgoers. Expressions of religiosity evolve into “ambient faith” when they are so pervasively and intricately interwoven into the social and political fabric that religiously induced sensual, aesthetic and emotional forms come to permeate public life and thereby shape political inclinations. “Ambient faith” springs from the historic role of Orthodoxy, which, as described above, has been a fundamental pillar in the creation of the state and nation (regardless of how both concepts have been understood over time), and therefore continues to inform sociality, belonging and the rhythms of social and political life.

Because Orthodoxy proposes a social and political mode of belonging, there has never been the sharp differentiation of political and religious spheres or public and private spheres that characterizes the post-Enlightenment normative version of modern governance in western Europe. Religion has come to penetrate public and private domains alike, making the implementation of secularism as a political principle, even during the Soviet period, incomplete at best (Wanner 2012, 7–23), which is why so many nonbelievers still support the Eastern Christian faith tradition. “Ambient faith” in the form of feeling “just Orthodox” exists alongside secularism and even nonbelief because it does not appeal to transcendent truths, nor does it require institutional affirmation, although it benefits from it. Both Greek Catholicism and Orthodoxy are understood to be inherited, eternal, and transcendent. Although the Orthodox Church monitored apostasy during the imperial period (Werth 2000), its efforts today overwhelmingly go toward strengthening its position in Ukrainian society and gaining active believers. Any Ukrainian can be considered Orthodox by virtue of being Ukrainian, reflecting a historic conceptualization of the church and nation as an organic and unified entity informing identity.¹⁹

As such, “ambient faith” activates new concepts beyond “believer,” “atheist,” and “affiliation,” which are necessary to understand the role of religion in Ukrainian society. For most who do not attend religious services (and this means the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian population), “ambient faith” characterizes their attitudes toward religion. These attitudes result from blending belief, doubt, and nonbelief with the desire to

¹⁹ One of the main arguments asserted by the Orthodox churches against allowing missionaries to proselytize in Ukraine is that all Ukrainians already have a faith whether or not they choose to act on it or not.

belong and the refusal to be coerced by institutions that yields a mode of being and belonging that centers on the experience of religiosity. This syncretically secular form of religious belief and practice meshes seemingly opposed desires in novel reconceptualizations of religiosity. Several phrases that were articulated in the course of ethnographic interviews describe attitudes that reflect the concept of “ambient faith”: Orthodox atheists, atheists with traditions, or nonbelieving sympathizers. This spectrum of attitudes toward religion reflects a syncretic secular blending of nonbelief and faith, abstention and practice, a guarded distance and an active attachment, all of which contribute to making Orthodoxy an “ambient faith.”

The stance of being “just Orthodox” allows an unchurched and even unbelieving person to participate in annual ritual celebrations and commemorations along with life cycle rituals in such a way that the person is connected to prior generations, to the members of the society where he or she lives, and to a larger, enduring collectivity of like-minded people that could be called a nation. Being “just Orthodox” also allows them to do so to a remarkable extent on their own terms. A wariness of institutions and an entrenched suspicion of individuals in positions of authority yield a guarded attitude toward institutions of any kind, including religious institutions. This sentiment becomes divorced from religiosity when a practitioner embraces “ambient faith” in the form of being “just Orthodox,” as opposed to professing a particular allegiance to a certain denomination of Orthodoxy. Although “ambient faith” permeates public life and colors a variety of political rituals, it is not a public or a civil religion. Yet, it can create political inclinations that can be mobilized at any time, as seen during the Euromaidan protests, and therein lies its power.

The notion of “ambient faith” is relevant when Vlad Naumescu (2007, 4) asserts that there is an “Orthodox imaginary” among the western Ukrainians he studied.²⁰ This imaginary, he argues, allows believers to minimize and transcend confessional boundaries among “national” churches by imagining them into one. This perception of being Orthodox in a general sense is fed by extensive jurisdictional switching, frequent intermarriage, and the growing visibility of nontraditional faith groups.

²⁰ The phrase “Orthodox imaginary” is inspired by the “social imaginary” of Charles Taylor (2004). “Orthodox imaginary” does not imply that Orthodoxy is imagined in the same spirit as when Benedict Anderson suggests that a nation is an imagined community. Yet, Naumescu argues that an “Orthodox imaginary” allows for membership in an imagined community based on an imagined shared religious and cultural heritage that conceptualizes all the national churches as one.

Naumescu (2007) suggests that the “Orthodox imaginary” is an adaptive strategy that Ukrainians have devised in order to grapple with Orthodoxy as they would like it to be (unitary, ambient, and depoliticized), rather than how it is (divided, competing for believers, money and state privileges, and increasingly used as a pawn in geopolitical struggles).

Although individuals do indeed shift their allegiances among different Orthodox jurisdictions with great ease, the same is not true for clergy or property. Institutions are not as flexible as individuals. After the UAOC and UGCC were outlawed, property and some clergy went to the Russian Orthodox Church. After 1991, however, many clergy reaffiliated back and, after very contentious disputes, property was also returned. Especially, after the Euromaidan protests, the status of certain denominations became aligned in the minds of individuals according to which church more closely reflected their own personal political convictions. The Greek Catholic Church, for example, was particularly active, visible and vocal in calls for reform on the Euromaidan, and later in its efforts to quell the conflict in the east, whereas the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate was put in a difficult position due to its communion with the Russian Orthodox Church and its inclusion of prayers for the Russian leadership during services. In essence, there is a difference between an “ambient faith,” which exists independently of institutional constraints, and an imagined unity, which is an attempt to rise above institutional constraints and the political orientations they support. A projection of an imagined unity that allows believers to separate their own institutional commitments from the political positions of those institutions nonetheless has limits.

The “Orthodox imaginary” that Naumescu posits is, after all, a Ukrainian version of the “Russian World,” which could also be considered an “Orthodox imaginary.”²¹ Russia’s “special calling” to maintain the “Russian World,” or Eastern Christian civilization, is also understood in imagined singular terms. It used to identify and justify the protection of “compatriots,” even if they live abroad. By melding the political and the religious, the concept of a “Russian World” is valuable to statecraft and governance

²¹ Writing about nineteenth-century Russia, Chris Chulos (2003, 12) asserts that “liturgical uniformity enabled the faithful to *imagine* their coreligionists were following the same traditions, something that was confirmed during visits to neighboring parishes, shrines, or wherever hierophantic essence was discovered.” Although slow to develop a sense of nation, Russia had a strong cultural identity that was inseparable from Orthodoxy and local experience, a dynamic that was even more prominent in Ukraine.

precisely because of the affective experiences faith offers that fundamentally shape political judgment and behavior by conjuring up feelings of belonging and otherworldly powers.

In 2004, during Viktor Yanukovych's first tenure as prime minister, the Sviatohorskyi Monastery in Donbas was elevated to the rank of lavra. This is a very significant distinction, and the first such elevation since 1833, when the Pochaiv Monastery was made a lavra. The relatively unknown Sviatohorskyi Monastery became the fifth lavra in the history of the ROC, which allowed the Donbas elite to position the Sviatohorska Lavra as a symbol of regional importance and autonomy. Yanukovych stressed that in obtaining its "own lavra," the Donbas had demonstrated not only its industrial power but also its spiritual and cultural importance. His spiritual adviser, Schema-Archimandrite Zosima Sokur (1944–2002), posthumously became a regional religious leader when his "Spiritual Testament" was made public. It was extremely useful politically to antagonists of Ukrainian autocephaly because he wrote: "In the case of Ukraine departing from Moscow, regardless of whether autocephaly is lawful or not, the tie with the Kyivan Metropolitan automatically breaks" (quoted in Minakov 2007). Such statements and the shifts in the status of key religious sites were meant to state emphatically the position of the Donbas elite in the eternal tug of war between Moscow and Kyiv for the loyalty of and jurisdiction over believers. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, the "All-Russian [*obshcherusskii*]" and the Ukrainian nation-building projects have been competitive processes (Miller 2003, 249). The concept of a "Russian World," as an "imagined community" based on the Russian language, culture and Orthodoxy, categorically denied the very possibility of an independent, autonomous Ukrainian nation and church. Addressing the Fifteenth World Russian People's Sobor held in Moscow on May 25, 2011, the Moscow Patriarch Kirill stressed that the nations inhabiting the area of historical Rus should

realize that they are part of the same civilization and see the Russian World as a common supranational project.... We need to continue to be aware of the uniqueness of the Russian way of living and reproduce it not only in the countries where Russian culture predominates but also to attest to it far beyond our boundaries.... No country in the Russian World can act on the international stage totally alone. The principle of unity should be respected here as well.... Only a united Russian World can become a strong subject of international law. (Patriarch Kirill 2011)

The relevance of the “Russian World” doctrine skyrocketed in the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests and Russian claims to Ukrainian territory.²² Given the use of the concept of the “Russian World” in explaining, and even justifying, Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, it is remarkable that in 2013 so few Ukrainians were aware of the term (see Table 6.11).

Table 6.11. Have you heard about the “Russian World” doctrine?

	UOC-MP	UOC-KP	UGCC
Yes	21.9	28.5	35.1
No	77.6	71.2	64.9
No answer	0.5	0.3	0.0

Source: Razumkov Center (2013)

Table 6.12. In your opinion, what does the “Russian World” doctrine mean?

	West	Center	South	East
Spiritual unity of fraternal Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples	12.6	45.7	70.4	59.5
Restoration of the Russian Empire	78.3	39.4	14.8	28.6
Hard to say	9.1	14.9	14.8	11.9

Source: Razumkov Center (2013) (the table includes only those who claim to have heard of this doctrine)

During his 2009 trip to Ukraine, the Moscow Patriarch Kirill persistently stated his understanding of the “Russian World.” He both implicitly and explicitly suggested to Ukrainians that “you are the historical center of the Eastern European Orthodox civilization, the ‘Russian World.’ You made a great contribution to the formation of an all-Russian common identity. The

²² Russian political consultants Petr Shchedrovitskii and Yefim Ostrovskii claimed that they had coined the very term “Russian World” around 1998 (Pavlov 2004). They used the “Russian World” as a core idea for their concept of the Russian Federation politics toward post-Soviet countries. In 2001, President Putin (2001) stated that “[T]he notion of ‘Russian World’ from time immemorial transcended the Russian geographical borders and, even more, transcended the boundaries of the Russian ethnos.”

Great Empire (Russian and Soviet) is your empire.” He encouraged the faithful to elevate their historic memory to a new, twenty-first-century level and transform themselves from “a guided people to a leading one.” He continued, “Together we will stand against the West, which for you is foreign, sinful, and poisoned by consumerism. Human rights and human dignity, democracy and supremacy of law are empty words, directed to drive us from the enlightened path of realizing our mission” (Patriarch Kirill 2009).

If the negative attitude of the UOC-KP and UGCC toward the “Russian World” doctrine was entirely predictable, the stance of the UOC-MP was not. The last several years have seen the emergence of new ideas and emphases in the public rhetoric of the long-serving primate of the UOC-MP, Metropolitan Volodymyr (1935–2014). At a council in Moscow, Metropolitan Volodymyr cited Samuel Huntington and argued that, “Ukraine is a divided country with two different cultures.” He said,

[T]oday we have to recognize the two poles of Ukrainian culture, its two different civilizational orbits—the east and the west. The eastern Ukrainian world, that of the left bank of the Dnipro, was formed as a result of the creative interaction of Ukrainian and Russian cultures, while the western Ukrainian cultural community, located mostly on the right bank of the Dnipro, emerged from the interaction of Polish, Austrian, Romanian, Lithuanian, and other European cultures. That is why right-bank Ukraine gravitates towards western values.... Ukraine’s mission is not limited to being a buffer between east and west. Ukraine is a self-sufficient social and cultural space that has to rediscover its inherent integrity through a synthesis of its eastern and western heritages. (Metropolitan Volodymyr 2008)

Furthermore, the metropolitan also stressed that his church did not claim the right to determine the civilizational choice of Ukraine, and admitted that the schism was caused not only by politicians and insidious “schismatic leaders” but also by the social and cultural divisions of the country itself. The metropolitan supported the UOC-MP intellectuals who had developed a historically informed, philosophical vision of a special destiny for Ukrainian Orthodoxy, believing that it is rooted in a different theological, cultural and even civilizational tradition than that of Russian Orthodoxy (Metropolitan Volodymyr 2009).

The hierarchy of the UOC-MP, and even Metropolitan Volodymyr himself, often underlined the unique role that the Kyiv See has played in the Church of Rus and the special status of the UOC-MP in the modern

ROC, preferring to stress the unity of UOC-MP with the ROC rather than its subordination to the latter. The Metropolitan contended that it is the UOC that should be deemed the heir of St. Volodymyr's Church of Rus, and that the granting of autonomy to the Moscow Patriarchy was just an act that "reestablished the ancient tradition regarding the canonical status of the Kyiv Church" (Metropolitan Volodymyr 2009).

The *Region, Nation and Beyond* survey (Survey 2013) and other opinion polls suggest that the majority of respondents visualize the future of Orthodoxy in Ukraine as being a consolidation of the Orthodox believers around the UOC-KP. Moreover, according to the survey, the UOC-KP has the most favorable standing among the greatest number of Ukrainians as compared to the other Eastern Christian churches in Ukraine. Deprived of the state protectionism, which was strong under Leonid Kravchuk (1991–1994) and moderate under Viktor Yushchenko, the clergy and believers of the UOC-KP have resisted pressure to join the Moscow Patriarchate. A *blitzkrieg* launched in 2010 under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych (2010–2014) to break the "schismatics" and revise the entire system of church–state relations ended in failure. One key reason was that, while the clergy and bishops of the UOC-MP saw their church as the "leading" one in Ukraine, they were unwilling to take responsibility along with the government for discriminating against the other confessions in order to secure a privileged status. In mid-2011, the presidential administration of Viktor Yanukovych recognized—not openly and without apologies to the offended but nevertheless recognized—the failure of its previous religious policy and, in particular, the error of its judgment concerning the UOC-KP. Every position in the president's annual address to the parliament in April 2011 regarding church–state relations was the antithesis of the policies he implemented in the previous fourteen months to elevate the status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (see Yanukovych 2011, 42–43).

Like its Orthodox counterparts, the UGCC also has all-Ukrainian aspirations. The primate of the UGCC at the time, Cardinal Liubomyr Huzar, uncompromisingly upheld an all-Ukrainian vision of his church during the period of 2000–2011. On the eve of the symbolic transfer of the UGCC's Archiepiscopal See from Lviv to the Ukrainian capital in August 2005, Liubomyr Huzar underscored: "We are not a provincial church somewhere on the edge of Ukraine where they wanted to push us out. We are one of the four branches of the Kyivan Church—an all-Ukrainian Church, a church of the entire Ukrainian nation" (Vysoky zamok 2011). The UGCC offers other "branches" a model of the future. This model implies a unified national Ukrainian Church, bringing into communion the

churches of the Kyivan tradition, all of which consider themselves to be the heirs of Holy Volodymyr's baptism. A unified Kyivan Church would be in communion with Rome and Constantinople (Huzar 2004), making it an ambitious pioneer in terms of interconfessional cooperation.

Cardinal Huzar's successor, Sviatoslav Shevchuk, reconfirmed the UGCC's national aspirations. On the occasion of the twenty-first commemoration of Ukrainian independence in 2012, Major Archbishop Sviatoslav said, "We build our national-cultural space when we counteract any attempts to assimilate us; when we help our countrymen in their every need; when we cultivate our own national consciousness, culture and language; and when we honor our cultural and religious traditions. This is how we give real, contemporary substance to the concept of Ukrainian statehood and Ukrainian patriotism" (Ukrainska 2012). This appeal to develop a "Ukrainian World" is part of a response to the "Russian World" doctrine, revealing two competing visions as to how an "ambient faith" can be pinned down and claimed. Each vision connects believers to a particular space, current nation-state borders and coethnics, as opposed to an imperial vision of space that positions the Russian Orthodox Church as the "traditional" and "historic" religious institution representing eastern Slavic civilization and allied with the Russian state.

The provocative notions of being "just Orthodox" and the choice of belonging to a "Ukrainian World" or a "Russian World" raise many additional questions, first among them concerning the limits of unity.²³ Individual believers still choose a single denomination when it comes to rituals, especially life cycle rituals. They consciously select a priest with a certain affiliation when it comes to a burial service, for example. So the inverse question also needs to be investigated: in view of this "just Orthodox" orientation, how are differences conceived and how are institutional allegiances, as weak as they are, established to a particular denomination over the others? Is an "ambient Orthodox faith" shared by the leadership of these churches to such a degree that unification of the various churches would perhaps entail little strain, so as to accommodate new institutional configurations? What, if anything, impedes this kind of ecumenical cooperation?²⁴

²³ Indeed, Naumescu (2006, 3) has written that this is, "a form of social imaginary in which people grasp themselves and 'religious others' as existing and acting simultaneously in a space of common display." See also Wanner 2006 for a critique of this concept.

²⁴ The tomos granting Ukrainian autocephaly was issued as this book was going to press, making these questions that much more urgent.

Conclusions

All identities are produced in a particular place, which sometimes has prompted a problematic mapping of cultures onto places in order to account for cultural differences. Instead of assuming the preexisting essence of a particular community located in a specific region, our starting points for analysis have been the way the community was formed and the dynamics driving the clusters of interaction among the groups of people that define a particular community. In thinking about the relationship of space to place, Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (1992) suggest that the identity of a place emerges through the intersection of a particular place's integration into a system of hierarchically organized spaces, and it is precisely this link that plays a pivotal role in culturally constructing a locality and the community of people who inhabit it. They write, "For if one begins with the premise that spaces have always been hierarchically interconnected, instead of naturally disconnected, then cultural and social change becomes not a matter of cultural contact and articulation but one of rethinking difference through connection" (Gupta and Ferguson 1992, 8). In other words, how a particular space is situated vis-à-vis other spaces and the connections that emerge from that emplacement are fundamental factors defining a place. This has been particularly true in the crafting of religious allegiances in Ukraine, where the periphery has influenced the center through the prominence of Ukrainian clergy, monasteries, in the sheer number of active believers, and where the experiences of "ambient faith," as opposed to fixed religious identities, characterize religiosity.

Every place is a bearer of history. The layers of time and history are revealed in the stories told about a particular site that turn it into a meaningful place. Jonathan Z. Smith (1987) has written about how a particular place is not just a storehouse of memory. It also provides a concrete, tangible place where one can encounter the past, and viscerally experience the past. The role of religion in making space meaningful has been overlooked by scholars because Christian doctrine asserts that God is omnipresent, which logically would neutralize the importance of place. And yet, what makes a place sacred is precisely the fact that it allows for unmediated or intensified contact with the divine. One does not need a priest, icons or incense, for example, at a holy spring or on a pilgrimage to a monastery to feel in contact with supernatural forces, however conceived. The very fact that some space is recognized as profane, as worldly and devoid of divine presence, suggests that in fact firm delineations are

made in the kinds of spaces that exist based on the nature of the connections they offer.

The four largest denominations in Ukraine, the UOC-MP, UOC-KP, UAOC, and the UGCC, have all-Ukrainian aspirations to support national unity and territorial integrity. Yet, each offers connections to different places and the histories that unfolded there. Despite the fact that more than half of the UOC-KP parishes are located in Galicia, Volhynia and Podillia, and 80 percent of all UGCC parishes are located in Galicia and another 11 percent in Zakarpattia, where the Greek Catholics are not subordinated to the Major Archbishop of Kyiv and Halych, this localization is not as important in creating regionalism as it has been portrayed.

There are differences in the levels of allegiance to local churches, the norms of behavior associated with religious traditions, and the intensity of practices specifically related to religious doctrine. These differences reflect how religion contributes to creating a certain cultural geography characterized by regionally variable social practices. Yet such variation in cultural practices does not rise to the level of regional differences that would constitute regionalism in the sense of a political principle predicated on securing increased political autonomy. Regional differences in the form of a variable cultural geography do not necessarily coalesce into a sense of identity. Similarly, regional differences do not become an object of an individual or an institution's allegiance, although they may either enhance or thwart the forming of attachments to a particular place. The cultural differences in the religious landscape of Ukraine reflect variations in historical experience, such as when a particular territory was incorporated into an empire, be it the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman or Soviet. These diverse historical experiences inform a certain cultural geography, which, of course, can be manipulated politically. Until the political crisis that ensued as a result of the Euromaidan protests, these religiously based differences represented a *potential* basis for regional separatism, rather than an actually existing sense of religiously informed regionalism.

Both religion and confessionalism have historically been rather discounted as issues of little importance to the Ukrainian national project. However, by the end of the twentieth century, Ukrainian elites begin to demonstrate quite a different approach toward religion and religious institutions. Ukrainian presidents no longer state, as Hrushevskyi did, that "We'll *do without clerics*" (Ulianovskiy 1997, 43–44; italics in the original). Rather, they demonstrate and profess their piety in front of TV cameras. Public figures, politicians, pop stars and sportsmen emphasize that they belong to a church. There are no prominent public figures in Ukrainian

politics or culture who openly express religious skepticism, let alone atheism. All of the presidents and prime ministers of independent Ukraine and many top officials readily integrate religious sentiments and symbols into their rhetoric and publicly sponsor the building of churches, with hopes of gaining political capital by supporting religious institutions.

Religion and religious organizations played a very important role during the Euromaidan protests in the winter of 2013–2014, which led to the downfall of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and his regime. Churches and clergy were active during every stage of the standoff between the regime and its citizens. They led the crowd in prayer, mobilized awareness of injustice, played a vital role in shaping popular opinion, provided organizational and material support to the protesters, and participated in negotiations among opposing parties. St. Michael's Monastery provided shelter to the protestors and became a hospital for the wounded; priests were with protesters from the first day of protests; a prayer tent and chapel were erected on the Euromaidan; the Ukrainian Catholic University community called for civil disobedience to the regime; and the UOC-KP Synod condemned the authorities for their use of violence against their own unarmed citizens.

Although the UGCC and the UOC-KP offered unqualified support for the protests, support came only from the rank-and-file clergy of the UOC-MP, who were motivated to protest by the regime's casual disregard for the law, the extent of corruption and by their desire to have a "rapprochement with Christian Europe" (Kievskaya Rus 2013). This was even expressed by the presiding chairman of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations, whose chairmanship is held on a rotating basis, in spite of the fact that the signature of Metropolitan Volodymyr of the UOC-MP appears on many of the council's most important documents (Razumkov Center and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2014).

Such actions position Orthodoxy as an ideology, not a religion, which is what gives the "Russian World" its political relevance. The initial constitution of the self-proclaimed "Donetsk People's Republic" (DPR) stated that DNR was an integral part of the Russian World as well as of Russian civilization. The constitution noted the fundamental role of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Russian World. Asserting that Orthodoxy of the Moscow Patriarchate in the creation of the DPR is irreconcilable with all other religions, the rebels have conducted veritable pogroms against Protestant churches in the region, taking these non-Orthodox believers captive even during their own services in church, and beating and murdering pastors. Such methods are understood as a

crude confrontation with the western regions of the country. Orthodoxy, as the antithesis to the West, has become an official political doctrine of Russia, which has been vigorously embraced in the separatist regions of Ukraine. The Russian minister of foreign affairs Sergei Lavrov claimed that, “Novorossia is returning to its traditional values, to its roots in Orthodoxy, and, as a result, is becoming even less understood [by the West]” (Interfax 2014). The rest of Ukraine, however, continues to endorse pluralism, tolerance for difference, and unity. In many respects, the Euro-maidan protests have demonstrated an embrace of religiosity as a unifying, integrative force, and a rejection of denominational affiliation as a divisive tool. This suggests a potential for new levels of solidarity around common moral values in the midst of such a diverse cultural geography, which will continue to fortify the involvement of religious institutions, clergy, average believers, and even the doubters and skeptics, in both the processes of nation building as well as the flourishing of local cultural differences.

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
7. Recent Regional Economic Development in Ukraine: Does History Help to Explain the Differences?

YAROSLAV PRYTULA and NATALIA POHORILA

The interaction between culture, society and economy has recently become the centerpiece of an interdisciplinary economic research agenda. Contrary to standard economic theory, which describes economic agents as fully informed and rational, current developments in sociology, psychology and behavioral economics show that peoples' decisions are often influenced by values, norms, interests and gender roles in a given culture. It is argued that many social and cultural attributes—such as trust, religious beliefs, life satisfaction, happiness, corruption and attitudes to risk—may have profound effects on economic outcomes. This chapter considers the above-mentioned attributes in order to study the peculiarities of regional socio-economic development in Ukraine.

Contrary to most postcommunist countries, Ukraine did not show progress in its economic development after becoming independent in 1991. In particular, in 2012, in the western part of the former Soviet Union, only Ukraine and Moldova still had not reached the preindependence level of GDP per capita (see Figure 7.1), although the economic potential of Ukraine was very close or even higher compared to its neighbors. The failure to implement necessary economic reforms during the initial stage of independence led to hyperinflation and a deep economic recession in the mid-1990s. Only in 2000, after implementing several important reforms, namely financial stabilization, mass privatization and partial price liberalization, did Ukraine's economy start to grow. However, the lack of necessary reforms resulted in widespread rent-seeking activity in the economy, creating an oligarchical economy (Åslund 2009).

Figure 7.1. GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international \$),
in seven post-Soviet countries, 1991–2012



Source: World Development Indicators (worldbank.org)

Privatization was one of the most important elements of the economic reforms in Ukraine aimed at building a market economy and creating a new business class. However, as pointed out by many researchers (see, for example, Hoff and Stiglitz 2004; Sonin 2002), social inertia and institutionalized rent-seeking reduced the effectiveness of reforms, enabling the *nomenklatura*, red directors and a few parvenus to become owners of the most lucrative enterprises. That resulted in a further rise of inequality in the country, both within social groups and regions.

The political choice for gradual reformation rather than shock therapy resulted in a chaotic pluralism (Balcerowicz 1995) that has long-lasting implications for the formation of the Ukrainian economy. For eastern Ukraine, the richness in resources, combined with subsidies and a more favorable economic policy, made it possible to keep most of its big albeit inefficient enterprises working. At the same time, this policy badly hurt other parts of the country, especially western and central Ukraine, which resulted in a deeper decline of regional economies. Interestingly, Demchuk and Zelenyuk (2009) point out that the industrial eastern region tends to be richer, better endowed with resources and Soviet industrial heritage, but at the same time less efficient in comparison with agrarian regions


of western and central Ukraine. Unexpectedly, they find a negative relation between regional foreign direct investment (FDI) and efficiency. This result may indicate that FDIs are indeed masked domestic investments that fled Ukraine for tax optimization.

Recent research on regional economic performance in Ukraine shows a growing regional economic inequality, explained by differences in resource endowment and the initial configuration of the assets inherited from the Soviet period (Grigori'ev et al. 2009) and by failures of the government to implement appropriate economic policies (Mykhnenko and Swain 2010; Prytula and Kuzenko 2013). Excessive centralization of the economy in the capital city Kyiv, combined with poorly implemented or incomplete transformational reforms and increasing corruption, resulted in uneven regional economic development. Figure 7.2 presents the dynamics of Gross Regional Product for six regions of Ukraine.¹ The relative success of the northern region of Ukraine is primarily due to the presence of Kyiv in the region. Ukraine's capital itself grew 267 percent between 1996 and 2011, and in 2012 accounted for more than 17 percent of Ukraine's GDP and about 50 percent of Ukraine's FDI. The growth of the eastern and Donbas regions, which lean on heavy industry, was close to Ukraine's average, while presumably agrarian western, southern and central parts of Ukraine had below-average growth rates.

While acknowledging the influence of geography, policy and economic conditions on the regional development of Ukraine, the importance of historical and cultural legacies for long-term growth has to be accounted for as well. On the one hand, historical legacies could seem too remote to be connected to current socio-economic developments, given that changes in the economic system and migrations of the twenty-first century have undoubtedly contributed to changes in local culture and habitus. On the other hand, a number of scholars show the power of past ages for explaining today's economic and political life (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; McNeill 1964; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993). Putnam,

¹ The composition of the six regions is as follows. The western region is made up of Lvivska, Ternopil'ska, Ivano-Frankiv'ska, Volyn'ska, Rivnens'ka, Chernivets'ka and Zakarpats'ka oblasts; the northern region, of Zhytomyr'ska, Chernihiv'ska, Kyiv'ska and Sum'ska oblasts; the central region, of Khmelnyts'ka, Vinnyts'ka, Cherkas'ka, Poltav'ska and Kirovohrad'ska oblasts; the southern region, of Odes'ka, Kherson'ska and Mykolaiv'ska oblasts, and Crimea; the eastern region, of Dnipropetrov'ska, Zaporiz'ka and Kharkiv'ska oblasts; and Donbas, of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Figure 7.2. Gross Regional Product of six regions of Ukraine, 1996–2011 (1996 = 100)



Source: Derzhavna sluzhba statystyky Ukrainy (ukrstat.gov.ua)

Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) show that the historical past, geographic location and access to resources together shape the “quality of civility,” which is believed to be overwhelmingly persistent despite changes in the relative ratings of economic indicators of the region. They believe that aspects of “civility”—social capital, political culture and trust—are the civilizing phenomena, and as such spread their influence over centuries, enabling or handicapping the modernization of social structure and relationships, and hence of the economy. An influential recent publication by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) clearly shows how historical development and culture shape political and economic institutions, which themselves feedback to, interact with and change certain beliefs and attitudes, leading to the prosperity—or causing the failure—of nations and/or societies. Tabellini (2010) also shows that culture, measured by individual values and beliefs, has a causal effect on economic development.

Given the differentiated historical legacies of different regions of Ukraine (see the chapters on history, language and religion in the present volume), one may assume that they influence not only the language(s) people use, their religious allegiance and national identity, but also peoples’ values, perceptions and habits. Indeed, as argued above, if one evaluates from a long-term regional perspective, such factors as institutional

capacity and social and human capital play an important, sometimes exclusive role in the country's national and regional development. Accordingly, region-specific economic realities and business practices are developed and shaped by a long history and by traditions that are normally responsible for a certain inertia in perception and behavior and for particular ways of dealing with problems. This chapter assumes that transparent business and politics, an entrepreneurial spirit, a tolerance of income differentials, and social and institutional trust are prerequisites for high social and economic performance. Therefore the chapter focuses on phenomena of risk, envy and corruption and on attitudes to risk and trust. First, it hypothesizes how these attributes developed in Ukrainian territories from historical circumstances, and then proceeds to discuss the current state of the attributes in Ukrainian society. The chapter shows that historical legacies may indeed be conducive to explaining interregional differences with regard to most of the attributes studied.

According to the "Great Steppe frontier" theory (McNeill 1964), the lands that were civilized or populated later in time can be characterized by a different value system and by different behavior as compared to those civilized earlier. Frederick Jackson Turner's ([1892] 1935) observation of the movement of frontiers throughout North America during its colonization assumes the existence of different anthropological types in the "civilized" lands and in "new colonies," the latter being less controllable, more entrepreneurial, more insatiable in their wishes, and having less respect for the local power. Applying this theory to Ukraine, its western and northern parts, which were populated between the tenth and twelfth centuries, can be described as more "civilized," while the center, the south and the east, settled only in the eighteenth century, can be thus considered less "civilized." Figure 7.3 below depicts four frontiers representing the moving Great Steppe frontier, which moved from the eleventh to the seventeenth century. The four northern and eight western oblasts remained in the "civilized" part for the longest period of time. According to this hypothesis, the Cossack lands in the center and the southeast were not a homogeneous whole but were divided by the Great Frontier into a "civilized" part where the Registered Cossacks (similar to the Polish Gentry Register) founded the Hetmanate, an entity with state functions and organization (a dashed area on Figure 7.3), and the Cossack Sich, a self-ruled and more "barbarian" part independent of the Hetmanate's authority, and often opposed to it (a dotted area on Figure 7.3) (Lypynskyi 1926).

Figure 7.3. Colonization of the Ukrainian center and south from the eleventh to the eighteenth centuries



Source: Produced by Bohdan Solchanyk

As in the case of northern America, the frontier moved through the Ukrainian lands in terms of both colonization and the institutionalization of power (see Figure 7.3). In view of this, this chapter assumes that the whole territory of modern Ukraine is a “frontier zone,” a borderline between two civilizations. The chapter aims to establish if the territories of western and northern Ukraine, settled for centuries, differ from the steppe zone that was colonized much later. The division is certainly conditional, which is moreover true for the “buffer belt” between the lines of the eleventh and twelfth centuries on Figure 7.3. The hypothesis is that the lands civilized later would be more characterized by the “frontier”-type values defined by Turner—being more materialistic, less controllable, more entrepreneurial, less trustful and with less respect for the local power—than other parts of Ukraine. However, as the concept of a frontier does not have and probably cannot have a clear definition, different types of values can prevail along the frontier line.

Regional economic differences could have been shaped not only by the divide between the areas civilized earlier and later, but also by the lega-

cies of other important historical periods such as the Cossack rule from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The latter was the period of an unprecedented economic autonomy for urban dwellers and for warriors—the Cossacks, and even (albeit to a lesser extent) the peasants. These conditions could have influenced a distinct attitude toward private property, since before the institution of serfdom (*kripatstvo*), the population of the present Ukrainian territories had experienced private property and economic freedoms.

The more recent period of Ukrainian history, from the early nineteenth century until the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, brings into consideration the processes of modernization and economic liberalization, in particular the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and Stolypin's reforms of 1906. Western and eastern parts of Ukraine experienced different forms of modernization. In western Ukraine, modernization occurred through the spread of education, the establishment of political institutions, economic emancipation and the development of civic society institutions in the Habsburg Empire, and later in the Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Romanian states. At the same time, weak industrial modernization in the region caused very slow changes in its social structure; the rural population still comprised about half of the region's population in the early 1980s (Krawchenko 1985; Subtelny 1988). Modernization in the east of Ukraine developed as an outcome of the expansion of the Russian Empire to the south, which brought industrial growth and mining development, and rapid industrialization in the Soviet Union in the 1930s.

The economic liberalization of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries implied changes in the economic system, with a transition from a feudal economy to one based on private capital. However, Stolypin's reforms proved to be only partially successful because of structural and policy problems and because of the traditional mentality of society. At the same time, the history of capitalism in the Russian Empire was short-lived and followed a "non-Western" model of development. As the aristocracy skipped the process of capitalization, financial capital was negligible and the government ruled the transformation, while the bureaucrats effectively opposed the reforms. As Russia was traditionally a society with a strong respect for central authority and with a culture of dependence, the "bureaucratic model" was consolidated as a model of capitalism (Afanasiev 1997). This model typically rests on a client–patron relationship, and is fraught with corruption.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the consequent decades of communist rule brought about fundamental changes in the quality of civil

life in Ukraine. Mass purges, the collectivization of private property and political censorship corrupted interpersonal trust, confidence in authority and public institutions, and turned political participation into a fiction. Decades of the planned economy also harmed economic participation: the erosion of basic rules of meritocracy and income-leveling contributed to the decay of labor motivation. In the planned economy, individual labor motivation and entrepreneurial spirit could not develop, as all the risks connected with the inefficiency of an enterprise were covered by the state.

In the post-1991 period, two contradictory trends could be observed: the establishment of a market economy and the conservation of the principles of a protective Soviet economy based on extractive heavy industry and inefficient collective farming. This had different consequences for the eastern and western parts of Ukraine. The imbalance of regional economic development can be defined as one of the most important post-Soviet tendencies, which earned Ukraine a description as “the most regionally unbalanced country in Europe” (Mykhnenko and Swain 2010, 143).

The following sections in the chapter study attitudes and habits of the population of Ukraine. The focus is on attitudes to risk and envy, life satisfaction and perceived corruption, and trust. Despite being “hidden,” that is, not available for direct observation and/or measuring, these aspects are important since, beyond purely economic incentives, they affect labor ethics and values of individual initiative and motivation, which are the essentials of the market economy. The attitudes in question have developed toward phenomena that are new for most Ukrainians: private property, business, competition, financial risks and political capitalism. For several decades, the population of Soviet Ukraine had lived in a planned economy with low income differentiation and nonexistent initiative and competition. Growing capital, a fusion between financial and political capital, and corruption have resulted in a mounting feeling of injustice and a belief in the unfairness of any sort of wealth among the population. The delayed transformation and the widely shared negative perception of economic reforms have handicapped the development of an entrepreneurial spirit, an inclination to invest and show initiative, a tolerance for others’ success, and trust—the cornerstones of legitimization for a new social system.

Individual Attitudes to Risk in Ukraine

YAROSLAV PRYTULA

Differences in attitudes to risk between individuals might be suggestive, sometimes even exclusively so, in explaining differences in their behavior. Guiso and Paiella (2005) show that, indeed, individual attitudes toward risk may have significant implications for individuals' earnings, wealth allocation, level of education, choice of occupation and choice of place of residence. Several studies have found a positive correlation between the choice to become an entrepreneur and the person's attitudes to risk (Caliendo, Fossen and Kritikos 2006; Nguyen-Chyung 2013). Furthermore, Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) found a positive correlation between attitudes to risk and the person's wealth status, while Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) show that aversion to risk may lead to poverty.

On the aggregate level, literature on risk preferences shows that people's view of risk may influence both the economic and the political situation of a country. Vieider, Chmura and Martinsson (2012) indicate that attitudes to risk may act as a transmission mechanism for a country's economic growth by encouraging entrepreneurship. Regarding political preferences, Nadeau, Martin and Blais (1999) show that attitudes toward risk-taking had a significant effect on individual voting choices and contributed to the outcome of the Quebec referendum on independence. Furthermore, the research of Kam and Simas (2012), using data from the 2008–2009 American National Election Studies (ANES) Panel Study, indicates that risk-averse voters will support candidates who offer certainty and stability, while risk-accepting voters will be more willing to support candidates characterized by uncertainty and change; in other words, individual attitudes to risk significantly influence support for challenger candidates. Possible economic and political consequences for a highly risk-averse population are noted in Dohmen et al. (2011). The authors mention that a relatively risk-averse population implies a more conservative pool of voters, increasing resistance to reform and delaying risky but necessary policy adjustments. For a developing country, such situation is equivalent to continuous stagnation.

The difference in attitudes to risk may also help to explain differences in regional development. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the research of Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) indicates that social networks among the inhabitants of northern Italy led, among other factors, to the civic and economic success of the region. The interrelation between

a strong social network and the attitudes to risk of network members is suggested in the review by Boix and Posner (1996) of the work of Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti. Boix and Posner note that, the stronger the norms of trust, reciprocity and cooperation within a network are, the less risk averse those in the network will be in cooperation with non-network members. The greater risk involved in cooperation with non-network members is compensated by higher social capital within the network.²

In recent years, researchers have shown a growing interest in the issue of cross-national differences in risk preference. In a pioneering work, Hsee and Weber (1998 and 1999) found cross-cultural differences between China and the USA in the perception of risk as measured by buying prices for risky financial options, but no cultural differences in attitudes toward perceived risk as measured by the proportion of the population that is averse to perceived risk, neutral with regard to perceived risk, and actively seeking perceived risk. Hsee and Weber attributed the differences found in risk perception to cultural differences between China and the USA. They hypothesized that the relative aversion to risk of the USA can be explained by their citizens' relatively more individualistic orientation. The proposed "cushion hypothesis" states that people in a more collectivist society are more likely to receive help in case of an adverse outcome of a risky endeavor, so that they are "cushioned" in case they fail. At the same time, Rohrman and Chen (1999), using a socio-psychological (psychometric) approach, found differences in risk perception between China and Australia. But in their study, China is relatively more risk averse than Australia, which casts some doubt on the "cushion hypothesis," since Australia is more individualistically oriented than China.

Rieger, Wang and Hens (2011) studied forty-five countries and found substantial cross-country differences in aversion to risk, aversion to loss and probability weighting. They show that attitudes to risk in their sample depend not only on economic conditions but also on cultural factors, as measured by the Hofstede dimensions of Individuality and Uncertainty Avoidance (Hofstede and McCrae 2004). Furthermore, Vieider, Chmura and Martinsson (2012) studied the data for thirty countries to show that risk attitudes vary considerably between countries. They found a strong and highly significant negative correlation between the risk tolerance of

² Empirical evidence on attitudes to risk among Italians supports this proposition. As shown in Iezzi (2008), residents of northern Italy are much less risk averse in financial matters as compared to residents of other regions in Italy.

a country and income per capita, and no influence from the Hofstede dimensions of Individuality and Uncertainty Avoidance. In their paper, they support what might be called the “opportunity hypothesis”: in a fast-developing economy, people benefit more from taking greater risks. In such economies, attitudes to risk act as a transmission mechanism for growth by encouraging entrepreneurship.

There are only a few studies that have looked at regional differences in attitudes to risk within particular countries. The study by Dohmen et al. (2011) of attitudes to risk in Germany found no difference in risk attitudes between the eastern and western parts of the country. In a recent study, Vieider, Chmura and Martinsson (2012) explored risk-taking behavior on two university campuses in China and one in Ethiopia. They found no difference in attitudes to risk between the cities in China where the Chinese campuses are located, but large differences between the two countries. The already mentioned work of Iezzi (2008) found residents of northern Italy much more willing to hold risky assets than residents of central Italy, while at the same time the latter were more likely to invest in risky assets than residents of southern Italy.

To evaluate attitudes to risk in regions of Ukraine, the dataset that comes from the *Region, Nation and Beyond* project survey (Survey 2013) has been used. Individual attitudes to risk are measured in two ways, following Dohmen et al. (2011) and Ding et al. (2010): by a willingness to invest in a hypothetical lottery and by self-assessment on a given scale. The hypothetical lottery question asked what portion of 100,000 UAH³ that had just been won in a lottery would be invested in another lottery that either doubles or halves the amount invested with equal probabilities. The answer was a number between 0 and 100. The self-assessment questions on attitudes to risk asked about respondents’ readiness to take or evade risks in specific contexts: in their own businesses and financial matters; in leisure and sports; and in their careers. The answers were graded on a five-point scale from 0, “Not prepared to take risk at all,” to 5, “Very much prepared to take risk,” with an option 6: “Hard to answer.” As shown in Dohmen et al. (2011) and Ding et al. (2010), the surveyed measures of attitudes to risk described above are valid indicators of experimentally measured risk attitudes. Based on these two approaches, two variables that measure attitudes to risk are formed: the answer to the lottery question (Risk 1), and factor scores extracted from three self-assessment ques-

³ 100,000 UAH was equal to approx. 9,500 EUR at the time of the survey in 2013.

tions with the help of principal component analysis (Risk 2). The analysis revealed a high correlation among responses to these questions. The percentage of the total variance explained is 70.4 percent. The correlation between four survey questions about attitudes to risk and the factor score variable is given in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1. Correlation matrix of different measures of attitudes to risk

	Lottery question (Risk 1)	Risk attitude in business/ finance	Risk attitude in leisure/ sports	Risk attitude in career	Factor score (Risk 2)
Lottery question (Risk 1)	1				
Risk attitude in business/finance	0.353	1			
Risk attitude in leisure/sports	0.331	0.666	1		
Risk attitude in career	0.252	0.482	0.496	1	
Factor score (Risk 2)	0.392	0.866	0.875	0.773	1

Note: All values are significant at 1 percent level

Table 7.1 indicates relatively high correlations between all measures of attitudes to risk. The strength of correlations among self-assessed measures of risk is comparable to the results of Dohmen et al. (2011) for a large sample of German households (German Socioeconomic Panel Survey dataset). Higher correlations than in Ding et al. (2010) between a willingness to invest in a hypothetical lottery and self-assessed measures of risk were found, although the scale for the lottery question was not the same in this study.

In general, the results show that Ukrainians are very reluctant to take risks. Almost 68 percent of respondents rejected the choice to invest in a hypothetical lottery. This result is similar to that found in Dohmen, Khamis and Lehmann (2010), who report that about 63 percent of Ukrainian households refused to invest in a hypothetical lottery. Similar results are obtained for other measures of attitudes to risk.

Table 7.2. Regional differences in attitudes to risk in Ukraine

Region		Lottery question (Risk 1)	Risk attitude in business/finance	Risk attitude in leisure/sports	Risk attitude in career
South	Mean	8.43	1.60	1.91	2.00
	N	904	815	840	785
Center	Mean	11.89	1.91	2.10	1.99
	N	896	809	817	815
West	Mean	10.88	1.89	2.02	1.96
	N	1199	1008	1066	984
East	Mean	9.57	1.73	2.02	2.01
	N	1047	920	955	928
Donbas	Mean	7.49	1.75	1.87	1.94
	N	861	726	760	729
North	Mean	11.57	2.01	2.29	2.05
	N	1071	857	926	835
Total	Mean	10.07	1.82	2.04	1.99
	N	5978	5135	5364	5076

The regional distribution of responses shown in Table 7.2 indicates univariate characteristics of attitudes to risk in six regions of Ukraine. The center, north and west are relatively less risk averse than the east, south and Donbas. One-way ANOVA shows significant regional differences in risk attitudes for both Risk 1 (the hypothetical lottery) and Risk 2 (factor scores extracted from the three self-assessment questions) measures of attitudes to risk. The post hoc Scheffe test ($\alpha = 0.05$) for Risk 1 shows three homogeneous regional subgroups: 1) Donbas, south and east; 2) the south, east and west; and 3) the east, west, north and center. The same test for Risk 2 variables shows two homogeneous regional subgroups: 1) Donbas, the south, east and west; and 2) the east, west, north and center. This implies significant unconditional difference in attitudes to risk between the Donbas-south and the north-center regions.

What determines the regional differences that are found in attitudes to risk? Do these differences occur because of differences in socio-economic and demographic realities in the regions, or are these differences deeply rooted in regional cultures? In order to shed light on these issues, a multivariate regression analysis has been performed, taking into account various personal characteristics of respondents. In analyses of such a kind the usual focus is on the impact of four strictly exogenous personal characteristics: namely gender, age, height,⁴ and parental background (Dohmen et al. 2011; Bartke and Schwarze 2008). Among other characteristics which are usually considered, but which may bring some endogeneity into the model, are income and wealth status, size of household, occupation or religiousness.

The available dataset makes it possible to investigate the hypothesis about the relation between individual attitudes to envy and to risk. This is in line with the research of Gershman (2012), who considers two sides of envy: the destructive (that can be satisfied by decreasing the outcome of the reference group) and the constructive (that can be satisfied by increasing one's own outcome). If the constructive envy prevails, it encourages riskier behavior in an individual in order to reach higher relative standing; and therefore a positive relation between individual envy and risk-taking can be expected. Indeed, recent empirical findings by Celse and Loheac (2013), who use a laboratory experiment to show how social comparison (envy) influences attitudes to risk, indicate that, consumed with envy, participants are willing to take more risky decisions. The measure of individual envy used is described in the next section of the present chapter.

A possible link between an individual's mother tongue and his/her attitudes to risk is also investigated. It is hypothesized that the bilingualism of those who name both Ukrainian and Russian as their mother tongues might cause them to be less risk averse as compared to individuals with a single mother tongue. The logic here is similar to the logic in Fryer et al. (2012), who study the effect of mixed race on adolescent behavior. They show that mixed-race adolescents, not having a predetermined peer group, engage in more risky and antisocial behavior in order to be accepted. Similar to race, language might be considered as a "visible" characteristic of an individual that, especially at adolescent age, determines the acceptance of an

⁴ Height is not used in this study since the available dataset does not contain such information.

individual into a peer group; hence those who are natively bilingual need to behave in a riskier way⁵ in order to be accepted into a desired peer group. To reveal the relation between attitudes to risk and the set of explanatory variables, different regression models have been estimated using the Tobit estimator of maximum likelihood. The use of Tobit regression is necessitated by the large portion of zeros in the dependent variable(s).

All model specifications include five-region dummies with the west as a reference region. Additionally, the basic Model 1 includes age in years, gender (female = 0), and parental education as explanatory variables. Education is a category variable that varies from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates primary, 2 indicates uncompleted secondary, 3 indicates secondary, 4 indicates special secondary, 5 indicates bachelor, 6 indicates master or specialist, and 7 indicates PhD-equivalent education. In Model 2, the size of household, the respondent's education, and her/his religion variables, which include Orthodox of the Moscow Patriarchate, Orthodox of the Kyiv Patriarchate, Greek Catholic (including Catholic) and Protestant, are added. The omitted categories for religion include other religions, atheists and those who do not declare a concrete confessional allegiance.⁶

Table 7.3a. Determinants of individual attitudes to risk

Dependent variable	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Risk 1	Risk 2	Risk 1	Risk 2	Risk 1	Risk 2
Center	-1.39 (2.38)	0.10 (0.07)	-2.89 (2.70)	0.00 (0.08)	-2.40 (2.71)	0.01 (0.08)
North	-1.07 (2.25)	0.21*** (0.07)	-2.83 (2.55)	0.09 (0.08)	-2.72 (2.55)	0.09 (0.08)
East	-11.06*** (2.38)	-0.10 (0.07)	-13.32*** (2.75)	-0.23*** (0.08)	-13.02*** (2.75)	-0.22*** (0.08)
South	-14.84*** (2.51)	-0.23*** (0.07)	-16.05*** (2.85)	-0.33*** (0.08)	-15.43*** (2.86)	-0.32*** (0.08)

⁵ Here, a riskier behavior is not limited to something antisocial; it might be riskier behavior in sports, games and so on.

⁶ There is a big group (23 percent) formed by those who identify themselves as "just Orthodox" without indicating a confessional allegiance (see the religion chapter in the present volume).

Table 7.3b. Determinants of individual attitudes to risk (continued)

Dependent variable	(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Risk 1	Risk 2	Risk 1	Risk 2	Risk 1	Risk 2
Center	0.57 (2.88)	0.14 (0.09)	-0.08 (2.88)	0.09 (0.09)	1.74 (3.19)	0.17* (0.10)
North	-1.15 (2.84)	0.19** (0.09)	-1.88 (2.88)	0.11 (0.09)	-2.67 (3.14)	0.17* (0.10)
East	-9.98*** (3.01)	-0.13 (0.09)	-10.88*** (3.11)	-0.25*** (0.09)	-11.88*** (3.48)	-0.24** (0.10)
South	-12.58*** (3.13)	-0.12 (0.09)	-13.09*** (3.30)	-0.29*** (0.10)	-13.46*** (3.61)	-0.34*** (0.10)
Donbas	-17.35*** (3.21)	-0.30*** (0.09)	-18.04*** (3.32)	-0.44*** (0.10)	-16.61*** (3.63)	-0.42*** (0.11)
Envy	3.26*** (0.79)	0.12*** (0.02)	3.11*** (0.79)	0.11*** (0.02)	3.48*** (0.89)	0.11*** (0.03)
Logincome	6.16*** (1.45)	0.07* (0.04)	7.22*** (1.52)	0.08* (0.04)	7.31*** (1.64)	0.03 (0.05)
IPIW (inversely proportional index of wealth)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.004*** (0.000)
Land possession by grandparents	12.44*** (1.85)	0.16*** (0.06)	12.27*** (1.85)	0.15*** (0.06)	12.47*** (2.06)	0.14** (0.06)
Married or living together			-2.57 (1.84)	-0.13** (0.05)	-1.91 (2.03)	-0.12** (0.06)
Native language: Ukrainian			-3.37 (3.86)	-0.28** (0.11)	-0.42 (4.26)	-0.20* (0.12)
Native language: Russian			-8.50* (4.36)	-0.11 (0.12)	-6.51 (4.83)	0.05 (0.13)
Native language: Ukrainian and Russian			4.72*** (1.88)	0.29*** (0.05)	5.92*** (2.04)	0.38*** (0.06)
Life satisfaction					1.57 (1.14)	0.14*** (0.03)

Dependent variable	(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Risk 1	Risk 2	Risk 1	Risk 2	Risk 1	Risk 2
Job satisfaction					-0.97 (1.08)	-0.04 (0.03)
Other controls:						
Gender, age, education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Religion, persons in household	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Employment and professional status	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observation	5022	4045	5022	4045	3688	3122
Pseudo R ²	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.07
Tobit maximum likelihood estimation is left-censored at minimum value of dependent variable. All specifications include a constant. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent levels, respectively.						

In Model 3, the measure of attitude to envy is added, and in Model 4, the respondent's mother tongue(s). According to the 2013 survey, 51 percent of respondents name Ukrainian, about 21 percent Russian, and 23 percent both Ukrainian and Russian as mother tongue(s). The omitted category for mother tongue includes all other mother tongues. Further, in Models 5 and 6, several income and wealth variables are introduced, namely Log-income, which is a log of monthly income reported by the respondent, IPIW (inversely proportional index of wealth), which is an alternative measure of wealth,⁷ and Land, which is a dummy variable indicating whether

⁷ IPIW (inversely proportional index of wealth) was compiled by Krzysztof Zagorski (2005). In Zagorski's study, the index is constructed on the basis of information about whether the respondent's family has bought an apartment, a new car, furniture, fashionable clothes, a summer house, a computer, or has traveled abroad in the last ten years. Each respondent who reported the possession of an item was assigned a value, which is inversely proportional to the percentage of those who bought it in the sample (for example, a car purchase receives the value 70, if 30 percent of those interviewed have it). Then the sum of all values was calculated.

the respondent's grandparents owned land greater than one hectare. Life and job satisfaction,⁸ employment status (employed, officially unemployed, retired, student and other statuses—on maternity leave, housekeeper and other—as a reference group), and professional status (white collar, blue collar and other as a reference group), as well as marital status (married or living together, and other as a reference group) are also added. Each model is estimated in two variants with two alternative dependent variables: Risk 1 and Risk 2, described above.

Table 7.3a reports the estimation results for Models 1–3. The coefficients for gender, age, education, religion, size of household, employment and professional status for Models 4–6 are not shown in Table 7.3b for the sake of brevity. All model specifications show consistent estimation results similar to the findings of other studies: females are more reluctant to take risks, age is negatively related to risk-taking behavior, and a higher level of education either of a respondent or of her/his parents positively correlates with riskier choices. The less robust result for the respondent's education may be due to a high correlation between children's and parents' education. Somewhat surprisingly, a robust negative relation between the number of persons in a household and risk attitudes has not been found. This might reflect a well-known social problem in almost all post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine, whereby, due to a lack of household buildings, individuals usually have no possibility to live separately from their relatives, and are forced to live together irrespective of their preferences.

Practically all model specifications show a profound regional difference in attitudes to risk, forming two regional clusters: the west, the center and the north, as regions more willing to take risks, compared to the east, the south and Donbas, which are more risk averse. The results of most interest are robust in their specification. They support the hypothesis that the divergences found are due to cultural differences, i.e., differences in preferences or beliefs, rather than being due to differences in the current socio-economic situation. Indeed, a cultural theory of risk (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Tansey and O'Riordan 1999) attributes cross-cultural differences in risk preference to differences in customs and beliefs, emphasizing that decisions are not formed independently of the long-term social context.

⁸ Life and job satisfaction variables are measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates "absolutely unsatisfied" and 5 indicates "absolutely satisfied."

Support for the hypothesis about a relation between attitudes to risk and to envy has also been found. All specifications show a positive relation between envy and risk-taking. This result is robust in relation to the inclusion of income and wealth characteristics, inferring that envy is an important dimension of attitudes to risk that goes far beyond being a characteristic of income or possession.

Another interesting result is the confirmation of the hypothesis about a relation between the individual's statement about her/his mother tongue and attitudes to risk. As predicted, people who report both Ukrainian and Russian as their mother tongues are relatively more willing to take risks. In addition to the above-mentioned logic deduced from the work of Fryer et al. (2012), who explain the riskier (mis-)behavior of individuals of mixed race by their desire to be accepted by their peers, one might suppose that bilingualism gives additional abilities to people that make them capable of accepting greater risks. Some support for this proposition comes from Wescott and Griffith (2010), who linked "linguagability" to success in the entrepreneurial market.

Among other findings, support for previous empirical results showing that religious people are less willing to take risks (Bartke and Schwarze 2008; Noussair et al. 2012) has been confirmed. The results show that "riskiness" decreases in the following order of religions: Orthodox of the Kyiv Patriarchate, Orthodox of the Moscow Patriarchate, Catholic (Greek and Roman Catholic), and Protestant. Interestingly, robust results are obtained for a nonmonetary risk-dependent variable. Thus it might be concluded that religiosity has different impacts on different risk contexts.

It is worth noting the positive relation between land possession of the respondent's grandparents and risk-taking attitudes in Models 4–6. The assumption is that this relation not only shows the relation between family wealth and risk attitudes (other income and wealth variables were included to control this), but also shows inherited preferences for riskier behavior. Indeed, Charles and Hurst (2002) show that risk preferences correlate strongly between parents and children. Two or three generations ago, land possession in Ukraine was a clear sign of an individual's entrepreneurial spirit that, arguably, channeled into the entrepreneurial and risk-taking behavior of her/his children today. Finally, contrary to Dohmen et al. (2011), a consistent and significant relation between either life or job satisfaction and attitudes to risk was not found, possibly because of their high correlation with income and wealth.

Envy and Life Satisfaction in Ukraine: The Theory and Study of Envy

NATALIA POHORILA

There are several theories about the roots of the feeling of envy. The anthropological approach considers envy as an attribute of traditional society. According to the theory of the image of limited goods, people in traditional societies believe that there is a limited amount of goods, and thus that economic advantage can only be obtained at the expense of others (Foster 1972). In such societies, observing somebody's wealth and advancement can easily stir envious feelings and demands for the vindictive redistribution of goods.

As for modern times, envy is likely to develop in the situation of anomie described by Robert Merton (1957) as a condition when an individual sees socially adopted goals, but does not perceive culturally approved means for the achievement of these goals. Negative feelings that generally characterize envy have been discussed in the conceptual framework of relative deprivation, which is a psychological outcome of the observed difference between the desired situation and the real condition of the person (Gurr 1970; Runciman 1966; Sztompka 1993). According to the theory of changes, envy is an emotion that supposedly grows when income inequality increases or norms concerning decent living standards are changing; and this is a feeling that can cause life dissatisfaction irrespective of the level of individual incomes (Clark and Senik 2010; Frijters et al. 2006; Senik 2008; Verwiebe and Wegener 2000). In consumer behavior research, envy is interpreted as a component of "materialism," which is the basic enduring belief that it is important to own material possessions in order to feel happy and successful (Ahuvia and Wong 1995; Belk 1984 and 1985; Richins and Dawson 1992).

Materialism was found to be inherent to the society of scarcity, which is centered on working for a living. The theory of postmaterialism stresses the fact that modern affluent societies are already beyond materialistic values, and the values of self-actualization, friendship and leisure are preferred to work and career (Inglehart 1990). The World Values Survey conducted by Ronald Inglehart established that Western postmodern societies are happier than other societies, which serves as evidence that strong materialism in society is not associated with happiness. Studies of social and consumer behavior confirm that the correlation between materialism and life satisfaction is reversed (Belk 1984 and 1985; Kasser and Ryan 1993; Richins and Dawson 1992), which is explained by individualistic values: materialism precludes one's investment in family, friends or self-actualization, as well as one's participation in community.

As for post-Soviet societies, the situation was quite different from that found in Western countries. Materialistic values were formed under the effect of communist ideology and its half-successful implementation. Communist ideology postulated the primacy of "cultural" over "materialist" values, while communist leaders were forced to deal with the satisfaction of the material needs of Soviet citizens. Along with the recovery of the USSR from the Second World War and Stalinism, with more openness to the world during the Khrushchev thaw, the problem of coping with consumers' growing demands became urgent. Progressive communist leader N. Khrushchev, while understanding the attractiveness of the high living standards of the West, did not—and could not—approve the Western means of obtaining the goal of such high standards. Soviet citizens wanted to obtain high-quality goods for low prices, but not to invest their labor in a more productive economy. Such an approach brought about the "revolution of consumption" between 1958 and 1986, when high consumerist aspirations did not correlate with the quality or quantity of work (Merle 2011). On the eve of the dismantling of the Soviet Union, this development resulted in a "hypertrophic attraction" of new and fashionable goods (Gronow and Zhuravlev 2015).

This section studies the feeling of envy and materialistic values in Ukraine. According to the UNDP indicators of human development, Ukraine can be considered as a society of scarcity in comparison with its closest European neighbors (Heiets et al. 2009, 351–366). Indeed, materialism has become prominent in Ukraine: in 2004–2005, Ukrainians put material wealth at the top of the Schwartz list of personal values (Magun and Rudnev 2007). It is important to remember that, until recently, Ukraine was a traditional and rural society, which is now undergoing eco-

conomic transformation accompanied by the deepening of income inequality. A study of incomes and psychological well-being in Russia in the early 1990s by Gudkov and Pchelina (1995) stressed that a society which is “poor” in terms of its social structure and psychology cannot avoid developing “social envy” as material aspirations grow rapidly, and the tolerance to income inequality remains low.

The question is whether the feeling of envy is necessarily destructive for life satisfaction and motivation. Studies of economic consciousness underline that the comparison of one’s income with the income of others does not necessarily lead to unsatisfactory conclusions and, consequently, to a worsening of one’s psychological condition. The theory of social comparison stipulates that the result of such comparison could be emotionally negative, constructive or destructive for the individual’s psyche, depending on the strength of materialist ideology in society, and on the level of income inequality (Clark and Senik 2010; Easterlin 2009; Hirschman and Rothschild 1973; Senik 2008). The existence of constructive envy is explained by hedonistic philosophy, which sees it as the outcome of an extensive experience with the consumer market.

Destructive envy develops in conditions of higher inequality, lower tolerance for inequality and scarce investment opportunities (Gershman 2012). Destructive envy is believed to be harmful for the healthy spirit of competition and investments, as the fear of envy of one’s fellows inhibits business activity. The negative correlation between envy and life satisfaction illustrates a “standard” envy effect, when individuals feel worse if their reference group does better. On the contrary, the positive correlation between envy and life satisfaction confirms a nonstandard, “Hirschman effect,” which occurs when information about the advancement of referent groups serves only to inform individuals about opportunities for success, and thus to motivate them to achieve more (Clark and Senik 2010). A “Hirschman effect” could be conducive to constructive envy, while a “non-Hirschman effect” could be conducive to destructive envy, under the condition that life satisfaction correlates with achieving (constructive) life strategies.

In post-Soviet countries, consumption has always been associated with strong emotions, both negative, resulting from frustrated aspirations, and positive, resulting from obtaining the desired goods in a deficient market (Chernyshova 2013). Consumption has entailed great efforts being invested in purchasing the demanded goods through *blat*, which refers to “the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods and services in short supply and to find a way around formal pro-

cedures” (Ledeneva 1998, 1). As a result, shopping became “imbued with emotions rather than rationality” (Chernyshova 2011). The steady infusion of Western ways of life made the situation even more tense. Those who could afford to travel abroad or to buy foreign goods (mostly members of the *nomenklatura*) saw the highest-quality goods, but still found them too expensive because they were trapped in the Soviet model of consumption—with “little money for quality goods” (Merle 2011). As a consequence, envy has tended rather to produce dissatisfaction. With the transition to a market economy in Ukraine, this situation could have changed, as people were given socially approved means of improving their living standards: namely, working for the private economy. The adaptation to this system could have turned envy into the more productive desire to obtain more goods in socially approved ways. The question is whether the two decades of a market economy have actually changed the ways in which people think and act about their provision with material goods.

The scale of envy

The scale of envy used in this study is a reduced version of the scale constructed by a Canadian researcher, Russell Belk, in 1983 (Belk 1984 and 1985). Belk conceptualized “envy” as one of the three components of the scale of materialism: envy, nongenerosity and possessiveness. The original scale of materialism suggested by Russell Belk was tested in 1983 using the convenience sample of students and young workers in Salt Lake City (Utah, USA). A replica study was done in 1995 using the samples of MBA students in twelve nations, including Ukraine (Ger and Belk 1996). Belk noted a strong stability of the three components of the research construct “materialism” over time and between countries, as well as the stability of a negative relationship between materialism and life satisfaction. The study defined envy as displeasure and ill will at the superiority of another person in happiness, success, reputation or the possession of anything desirable. Scales of possessiveness and nongenerosity are not considered here because of the low correlation between the components of this scale and thus the methodological difficulties of applying them to the study of Ukraine in the 2000s.

For the present analysis, only four variables were selected from Belk’s eight-item original scale of envy that correlated with each other in the pilot study of the project at the level of at least 0.2 of Pearson’s coefficient. The

variables included in the project survey (on a 5-point scale) have been analyzed with the help of principal component analysis; the factor scores obtained are interpreted as the “envy” scale, a shortened version of Belk’s original scale. The envy scale explains 59 percent of variability and produces factor loadings higher than 0.69. Table 7.4 below lists the questions of the envy scale, and the factor loadings which resulted from the principal component analysis.

Table 7.4. The survey questions and factor loads of the envy scale


There are certain people with whom I would like to trade places.	0.689
I am bothered when friends have things I cannot afford.	0.842
I am bothered when I see people who buy anything they want.	0.789
I know some people whose spouse or partner I would like to have as my own.	0.738

Interregional differences

This section attempts to explore whether regional differences in Ukraine can be explained on the basis of the anthropological and civilizational hypotheses described above. On the one hand, in accordance with the anthropological hypothesis, envy could be higher in the regions with a stronger traditional culture—in the western, northern and central parts of Ukraine. On the other hand, a strong sense of relative deprivation could have developed in the former vanguards of the Soviet economy—in the south and east, manifesting itself in strong materialistic expectations and a dislike for the quickly growing new wealth. In accordance with the civilizational hypothesis, which emphasizes the legacies of human settlement and of institutionalized power, regions civilized earlier would have a stronger ability to tame negative emotions and to incorporate values beyond materialism (Elias 2000). Thus the western and northern regions of Ukraine would show less envy, or, alternatively, envy in these regions would have less negative, destructive connotations.

Figure 7.4 shows that envy is most prevalent among the urban population of Donbas, followed by northern and western Ukraine. The three regions are statistically different from central, eastern and southern Ukraine; all differences are statistically significant. The splitting of the population under study into urban and rural increases the difference between

Figure 7.4. Envy in Ukrainian regions, urban and rural populations, of those with the score > 3.0 at the 5-point scale



the urban population of the regions ($\text{Eta}^2 = 0.039$ compared to $\text{Eta}^2 = 0.010$ for the rural population). The differences among the rural population of five regions are less pronounced and are statistically insignificant.

The Donbas region has the highest levels of envy in the country, if the urban population alone is considered. Despite the fact that materialistic values and consumerism had been suppressed during Soviet times, many circumstances are believed to have been conducive to the formation of a strong materialism in Donbas. Stalinist industrialization propelled a huge immigration, a break with traditional values, and harmful work conditions that together resulted in the establishment of a primacy of materialistic values over spiritual ones, pertaining to the “Soviet model of consumption” (Pasko, Pasko and Korzhov 2006). Higher incomes in the military–industrial complex concentrated in the Donbas region in comparison with the rest of Soviet Ukraine allowed a partial realization of these materialistic aspirations, but with the fall of communism, the region experienced a severe relative deprivation. The highest envy levels observed in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts can also be explained by more recent events, in particular the winning of a majority of parliamentary seats by the Party of Regions, based in the region, in 2006, and the election of its leader, Viktor Yanukovich, as president of Ukraine in 2010. The study shows a positive correlation between envy and household wealth acquired not more than a decade ago. Thus, in addition to being a former vanguard region in

Ukraine, this finding can be explained by the quick rise of the aspirations of the region's population due to these political changes.

Furthermore, a somewhat higher-than-average level of envy was found in northern Ukraine, the region that includes Kyivska, Chernihivska, Zhytomyrska and Sumська oblasts. This territory corresponds roughly to the historical Cossack state. Although the period of Cossack rule was short, the experience of economic autonomy in the region was unparalleled compared to the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth or Muscovy and, later, the Russian Empire, where the peasants were deprived of virtually all rights. The abrogation of the right to the possession of private property, first instituted by the Russian Empire in the seventeenth century, and later by the Bolsheviks in 1918, may have left a deep imprint on the consciousness of the population, in the form of strong sentiments attached to material possessions and the fear of their loss. In the conditions of unstable private property rights that have characterized the region since the seventeenth century, the social basis of materialistic attitudes, the fear of property loss and envy, became solidified.

Finally, a somewhat higher-than-average level of envy in western Ukraine can be explained by the anthropological hypothesis, as traditional society has remained strong in the region. Despite the fact that interregional differences in levels of envy are more pronounced for the urban rather than the rural population, the influence of traditional values on city dwellers may be tangible.

In summary, there are different explanations for the higher levels of envy in the three regions: recently evolved aspirations against the backdrop of relative postcommunist deprivation (Donbas), which can be called a “new deprivation hypothesis”; the old deprivation of the historical descendants of the Cossack state (northern Ukraine); and envy in a traditional society (western Ukraine). In order to test these hypotheses about different mechanisms of envy formation, correlations between actual material well-being and envy, and envy and life satisfaction, have been analyzed in six regions.

At the national level, neither income nor IPIW⁹—the measure of material possessions of the respondent—correlate with the level of envy. However, at the regional level, IPIW correlates significantly with envy in three regions, though with opposite signs of coefficients: negative in the northern and western regions, and positive in Donbas. More affluent habitants of the northern and western regions are less envious, but in Donbas

⁹ Inversely Proportional Index of Wealth; see footnote 74.

they are more envious than their poorer fellows. The “old deprivation” explanation works here in the form of the envy of the poor with regard to the wealthy, which changes when the poor become wealthier. The Donbas case could be the effect of accelerated material aspirations based on the idea of a “special role” for the region in the national economy, fueled by the political changes described above and translated into the desire to have more wealth when some of it is already possessed. This is a modified form of the “new deprivation” hypothesis.

Life satisfaction correlates inversely with envy at the national level, as was proved by Belk, who found it to be at the level of Pearson's $r = -0.30$ in the study of MBA students in 1983 (Belk 1984). However, in the case of Ukraine, Pearson's correlations are significant in northern and western Ukraine, while in the east and Donbas they are significant but very small, and they are insignificant in central and southern Ukraine. Correlation is considerable in the north, where more envious people are less satisfied with life than in other regions, supporting the hypothesis about the destructive role of envy.

Testing hypotheses about different regional patterns of envy formation

The extent to which envy explains life satisfaction in different regions, and how household wealth (IPIW) mediates this relationship, should be tested in the multivariate model, which controls for structural characteristics of the Ukrainian population such as age, gender, place of residence, education, income (taken as a natural logarithm) and household wealth (see Table 7.6 below). As the models for the general population were found to be very weak, models for the urban population alone, among whom the highest regional variation was found, were considered separately.

Older age and university education were found to be factors averse to envy; however, the coefficients are very small. The relatively higher coefficients of the equation modeling envy are observed for the variables “North,” $r = 0.144$, and “Donbas,” $r = 0.180$ (Model 1). For the urban population, these coefficients are even higher: $r = 0.168$ and $r = 0.199$, respectively. This result confirms the earlier assumption that regional differences are the strongest explanation for the variation in envy. The north, the west and Donbas clearly stand out against the south and, to a lesser extent, against the center and the east (without Donbas).

Table 7.5. Pearson's correlation of envy with IPIW and life satisfaction in six regions

	Envy and IPIW	Envy and life satisfaction
West	- 0.073*	- 0.181*
Center	0.056	- 0.053
North	- 0.111**	- 0.191**
South	0.048	0.018
East	0.024	- 0.067*
Donbas	0.109**	- 0.092*

* Significant at the p-value level 0.05-0.001

** Significant at the p-value 0.001 and less

The inclusion of interactive terms in the equation helps one to understand how the effect of IPIW on the intensity of envy varies between regions. Model 3 shows that the relation between personal affluence (IPIW) and envy is different in northern Ukraine in comparison with other regions: poorer people are more envious in this region (beta coefficient = -0.108, significant at the level of 1 percent). This confirms the “old deprivation” theory but only for the northern region, as the coefficient for interactive terms of IPIW with other regions is insignificant. Life satisfaction in all regions is explained by objective material conditions—higher incomes, household wealth and younger age (IPIW)—similar to the absence of envy (Models 4 and 6).

Envy and life satisfaction are inversely correlated, which confirms the assumption about the destructive role of envy in Ukraine. The standard envy effect—“less envy, more happiness”—characterizes the majority of those surveyed, and in particular the group of respondents with university degrees. However, for some categories of the population this relationship does not work. Negative coefficients for age for both variables, envy and life satisfaction, prove that young people are more envious than old people but are also happier. A significant coefficient for the age squared indicates that envy is strongest among the young (younger than twenty), while for older ages it slowly decreases. This observation can be interpreted such that envy plays a constructive role for the young, providing them with information about future prospects (Hirschman and Rothschild 1973). The same explanation can be applicable to the western region: people are slightly more envious here than inhabitants of the center, the south and the east, but in general the population in this region is more satisfied with life than in other regions of Ukraine.

Table 7.6. OLS regression of envy and life satisfaction on the place of residence and demographic characteristics, the whole population and urban population, standardized betas

Dependent variable	Envy			Life satisfaction			
	Model 1	Model 3, urban	Model 3,	Model 4	Model 5, urban	Model 6, urban	Model 7, urban
Age2	−.085**	−.070**	−.067**	−.089**	−.121**	−.119**	−.125**
Logincome	−.002	.014	.013	.115**	.128**	.137**	.126**
IPIW	−.000	−.037	.085**	.201**	.189**	.198**	.189**
University education	−.078**	−.103**	−.093**	.069**	.086**	.070**	.080**
Incomplete higher education	.007	.002	.004	.039**	.039*	.039*	.039*
Urban	.009	—	—	.033*	—	—	—
North	.144**	.168**	.248**	.030	−.026	.005	−.019
Donbas	.180**	.199**	.207**	.010	−.018	.003	−.010
West	.074**	.103**	.126**	.100**	.061**	.075**	.060**
Center	.064	.063	.060*	.038	.022	.025	.022
East	.010	.010	.048	−.013	−.017	−.028	−.015
North x IPIW	—	—	−.108**	—	—	—	—
West x IPIW	—	—	−.040	—	—	—	—
Donbas x IPIW	—	—	.001	—	—	—	—
North x envy	—	—	—	—	—	—	−.056**
Donbas x envy	—	—	—	—	—	—	−.038*
West x envy	—	—	—	—	—	—	−.064**
Envy	—	—	—	−.086**	—	−.094**	—
N	4377	2967	2967	4377	2939	2967	2939
R2	3.7	5.0	5.6	10.6	10.8	11.6	11.2

* Significant at the p-value level 0.05 and less

** Significant at the p-value 0.01 and less

Note: Nonbold print marks coefficients significant for all models, while bold print marks significant coefficients in at least one model

In general, more envious people are less happy, and the population of western Ukraine is more satisfied with life than the population of other regions. However, the question is whether the envious in the three regions with a higher degree of envy—the west, the north and Donbas—are less satisfied with life than the envious in other regions. The answer to this question may shed light on the concept of constructive envy. A significant negative correlation for the interactive term between envy and life satisfaction in Donbas, western and northern Ukraine indicates that the envious people in these regions are less happy than the respective category in other regions (Model 7). Model 7 testifies to the special role that the feeling of envy plays in these three regions. Indeed, in the regions where on average people are more envious, those who are envious are less happy than the envious people in other regions: in the center, the east (excluding Donbas) and the south. Thus life satisfaction in western Ukraine could be explained by many factors, but the level of life satisfaction for envious people in the region is not smaller than in other regions. In other words, envy is psychologically destructive for envious people; however, if the number of satisfied people outnumbers those who are dissatisfied, the high level of envy in the region is not destructive for the region's general life satisfaction.

The levels of envy in Ukraine differ between regions: urban dwellers of Donbas, four northern oblasts, including Kyiv, and seven western oblasts are more envious than the inhabitants of central, southern and eastern Ukraine excluding Donbas. The “old deprivation” hypothesis explains the high levels of envy in the northern region: the poorer inhabitants of the region experience more envy. The Donbas case has been explained by “aspirational deprivation” or “new deprivation,” which takes place when aspirations are growing, but capacities remain the same (Gurr 1970; Sztompka 1993). The positive correlation between a family's wealth and envy is supportive of this statement: in the Donbas region, more wealth brings more envy. In the two regions that are on the other side of the Great Steppe frontier, the north and the west, this correlation is negative. This possibly indicates the deprivation of the old, classical type: when material needs are satisfied, people become less envious. However, controlling other variables in the regression equation brings support only for the “old deprivation” hypothesis in the north. Higher levels of envy in western Ukraine remain unexplained.

Supporting the findings of previous studies, envy proves to be psychologically destructive, especially for the envious who are living in the three regions with high rates of envy. The exception is the “healthy” envy of the youngest group surveyed: in whatever region they live, their envy seems to

be more of a “constructive” type. People in western Ukraine are generally more satisfied with life, notwithstanding the fact that envious people here are less happy than in the regions with lower levels of envy in the center, the east and the south. In a way, the population of western Ukraine is more psychologically “constructive,” but this is definitely not due to “constructive envy.” Life satisfaction increases with larger incomes and home possessions, which indicates, although indirectly, that satisfied envy may bring happiness to those who had possibly behaved in a “constructive” way and sought to increase their income.

All statistical models were very weak for the general population; however, they were somewhat stronger for the urban population, with Donbas standing out. The anthropological studies interpret envy as a phenomenon of rural society. In Ukraine, however, the rural population is not more envious, nor are there pronounced regional differences in the levels of envy for this population. Russell Belk’s study shows variation between countries among MBA students who are urban dwellers. This study found much deeper differences between the urban populations of different regions. It is possible that the theory of materialism and of envy works for urban modernized society in a different way than for traditional rural society, and thus needs to be further explained.

Attitudes to Business Risk in Ukraine

SVITLANA TYAHLO

This section focuses on how businesses in Ukraine design their potential investment projects, what they expect from them and how these preferences and expectations differ across regions. A particular interest is in the attitudes to risk of company representatives, who are often confronted with risky choices where payoffs are not certain.

The discussion of these issues was initiated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who successfully challenged the assumption of human rationality in their analysis of decision-making under risk. In particular, their findings about loss aversion and certainty effect have generated a wealth of literature. While there is only one way of being rational, studies have shown that there are many ways of being irrational (Hens and Bachmann 2008). In recent years, it has become particularly popular to investigate cultural differences in behavioral biases. Scholars usually rely on a cross-country approach in defining cultural regions. Nevertheless, there are some attempts to study within-country differences as well. One of the recent publications in this field is a paper by Vieider et al. (2015) that discusses attitudes to risk in China and Ethiopia. The Ukrainian labor market has been studied by Dohmen, Khamis and Lehman (2010), who investigate the relation between the subjects' attitudes to risk and their employment status. This study adds to the existing literature by considering the risk tolerance of firms in Ukraine. Its main assumptions are that individuals make reasonably accurate predictions of their choices, and that the risk tolerance of decision-makers represents the risk profiles of their organizations.

The principal source of data is the managerial survey conducted for the purpose of this study¹⁰ by Socioinform—a survey agency in Ukraine—between January and March 2013. The sample consists of 625 firms in Ukraine, i.e., 25 companies per oblast (24 in total) and Crimea. The sample is additionally balanced according to business size as follows: small firms (with 20 to 50 employees) represent 20 percent of the sample, mid-

¹⁰ Questions on attitudes to business risk were part of a joint project by researchers from the University of St. Gallen (Switzerland) and Ivan Franko National University of Lviv (Ukraine).

sized companies (with 51 to 250 employees) represent 50 percent, and large enterprises (with 251 to 1,000 employees) represent 30 percent.

The k-means method¹¹ is applied to investigate attitudes to risk across firms in Ukraine. This approach allows us to define the main types of risk tolerance based on respondents' answers to the following, somewhat modified gambling question originally suggested by Dohmen, Khamis and Lehman (2010), with two loss and gain scenarios added:

Assume that you have 100,000 UAH, and you have an opportunity to play a lottery. Playing the lottery, you have equal chances either to double or halve the invested amount. What percentage of 100,000 UAH are you ready to risk in the lottery?¹²

Loss scenario: If you failed in step 1, what percentage of the remaining amount are you ready to put into the same lottery again?

Gain scenario: If you won in step 1, what percentage of the remaining amount are you ready to invest in the same lottery again?

The results obtained suggest that firms represented in our sample can be grouped into three clusters: Cluster I, showing a high-risk tolerance, which includes 20 percent of companies (125 cases); Cluster II, showing a conservative appetite for risk, which is the most numerous group, comprising 52 percent of firms (325 cases); and Cluster III, showing a moderate attitude to risk, which accounts for 28 percent of the interviewed businesses (175 cases).

Table 7.7 shows simple descriptive statistics for the answers to the lottery questions introduced above across the three clusters representing different appetites for risk. A median¹³ company from Cluster I is ready to gamble 50 percent of the suggested amount if it plays only once. Cluster II demonstrates the lowest risk tolerance: a median player prefers to keep the whole amount of 100,000 UAH instead of gambling. Cluster III represents a moderate case: a median company is ready to risk up to 25,000 UAH.

¹¹ The k-means algorithm groups cases with the closest values into one cluster (see Seber 1984; Spath 1985).

¹² The same question is discussed in the section on individual attitudes to risk above.

¹³ The median is a measure of central tendency which separates the higher half of a data sample from the lower half. It is a robust alternative to the mean, since it is not sensitive to extreme or rare values.

A negative recent experience tends greatly to reduce appetite for risk. A positive previous experience encourages companies to gamble more the second time. Such procyclical behavior is called the “house money effect.” Investing in risky projects becomes less dangerous since, after the gain, a firm is less likely to fall below its reference point. If an average firm from Cluster II is considered, the firm reduces its risk exposure in relative terms but increases it in absolute terms. It is clear that opposite scenarios have an asymmetric effect on firms’ choices. Business representatives tend to dislike losses more than they like gains; this result echoes the classic findings by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).

Table 7.7. Risk tolerance in a static and dynamic game

	First step			Loss scenario			Gain scenario		
percentage	mean	median	min: max	mean	median	min: max	mean	median	min: max
Cluster I	52.56	50	10:100	19.38	10	0:100	56.32	50	0:100
Cluster II	2.76	0	0:25	0.86	0	0:20	2.69	0	0:20
Cluster III	27.31	25	0:60	8.26	5	0:50	28.49	30	0:50
Total “zero” responses	232			414			256		
	37.12			66.24			40.96		

Source: Managerial Survey 2013, uaregio.org

Figure 7.5 provides an overview of the distribution of attitudes to business risk across the regions. Similarly to Denisova-Schmidt and Huber (2014 and next section), Ukraine is mapped into five regions, and additionally Kyivska oblast is included in the east and Crimea in the south. All companies from Crimea share a highly conservative risk profile. The rest of Ukraine is characterized by mixed features, with one or two types of risk tolerance prevailing. In view of the differences between neighboring oblasts, for example, between Lvivska and Zakarpatska, as well as the similarities between geographically distant ones, for example, between Lvivska and Donetsk, it is suitable to continue the analysis of attitudes to risk in Ukrainian firms by means of risk tolerance clusters that do not necessarily completely overlap with historical or cultural regions. Such an approach ensures clearer patterns in the risk preferences of Ukrainian businesses that may be crucial for decision-making by investors or state bodies.

Figure 7.5. Cluster distribution by regions and oblasts





Figure 7.5. Cluster distribution by regions and oblasts



The personal characteristics of respondents, and in particular their extensive entrepreneurial and senior management experience, can lead decision-makers to more conservative investment choices. This tendency is visible from Table 7.8 which shows that managers in companies with the lowest risk tolerance have the most extensive business experience. The relation between risk tolerance and prior business experience is both significant and negative¹⁴ only for firms in Cluster II. The firms with moderate risk appetites are represented by the respondents with least experience in the sample.

¹⁴ Rank correlation Kendall tau: tau = -0.1635 (p-value = 0.0000) is used.

Table 7.8. Prior business experience

n percentage	Cluster I	Cluster II	Cluster III
First entrepreneurial experience	52	106	85
	41.60	32.61	48.57
First senior management experience	60	107	85
	48.00	32.92	48.57
Both	43	70	66
	34.40	21.54	37.71

Source: Managerial Survey (2013)

All business representatives had the choice to answer the survey questions in a preferred language. Figure 7.6 summarizes responses according to the language in which the interviews were conducted. Russian speakers represent 54.4 percent of respondents (340 cases), with a clear dominance in the groups of both the highest and the lowest risk tolerance. Ukrainian speakers represent the majority in the cluster of moderate appetites for risk.

Figure 7.6. Interview language



Source: Managerial Survey (2013)

In addition to the main questions, the respondents were asked a wide range of questions related to their firm's characteristics, such as ownership

structure, sector affiliation, workforce composition (gender, education and occupation), export and innovation activities, and annual sales in 2012, as well as general management satisfaction with business development over the last three years. This information reveals the degree of objectivity of this study's empirical results. Table 7.9 summarizes information about the surveyed firms as median values or fractions of total observations across three clusters of risk types. Some differences among clusters by sector can be observed. For instance, a median agricultural or transportation company is prone to relatively moderate risk affinity, while a wholesale or manufacturing business tends to have high risk tolerance. In terms of size, a median firm with conservative risk preferences is larger than a peer with high risk tolerance. It is worth looking at firms' R&D activities. At the time of the interviews, median businesses of all risk types reported no employees engaged in R&D, while 42.56 percent of companies (266 cases) had launched new products in the year before. Furthermore, 32.16 percent of firms (201 cases) claimed that their employees were involved in R&D, and only 56.22 percent of those firms (113 cases) introduced new products into the market. There are 153 firms which reported no staff involvement in R&D but which introduced new products. A median level of satisfaction with overall business development across all risk clusters was evaluated as good.

Table 7.9. Median firm characteristics across clusters

	Cluster I	Cluster II	Cluster III
Number of employees	70	90	85
Sector, percentage			
Agriculture	4.00	8.31	10.21
Construction	4.80	4.00	4.00
Information	20.80	23.38	24.57
Manufacturing	37.60	34.46	32.57
Mining	8.80	9.54	8.57
Transport	6.40	8.62	10.21
Wholesale	17.60	11.69	9.71
Employees, percentage			

	Cluster I	Cluster II	Cluster III
Females	42.35	40.00	40.38
Full-time	100.00	95.00	95.00
With high school degree	23.08	22.22	26.57
With bachelor's degree	32.26	30.00	30.77
With master's degree	20.00	22.22	20.00
Workers	80.00	80.00	80.77
Middle management	10.00	10.31	10.00
Top management	5.56	5.77	5.53
In sales	2.67	2.50	1.46
In production	80.00	78.00	79.17
In R&D	0	0	0
100 percent foreign ownership ("yes"), percentage	2.40	3.08	1.14
Exporter ("yes"), percentage	20.80	26.15	25.14
Export to total sales, percentage	0	0	0
Gross revenues, percentage			
Up to 5 million UAH	42.40	48.31	48.57
5 to 20 million UAH	34.40	24.00	25.14
20 to 50 million UAH	9.60	10.77	6.29
50 to 100 million UAH	2.40	4.92	11.43
Above 100 million UAH	5.60	3.69	2.86
n/a	5.60	8.31	5.71
Introduced new products ("yes"), percentage	44.80	42.15	41.71
Business development in last three years (on a scale from 1, "very bad," to 5, "very good")	4	4	4
Number of observations	125	325	175

Source: Managerial Survey (2013)

Personal savings and revenues or loans from the existing business serve as the most popular financing sources across firms with different appetites for risk (Table 7.10 below). In the first place, companies tend to rely on their own financial abilities in business activities; they show a clear preference for available cash. The data show that 32.64 percent of firms (204 cases) would take bank credits for investment purposes, 41.92 percent of companies (262 cases) would use at least two different financing opportunities, and only two respondents would go for all five suggested ways of financing. Thus, companies try to diversify their exposures somewhat. Family and friends play a secondary role in this context.


Table 7.10. Financing sources for business establishment or extension

n percent	Existing business revenues/loans	Non/real estate sales	Personal savings	Family/friends loans	Bank loans
Cluster I	65	13	71	15	43
	52.00	10.40	56.80	12.00	34.40
Cluster II	175	20	145	34	100
	53.85	6.15	44.61	10.46	30.77
Cluster III	78	18	89	18	61
	44.57	10.28	50.86	10.29	34.86

Source: Managerial Survey (2013)

Figure 7.7 shows that at least 60 percent of firms in each risk tolerance group expect to receive regular income with some growth potential from their capital investments. This corresponds to moderate risk-taking behavior. Higher risk tolerance results in a bigger appetite for investments with capital growth. According to the data, 20.61 percent of firms (67 cases) in the conservative cluster aim at regular income, while 18.40 percent (23 cases) of companies with high risk tolerance state capital growth as their main investment goal. The moderate group is rather balanced in this sense.


Figure 7.7. Main goals of business investment



Source: Managerial Survey (2013)

Across all types of attitudes to risk, a short-term orientation of up to two or three years prevails in how businesses in Ukraine make investment decisions. Such expectations are reasonable for non-capital-intensive investments. Firms whose investment horizon exceeds five years account for 6.4 percent (40 cases) of the total sample; in this group, manufacturing and information industries represent 32.5 percent (13 cases) and 25 percent (10 cases), respectively. In general, a more long-term business projection is missing in the majority of the firms surveyed.


Figure 7.8. Investment horizon in years



Source: Managerial Survey (2013)

Figure 7.9 demonstrates that companies are most worried about their performance against their competitors. Businesses use a sector or industry growth rate as the main benchmark. This is a common pattern in all three clusters of the firms investigated. Inflation and credit rates are other popular indicators against which firms benchmark returns on their investment (see Figure 7.9).

Figure 7.9. Top benchmarks for performance of business investments



Source: Managerial Survey (2013)

Firms with different risk tolerance converge, to some extent, with regard to their market expectations (Table 7.11 below). Under normal market conditions, businesses expect their investments to outperform industry growth by 60–150 percent. For median companies with a different risk tolerance, the corporate tax rate should normally be set at 13–15 percent. Companies' expectations about inflation and unemployment rates vary between 4–5 percent. Median companies across the three clusters expect credit rates and pension fund taxation to be 10 percent and 20 percent, respectively.

Table 7.11. Median firm expectations under normal market conditions

Percentage	Cluster I	Cluster II	Cluster III
Annual return on business investment	24	20 (1.23)	25 (0.57)
Sector/industry growth	15 (0.80)	15 (1.23)	10 (0.57)


Percentage	Cluster I	Cluster II	Cluster III
Inflation rate	4 (0.80)	4 (0.92)	5
Unemployment rate	5 (1.60)	4 (1.23)	5
Credit rate	10 (0.80)	10 (0.61)	10 (0.57)
Corporate tax	14 (1.60)	13 (0.31)	15 (0.57)
Pension fund taxation	20 (1.60)	20 (0.61)	20 (0.57)

Note: Fractions of missing observations are reported in brackets

Source: Managerial Survey (2013)

The majority of firms, i.e., 65.28 percent (408 cases), prefer to develop their businesses within the sector where they already have experience and established partnerships (Figure 7.10 below). Investigating related industries comes as the second most popular option. Companies representing Cluster II show the highest degree of conservatism in this relation. Firms with moderate risk attitudes are more open to trying their fortune in related industries, while businesses with a high appetite for risk are more prepared to consider projects in unrelated sectors.


Figure 7.10. Sector/industry preferences for business establishment or extension



Source: Managerial Survey (2013)

There is a strong preference (above 60 percent) across all clusters to proceed with potential business activities in the current region(s) (Figure 7.11 below). Representatives with a high risk tolerance reported an interest in extending their business activities to other parts of Ukraine relatively more often.

Figure 7.11. Location preferences for business establishment or extension



Source: Managerial Survey (2013)

The relation between a company's existing regional networks and preferred geographical areas for establishing a new business, or extending the existing one, is significantly positive.¹⁵ This suggests that the radius of potential regional presence tends to increase with the radius of existing partnerships. Companies with business presence in different parts of Ukraine are most willing to invest in potential investment projects abroad. Interestingly, the firms with partnerships solely in foreign countries do not intend to extend their activities abroad but prefer to focus on the present region(s). According to the data, 36.64 percent of the interviewed companies (229 cases) have business partners across Ukraine and abroad.

¹⁵ Rank correlation Kendall tau: tau = 0.0919 (p-value = 0.0096) is used.

Table 7.12. Location preferences given geographical presence of existing partners

n percentage	Partners from						
	Same region	Other regions	Abroad	Same region &		Other regions &	
				Other regions	Abroad	Same region	Abroad
Hard to answer	15	0	2	27	6	25	0
	2.40	0	0.32	4.32	0.96	4.00	0
Same region	110	6	3	154	12	153	3
	17.60	0.96	0.48	24.64	1.92	24.48	0.48
Other region(s)	11	1	0	24	3	22	1
	1.76	0.16	0	3.84	0.48	3.52	0.16
Abroad	2	0	0	13	2	29	1
	0.32	0	0	2.08	0.32	4.64	0.16

Source: Managerial Survey (2013)

The findings of this study point to three types of risk tolerance among businesses in Ukraine, which are represented by small, medium and large enterprises from various regions and economic sectors. Risk appetites appear heterogeneously across Ukraine. According to our study, neither historical or cultural regions nor administrative units are homogeneous in their appetites for risk. The only exception is Crimea, where all firms display a strong conservatism in their risk tolerance. In general, geographical proximity or historical and cultural ties among oblasts do not necessarily imply a similarity of their attitudes to business risk. Within the most conservative group of companies, decision-makers with greater business experience have a lower risk tolerance. Though Russian speakers represent 54.4 percent of the sample, Ukrainian speakers constitute the majority in the group of moderate risk attitudes. The majority of firms across all risk tolerance types recognize regular income with some capital growth as the main goal of their business activities. This translates into an expected annual return on investment of above 20 percent. The usual time horizon for investment projects is two to three years. This highlights the deficient long-term thinking of businesses in Ukraine. Companies tend to evaluate their performance using market benchmarks, in particular sector growth. Under normal market conditions, companies expect to outperform their competi-

tors by roughly 60–150 percent. Generated cash from business activities and personal savings constitute the main financing sources for investment projects. Only 30 percent of firms consider bank credits. Most companies prefer to implement business projects within their own industrial sector, and in the regions where they are currently based in Ukraine. Firms with a higher risk tolerance are more likely to look for business opportunities in other sectors and regions.

Corruption and Informal Practices in Doing Business in Ukraine

ELENA DENISOVA-SCHMIDT and MARTIN HUBER

Ukraine faces some discouraging market challenges, including underdeveloped laws and selective enforcement, as well as unpredictable government actions and corruption¹⁶ (US Commercial Service 2012). While all of these problems seem to have held more or less steady, corruption continues to worsen (see recent discussions in Denisova-Schmidt, Huber and Prytula 2015; Denisova-Schmidt and Prytula 2017a). The country has a very large shadow economy, which the World Bank estimated at 54.9 percent of Ukraine's GDP in 2010. Bribes and kickbacks are considered to be business as usual. Strong ties leading to conflicts of interest between businesspeople, politicians and public officials are also a significant part of the country's systematic corruption. However, business corruption in Ukraine is not an isolated phenomenon; it is tightly embedded in the general corruption in society (Denisova-Schmidt and Prytula 2016a, 2016b and 2017b). Only 25 percent of Ukrainians consider corruption to be unacceptable under any circumstances (Combating 2012).

Studies on business corruption in Ukraine usually cover its forms and extent (see Bilotkach 2006; Leipnik and Kyrychenko 2013; Markovskaya, Pridemore and Nakajima 2003; Pleines 2005 and 2010; Rodgers, Williams and Round 2008). Some scholars have found regional variations in corruption in industries (Shelley 1998), and on institutional levels (Becker et al. 2011). In this section, corruption and some other business activities of companies operating in Ukraine are examined in the context of historical regions (Table 7.14).

The approach developed and tested in the Russian business environment by Shekshnia, Ledeneva and Denisova-Schmidt (2013, 2014 and

¹⁶ Corruption is often understood as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain,” a definition provided by Transparency International (TI).

2017) is used in this study, which allows us to ask questions about corruption indirectly by coding the negatively connoted word “corruption” into the more neutral “informal practices,” defined as “the practical norms CEOs and managers often use to get things done” (Shekshnia, Ledeneva and Denisova-Schmidt 2013, 2014 and 2017). This helps us to get information about some of the less reprehensible but more widespread forms of corruption (Denisova-Schmidt and Prytula 2015a and 2015b; Denisova-Schmidt, Huber and Prytula 2016) (Table 7.13).

Table 7.13. Informal practices versus corruption

	Informal practice	Corruption
Internal Informal practices	Paying salaries and bonuses to staff in cash without paying taxes and social fees	= fraud
	Receiving kickbacks or other material benefits from job candidates	= gift = conflict of interest
	Using company funds, facilities or staff for personal gain	= abuse of power or office
External informal practices	Receiving kickbacks or other informal rewards (for example, expensive gifts) from vendors, suppliers or buyers	= gift = conflict of interest
	Selecting vendors/contractors/winners of open tenders on the basis of informal relationships and agreements	= cronyism = nepotism = lobbying
	Using unethical informal tools such as <i>kompromat</i> against competitors	= influence peddling

Region: Definitions

Ukraine was clustered into five regions: east, west, north, south and center, following Barrington and Herron (2004), excluding the city of Kyiv and Crimea¹⁷ (Table 7.14).

¹⁷ As the country’s capital, Kyiv is distinct from any other region in terms of its administrative and political significance. Crimea was not considered due to its arguably distinct culture and history.

Table 7.14. Mapping of Ukrainian regions

East	Part of Ukraine having the longest common history with Russia (Donetska, Luhanska, Kharkivska, Zaporizka and Dnipropetrovska oblasts)
North	Part of Ukraine which came under Russian control between the middle of the 1600s and the late 1700s (Poltavska, Kirovohradska, Cherkaska, Chernihivska and Sumska oblasts)
South	Much of the area which had been under Ottoman Turkish rule until the late 1700s, and was then under Russian control (Khersonska, Odeska and Mykolaivska oblasts)
Center	Part of Poland, before falling under Russian control as a result of the second and third partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795 (Zhytomyrska, Vinnytska, Khmelnytska, Rivnenska and Volynska oblasts)
West	Belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire from (at least) the late eighteenth century up to 1918 (Chernivetska, Zakarpatska, Lvivska, Ternopilka and Ivano-Frankivska oblasts)

Source: See Barrington and Herron (2004)

Regional differences in Ukraine are also discussed (more extensively) in Denisova-Schmidt and Huber (2014), where propensity score matching is applied to the data in order to make firms across various regions as similar as possible in terms of their observed characteristics such as size, industry, employee composition, export orientation and so on. The motivation for this approach is that some characteristics of firms are very likely correlated with both perceived corruption and geographical region; for example, companies in a particular industry or with a strong export orientation may be more severely exposed to corruption and at the same time more likely to be located in a particular region of Ukraine (i.e., the iron and steel industry in eastern Ukraine). Therefore, if one is interested in the regional difference in perceived corruption not coming from distinct industry compositions across regions, but rather being inherently related to cultural or historical differences between the various regions, then firms across regions need to be made comparable in all their characteristics as firms, jointly associated with perceived corruption and region. One statistical tool to achieve this is matching (see Rubin 1974), which, bluntly speaking, for each firm in a region aims at finding or “matching” a firm in another region that is comparable in terms of its observed characteristics. The average difference in perceived corruption of matched firms across regions then gives the regional difference, after adjusting for differences in the industry structure, which may therefore be interpreted as regional difference related to distinct cultural or historic developments. In Table 7.15 the means across regions

of those dimensions in which firms are made comparable, in the matching approach of Denisova-Schmidt and Huber (2014), are presented. As discussed therein, it appears reasonable that several of these dimensions might influence perceived corruption, and also might differ across regions. Some key findings of the matching analysis of Denisova-Schmidt and Huber (2014) will be reviewed below.

Table 7.15. Average firm characteristics across regions

Region	East	North	South	Central	West
Number of employees	380.768	239.376	178.640	209.040	236.192
Sector: Agriculture (binary)	0.080	0.064	0.120	0.064	0.096
Sector: Mining (binary)	0.072	0.120	0.080	0.112	0.072
Sector: Construction (binary)	0.032	0.032	0.040	0.040	0.064
Sector: Manufacturing (binary)	0.408	0.344	0.227	0.344	0.360
Sector: Wholesale (binary)	0.144	0.088	0.133	0.136	0.120
Sector: Transport (binary)	0.064	0.096	0.080	0.112	0.088
Sector: Information (binary)	0.200	0.256	0.320	0.192	0.200
Share of females	0.412	0.413	0.472	0.428	0.432
Share of full-time employees	0.869	0.888	0.860	0.900	0.824
Share of employees with high school degree	0.304	0.307	0.399	0.342	0.383
Share of employees with bachelor degree	0.348	0.426	0.301	0.360	0.346
Share of employees with master degree	0.347	0.267	0.293	0.292	0.272
Share of workers	0.745	0.756	0.754	0.775	0.771
Share of middle management	0.151	0.138	0.132	0.142	0.149
Share of top management	0.073	0.084	0.078	0.065	0.061
Share of employees in sales	0.077	0.064	0.050	0.056	0.056
Share of employees in production	0.711	0.711	0.733	0.729	0.773
Share of employees in R&D	0.022	0.016	0.003	0.019	0.008

Region	East	North	South	Central	West
Foreign ownership (binary)	0.032	0.008	0.027	0.024	0.016
Exporter (binary)	0.256	0.152	0.107	0.280	0.336
Share of exports of total sales	0.078	0.051	0.024	0.105	0.138
Gross revenue: Up to 5 million UAH (binary)	0.448	0.568	0.493	0.456	0.384
Gross revenue: 5 to 20 million UAH (binary)	0.200	0.240	0.267	0.264	0.304
Gross revenue: 20 to 50 million UAH (binary)	0.088	0.048	0.093	0.096	0.152
Gross revenue: 50 to 100 million UAH (binary)	0.056	0.032	0.093	0.072	0.088
Gross revenue missing (binary)	0.128	0.088	0.027	0.080	0.032
Introduced new products (binary)	0.416	0.312	0.240	0.416	0.600
Business development in last three years (on a scale from 1, "very bad," to 5, "very good")	3.304	3.416	3.480	3.536	3.656
Number of observations	125	125	75	125	125

Source: Survey (2013)

Empirical results

The project questionnaires asked businesses about the prevalence of informal practices and corruption in several institutions: tax inspection, customs, courts, the police, the sanitation service, fire inspection, and local, regional and central administrations. They also inquired into the interviewees' degree of engagement in such activities when dealing with these institutions. Both sets of answers ranged from "never," "seldom," "sometimes," "often" to "systematically." The results in Table 7.16 and Table 7.17 show that the majority of respondents perceive these institutions to be very corrupt, while the reality of the respondents' actual engagement in corrupt activities with these institutions is completely different. The perception corresponds to the reality in only one aspect: the ranking of public institutions from more to less corrupt.

Table 7.16. Corruption at public institutions (perception)
(in descending order by “not never” responses)

(Responses to the survey question: “Please indicate to what extent the following institutions engage in informal practices and corruption”)

Institution		Never	Seldom	Some-times	Often	Systemati-cally	N/a	Not never*
Tax inspection	n	38	90	180	170	86	61	526
	percentage	6.1	14.4	28.8	27.2	13.8	9.8	84.1
Fire inspection	n	52	116	197	129	82	49	524
	percentage	8.3	18.6	31.5	20.6	13.1	7.8	83.9
Sanitation services	n	65	95	185	129	88	63	497
	percentage	10.4	15.2	29.6	20.6	14.1	10.1	79.5
Administra-tion on the local level	n	93	127	163	116	55	71	461
	percentage	14.9	20.3	26.1	18.6	8.8	11.4	73.7
Police	n	87	91	141	131	98	77	461
	percentage	13.9	14.6	22.6	21	15.7	12.3	73.8
Administra-tion on the regional level	n	126	106	146	100	55	92	407
	percentage	20.2	17	23.4	16	8.8	14.7	65.1
Customs	n	111	51	141	133	87	102	412
	percentage	17.8	8.2	22.6	21.3	13.9	16.3	65.9
Courts	n	93	85	132	138	86	91	441
	percentage	14.9	13.6	21.1	22.1	13.8	14.6	70.5
Administra-tion on the national level	n	140	95	103	86	72	129	356
	percentage	22.4	15.2	16.5	13.8	11.5	20.6	57

* “Not never” represents the sum of all “seldom,” “sometimes,” “often” and “systematically” responses

Source: Survey (2013)

Table 7.17. Corruption at public institutions
(reality; in descending order by “not never” responses)


(Responses to the survey question: “How often do firms comparable to yours have to engage in informal practices [making additional payments or informal gifts] when dealing with...?”)

Institution		Never	Seldom	Some-times	Often	System-atically	N/a	Not never*
Tax inspection	n	71	132	203	105	41	73	481
	percentage	11.4	21.1	32.5	16.8	6.6	11.7	76.9
Fire inspection	n	82	170	173	81	56	63	480
	percentage	13.1	27.2	27.7	13	9	10.1	76.8
Sanitation services	n	117	147	162	78	44	77	431
	percentage	18.7	23.5	25.9	12.5	7	12.3	69
Administra-tion on the local level	n	148	162	142	61	33	79	398
	percentage	23.7	25.9	22.7	9.8	5.3	12.6	63.7
Police	n	176	151	123	54	26	95	354
	percentage	28.2	24.2	19.7	8.6	4.2	15.2	56.6
Administra-tion on the regional level	n	197	147	112	49	24	96	332
	percentage	31.5	23.5	17.9	7.8	3.8	15.4	53.1
Courts	n	195	145	102	53	24	106	324
	percentage	31.2	23.2	16.3	8.5	3.8	17	51.8
Customs	n	228	77	117	60	26	117	280
	percentage	36.5	12.3	18.7	9.6	4.2	18.7	44.8
Administra-tion on the national level	n	254	110	85	30	23	123	248
	percentage	40.6	17.6	13.6	4.8	3.7	19.7	39.7

Source: Survey (2013)

There are some regional differences in the perception of corruption in public institutions, even after making the firms across different regions comparable in terms of their observed characteristics, as shown in Figure 7.12. This graph replicates some results from Denisova-Schmidt and Huber (2014), namely the average differences in response to the question “How often are informal practices/corruption used by the following institutions?,” measured on a scale from 1 (“never”) to 5 (“systematically”), between firms in the east and the other four regions, after matching on characteristics of firms. The results suggest that firms in the north generally find corruption and informal practices to be more pronounced, especially with the courts and the police. In contrast, companies in the south consider levels of corruption to be lower compared to the east, particularly regarding tax inspections and customs, while companies in the western region find the police to be less corrupt than do companies in the east. A related question asked was: “How often do companies comparable to yours have to engage in informal practices when dealing with the following institutions?” (see Figure 7.13). Again, companies in southern and western regions claim to be least exposed to such practices (see Denisova-Schmidt and Huber 2014).


Figure 7.12. Average differences in response to the survey question
“How often are informal practices/corruption used by the following institutions?”
 (on a scale from 1, “never,” to 5, “systematically”) between firms in the east and the other four regions,
 after matching on characteristics of firms



* indicates differences that are statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level

Source: Survey (2013)

Figure 7.13. Average differences in response to the survey question
"How often do companies comparable to yours have to engage in informal practices when
dealing with the following institutions?"
 (on a scale from 1, "never," to 5, "systematically") between firms in the east and the other four regions,
 after matching on characteristics of firms



Source: Survey (2013)

The questionnaires also asked whether comparable companies engage in informal practices such as usually paying salaries to their staff in cash, or if managers receive any benefits from job candidates or use company funds or employees for their personal needs. They asked about any informal practices in dealing with suppliers and buyers as well (Table 7.18).


Concerning regional differences, no significant differences were found between eastern and northern firms, after adjusting for firm characteristics. However, as shown in Figure 7.14, firms in the south report encountering significantly fewer informal practices in open tenders, in the remuneration of employees, in the use of firm resources for private gain and in competition with other companies, as compared to the east. Firms in the central region find informal practices in job applications to be more common than do firms in the east, while all other differences are insignificant. Firms in the west state that the use of firm resources for private gains and informal practices against competitors are significantly less systematic than in other regions.

Table 7.18: Corruption in companies (in descending order by “not never” responses)
 (Responses to the survey question “To what extent do firms comparable to yours encounter the following informal practices?”)

Practice		Never	Seldom	Sometimes	Often	System- atically	N/a	Not never
Internal practices								
Paying salaries and bonuses to staff in cash without paying taxes and social fees	n	235	96	115	64	31	84	306
	percentage	37.6	15.4	18.4	10.2	5	13.4	49
Using company funds/ production or office premises/company staff by managers for personal gain or to carry out personal assignments	n	326	89	71	38	6	95	204
	percentage	52.2	14.2	11.4	6.1	1	15.2	32.6
Receiving kickbacks or other material benefits from job candidates by heads	n	331	83	69	36	5	101	193
	percentage	53	13.3	11	5.8	0.8	16.2	30.8
External practices								
Selecting vendors/ contractors/winners of open tenders on the basis of informal relationships and agreements	n	183	104	133	84	26	95	347
	percentage	29.3	16.6	21.3	13.4	4.2	15.2	55.5
Receiving kickbacks or other informal rewards (for example, expensive gifts) by regional managers from vendors, suppliers or buyers	n	243	97	126	50	9	100	282
	percentage	38.9	15.5	20.2	8	1.4	16	45.1
Using unethical informal tools such as <i>kompromat</i> against competitors	n	329	83	81	25	9	98	198
	percentage	52.6	13.3	13	4	1.4	15.7	31.7

Source: Survey (2013)

Figure 7.14. Average differences in responses to the question
“To what extent do firms comparable to yours encounter the following informal practices?”
 (on a scale from 1, “never,” to 5, “systematically”) between firms in the east and the other four regions,
 after matching on characteristics of firms



Source: Survey (2013)

Many respondents do not consider these activities to be corruption. This attitude probably explains the relatively weak anticorruption strategies used in the companies interviewed (Table 7.19). It should be noted that informal tools such as “the use of subcontractors, agents, and third parties to work with regional authorities and regulatory agencies,” and “allocations in the annual budget for developing informal relationships with representatives of regional authorities and regulatory agencies,” seem to be more popular and probably more efficient than such formal instruments as “the use of courts to counter unscrupulous actions by authorities or regulatory agencies” and “formal approaches to state officials to counter unscrupulous actions by regional and local authorities and regulatory agencies.”

Here, too, some regional differences were found, after making the firms across different regions comparable in terms of their observed characteristics by matching. Companies in the south report significantly less willingness to cooperate proactively with local authorities. Firms in the central region claim to mobilize the mass media and courts against corruption more often, as well as to call on national authorities to fight local corruption more frequently. Finally, firms in the west state that they make

Table 7.19. Anticorruption strategies (in descending order by “not never” responses)
 (Responses to the survey question “To what extent do firms comparable to yours use the following strategies to manage and counter informal practices of public authorities?”)

Strategy		never	to a small extent	to some extent	widely	not never
Training of managers and regional staff in the internal rules of interaction with counterparts	n	290	175	124	34	333
	percentage	46.4	28	19.8	5.4	53.2
Creation and dissemination of codes of corporate behavior	n	292	196	102	33	331
	percentage	46.7	31.4	16.3	5.3	53
“Buffer” strategy: The use of subcontractors, agents and third parties to work with regional authorities and regulatory agencies	n	304	223	81	15	319
	percentage	48.6	35.7	13	2.4	51.1
Active briefing of partners on the company’s rules and standards on working with government and regulatory agencies	n	308	183	110	22	315
	percentage	49.3	29.3	17.6	3.5	50.4
Allocations in the annual budget for developing informal relationships with representatives of regional authorities and regulatory agencies	n	342	210	59	12	281
	percentage	54.7	33.6	9.4	1.9	44.9
Proactive proposals to regional authorities and regulatory agencies on cooperation programs and methods	n	367	185	65	6	256
	percentage	58.7	29.6	10.4	1	41
Creation of alliances with other companies in the region to counter unscrupulous actions by representatives of the authorities or regulatory agencies	n	372	169	69	13	251
	percentage	59.5	27	11	2.1	40.1
Use of courts to counter unscrupulous actions by authorities or regulatory agencies	n	375	170	67	11	248
	percentage	60	27.2	10.7	1.8	39.7
Use of the media to counter unscrupulous actions by authorities or regulatory agencies	n	386	162	64	11	237
	percentage	61.8	25.9	10.2	1.8	37.9
Formal approaches to state officials to counter unscrupulous actions by regional and local authorities and regulatory agencies	n	402	157	48	16	221
	percentage	64.3	25.1	7.7	2.6	35.4

Source: Survey (2013)

more use of “buffer” strategies via third parties when dealing with local authorities (the “outsourcing” of corruption). Many scholars recommend intensive cooperation with local partners on difficult issues (see Denisova-Schmidt 2011; Fey and Shekshnia 2011). International companies should, however, be careful using this strategy: this might be subject to, for example, the UK Bribery Act, or other national regulations. Companies are responsible for any possible bribes paid by their agents. For example, the Swiss company Alstom was given summary punishment in 2012 because the company did not prevent bribing of officials in Latvia, Tunisia and Malaysia.

The survey analyzed in the present study also asked respondents to justify the use of informal practices. The majority of the CEOs interviewed (81.8 percent) agree that informal practices are a financial burden (Figure 7.15), and an obstacle to doing business (78.2 percent agree) (Figure 7.18). However, interviewees also believe that such practices help to save money and to save time (46.1 percent and 63.2 percent, respectively) (Figures 7.16 and 7.17).¹⁸

Figure 7.15. Informal practices are a financial burden




Figure 7.16. Informal practices help save costs




Figure 7.17. Informal practices help save time





Figure 7.18. Informal practices are an obstacle to business development and to the operations of a firm




Source: Survey (2013)

¹⁸ Respondents were asked to evaluate the statement on a scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“very much”). “Agree” is the sum of all 3, 4 and 5 responses; “disagree” is the sum of all 1 and 2 responses.

Respondents were also asked if they believed that corruption hindered the development of their businesses. Corruption does not seem to be such a huge problem for business operations in all regions (see Denisova-Schmidt 2014; Denisova-Schmidt and Huber 2014). Only half of respondents (52 percent) considered corruption to be a problem (Figure 7.19).¹⁹ Other surveys show similar findings: over 80 percent of respondents (business-people) believe that corruption is an integral part of business-to-business transactions in Ukraine (Combating 2012). In general, corruption seems to be more of a norm than a deviation (see Ledeneva 2013; Svensson 2005).

Figure 7.19. Corruption is an obstacle



Source: Survey (2013)

The results of this study show that Ukrainian firms tend to assume that authorities are corrupt; but in reality this is not often the case. While firms tend to blame officials for corrupt activities, they hide or underestimate their own (internal) corruption. Firms seldom apply anticorruption measures, and when they do apply them, they prefer informal rather than formal tools. Corruption is perceived to be less prevalent in the south and in the west compared to the east. It is, however, not seen as a major issue for most companies in the country (Denisova-Schmidt, Prytula 2018).

¹⁹ “No” is the sum of all “never” and “seldom” responses; “yes” is the sum of all “sometimes,” “often” and “systematically” responses.

Conclusions

This chapter has mapped individual and business attitudes to risk, envy and corruption, using data generated from the surveys conducted in the framework of the *Region, Nation and Beyond* project in 2013. Almost all variables studied exhibit some regional differences; and several hypotheses have been tested in the chapter to explain the interregional differences. The core theoretical assumption of this chapter is that differences can be explained by historical legacies, which influence values, perceptions and habits and thus institutional capacity as well as social and human capital, rather than being explained by the social and economic realities of different regions.

The analysis of individual attitudes to risk was the most supportive of the Great Frontier hypothesis: the inhabitants of the western, northern and central parts of Ukraine were found to be more willing to take risks than the inhabitants of the east, the south and Donbas, who are more risk averse. The study of envy did not find a direct confirmation of the Great Frontier hypothesis, as Donbas inhabitants (and above all the urban population) were found to be the most envious, followed by inhabitants of the north and the west. However, the correlation of envy with the factual level of wealth supports the hypothesis, as in the latter two regions it is negative, while in Donbas it is positive, meaning that more wealth brings with it more envy in this region. The Donbas case is explained by a “new deprivation hypothesis,” namely, that recently grown aspirations relate to the rise to power of local elites in the capital against the backdrop of postcommunist relative deprivation.

The examination of attitudes to risk among businesses revealed insignificant interregional differences, with the exception of Crimea, where all companies share a highly conservative risk profile. The analysis of corruption found that the perception of corruption and informal practices in public institutions among businesses was higher in the north and lower in the south and the west.

Apart from regional differences, other interesting results were found concerning the influence of other factors on the attributes researched. In particular, one finding is that the risk tolerance of the general population is positively correlated with enviousness, “languagability” (bilingualism), and the land possession of respondents’ grandparents. Also, while regions are the primary variables that explain envy, envy does not however seem to have a strong effect on life satisfaction, which is the key interest for other disci-

plines. In relation to corruption, Ukrainian firms tend to assume that state authorities are corrupt, which in fact is not often the case. At the same time, firms tend to hide their own internal corruption, and do not count corruption as a significant obstacle for doing business. Finally, the study of attitudes to business risk presents interesting results about the characteristics, performance and expectations of a median Ukrainian firm.

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8. Ukraine in 2013–2014: A New Political Geography

YAROSLAV HRYTSAK

The nature of Ukrainian regionalism

In the analysis of Ukrainian political geography, one encounters two seemingly mutually exclusive tendencies. On the one hand, there are strong regional divides that reflect the cultural diversity of the country, with the language factor (dividing Ukraine into Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking regions) appearing to be the most stable and strong predictor. On the other hand, these regional divisions are themselves not stable. From the first free parliamentary elections in 1990 and the first presidential elections in 1991 up till the 2004 Orange Revolution, the main dividing line moved slowly but surely from the west to the east. During the last decade, as subsequent elections have shown, this line has been stabilized.¹

These analytical tendencies are based on two different interpretations. One group of scholars sees the country divided into “two Ukraines,” the Ukrainian-speaking west² and the Russian-speaking east, and insists on language as the most important divisive factor (Riabchuk 2000). The other group turns its attention to the fact that these divisions are not stable but more nuanced, as regional differences run not between “two Ukraines” but

¹ Maps of the results of parliamentary and presidential elections in Ukraine from 1991 till 2014 are available at: <http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/category/countries/u/ukraine>.

² In a Ukrainian context, the “west” has two meanings. In a broader sense, it refers to the Ukrainian-speaking oblasts in the west and the center. In a narrower sense, it means the oblasts that were outside the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union until World War II, being annexed to Soviet Ukraine in 1939.

within each of them; these scholars show that, apart from linguistic factors, there are other factors at work (Rodgers 2007).³

To put it as briefly as possible, these two schools differ in the way in which they see regional divisions in Ukraine as demonstrating two or rather twenty-two Ukraines. As I have participated in these discussions about regionalism in Ukraine myself,⁴ this chapter may be somewhat biased. Still, my arguments are not merely a reflection of my political preferences⁵ but derive more from my academic research. I belong to a group of Ukrainian historians who believe that Ukrainian identity has been shaped not so much by cultural and linguistic factors but rather by long-term historical factors,⁶ above all by long-standing patterns of relations between the state and society. Accordingly, the group of scholars holding similar views⁷ will tend to talk about the Ukrainian nation in civic rather than in ethnic terms.

My presumptions have been largely validated by an ongoing sociological project carried out in Ukraine, which I have co-organized and codirected since the early 1990s. This is a series of surveys of Ukrainian regionalism with a special focus on Lviv and Donetsk, the two cities situated on the opposite poles of political mobilization in Ukraine. Among other things, the surveys have revealed that, while in Lviv identities are fixed and determined by language, in Donetsk they are in flux and situational. Moreover, the nationwide data on the hierarchy of identities suggest that, while in the Ukrainian-speaking west a national identification as Ukrainian prevails, in the rest of Ukraine people tend to identify themselves in social terms more often than not (for example, as workers or as retired) (Hrytsak et al. 2007).

³ See Rogers 2007 for a detailed overview of academic literature on regionalism in Ukraine.

⁴ In fact it was I who coined the metaphor of “twenty-two Ukraines” in 2002, as opposed to the concept of there being “two Ukraines” (see Hrytsak 2002 and 2004).

⁵ I stand for the need for reconciliation between different regions of Ukraine, and therefore I tend to downplay regional divisions in Ukraine (see Hrytsak 2011).

⁶ See the chapter by Gaidai, Liebich, Myshlovska, Sereda and Sklokina in the present volume for a detailed discussion of this topic.

⁷ Ivan L. Rudnytsky (1919–1984) was the leading historian in this school of thought. He continued and synthesized the views of the two most influential Ukrainian liberal thinkers, Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–1895) and Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882–1931), who also happened to write on Ukrainian history. Apart from Rudnytsky, it is Roman Szporluk (b. 1933), the Harvard-based Ukrainian historian, who made the strongest impact on me and my generation; his views are best summarized in Szporluk 2008.

These findings are in line with the results of other surveys and projects that have included Ukraine as part of a larger geographical focus. They have shown that, on the one hand, the two different types of identification—a stable and predominantly national one as in Lviv, and an unstable and predominantly social one as in Donetsk—represent a division that runs across the former Soviet Union. It divides the former Soviet “west” (territories that were annexed by the Kremlin in 1939, including western Ukraine) from the Soviet “rest” (Miller et al. 1998). At the same time, the west–east divisions are characteristic for most post-communist European countries. They seem to reflect historical waves and patterns of modernization that came from the west. In particular, Ukrainian Galicia, the core of the Ukrainian west with its center in Lviv, tends to identify itself similarly to southeastern Poland around Krakow, and these divisions coincide with the nineteenth-century Austrian–Russian border (Zarycki 1999, 60).

On the basis of the surveys’ results, I have come to the understanding that the concept of “two Ukraines” is not academically neutral either. It rather reflects a point of view of Ukrainian-speaking intellectuals who are largely (but not exclusively) based in western Ukraine or who are originally from the region.⁸ The way they tend to discuss identities reflects the pattern of identification that dominates there, considering national identity as the most important in the hierarchy of identities. My suggestion is that, in order to understand Ukraine better, one should move beyond national identity and, as a matter of fact, “beyond identity” altogether (see Hrytsak 2008 and 2015),⁹ turning instead to the analysis of other topics and factors that can better explain the new dynamics in Ukraine.

⁸ More often than not, these intellectuals are writers or literary critics (for example, Yurii Andrukhovych, Oleksandr Boichenko, Mykola Riabchuk and Oksana Zabuzhko). This may explain their obsession with the “language issue.” Generally in Eastern Europe, and particularly in the Ukrainian case, *belles lettres* have played a very important role in the articulation of national identity. In this respect, Viacheslav Lypynsky (1981) criticized the Ukrainian national project as “literary Ukraine,” having more to do with literary visions than with reality. Lypynsky and his followers who belong to the academic sphere have offered an alternative vision of Ukraine that is in contrast to the literary one.

⁹ These books are not strictly academic (they are collections of essays and blog posts), but they are based on my academic research.

Euromaidan as moment of truth?

From its very beginning, the Euromaidan seemed to confirm the theory of “two Ukraines.” Its representations reaffirmed the divisions that had been familiar since the previous (Orange) Maidan, ten years earlier (see, for example, the map in Fisher 2013). By the very end of 2013, the mass protests in Kyiv had large support in the west (80 percent) and the center (63 percent) of the country, while in the south and the east they were supported only by a minority (20 percent and 30 percent, respectively). The geography of Euromaidan protesters reflected a similar pattern: the share of those who directly participated in the Euromaidan and related actions in Kyiv or locally was 26 percent from the west, 15 percent from the center, 5.5 percent from the south, and 3 percent from the east. The highest ratio of protesters was from Kyiv itself (49.8 percent) (Fond Demokratychni initsiatyvy and KIIS 2013a).

The Euromaidan was, however, a very protean phenomenon, both in its character and its social structure. Thus, the initial preponderance of Kyiv inhabitants among protesters declined to about 20 percent by late December 2013 and then to 10 percent by early February 2014. At the same time, western Ukraine’s role constantly increased, from generating slightly over a quarter of protesters in early December to a third in mid-January and then half of them by early February. Tellingly, an increase of the west’s share coincided with a decrease in the share of Russian speakers from 25 percent to 15 percent between December 2013 and February 2014 (see Table 8.1 below).¹⁰

A turning point in Euromaidan history was formed by the “anti-protest” laws of January 16, 2014, that criminalized civic protests and restricted freedom of speech. After this, mostly peaceful manifestations turned into violent clashes between protesters and special law enforcement units. On February 18–20, 2014, the demonstrations ended in clashes that claimed the lives of more than a hundred protesters and several dozen members of the law enforcement units. These sad statistics reflect regional patterns too: the majority of victims came from the west, the center and Kyiv (Kuzik 2014; Świącicki 2014). In general, the regional patterns of participation in and support for the Euromaidan distinctly reveal the per-

¹⁰ Another survey conducted in the first weeks of the Euromaidan seemed to confirm the same pattern: every fourth protestor belonged to the Greek Catholic Church, which has its stronghold in Galicia (see Onuch 2014).

Table 8.1. Composition of the Euromaidan

	Maidan meeting December 7–8, 2013, percentage	Maidan-Tabir December 20, 2013, percentage	Maidan-Sich February 3, 2014, percentage
Regional composition			
Kyiv	49.8	19.3	12.4
Outside of Kyiv, including:	50.2	80.7	87.6
West	51.8	42.4	54.8
Center	30.9	34.4	23.0
South and east	17.3	23.2	21.0
Language composition			
Ukrainian	54.6	52.5	59.0
Russian	25.9	19.6	15.6
Both	18.6	27.6	24.0
Other	0.4	0.3	0.8

Source: Fond Demokratychni initsiatyvy and KIIS (2013a, 2013b and 2014)

sistence of a west–east divide. Moreover, with the intensification of the conflict in Kyiv, this division increased rather than decreased. Still, the general picture becomes much more nuanced when it comes to the Anti-maidan, the protests organized by the opponents of the Euromaidan. Support for the Antimaidan was much lower in the south (54 percent) and the east (43 percent) than was support for the Euromaidan in the west and the center. In early February 2014, a significant share of the population in the south (42 percent) and the east (39 percent) felt neutral about the protests. In other words, the 2013–2014 divisions were much milder than the 2004 divide. It seems that the unpopularity of Viktor Yanukovich (presidency 2010–2014) and his regime moved different regions of Ukraine somewhat closer together. There was also a broad consensus on the ways in which people saw a resolution of the conflict: in each region, an absolute majority (from 64 percent in the center to 80 percent in the south) was in favor of round table negotiations (KIIS 2014; Ukrainska pravda 2014d).

Despite the regional cleavages that the Euromaidan reflected, it was still a multiethnic and bilingual phenomenon. Had the Yanukovych regime been willing to compromise, the Euromaidan most likely would have been dominated by bilingual Kyiv protesters and regional differences would have been smaller. This never happened. Yet, even though the Ukrainian-speaking west intensified its profile in the Euromaidan events, nothing similar occurred in the Russian-speaking east when it came to the Antimaidan activities. Quite to the contrary, the Antimaidan started to crumble.

As in the case of the Euromaidan, the turning point was the events that followed the antiprotest laws. Apart from the violence in Kyiv, they triggered the seizure of buildings of local authorities by the protesters. It was Lviv that took the lead on January 17, 2014, and other oblast cities quickly followed. After ten days, by January 27, mass protests had evolved in each and every oblast with the one exception of Donetsk oblast. Attempts to seize public buildings took place in seventeen oblasts, including in southern Ukraine (Khersonka oblast) and in eastern Ukraine (Dnipropetrovska and Zaporizka oblasts).

One of the most unexpected developments occurred in Zaporizhzhia, a Russian-speaking industrial city neighboring Dnipropetrovsk. On January 26, 2014, about 10,000 protesters participated in an attempt to seize local government buildings there. The number of protesters was unprecedented for Zaporizhzhia: until then, protest actions had gathered usually 100–500 or occasionally 1,000 persons. This protest was ruthlessly suppressed by law enforcement units and the so-called *tiushky*, mercenary agents hired by the Yanukovych government. Still, it was a harbinger of things to come: support for the Euromaidan started to grow in a largely Russian-speaking industrial heartland of Ukraine (Sidorov et al. 2014).¹¹

The end of January 2014 saw a very different map of Ukraine: the south and the east, a traditional support base of Yanukovych, now were

¹¹ The unprecedented scale of protests on January 26, 2014, in Zaporizhzhia may be largely explained by the particularities of the local situation. Yanukovych relied on Evgenii Anisimov, a local well-connected criminal who unofficially imposed heavy taxes on local business, to control the oblast. Once Anisimov lost Yanukovych's trust, he was arrested in October 2013. Local business activists demanded that the rest of the team connected to Anisimov, remaining in power, be fired. When their demands were not met, they proclaimed an indefinite protest, a month before the Euromaidan started (Sait goroda Zaporozhzhia 2013). Tellingly, the actions on January 26, 2014, were considerably strengthened around the time the local market finished its Sunday short business hours, allowing local businessmen to join the protesters (Turchenko 2015).

cut in two by a large region consisting of Dnipropetrovska and Zaporizka oblasts, which were supporting the Euromaidan protests (see Figure 8.1 below). By the end of February 2014, the two oblasts were joined by Kharkiv, where protesters took control of the local council building (Gorbachov 2014).

Figure 8.1. Map of mass protests in Ukraine: the situation on 27 January, 2014, 14:00



Source: Inspired (2014)

The general picture of divisions between the regions supporting the Euromaidan and those opposing it becomes more nuanced when other factors, such as the age, education and social status of protesters, are analyzed. A study of the pro-Euromaidan and Antimaidan social network communities¹² on the internet carried out in 2014 revealed that the former dominated throughout Ukraine with the exceptions of Donbas and Crimea. Tellingly, while the number of supporters of the Euromaidan on social media prevailed over Antimaidan supporters in all regions (in Lvivska oblast, this ratio was 95:1, and in neighboring Ivano-Frankivska oblast it was 192:1), the ratio of Euromaidan domination in Donbas and Crimea

¹² The analyzed networks included a Russian equivalent of Facebook, Vkontakte.

was much less persuasive (3.5:1 in Donetsk, 2.3:1 in Simferopol and 5.4:1 in Sevastopol, respectively) (see <http://statistika.in.ua/vk/pislyamaidan>). Since the internet is mostly used by the younger generation based in large cities (KIIS 2013), it is rather safe to presume that urban young people dominated among the Euromaidan supporters.

The “spring” that failed

The success of the Euromaidan led to further dramatic, sometimes even tragic events in the south and the east of Ukraine, known as the “Russian Spring.” This “spring” was conceived as large-scale protests on the part of the local Russophone population against the allegedly illegitimate and nationalist government which had come to power in Kyiv (referred to as a “fascist junta” by the pro-Russian protesters) (Russkaia vesna 2015). The protests were supposed to lead either to a restoration of the previous order all over Ukraine (with the possible exception of Galicia), or, in case of failure, to the separation of the east and the south into a separate state of “Novorossia” (New Russia). Either way, the whole operation was supposed to be swift and to last a few months only, if not weeks, starting on March 1, 2014 (hence its name “spring,” referring to the season which traditionally starts on the first day of March in Eastern Europe).

Even though the extent of the Kremlin’s involvement in the “Russian Spring” events is unclear, its role in them is undeniable.¹³ In any case, the “spring” was triggered by the annexation of Crimea by Russia. The expectations were that all other predominantly Russian-speaking oblasts would follow suit and, like Crimea, vote for unification with Russia.

The “Russian Spring” can be considered along the lines of a model of national minority mobilization as suggested by Rogers Brubaker (1996). Even though this model underlines the importance of external factors (such as the interference of a large state under the pretense of defending its “own” national group that happens to be a minority in the neighboring country),

¹³ Some analysts claim that the *Novorossia* operation was conceived by the Kremlin right after the Georgian–Russian War of 2008. The operation’s aim was presumably to prevent a rapprochement between Ukraine and the European Union by dividing Ukraine along the 2004 line reinforced by the Orange Revolution. This operation was supposed to be carried out in 2015–2017 regardless of who would be in power in Kyiv. Thus the Euromaidan would have merely accelerated the pre-meditated Russian aggression (Litvinenko and Horbulin 2009; Sheremet 2014).

still, its success also depends on an internal minority group mobilization (in the case of Ukraine, a mobilization of the Russian minority).

The beginning of the Russian Spring looked like a mirror reflection of the Euromaidan: it started with large mass demonstrations on March 1, and then involved attempts to seize regional administration buildings. Some analysts have even argued that the civic mobilization of pro-Russian activists, on a scale never seen before, made them a legitimate part of the Ukrainian civic nation (Ilin 2014).

During the first half of April 2014, small armed units of separatists took power in eight cities of Donbas, including Donetsk (Ukrinform 2014). Ultimately “Novorossia” comprised only the two separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Moreover, the two republics together controlled only one-third of the regional territory of Donbas. In April 2014, only a minority of the local population (18 percent in Donetsk and 25–30 percent in Donetska and Luhanska oblasts) was willing to separate from Ukraine and join Russia (Ostrov 2014; Zerkalo nedeli 2014a).¹⁴

The inability of separatist leaders to enlist mass support from the local population was behind their limited success. The separatist leaders complained that the majority remained inactive even in Donetsk (Sait goroda Donetska 2014b; Sergatskova 2014a). The pro-Russian activists could gain the support of only 10,000–15,000 people during the protest on March 1. The confrontations between Russian Spring supporters and their pro-Ukrainian opponents in eastern Ukraine showed that the number of the latter was similar to or even bigger than the former (Novaia gazeta 2014; Zerkalo nedeli 2014b). The crucial difference, however, was that the separatists acted more aggressively and indeed violently, with implicit support from local law enforcement units. For example, on March 13, 2014, the separatists injured twenty-six participants at a pro-Ukrainian meeting in Donetsk and killed one person (Khrypunkova 2015; Sait goroda Donetska 2014a).

A similar situation was developing in neighboring Kharkiv. The number of participants at the local pro-Ukrainian meetings was equal to or even bigger than that of the pro-Russian ones. Still, the former could not defend themselves from the attacks of *titushky* and activists from Russia,

¹⁴ The accuracy of these surveys was confirmed by the surveys conducted on the request of the Kremlin. According to them, support for separatism in Donbas was low in 2014 (being supported by 20–25 percent of the local population) (see Unian 2014).

who came in large numbers given the proximity of the Russian–Ukrainian border. A sad irony was that the number of people who stood and observed the protests was at least equal to or probably larger than those who took part in the pro-Ukrainian meetings (Troian 2014).

In many ways Kharkiv was a crucial city in defining further dynamics of the Russian Spring. The city has an important symbolic meaning. As the first Soviet capital of Ukraine, in the eyes of many it has been seen as Kyiv's rival. The pro-Russian sympathies of the local administrative and industrial elites were allegedly stronger here than anywhere else, including Donetsk. At the same time, these sympathies were somewhat counterbalanced by the local intellectual elites, as the city enjoys the status of an academic and cultural metropolis in Ukraine. Still, in general, the Anti-maidan supporters in the city (30 percent of the population) had a numerical preponderance over the Euromaidan supporters (15 percent), while the majority was neutral or indifferent (Kazanskyi 2015; Kozhemiako 2014). It was expected that Yanukovich, who fled Kyiv right after the tragic events of February 2014 on the Euromaidan, would announce the separation of the southeast from the rest of Ukraine at a congress of local deputies in Kharkiv. This scenario never materialized. Still, the Kharkiv People's Republic was proclaimed on April 7, 2014, on the same day as the Donetsk People's Republic. It existed for one day only, however. On April 8, it was disbanded by the Ukrainian law enforcement units that were dispatched, tellingly, from Vinnytsia, a central Ukrainian city (Bohdan 2015).

In eastern Ukraine, the separatists took over the cities where the local executive power, including law enforcement units, was on their side. The administrative factor proved to be crucial for their victory since, in contrast to the Euromaidan, they failed to win via mass mobilization. Their attempts to seize power were futile where they met resistance (Nikvesti 2014; *Ukrainska pravda* 2014c). Thus, on April 13, 2014, the separatists were ousted relatively peacefully from the main public square in Zaporizhzhia by much more numerous supporters of the Euromaidan (*Sait goroda Zaporozhzhia* 2014). From the end of January 2014, the Euromaidan in this city had a stable record of mass support.

The situation in Dnipropetrovsk was similar. The pro-Euromaidan meetings gathered about 10,000 participants there (*Ukrainska pravda* 2014a). The failure of separatists to seize power in Dnipropetrovsk is often credited to the local oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky and his team. In the first days of the Russian Spring, he left Switzerland (where he resided) and took the position of governor of Dnipropetrovsk. Combining his access to

administrative resources and his own financial means, Kolomoiskyi turned Dnipropetrovsk into the stronghold of antiseparatism in eastern Ukraine (Freeland 2014). While Kolomoiskyi's role in the stabilization of the situation cannot be denied, it is important to remember that "Orange" parties have been gaining support in the region ever since the 2004 Orange Maidan. In 2012 it was presumed that, if the tendency persisted, the city would become the main opposition center to Yanukovych in eastern Ukraine. Tellingly, during the previous parliamentary elections in 2012, the opposition parties won in the downtown areas of Dnipropetrovsk that had the highest concentration of educated and well-off people (<http://statistika.in.ua/politika/dnipropetrovsk>).

In many ways, the situation in Odesa differed from that in both Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk. A separatist republic was proclaimed in Odesa on April 16, 2014; however, initial support for it was rather small (Odessa.net 2014b). Even the republic's newspaper was published in Donetsk, not Odesa (Odessa.net 2014a).¹⁵ Further developments led to violent clashes on May 2, resulting in the deaths of forty-eight people, five of whom were supporters of the Euromaidan and forty-three of whom supported the Antimaidan. Similarly to Donetsk, local law enforcement units supported the separatists. However, the danger of separatism mobilized pro-Ukrainian activists. They enlisted substantial human and financial resources, most importantly, as local Euromaidan leaders proudly claimed, without any support from oligarchs such as Kolomoiskyi (Sait goroda Odessy 2014). Finally, the pro-Russian separatists failed since they never managed to mobilize a sufficient number of people in their support (Miachina 2014; Novostnik 2014). A crucial difference between Odesa and Donetsk was that the number of people with an attitude of not caring was much smaller in the former than in the latter (Ekho Moskvyy 2014a; Sergatskova 2014b).

This brief overview of the above cases can be supplemented by the results of a larger and more comprehensive survey which was carried out in every oblast of the east and the south in the first weeks of the Russian Spring in April 2014 (Zerkalo nedeli 2014a). In six out of the eight oblasts surveyed, the majority saw the Euromaidan as a legitimate protest against the corruption and tyranny of the Yanukovych regime; in three oblasts, Khersonska (61.9 percent), Mykolaivska (60.3 percent) and

¹⁵ Local Antimaidan leaders declared that they had nothing to do with the self-proclaimed republics (Ukrainska pravda 2014b).

Dnipropetrovska (54.5 percent), this claim was supported by more than 50 percent of the population. The only exception was formed by the two Donbas oblasts, Donetsk and Luhanska, where a majority (70.5 percent and 61.3 percent, respectively) considered the Euromaidan as a coup d'état staged by the opposition with support from the west. Still, given the demographic preponderance of Donbas over the other six oblasts in the eastern and southern region, overall more people considered the Euromaidan as a staged coup d'état (46 percent) rather than as a legitimate protest (41.7 percent).

Similar tendencies were reflected in responses to other questions of the survey, such as "Should Viktor Yanukovich have dispersed the Maidan by force?" or "Who is responsible for the victims on the Maidan?" There was a difference of opinion between the other six oblasts and the two Donbas oblasts. It was, however, the opinion of the latter that defined the overall result for the region. This divergence can be one possible explanation behind the image of "two Ukraines": it was the numerical preponderance of Donbas¹⁶ over other Russian-speaking oblasts that made the "east" look so radically different from the "west." The other six oblasts were overshadowed by Donbas and were therefore less visible. However, despite all the differences between Donbas and the other six oblasts, according to the April 2014 survey all oblasts in the region saw Ukraine and Russia as two separate independent states (Zerkalo nedeli 2014a).

These and similar surveys suggest that the main dividing line in Ukraine has shifted further east. It has moved to the front line between the two separatist Donbas oblasts, on the one hand, and the neighboring Dnipropetrovska, Zaporizka, Mykolaivska and Khersonska oblasts, on the other. According to a September 2014 survey, the highest support for military action against the Donbas separatists was demonstrated by Dnipropetrovska and Zaporizka oblasts (63.6 percent), which was notably higher than in Kyiv (27.6 percent), the center (36.9 percent) and the west (43.9 percent) (SOCIS 2014a).¹⁷

¹⁶ According to the last Ukrainian national census in 2001, the population of the two oblasts comprising Donbas represented 30 percent of the whole Russian-speaking population in the east and south (calculated on the basis of Derzhavnyi komitet statystyky 2001).

¹⁷ This survey has never been publicized. The survey data was provided to me by Ihor Hryniv from SOCIS. The SOCIS website has results of another survey that was conducted around the same time, which however did not include a question about military action in Ukraine (see SOCIS 2014b).

The crucial issue has been the allegiance of the other Russian-speaking oblasts, such as Kharkivska and Odeska. A survey organized in 2014 by Alexei Navalny, leader of the opposition in Russia, showed that these two oblasts were closer to Dnipropetrovsk than to Donetsk. The concept of “Novorossia” found no significant support there, and the majority of the population (87 percent) wanted to stay in Ukraine. Attitudes to Yanukovych and Putin were mostly negative (70 percent and 56 percent, respectively), while attitudes to the newly elected Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko were rather positive (38 percent) or neutral (29 percent); only 23 percent saw Poroshenko negatively (and 11 percent could not answer the question). At the same time, the majority had negative attitudes to the Ukrainian government (with 43 percent negative as compared to 22 percent positive answers), while a relative majority (with 41 percent positive as compared to 23 percent negative answers) felt positive about the Euromaidan (Fond borby s korruptsiiei 2014).¹⁸

The surveys mentioned above and other similar ones made some writers conclude that the Russian-speaking east has ceased to exist as a homogeneous region (Demchenko 2014). Such writers were only partly right; for the “east” has hardly ever existed as a homogeneous region. Even during the Orange Revolution, there were visible animosities between Donetska oblast, on the one hand, and the neighboring Dnipropetrovska and Kharkivska oblasts, on the other (Lewicka and Foland 2007). These animosities were, however, overshadowed by a widening west–east split caused by the political confrontations of the Orange Revolution and, in particular, by the language of hatred used by political leaders (Pavliuk 2012).

The disintegration of the “east” does not mean that the west–east divide has disappeared altogether. The situation is more complicated and nuanced, and its complexity was well demonstrated by the 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections. On the one hand, they confirmed that Ukraine has become more homogeneous after the Euromaidan than was the case before it. This was manifested by the landslide victory of Petro Poroshenko in the presidential elections—he won in every single oblast, including even in those parts of Donetska and Luhanska oblasts that were not controlled by the separatist republics—and by the fact that the Euromaidan parties won nationwide in the parliamentary elections. On the other hand, the old 2004 divide did not disappear altogether. Three

¹⁸ Another survey carried out in Odesa around the same time confirmed these results (see Yusov 2014).

out of the six parties that entered the parliament, including the victorious People's Front of Arsenii Yatseniuk and the Opposition Bloc comprising the remnants of Yanukovych's Party of Regions, did not cross the former dividing line. Still, this west–east divide persists among the older generation born and raised in the Soviet Union; and the divide diminished among the younger generation (Krymov 2014).

In general, both the presidential and parliamentary elections showed distinctly that the “Russian Spring” project has failed. This project had reportedly been abandoned by the Kremlin by the end of 2014 (Novaia gazeta 2015). At the same time, its failure was predicted before it even started by a political scientist from Luhansk, Konstantin Gaivoronskii. He was not supportive of the Euromaidan, and therefore his opinion deserves to be taken at face value. According to him, the Antimaidan lacked both civic leaders and institutions. The east and the south of Ukraine, which the separatists sought to represent, had neither a strong identity, including a regional one, nor a clearly formulated aim. Given the lack of these structural and ideological prerequisites, the Russian Spring was doomed—a fact that the Kremlin seemed not to understand (Gaivoronskii 2014).

Values matter

The success of the Euromaidan on the one hand and the failure of the Russian Spring on the other raise the issue of what values motivated the two rival groups. These groups revealed radically different identities and political preferences; the question is how far each of them was prepared to go in order to defend its identities and preferences. The Antimaidan proved unable to defend the latter once it lost state support, while on the contrary the Euromaidan stood to the very end, in defiance of state repression, and thus managed to achieve its goals. The hypothesis is that values—deep motivators of human behavior—mattered more than identities.

There are several facts that support this hypothesis. The first concerns a striking difference between the 2004 Maidan and the Euromaidan ten years later: while the Orange Revolution was organized by the political opposition and supported by civil society, the Euromaidan was organized primarily by civil society groups, and the opposition parties were now an unwelcome and distrusted appendage (Khmelko and Pereguda 2014). As the World Values Survey suggests, an unconventional political “elite-challenging” rather than “elite-supporting” action is related to a shift from values of survival to values of self-expression among large segments of

postindustrial societies, above all among the younger generation (Inglehart and Weizel 2005, 117–118).


Secondly, two waves of the World Values Survey in the 2000s, as well as the Eurobarometer survey, reveal that such a shift took place in Ukraine in the 2000s. They show, among other things, that the values of young Ukrainians were closer to those of their peer group in EU countries than to those of their older compatriots (Inglehart and Weizel n.d., see especially slide 3; Magun and Rudnev 2007). A survey of the Euromaidan protesters in Kyiv and Lviv in the early phase of protests (December 7–8, 2013) reached a similar conclusion. Moreover, some values, such as a disdain for conformism and a willingness to sacrifice one's own interests for the common good, were more prominent in Ukraine than in any other European country (Shestakovskiy 2014). Therefore, as some analysts have observed, it is not without reason that the Euromaidan was called a "Revolution of Values" or a "Revolution of Dignity" (Gerasimov 2014).

Thirdly, this shift of values has been mirrored by an increase of value-related discourses in and about Ukraine (Forostyna 2015). Some commentators see Russian–Ukrainian antagonisms primarily as a conflict of values, in which Russia and the Donbas separatist regions represent the values of a closed society (Dubynianskyi 2014; Ekho Moskv 2014b). Basically these commentators reiterate a point made by both Russian and Ukrainian political leaders, including Poroshenko (Gordon 2015; Novostnoie Agenstvo Kharkova 2015) and Putin (Zerkalo nedeli 2015). These discourses, however, talk about values in a vague way. They tend to understand the term "values" as an ideological tool rather than a meaningful category of description. The last wave of the World Values Survey carried out in 2011, the results of which became available in 2015, contributes to further disorientation. It shows that Russia and Ukraine have reversed their positions: the former has shifted to values of self-expression, while the latter has somewhat regressed to values of survival (World Values Survey n.d.).

In order to clarify the situation, a national opinion poll based on the methodology of the World Values Survey was organized in spring 2015 in the framework of the *Region, Nation and Beyond* project. The poll had a large sample of 20,000 interviewees, and it allowed one to analyze the data at the oblast level. The results were revealing in three different ways. Firstly, they demonstrated that, after a minor digression in the early 2010s, Ukraine has continued making progress toward the values of self-expression (SOCIS 2015). Secondly, when it comes to the axis between survival and self-expression, the regions of Ukraine did not differ that much in their

values (see Figure 8.2 below); in this sense, they were rather homogeneous. This homogeneity may explain why Ukraine, despite its regional cleavages, has remained a relatively stable community.

Figure 8.2. Values in Ukraine in 2015 (horizontal axis: values of survival as contrasted to values of self-expression; vertical axis: traditional values as contrasted to secular/rational values)



Source: Survey (2015)

The 2015 survey shows major correlations between the educational level, social status, place of residence and age of respondents and their values: values of self-expression were characteristic, above all, of people with high education and with middle-class status, of residents of large cities, and of people of a younger age. These findings reveal, among other things, a new tendency whereby regionalism has become a somewhat declining factor in the political geography of Ukraine; meanwhile social factors have become more prominent.

Thirdly, the 2015 survey reveals in a rather unexpected way the persistence of “two Ukraines.” This concerns the divergence between religious/traditional values and secular ones. While most of the Ukrainian-speaking oblasts of the west and the center are characterized by religious values, the

Russian-speaking south and east showcase secular values, and Kyiv is right in the center between the two poles (see Figure 8.2 above).

The differences between religious and secular values have a clear historical dimension: according to Ronald Inglehart and Christian Weizel (2005, 26–32), the rise of secular values is related to industrialization. It comes largely with the mass migration of peasants into the industrial cities. Religious thought becomes superfluous as “industrial society demonstrates seemingly unlimited human control over nature” (ibid., 32). By this token, the difference between the Ukrainian “west” and the “rest” may be the legacy of the different timing (comparing pre–World War II and post–World War II) of Soviet industrialization in pre-1939 and post-1939 Ukraine, respectively.¹⁹

The waves of industrialization may help to explain the persistence of “two Ukraines” in a different way. The decline of religious thought does not lead to the demise of mythical thinking altogether. The former is replaced by secular utopias, in the form of the ideologies of communism and nationalism. Thus, the phenomenon of “two Ukraines” emerges whenever ideologically driven issues with a quasi-sacral status, such as the status of the Russian language or the choice of national heroes, are instrumentalized in national discourses and in a national political agenda.

The Communist Party of Ukraine and its ideology seem to have subsided in the shadow of the Euromaidan and the war in eastern Ukraine. This tendency may also be responsible for the dissolution of the old west–east division. Still, this divide cannot be fully dismissed and relegated to the past. It may be reinvigorated in the future, for example, if and when issues related to homosexuality become the focus of public discussion in Ukraine, as has occurred elsewhere during the last two or three decades (Inglehardt and Weizel 2005, 127–128).

¹⁹ This hypothesis seems not to be true in the case of western Ukraine, which is characterized *both* by religious values and nationalism. One has to take into account, however, that in the 1930s the conflict between the local Greek Catholic Church and integral Ukrainian nationalism was very acute in the region: both sides treated each other with a lot of hostility in terms of mutual rivalry for their impact on Ukrainian youth (Zaitsev, Behen and Stefaniv 2011; Zaitsev 2013). This conflict was overshadowed by later developments, above all the Soviet annexation of western Ukraine during and after World War II.

In place of a conclusion

In order to provide an adequate picture of the new political geography of Ukraine, one has to identify the factors that have led to its emergence—and then to evaluate whether they have a contiguous or continuous character. In general, there are three such factors.²⁰ The first one is the absence of Crimea and a part of Donbas, which impacts the results of the post-Euromaidan surveys and elections in Ukraine. According to the data of the Ukrainian Central Electoral Commission, the two territories had 6.8 million potential voters, or 19 percent of all 35.5 million voters in Ukraine (Before It's News 2014). The absence of such a large number of people has inadvertently affected the general survey and election results both at the national and macroregional levels (above all, concerning the Russian-speaking east and south regions).

The second factor is the low turnout of voters in the Russian-speaking oblasts. In the 2014 parliamentary elections, it was 30–45 percent for these oblasts, compared to 50–55 percent in the center and 60–65 percent in the west (Wikipedia n.d.). This factor cannot be neglected. However, it becomes less important against the backdrop of a relatively low turnout throughout Ukraine (52 percent) in comparison with previous elections. The voters in southern and eastern Ukraine were not the only groups characterized by low voting activity. The same was true for the younger generation, which was largely supportive of the Euromaidan. The low participation rates in the south and the east might also be explained by the diminution of electoral fraud, which involved the deliberate inflation of voter turnout traditionally practiced in the region by the local authorities during Yanukovich's presidency (Olszański 2014).

In my opinion, the third factor is by far the most important. It concerns the change of public opinion in the wake of the Euromaidan, above all concerning attitudes toward Putin. In October 2013, just before the beginning of the Euromaidan, people with positive attitudes toward him outnumbered those who felt negatively, by 47 percent to 40 percent. In the first weeks of the Russian Spring in April 2014, the share of negative attitudes almost doubled, from 40 percent to 76 percent. Tellingly, this mood

²⁰ Here I mostly reiterate the points that were made by Dr. Oxana Shevel at the round table “Euromaidan, Mass Protests and Presidential Elections in Ukraine” at the 2014 ASEEES Convention, San Antonio, Texas, November 21, 2014.

dominated in each and every region of Ukraine (70 percent in the east and south, and 90 percent in the center and west), with the sole exception of Donbas (Reiting 2014).

At the same time, it is only on some issues that opinions have changed, and one should be careful about generalizations. The same survey that measured attitudes to Putin also included a question about Stepan Bandera, a leading symbolic figure of Ukrainian nationalism. The latter was widely used by Kremlin propaganda to denigrate the Euromaidan protesters, who were presented as *banderivtsi* (followers of Bandera), i.e., extreme nationalists, close to being fascists. The share of people who felt positively about Bandera increased from 22 percent to 31 percent; however, this increase is not comparable to a dramatic decrease in positive attitudes toward Putin. While Putin unites all Ukrainians in their negative attitudes toward him, Bandera remains the most divisive figure (Reiting 2014).

More importantly, the region where the most negative attitudes to Bandera have been registered is formed by Dnipropetrovska and Zaporizka oblasts,²¹ which, as mentioned above, have shown the highest support for military action against Donbas. This suggests that the dramatic changes in attitude are more related to current issues such as the Russian aggression in Ukraine than to long-term factors such as historical legacies and the ways they are reflected in historical memory. If this suggestion is true, then it supports the hypothesis that changes in values, rather than identities, matter most in the emergence of a new political geography in Ukraine.

It is too early to make a conclusion about the hierarchy of these three factors. It is, however, sure that the absence of a part of Donbas and Crimea has a crucially contingent character. If these regions were to be reintegrated into Ukraine, the political geography could change again. Whether the pre-Euromaidan division between “two Ukraines” would remain is another question. The answer to this depends on whether the shift in values and attitudes would be sustainable in the aftermath of the Euromaidan and during the ongoing war in Donbas. And this, in its turn, will depend on whether the new government which came to power following the Euromaidan will be able to deliver the much-expected political and economic reforms, or whether it will fail as did the 2004 Maidan.

These are the questions that cannot be answered at the moment. Still, what becomes more and more clear is that regionalism in Ukraine is of

²¹ See the data of another survey carried out at the end of 2014 and beginning of 2015 (Fond Demokratychni Initsiatyvy 2015).

a changeable character. Regional divisions in Ukraine are not stable, and they can change depending on political circumstances. In other words, the case of Ukraine is characterized by a particular paradox: *its regionalism is without (stable) regions*.

The only possible exception is Galicia, which is characterized by a strong and stable regional identity. Before 2013, Donbas also appeared to be another stable region. But now, in the aftermath of the Euromaidan and the war, it is falling apart: it is divided into an occupied zone and a zone which remains part of Ukraine. The northern part, which is part of Ukraine, tends to identify itself as southern Slobidska Ukraine (*Slobozhanshchyna*), while the southern part identifies itself as *Pryazovia* (Azov region).

Given the changeable character of Ukrainian divisions, there may be one, two or twenty-two Ukraines. The overall effect of the Euromaidan and the war is that, among different paradigms, the “two Ukraines” option seems to recede, while two others are getting stronger. Alongside these patterns, the emergence and increasing relevance of divisions based on age, education and social status are witnessed. Whether they will become more salient than the regional divisions remains to be seen.

As is the case with most issues in contemporary Ukraine, an analysis of the new political geography must end with a question mark. However, this question mark stems not from our ignorance, but rather from the fact that, the more is known about regionalism, the more pertinent and sophisticated are the questions that have to be formulated.

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9. Renegotiating Ukrainian Identity at the Euromaidan

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Undoubtedly, the Euromaidan which lasted between November 2013 and February 2014 can be described as a crucial historic event and a turning point for the Ukrainian state and its citizens. The protest movement brought together people of various ethnic, religious and socio-economic backgrounds as well as different ideological and political views. The Euromaidan functioned as a public space where various groups' visions and strategies interacted, merged and sometimes clashed. It was one of the largest social movements in the recent history of post-Soviet countries, and it also became the bloodiest protest in the history of post-Soviet Ukraine, with more than a hundred people killed. Starting as a festive and peaceful demonstration, similar to its predecessor—the Orange Revolution—it became a ground for militarized violence that resulted in the mass killings of protestors and collective trauma. Despite its being a very recent event, various aspects of the Euromaidan movement and its aftermath have attracted significant scholarly attention (i.e., Marples and Mills 2015; Martseniuk and Onuch 2014; Petrenko 2014; Blacker 2015; PS Lab 2015; Spilne/Commons 2015; Shore 2018). The questions as to what extent the Euromaidan movement represented Ukrainian society and whether it has united or divided the country are still widely debated. At the same time, many scholars agree that the Euromaidan has become one of the pillars of identity construction in independent Ukraine, creating powerful symbolism as well as a “pantheon” of new heroes and martyrs (Zhurzhenko 2015; Finnin 2013). The aim of this chapter is to look at the grassroots discourses of “Ukrainian identity” that were constructed and voiced at the Euromaidan as a specific communicative sphere. The identity-transforming aspect of the Euromaidan movement is considered by exploring the construction of collective identities and their

legitimization within the historical narratives of contemporary Ukraine, as well as attitudes to significant events, symbols and values. In particular, this chapter examines the ways in which protestors “imagined” (in the terms of Anderson [1991]) the community of Maidaners (the Euromaidan participants) and their opponents as well as the Ukrainian nation in general. The chapter will consider the question of the meanings, repertoires and markers of expressed identities as well as the patterns of in- and exclusion from the collectivity that the Euromaidan claimed to represent. Rather than implying that identity played a decisive role in the mobilization of the protest, though, the goal is to explore the self-expressed narratives and meaning of the categories of national and transnational belonging in a particular historical moment. In this chapter I argue that, while national identification was not dominant for the Euromaidan participants, this diverse and complex protest movement reflected and reinforced existing societal divides and intergroup biases and became at the same time a realm of transformation and rearticulation for Ukrainian civic identity.

Methodology

To address these issues it is important to let the Euromaidan participants speak for themselves. With this in mind, the results of the research project “Voices of Resistance and Hope,” conducted by the Center for Urban History of East Central Europe (Lviv) in cooperation with Warsaw University (and in which the author of this chapter was involved), will be analyzed.¹ The project recorded the personal stories, opinions and attitudes of Euromaidan participants from the microperspective of experiencing a historical moment. One hundred and forty in-depth semistructured interviews with activists and participants in the civil unrest were conducted at the height of the protests from December 2013 until mid-February 2014, in Kyiv, Lviv and Kharkiv. This allows us to look at the social movement from below and at its regional peculiarities. Since the Euromaidan also had an international dimension, five interviews were additionally conducted with participants in the protests in Lublin and Warsaw, in Poland. Although the sample was not intended to be statistically representative, the goal was to

¹ For more information on the project, see the Center for Urban History of East Central Europe, “Voices of Resistance and Hope,” <http://www.lvivcenter.org/en/researchprojects/ProtestVoices/>.

reflect the specifics of the protest situation in each city and to interview people of different socio-demographic and cultural backgrounds, representing various groups of protesters. The interview questions concerned personal experiences and stories at the Euromaidan, protesters' backgrounds and identities, their motivations for joining the unrest, their emotions, opinions and attitudes toward ongoing events, their perceptions of protest symbols, of slogans, and of supporters and opponents of the Euromaidan, and their visions of Europe and European values, as well as their hopes and expectations for the future.

The study of the Euromaidan movement involves a number of ethical and methodological challenges, such as capturing and representing the movement's complexity and diversity, and retaining a personal critical stance and an objectivity while at the same time realizing one's own role and one's emotional involvement as both researcher and concerned citizen. Last but not least, it was important to secure respondents' safety and anonymity while the rallies were still continuing and police violence against protesters was growing.

This chapter will concentrate on analyzing only part of the database—namely fifty-one in-depth interviews recorded in Kyiv, at and around Independence Square (Maidan), encompassing protesters from different regions of Ukraine. Twenty-five of those interviews were conducted from December 6 to December 22, 2013, after the first violent attacks on protesters. The other twenty-six conversations were recorded from February 7 to February 16, 2014, during an unsteady lull in between the bloody clashes at Hrushevskiy Street and the mass shootings which resulted in more than a hundred people being killed (later called the “Heavenly Hundred”) and the escape of Viktor Yanukovich (presidency 2010–2014) from the country. The interviews were conducted in two waves prior to the end of the Euromaidan, allowing one to look at the dynamics of protesters' moods without the impact of subsequent traumatic events (such as the killing of the “Heavenly Hundred,” the annexation of Crimea and the war in the eastern Ukraine) on their narratives.

Even though it was not possible to reflect fully the composition of the Euromaidan in terms of qualitative research, the background of the respondents was quite diverse. Among the fifty Kyiv interviews analyzed here, sixteen were conducted with female protestors and thirty-five with male protestors. Seventeen of them were Kyiv residents, while fifteen were from western Ukraine, ten from eastern and southern Ukraine, six from central and northern Ukraine, and three from abroad (Georgia, the USA and the Czech Republic). The self-attributed ethnic background of inter-

viewees was also quite diverse: in addition to ethnic Ukrainians, there were three Russians, two Jews, two Crimean Tatars and one Georgian. Eleven interviews were conducted in Russian, and the rest (forty) in Ukrainian (of which five were in *surzhyk*, the mixture of Russian and Ukrainian), following the respondents' own choice. In order to contextualize the results of the in-depth interviews, the *Region, Nation and Beyond* statistical surveys conducted in 2013 and 2015 are also drawn upon.

The Euromaidan and the repertoire of identities

Important historical events and shared experiences can provoke changes in individual and collective belonging, especially when it comes to national identities. The main research focus here is on the kinds of identities and group loyalties that were activated and articulated at the Euromaidan as a very specific communicative realm. One of the main features of a given identity is the tensions between its fixed and its dynamic components. On the one hand, identities provide ontological safeness, becoming “anchors” for individuals in unstable times; on the other hand, they are also subject to constant changes. As Suny (1999, 144) argues, “one might think of identity as a provisional stabilization of a sense of self or group that is formed in actual historical time and space, in evolving economies, politics and cultures—as a continuous search for some solidity in a constantly shifting world.” National identity may be a more or less salient relative to other collective identities for individuals and subgroups within a nation, who also may challenge the meanings of national belonging (Kulyk 2013). Summarizing different approaches to national identities, Slawomir Kapralski (2012) argues that the process of identification is regarded through narrative connection between the three modalities of time—past, present and future—and related identity constructs: that is, historical identity based on socio-cultural heritage and important events of the past, prospective identity based on the collective vision of the future and the actual identity that reflects the current way of life of the given group. According to Kulyk (2013), individuals identify with different collectivities, and multiple identities are organized into hierarchies of salience. Each collective identity also varies in its content, in terms of the prescribed meaning of membership in the collectivity, and the degree of contestation of that content within the group. Finally, the content of a collective identity is also relational to the extent that it is composed of comparisons and references to other groups from which it is distinguished (Abdelal et al. 2006).

The concept of identity itself has been the subject of scholarly debates and criticism (most famously in Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Identity is often regarded not as a final construct but rather as a process of identification. Analyzing how the multiple identities embodied in social action are managed by individuals and groups, Omoniyi and White (2006, 3) propose the model of “hierarchy of identities”—a tool and a paradigm to analyze multiple identification. He describes the situation or the context in which the processes of identification take place, redefining social actions as separable into a series of “moments.” This model recognizes the fluidity of identity and the fact that people negotiate between several identity categories of “selves” in different “moments” of identification. Thus, identity becomes “a mixture of individual agency and the influence of social structures of various types.” Instead of “hierarchy,” Suleiman (2006, 51) proposes using the analytical tool of “polycentricity” or “identity repertoire” to explain the construction of multiple belongings.


The issue of the multiplicity of identities in post-Soviet Ukraine has been the subject of numerous studies and discussions (Hrytsak 2011; Portnov 2010; Sereda 2009; White and Feklyunina 2014). Very often identities in post-Soviet Ukraine are described as contested and regionally antagonistic (see, for example, the chapter by Maria Lewicka and Bartłomiej Iwańczak in this volume, and Riabchuk 2003). The collapse of the communist regime has led to the blurring of Soviet identity, which was never finally formed, and to the spread of new ethnic, civic and transnational alternatives, which have interacted with the previous forms of identity and result in various amalgam identities (see Kravchenko 2004). Languages, religious affiliations, geopolitical preferences and different interpretations of the past are often regarded as the main dividing lines in Ukrainian society, producing regional east–west tensions. At the same time, many scholars criticize the tendency to overemphasize—and thus to (re)produce—these divisions in both academic and political discourses (i.e., Zhurzhenko 2014).

In the *Region, Nation and Beyond* surveys of both 2013 and 2015, the respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of belonging to different groups.² Our hypothesis was that one of the outcomes of the Euromaidan and subsequent events (such as the annexation of Crimea and the

² The question was formulated in the following way: “People answer the questions ‘Who am I?’ ‘What do I feel?’ differently. To what extent do you feel ..., on the scale: 1 – definitely not, 2 – rather not, 3 – hard to say, 4 – rather yes, 5 – definitely yes.”

military conflict with Russia) would be a significant strengthening and rise in popularity of Ukrainian identity. As can be seen from Figure 9.1 below, this hypothesis was partly confirmed. The average strength of Ukrainian identity increased from 4.31 in 2013 to 4.49 in 2015, while the popularity of Russian identity decreased significantly. The ratio of respondents who answered the question “To what extent do you feel Ukrainian?” by “definitely yes” rose by 10 percent (from 54.4 percent to 64.3 percent). The regional distribution shows that the average strength of Ukrainian identity rose in most of the oblasts (in 17 out of 24), and particularly in Chernivetska (+0.5), Luhanska (+0.4), Zaporizka (+0.3), Odeska (+0.2) and Dnipropetrovska (+0.2). On the other hand, the strength of Russian identity significantly decreased in most of the oblasts, especially in Odeska (-0.9), Dnipropetrovska (-0.5), Zaporizka (-0.9), Kharkivska (-0.5), Sumska (-0.5) and Chernihivska (-0.9).

Figure 9.1. Dynamics of identities in 2013 and 2015



Source: Survey (2013) and Survey (2015)

At the same time, the position of Ukrainian identity in the general repertoire of group belongings did not change: both in 2013 and in 2015 the nonterritorial identities (such as gender and family) were more “popular” than national identities among the population. Interviews with protesters at the Euromaidan show similar tendencies. When describing themselves, protesters most often identified with three types of group belonging: profession, education and family. Thus, when not asked specifically about their forms of belonging, Maidaners tended to describe themselves as, for example, “a former army officer,” “a mother of three kids,” “a private entrepreneur,” “a working pensioner” or “a person with two higher educations.” Many protesters emphasized the importance of using their professional skills to contribute to the movement. Around one-third of respondents described their role at the Euromaidan as corresponding to their occupation (for example, a priest conducting liturgies at a “church” tent, a librarian volunteering for the “Library of the Maidan” or a film director making movies about the protest for a wider audience). At the same time, for many protesters the Euromaidan was an opportunity to “try on” new performative identities: for example, among respondents from militarized self-defense units there was a hairdresser, an artist and a child psychologist.

It is important to note that parental discourse was strongly activated at the Euromaidan, especially after the violent crackdown against the protesters (many of whom were young people) on November 30, 2013, by Berkut riot police. Respondents often named this event as one of the main triggers for their decision to come to Independence Square, and called the beaten protesters “our children” who had to be protected from the authorities’ violence. For example, a 47-year-old bee-keeper from the Lviv region explained his motivations for joining the Euromaidan as follows:

First of all because we are treated as fools, as blind puppies—one thing is said and another is done [here the respondent refers to the government’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU—A.C.] Well ... the second reason is clearly the beating of our children. He [Yanukovych – A.C.] did not beat soldiers or anyone else—he harmed innocent kids.

Such references can of course be attributed to the injured protesters’ age (albeit not all of them were youngsters). At the same time, as Benedict Anderson (1991, 5) and other scholars observe, nationalism is akin to kinship in that it rests on assumptions of putative “blood” connections between those regarded as fellow nationals/citizens. Therefore, the sense

of belonging to the same nation arises on the basis of birth and blood connections, like membership in a family (Suad and Naǧmābādī 2005, 154). The symbolic “adoption” of younger protestors may thus be interpreted in terms of a elective national community construction at the Euromaidan.

Therefore, the Euromaidan became a particular milieu for the (re)articulation of group attachments. To find out what influence the social movement had on national belonging, a question about respondents’ territorial identities (local, regional, ethnic, civic, European and other) was asked during the second wave of the research.³ A fraction of respondents refused to describe themselves in ethnic or national terms, arguing that they are “just humans beyond any divisions.”⁴ However, an absolute majority of interviewees (65 percent) described themselves primarily as “citizens of Ukraine.” At the same time, their understanding of what that means involved a combination of ethno-national and civic-political discourse, varying from “being a citizen means to know your roots, respect your language and traditions and to love your own nation”⁵ to “nationality and religion are not important—I am a free person. At the same time, I am not just a citizen of the world, I care about my Fatherland. Patriotism is a very elevated feeling because it is altruistic and I feel this way as a citizen of Ukraine.”⁶ In several cases religious discourse appeared as well. For example, a respondent who described himself as a citizen of Ukraine further explained that:

[a citizen] is a person who values patriotism most, then in second place is God and faith, and then a human being. People who gathered here take responsibility and care about their families, live a spiritual and a truly religious life and are the patriots of their country.

³ The question was asked in the following way: “People answer the questions ‘Who am I?’ ‘Who do I feel myself to be?’ differently. Among the following options, please choose the one that is most important to you and explain why: a resident of a city/village (please specify), a resident of a region (please specify), a citizen of Ukraine (or another country), a representative of a certain nationality (please specify), a European, or a representative of another community (please specify).”

⁴ Female, 29, from Kyiv, interview conducted on February 8, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

⁵ Male, 60, from the Lviv region, interview conducted on February 9, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

⁶ Female, 76, from Kyiv, interview conducted on February 9, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

These are not corrupt people; they are the ones with whom you can protect your Fatherland.⁷

The motif of “corrupt people,” describing opponents of the Euromaidan, appeared very often (this issue is discussed later in the chapter). An identity of “Ukrainian citizen” was also a dominant choice among the interviewees belonging national minorities and Russian speakers. An elderly man from Kyiv who was standing at the Euromaidan with a poster in Russian proclaiming “I am a Russian-speaking Ukrainian nationalist—down with the gang!” explained his slogan in a complex way:

It means that I want to be a European and live a decent life. My poster is in Russian because we are all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of nationality. Although I am Ukrainian, unfortunately because of my work I know more Russian words than Ukrainian ones. Many Kyiv residents come and—to my surprise—are very grateful for this slogan.⁸

Even though the respondent called himself a “Ukrainian nationalist,” his reflections show the blurriness and multiple layers of identifications. There are European, civic and ethnic Ukrainian, Russian-language and local Kyiv discourses interacting in his feeling of Ukrainian belonging. The Maidan survey (Fond Demokratychni Initsiatyvy 2014a, 2014 b) data show that, before the protest’s radicalization, Russian speakers and bilinguals constituted roughly half of all protesters. At the same time, the Ukrainian language dominated in the public sphere of the Euromaidan (in speeches, slogans, songs and so on), while Russian was mostly used in private communication. The language issue has long been instrumentalized and politicized in Ukraine, so the interviewed protester felt the need to justify the fact that he is a Russian speaker at the Euromaidan and to emphasize the contribution of people like him to the movement. Even though none of the interviewees complained about facing any kind of ethnic or linguistic discrimination at Maidan, wider societal stereotypes did influence their narratives. For example, a Jewish respondent referred to widespread anti-

⁷ Male, 25, from Ivano-Frankivsk, interview conducted on February 8, 2014, on Hrushevskyi Street in Kyiv.

⁸ Male, 69, from Kyiv, interview conducted on February 8, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

Semitic beliefs by stating: “I am a Ukrainian citizen but my ethnicity is written on my face.”⁹

A number of respondents recognized that the Euromaidan became an identity-transforming experience by making them feel, for the first time, “a part of a great nation of free people,”¹⁰ “participants in creating history”¹¹ or “immensely proud of being Ukrainian.”¹² Respondents often emphasized the multiethnic character of the Euromaidan, particularly in the martyrological context of paying tribute to the first victims among the protesters (Sergii Nigoian, of Armenian origin, and a Belarusian citizen, Mikhail Zhyzneviski):

It was real nationwide indignation, when citizens got very angry, and the formation of civil society started. Before that, Ukraine barely existed. People started to feel themselves the citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality—no matter who you are: Ukrainian, Czech, Pole, Jew, Armenian, Tatar.... They feel citizens who have influence on these processes, because who if not us.¹³

A particular pattern of articulating Ukrainian identity and the Euromaidan’s influence on it appeared among youngsters. For instance, five respondents aged below 30 stated that being Ukrainian means for them first of all choosing not to emigrate. A 28-year-old manager from Kyiv confessed that, even though she had a residence permit for another country, she planned to stay in Ukraine until “the last hope dies,” aspiring to contribute as a citizen. In several cases, possible migration was even framed as a “betrayal”:

Well, as they say, it is impossible to choose your parents and your Fatherland. I was born in Ukraine and I love it like my own mother, therefore I am responsible for it as I am responsible for my parents.... I’d better follow this thorny path rather than just betray and

⁹ Male, 52, from Kyiv, interview conducted on February 8, 2014, at the respondent’s home in Kyiv.

¹⁰ Female, 33, from the Dnipropetrovsk region, interview conducted on February 8, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

¹¹ Male, 30, from Kharkiv, interview conducted on February 9, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

¹² Female, 33, from Kyiv, interview conducted on February 8, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

¹³ Male, 35, from Kyiv, interview conducted on February 8, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

leave. I was abroad many times and I have studied there, but still I'm always coming back home, to my house, to my family, traditions and everything that is dear to my heart.¹⁴

Overall, respondents tended to frame their national identification in emotional terms of love, pride and altruism toward their country (using most often the Ukrainian word *batkivshchyna* [the land of fathers]). Other territorial identities (local, regional or European) were mainly articulated as subordinate to civic or national belonging.

Moreover, the Euromaidan itself became a framework for identity construction. The word *maidanivtsi* ("participants in the Euromaidan" or "Maidaners") was actively used in the public sphere both during and after the protest. As many scholars have argued, mass protest movements enforce the feeling of group unity in locations loaded with symbols and rituals. Old symbols (like the national flag) gain new meanings, while a folk-like creative culture of its own blossoms (with "revolutionary" songs, street art, slogans and so on). In this regard, Sidney Tarrow (1993, 286) argues that "protest cycles characteristically produce new or transformed symbols, frames of meaning and ideologies that justify and dignify collective action and around which a following can be mobilized." In the interviews, respondents constantly referred to particular markers, practices and rituals of the Euromaidan that gained symbolic meaning and reinforced their feeling of unity and shared experience (for example, the protesters' orange helmets, the barricades, the *yolka*,¹⁵ or the singing of the national anthem with flashlights turned on). One of the protesters even described a particular "smell of the Maidan" that helped people recognize each other outside the protest spaces:

Well, of course, today the symbol of the Maidan is the smell of a campfire, which you recognize in other people even at the distant metro stations. This smell is very important for me. I have a friend

¹⁴ Male, 25, from Ivano-Frankivsk, interview conducted on February 8, 2014, on Hrushevskiy Street in Kyiv.

¹⁵ A popular internet meme (from the Russian *yolka*, "Christmas tree"), mocking president Yanukovich's mistake, when he could not remember the word in Ukrainian during his speech on December 3, 2010. "Yolka na krov'i [The Christmas tree in blood]" also became the name for the dispersal of protesters by Berkut riot police on November 30, 2013, officially justified by the need to install the Christmas tree on Independence Square. The metal carcass of the tree was later partly used by the protesters to build barricades, and was decorated with posters, flags and slogans (see Image 9.2).

who does not like the Maidan very much. Also a Jew, by the way. He said he attended a concert at the Maidan, and would never come back again because of this smell. You know, we—the middle-class people—are very sensitive to smells.¹⁶

Image 9.1. Euromaidan supporters near the campfire at Independence Square, Kyiv



Source: Photo taken by Mstyslav Chernov/Unframe¹

Image 9.2. The *yolka* (Christmas tree), one of the Euromaidan's main landmarks and symbols



Source: Picture taken on December 8, 2013, by Oleksii Chebotarov

As the above example shows, the unities that a protest movement creates may overlap or clash with established belongings like nation or class. These new unities create new frameworks that allow for a rethinking of the concept of identity itself. For example, Robert Pyrah and his colleagues suggest using the term “subcultures” to define identities that do not conform to the fixed, standard categories such as “ethnic group,” “majority” or “minority.” A “subculture” is understood as an identity that sits between these categories. It may blend languages (for example, dialect forms), cultural traditions, or ethnic identifications. Hence a “subculture” in these

¹⁶ Male, 35, from Kyiv, interview conducted on February 9, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

¹⁷ Self-photographed, <http://mstyslavchernov.com/> [CC BY-SA 3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>)], via Wikimedia Commons.

terms is not “subaltern,” but rather an identity resisting complete incorporation into the standard categories of “majority” and “minority.”¹⁸ In our opinion, such a theoretical approach can be fruitfully applied to the study of mass protest movements.

“Those who are not with us...”: The Euromaidan and the construction of “others”

An identity may also be defined by what it is not, in terms of its opposition to other identities. The Euromaidan had a transformative effect on both individual and collective belongings. Common ideas, actions and shared experience shaped the identities of the participants in this momentous social movement. The reverse side of these processes is the phenomenon of intergroup bias, which social psychologists describe as a tendency to evaluate one’s own membership group (the in-group) or its members more favorably than a nonmembership group (the out-group) or its members. As Hewstone, Rubin and Willis (2002) show, bias can encompass behavior (discrimination), attitude (prejudice) and cognition (stereotyping). More precisely, this group-serving tendency can take the form of favoring the in-group (in-group favoritism) and/or derogating the out-group (out-group derogation). The analysis of the in-depth interviews with protesters shows that both these tendencies were strongly articulated.

When describing the Euromaidan participants as a group, respondents usually used very positive epithets for them, such as “the best people of Ukraine,” “truly free persons,” “highly spiritual people,” “the hope and the future of our nation” and so on. The unity (“we are all here like one family”¹⁹) and yet also the diversity (“people who would otherwise never be seen in one place”²⁰) of the movement were emphasized, along with the idea that the Euromaidan was the reflection of Ukrainian society in a nutshell. The positive role of the intelligentsia and the middle class was stressed in a number of interviews:

¹⁸ A detailed description of the project “Subcultures as integrative forces in East-Central Europe” can be found at <http://subcultures.mml.ox.ac.uk/>.

¹⁹ Male, 40, from the Donetsk region, interview conducted on December 6, 2013, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

²⁰ Male, 20, from the Zakarpattia region, interview conducted on December 6, 2013, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

These are the best people from different regions. Artists, writers, left-wingers, right-wingers, trade unionists, chorists,... Marxists together with transhumanists, people who came from highland villages along with Harvard and Cambridge alumni who speak five languages, top managers and successful business owners. I do not know how many millions went through the Maidan, but these are people of various backgrounds and views who fight for their right to freedom. They represent our society.²¹

Respondents particularly emphasized the high level of trust among the protesters. The Euromaidan implied unity, turning strangers into allies and “brothers” who would take care of each other. Even though internal tensions and discrepancies between different groups of protesters were reflected in the interviews, a tacit taboo on criticizing other Maidaners (apart from politicians) existed, at least at the height of the events. Meanwhile the construction of the out-group (the Euromaidan’s opponents) appeared to be a complex process implying numerous frameworks of exclusion—among them, political, ideological, social, ethnic, regional and historical. These patterns overlapped and combined in respondents’ narratives about the Euromaidan’s opponents.

The most obvious “others” for the Euromaidan were state authorities: Yanukovych and his regime, as well as police and security forces. The movement positioned itself as antigovernmental, while direct physical clashes happened between protesters and the riot police. The pattern of political “othering” was also extended to Yanukovych supporters. Yet for many respondents, not only Yanukovych but also opposition politicians appeared as “antagonists” to the Euromaidan. For instance, a 60-year-old respondent from the Lviv region put it in these terms: “Let the opposition make no headway while the Euromaidan is getting wiser and stronger and becomes more organized. The structures are created that will allow us advance and win.”²² The radicalization of the Euromaidan went along with a growing distrust in the political opposition leaders Arsenii Yatseniuk, Oleh Tiahnybok and Vitalii Klychko, who were blamed for not being decisive and united enough. Some of the respondents even called the opposition leaders “the antiheroes of Maidan.”

²¹ Male, 35, from Kyiv, interview conducted on February 8, 2014, at the respondent’s home in Kyiv.

²² Male, 60, from the Lviv region, interview conducted on February 9, 2014, on Hrushevskiyi Street in Kyiv.

At the same time, mental borders were being constructed along numerous dividing lines, and the opposition between “politicians” and “protesters” was only one of them. Thus, class and social frameworks of exclusion were typically applied to the “Antimaidan” movement. Participants in pro-Yanukovych rallies²³ were described as poor, shabby-looking, uneducated people, “ready to sell their vote for a bag of buckwheat”²⁴ and therefore inclined to deviant behavior (such as banditry, alcoholism or drug consumption). Many Maidaners believed that their opponents had been cheated and defrauded by being promised money they will never actually get. They were described as dependent on their employers, “like slaves,” and therefore stripped of any choice of their own, evoking feelings of “pity, not hatred”²⁵:

I, unfortunately, was unable to communicate with any opponent of the Euromaidan.... I repeatedly visited the Mariinskyi Park²⁶—out of ethnographic motives—I wanted to have a look at these people. But they, unfortunately, were either in a state of alcoholic intoxication, which did not allow them to maintain a meaningful conversation, or were surrounded by a high metal fence and the cordon of police officers.²⁷

The exotification and even animalization of opponents was widely spread. In the above statement, the respondent describes her encounter with the Antimaidan as if it were almost like a visit to a zoo. Pejorative and dehumanizing discursive frames appeared in one-third of the interviews. The Antimaidaners were called by the interviewees “slaves,” a “grey mass,” “thoughtless cattle,” “vampires,” “zombies” or even just “ugly persons” and “imbeciles.”

The Antimaidaners were seen primarily as ideological opponents and victims of governmental propaganda. They were believed to share pro-Russian sympathies and a nostalgia for the USSR, so the word *sovok*²⁸ was

²³ The headquarters of the Antimaidan in Kyiv was Mariinskyi Park, some 1.4 km from Independence Square.

²⁴ Male, 50, from the Ivano-Frankivsk region, interview conducted on February 7, 2014, on Hrushevskiy Street in Kyiv.

²⁵ Female, 33, from Dnipropetrovsk, interview conducted February 8, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

²⁶ A major location of Antimaidan protests.

²⁷ Female, 28, from Kyiv, interview conducted on February 7, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

²⁸ A pejorative term that describes a person who perceives events and the surrounding world according to the system of Soviet beliefs and myths. The term implies a play of words, as in both Russian and Ukrainian *sovok* also means “a dustpan.”

repeatedly used to designate their views and the presumed features of their character (such as passivity, indifference and resistance to social changes):

I come from Kharkiv, I've interacted with such people [the Euromaidan's opponents—A. C.].... They do not always support communist ideology. But this whole communist spam remained in their heads for various reasons—out of inertia, from parents, the environment and so on. On the other hand, these people do not think by themselves, instead they are watching the TV. This is why they're called the grey mass, the *sovok*—people who do not care about anything. These people are inactive and they support [the] current government for various reasons.²⁹

The opponents of the Euromaidan were also excluded on the basis of their different patterns of perceiving Ukrainian history—namely the Soviet period and the Great Famine (Holodomor) in particular. Historical and ideological “othering” was often combined with regional divisions. The Antimaidaners were believed to represent mostly the eastern part of Ukraine, deprived of national memory, and were blamed for being the ones who brought Yanukovich to power in the first place:

And those people from eastern terrains who survived the Holodomor—they forgot about it, are afraid to admit it or were forced to forget that terrible genocide. It was the extermination of our nation. And those who were destroyed, whose parents and grandparents died of hunger do not understand, do not want to realize that this evil was created by enemies similar to those who now govern our country.... These are our eastern Ukrainians, who today do not want to understand—and we came to the Maidan to make them realize these things.³⁰

Some respondents used even stronger frameworks of exclusion, arguing that the opponents of the Euromaidan from Donbas and Crimea are “not even Ukrainians, or people who never became Ukrainians” because of

²⁹ Male, 32, from Kharkiv, interview conducted on February 7, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

³⁰ Male, 58, from the Lviv region, interview conducted on February 13, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

“historical reasons,”³¹ hinting at their Russian origin. An interesting paradox could be observed: claims that the rallies were supported by all the citizens of Ukraine often went along with statements such as “Easterners do not understand what the Euromaidan is about, they are frightened and intimidated, deprived of the possibility to make their own choice.”³²

It is important to remember that protesters were interviewed in extremely stressful conditions, after bloody clashes with police and the first deaths, when the outcome of the confrontation was still unclear. As available sources³³ and surveys show, negative attitudes and stereotypes were willingly reciprocated by Euromaidan opponents (PSLab 2015). Obviously, the divisions and mental borders that were articulated by respondents have deep roots in pre-Euromaidan times and reflect long-lasting politicized tensions in Ukrainian society. Nevertheless, it is clear that both in-group favoritism and out-group derogation were strongly articulated by Euromaidan participants, sometimes taking dangerous forms of dehumanizing opponents and denying their agency and self-determination.

History and memory at the Euromaidan

Identification process and interpretations of the present and the past can mutually influence each other. As Kulyk (2013) argues, identification with a nation or any other collectivity is manifested in a wide range of beliefs or feelings, including those pertaining to the collectivity’s past in general, and to certain historical events and figures in particular. Historical memory thus belongs to the content of national or other collective identity. Selected events and personalities are “dug up” from the past by memory entrepreneurs and (re)narrated in order to legitimize present goals and to strengthen particular identity projects. The fragmented, eclectic and often contested identity politics of post-Soviet Ukraine have been the subject of many studies (Hrytsak 2011; Kasianov and Ther 2009; Portnov 2010). These studies discuss attempts to replace a powerful Soviet ideological

³¹ Female, 70, from Kyiv, interview conducted on February 12, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

³² Male, 35, from the Kyiv region, interview conducted on February 13, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

³³ See, for example, the public pages of the Antimaidan movement on the Russian social network Vkontakte: <https://vk.com/club61763774>, <http://vk.com/antimaydan> or http://vk.com/zaberkut_ru.

project with a Ukrainian alternative since the early 1990s. As a society undergoing socio-political transformation, the population of Ukraine has experienced changes in established identity structures and also controversies among promoters of alternative visions of the Ukrainian past (Kravchenko 2004). Regional divisions of collective memory in Ukraine have also attracted a great deal of scholarly attention (Hrytsak 2011; Riabchuk 2003; Shevel 2011). As different parts of contemporary Ukraine have belonged to various states in the past, their dissimilar historical experiences have shaped cultural, ethnic and linguistic regional particularities (Kulyk 2013; see also the introduction and the chapter by Gaidai, Liebich, Myshlovska, Sereda and Sklokina in the present volume).

The differences in historical experience translate into differing attitudes toward such subjects as Soviet heritage, the history of World War II, and relations with Russia, the EU and NATO. According to Oleksandr Zaitsev (2015), Ukraine's biggest problem lies not in there being different versions of historical memory, but rather in the fact that these versions have become mutually exclusive sacred myths maintained with the participation of professional historians. Therefore, as the author argues, Ukraine has become a battlefield for two historical mythologies: Ukrainian national discourse in its conservative, liberal and nationalist/integral versions, on the one hand, and variations of the Soviet Russian, Slavic Orthodox and Eurasian discourse that sometimes form unexpected combinations, on the other. Hence regionalized memories and identities are heterogeneous and ambivalent, requiring a nuanced approach.

As the past has often been used for political purposes in Ukraine, it became an especially fruitful resource for mass mobilization, providing legitimizing narratives and models from history during the protests of 2013–2014. In relation to history and memory, some of the questions in our research were: did Maidaners share a common vision of Ukraine's history, or did they rather represent different mnemonic communities? How did average protesters make sense of the Ukrainian national myth, the Soviet heritage and the European aspirations in the context of ongoing protests and escalating violence? Which events from the past did they emphasize? Whom did they consider heroes, victims and villains in Ukraine's history, and why? What narrative constructions were used to legitimize the place and importance of the Euromaidan movement in Ukrainian history?

The Euromaidan itself can be regarded as a realm of discursive (re)construction of collective memories. Independence Square has become the stage of the most significant protests in recent decades—the “Granite

Revolution” in 1990, the “Ukraine without Kuchma” movement in 2000–2001 and the Orange Revolution in 2004. The Euromaidan movement relied heavily on historical references and symbols. Militarized self-defense units were organized in “hundreds,” referring to the tradition of Ukrainian Cossacks. Together with Ukrainian flags, Independence Square dazzled with the red-and-black flags of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Anniversaries of some historical events were collectively commemorated, developing new symbols, rituals and meanings (for example, National Day of Unification/Zluka Day on January 22³⁴).

Moreover, the Maidan itself became a significant *lieu de mémoire*, encompassing the narratives of both glory and martyrology. How to commemorate the death of more than a hundred protesters at Independence Square is still a subject of debate.³⁵ Meanwhile, in Lviv, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Chernivtsi and many other Ukrainian cities and towns, central streets and squares have been renamed after “The Heroes of Maidan” or “The Heavenly Hundred”—often replacing old Soviet toponyms.

Generally, it is important to emphasize that respondents described Euromaidan as a rather unique phenomenon. It was occasionally compared to similar events in world history—as diverse as the French Revolution, or the ouster of Nicolae Ceaușescu (1918–1989) in Romania, or events in the Ukrainian past such as the Cossack uprisings or the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1920. Many respondents drew parallels with the Orange Revolution (often called “the first Maidan”), emphasizing that the Euromaidan is different in many aspects. The events of late 2004, in which 62 percent of respondents themselves participated, became a crucial historical/biographical experience and a constant reference point:

During the Orange Revolution I was a third-year student. I also came to the Maidan. This Maidan is more mature, less romantic and more conscious. People do not just expect that their life will improve tomorrow.... There is no trust in politicians, to be honest. This Maidan is much more decisive.³⁶

³⁴ National Day of Unification (Zluka Day) in 2014 was marked by tragic events, namely the first deaths of protesters (Sergii Nigoian, Mikhail Zhyznevki and Yurii Verbytskyi).

³⁵ Read more on the initiative of creating the Museum of Maidan here: <http://www.memory.gov.ua/page/muzei-maidanu>.

³⁶ Female, 28, from Kyiv, interview conducted on December 6, 2013, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

The experience of the Orange Revolution as a nonviolent protest achieving its primary goal without a drop of blood being spilled was described as crucial by Euromaidan participants, despite the general disappointment with the politics of Viktor Yushchenko (presidency 2005–2010). As the interviews show, during the Euromaidan people became more skeptical about the role of particular politicians, relying on self-organization rather than on opposition leaders (Chebotarova 2015).

The focus on select historical periods, facts and processes is supposed to articulate the values that are important for the present which can be used for the legitimization of existing social institutions and agencies. Thus, by selecting and defining certain personalities and events from the imagined historical past, community members are establishing a connection between the past, the present and the future that constitute important elements of their national identity (Sereda 2009). The definitions of historical “heroes” and “villains” also reinforce group identities and divisions as both of these categories refer to representatives of certain communities (“us” and “them”) and entail the construction of an image of the enemy. Respondents were asked to name the most positive and negative events and personalities in Ukrainian history. Two periods were most commonly framed as positive: the Cossack state (particularly under the leadership of hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi [1641–1685]), and the development of Ukrainian culture in the nineteenth century (particularly the role of such “nation-building” writers as Taras Shevchenko [1814–1861], Ivan Franko [1856–1916] and Lesia Ukrainka [1871–1913]). These popular Ukrainian “heroes” were often reframed as “Maidan-inspirers” in the visual representations of the protest. For example, the “Icons of Revolution” graffiti, depicting Taras Shevchenko, Lesia Ukrainka and Ivan Franko as radical revolutionary Maidaners, was painted on Hrushevskiy Street, on the walls of the Emporium furniture shop by street artist nicknamed Sociopath. In late January 2014 some of the most violent clashes between riot police and protesters took place there (which explains the Molotov cocktails, the helmet and the respirator as added attributes on the pictures). Portraits are accompanied by “revolutionary” quotes from the writers’ works. The graffiti were washed off the façade by the shop owner in September 2017, which evoked a wave of discontent.

Generally speaking, the above-mentioned periods and personalities can be described as the least controversial for contemporary Ukrainian identity-building, and are the most commonly promoted in official discourse (in school programs, official speeches and popular images; for example, their portraits appear on the Ukrainian currency). As can be

seen from the *Region, Nation and Beyond* survey results, these personalities belong to the canon of Ukrainian cultural and historical figures, popular in all the regions of Ukraine (on this canon, see also the chapter by Chebotarova, Hofmann, Kratochvil and Schmid in the present volume). The figures in question were incorporated in both national and Soviet models of the Ukrainian past, albeit in different contexts. For example, in the Soviet version, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was regarded as the leader of class struggle against the Polish bourgeoisie and the one who consolidated Ukrainian–Russian brotherhood by signing the Pereiaslav Treaty in 1654, while in the national model, he is praised as a leader of a proto-Ukrainian Cossack state and of the uprising for Ukrainian independence (see Sereda 2009; Yekelchuk 2014). In both versions, the dark side of the Khmelnytskyi rebellion—the massacre of Jews, gentry representatives and Greek Catholics—is usually omitted. The protesters regarded Zaporizka Sich as a “role model,” often comparing fellow Maidaners to Cossacks:

Ukrainian Cossacks were heroes ready to sacrifice their life. Just like contemporary Cossacks. Look at that Cossack Mykhailo,³⁷ whom they tormented and tortured. He is a very brave man, he endured everything. I have huge respect for him and for the guys who were not afraid to come here.³⁸

In this connection Olena Petrenko (2014) argues that the reinforcement of a militarized Cossack discourse—along with the legacy of the OUN and UPA—was the reaction to growing violence and the feeling that the group was under threat. Militarism, in this case, worked as a mechanism to reinforce traditional masculinity. The Cossack and the UPA narratives represented empowerment, the regeneration of the nation and “true” masculinity. According to Petrenko, the model of the Ukrainian hero-warrior that had initially been promoted as an abstract ideal in the post-Soviet period thus received an opportunity for real embodiment by Ukrainian men. This, in turn, contributed to a sharpening gender dichotomy and hierarchy. Such

³⁷ Mykhailo Havryliuk participated in the Euromaidan protests. In January 2014 he was stripped in freezing temperatures and beaten by Berkut officers in revenge for his participation in street clashes. In October 2014, he was elected to the Verkhovna Rada during the Ukrainian parliamentary election, as a candidate of People’s Front Party.

³⁸ Male, 50, from the Ivano-Frankivsk region, interview conducted on February 7, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

discourse contributed to the suppression of female participation and voices in the public sphere of the Euromaidan.

The mass media that aimed to discredit the protesters also actively used historical references, commonly depicting Maidaners as right-wing extremists who glorify the two presumed “Nazi collaborators,” Stepan Bandera (1909–1959) and Roman Shukhevych (1907–1950).³⁹ While radical nationalists (belonging to *Svoboda* party and organizations such as the Right Sector or Patriot) were indeed present at the Euromaidan, their role and influence on the protest is still debated among scholars (see e.g. Ischchenko 2016). Yet were Bandera and his followers overwhelmingly praised by average protesters?

As our interviews show, the legacy of the OUN and UPA has evoked a much wider spectrum of attitudes than was the case with the Cossack narrative. In several interviews respondents (mostly from western Ukraine) described nationalist insurgents as unquestionable heroes and real “role models of fighters” for Maidaners. Yet some protesters refused to accept such an approach. One respondent held that he “simply cannot state that Bandera and Shukhevych are heroes ... not yet.”⁴⁰ Many respondents emphasized the controversy around these organizations’ wartime activities or tried to avoid this subject altogether. Yet the traditional OUN greeting “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!” was widely adopted in Euromaidan rhetoric and internalized by a majority of protesters as one of the main protest slogans. Feminist groups adopted it for their own political agenda (“Glory to the heroines!”), to emphasize women’s participation in the Euromaidan (Petrenko 2014). Yet another nationalistic greeting—“Glory to the nation! Death to the enemies!”—was often criticized for carrying an aggressive and inappropriate message:

First of all, my attitude to the slogan “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!” has changed. It has simply acquired other dimensions. My attitude to those historical “heroes” is very contradictory—there are no bloodless saints in national guerilla movements.... Today’s “Glory to the Heroes” shows that Ukraine has generated something new.

³⁹ See, for example, the investigation by the Russian TV channel NTV: “Nasledniki Bandery: Ukrainu vedut k grazhdanskoi voine po siriiskomu stsenariiu” [Bandera’s offspring: Ukraine is led to a civil war according to the Syrian scenario], *NTV*, February 20, 2014, <http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/844597/>.

⁴⁰ Male, 23, from the Mykolaiv region, interview conducted on February 8, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

I: Are there any slogans you don't like?

R: You know, "Glory to the nation! Death to enemies!" is still rather frightening for me, because I am sure that 90 percent of people who insist on this slogan are very far from the concept of a modern European nation.⁴¹

While the respondent is ambivalent in his assessment of the nationalistic movement, he admits partly changing his attitude to its legacy—and in this case, to its slogans. An active use of the OUN and UPA symbols at the Euromaidan eventually contributed to their banalization and a growing acceptance of this heroic narrative, also in the wider society. Paradoxically, the propaganda against the Euromaidan that generalized all the protesters under the label of "Banderites" also contributed to the popularization of the myth of Ukrainian nationalistic resistance (Petrenko 2014). As the data of *Region, Nation and Beyond* surveys show, the percentage of respondents who agree with the statement that "the OUN and UPA were fighters for Ukrainian independence" grew from 32.4 percent in 2013 to 45.1 percent in 2015, which can partly be attributed to the influence of the Euromaidan discourse. Yet Bandera still remains a very controversial figure across Ukrainian regions: in 2015, the share of people who considered him one of the most important persons in Ukrainian history varied from 54.1 percent in Lvivska oblast to merely 4–5 percent in Khersonska and Luhanska oblasts.

The question about the most negative events and personalities in the history of Ukraine was quite difficult to answer; approximately half of the respondents refused to name the "antiheroes." A usual line of argumentation was that history is not black and white, and so it is difficult to define one's role unambiguously. Yet two groups were commonly described as "villains": the communists (Stalin [1878–1953], Lenin [1870–1924], "Holodomor organizers," "Bolsheviks" and so on), and the presidents of independent Ukraine (particularly Viktor Yanukovich, Viktor Yushchenko and Leonid Kravchuk [presidency 1991–1994]). As can be seen, these negative events and "antiheroes" belong to the realm of communicative memory: the quite recent past, which either respondents or their parents have experienced themselves (Assmann 2008). The presidents of independent Ukraine were mostly criticized for the harsh economic situ-

⁴¹ Male, 50, from Kyiv, interview conducted on February 7, 2014, at the respondent's home in Kyiv.

ation, for poverty, for the rule of an oligarchy and for failed attempts to build a democratic and free Ukraine. The depiction of communists as the main villains also reflects the Euromaidan's dominant anti-Soviet message. Thus, one of the core moments for the protest was the destruction of the Lenin monument in the center of Kyiv, which gave impulse to the wave of acts of "Leninfall" across Ukraine (usually performed by right-wing groups) as a symbol of farewell to the communist legacy.⁴² While one-third of respondents expressed a positive attitude to these actions, others were more cautious in their assessments, arguing against vandalism or for preserving traces of their own history. The need for a more nuanced dialogical approach to the Soviet past and those who feel nostalgic about it was also voiced:

Ukraine's political program is formed in Kyiv under the pressure of Lviv, which makes it totally unacceptable for the east.... Once I came to the Maidan on New Year's Eve and heard a Banderite song about the forest and a machine gun.... I was wondering what response this song might have among the people of Galicia, of [the] Frankivsk region, where such songs were secretly sung by fathers and grandfathers on family holidays. On the other hand, my wife has a grandmother; she is 92. She cries when singing the song "I Love You, Life."⁴³ And I cannot imagine the song "I Love You, Life" played at the Maidan. However, there is not a single word that would contradict the Euromaidan aims.... Kyiv failed to find the adequate message for Ukraine's east. That is why the ideological vacuum was filled by the "Ministry of Truth" of our neighboring country.⁴⁴

In this quotation—as in many other cases—the discourse of the Soviet legacy is regionalized and linked to growing Russian influence in Ukraine. Along with the Ukrainian national narrative, European aspirations were repeatedly framed as an escape from the "Russian world" and a reentry into the political and social realm, of which Ukraine was deprived during the decades of Soviet rule. The discourse of European belonging, in terms of shared values and future perspectives for Ukraine, was more powerful

⁴² For more detailed analysis of the "Leninfall" phenomenon, see the history chapter in the present volume.

⁴³ A popular Soviet song, written in 1956 and sung by Mark Bernes.

⁴⁴ Male, 52, from Kyiv, interview conducted on February 7, 2014, at the respondent's apartment in Kyiv.

during the early stages of the protest. One of the most popular reasons for supporting European integration among respondents was the hope of strengthening the rule of law to fight the permissiveness of ruling elites, social problems, total corruption, and injustice in the courts and from the police. In many interviews, Europe was framed as an “ideal type,” a certain aim that embodied the values and possibilities which Ukraine was thought to lack: a strong civil society, borderless freedom of movement, respect for human rights, personal and moral freedom, an honest court system, social guarantees, economic success and so on. At the same time, attitudes toward the imagined Europe were not always positive: some respondents described European values (such as support for LGBT rights) as “a threat to Ukrainian traditions,”⁴⁵ or argued that altogether “Europe has no values, just rules.”⁴⁶ Several respondents emphasized their own positive experience of living in or traveling to EU countries, while for the majority Europe offered a path to get away from Russian influence and the Soviet legacy. The differ-

Image 9.3. Graffiti on the Euromaidan barricades (author unknown)



Source: Photo by Anna Chebotarova, December 12, 2013

⁴⁵ Male, 34, from Lviv, interview conducted on December 6, 2013, at Independence Square in Kyiv.

⁴⁶ Male, 29, from Lviv (currently lives in the Czech Republic), interview conducted on February 7, 2014, at Independence Square in Kyiv.


ence between Europe and Russia was commonly framed as a “civilizational choice” through binary oppositions such as the rule of law versus permissiveness, progress versus degradation, modernization versus backwardness, freedom versus dependence, a future perspective versus a past perspective, and so on. Therefore, the discourses of Europe that gained popularity during the Euromaidan protest were significantly used to promote the estrangement of Ukraine from Russia and its Soviet past.

The bloody dispersal of pro-EU protests on November 30 had a key impact on the nature of the Euromaidan and on motivations for joining the movement. Violence against protesters had catalyzed growing resentment not so much about the abandoned European perspective, but rather about police cruelty and the general situation in the country. This way, the pro-EU protest turned into antigovernment rallies, uniting people with often contradictory ideological and political views (Chebotarova 2015).

The Euromaidan and its regional dimension—A dividing line?

One of the crucial questions posed by many scholars and analysts is to what extent the Euromaidan represented Ukrainian society in general. In this volume, Yaroslav Hrytsak analyzes the results of a survey conducted at the Euromaidan from December 2013 to February 2014 (Fond Demokratychni Initsiatyvy 2014a, 2014b). As this survey shows, the composition of the Euromaidan was dynamic and diverse, and various groups dominated the protest prior to and after its radicalization. Hrytsak concludes that, despite being a multinational and multilingual movement, the Euromaidan reproduced preexisting regional and language divides in Ukrainian society, albeit in a less radical way than the Orange Revolution. The 2015 *Region, Nation and Beyond* survey showed that opinions about the Euromaidan remained divided also a year after the event (see Figure 9.2 below).

Three major groups can be distinguished among respondents: the loyal supporters (those who were enthusiastic about the Euromaidan both during the actual events and a year later), the disappointed (those who supported the Euromaidan at the height of the events but do not do so anymore) and the opponents (those who have never supported the Euromaidan). The percentage of new admirers (those who did not support the Euromaidan during the protests but do so now) was comparatively low (around 5 percent). The largest share of the Euromaidan’s loyal supporters (71.9 percent) was found in western Ukraine, while in the center respon-

Figure 9.2. Macroregional ⁴⁷ distribution of the level of Euromaidan support in March 2015

Source: Survey (2015)

dents were much less unanimous and around 30 percent of them expressed a growing disappointment. At the same time, almost half of respondents in the eastern and southern regions strongly opposed the Euromaidan. However, significant intraregional differences could be observed: while the ratio of loyal supporters of the Euromaidan was more than 20 percent in Dnipropetrovska oblast (29 percent), Zaporizka oblast (25 percent), the Ukrainian-controlled part of Luhanska oblast (24.4 percent) and in Khersonska oblast (32.2 percent), in the nonoccupied regions of Donetsk oblast this indicator was only 8.4 percent (see Figure 9.3 below).

⁴⁷ Macroregions were divided up in the following way: the west (Lvivska, Ternopil'ska, Rivnenska, Ivano-Frankivska, Volynska, Zakarpatska and Chernivetska oblasts); the center (Khmelnitska, Vinnytska, Zhytomyrska, Kyivska, Cherkaska, Kirohovradska, Poltavska, Sumska and Chernihivska oblasts); the east (Kharkivska, Dnipropetrovska and Zaporizka oblasts, as well as the Ukrainian-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhanska oblasts); and the south (Mykolaiivska, Khersonska and Odeska oblasts).


Figure 9.3. The share of the Euromaidan's "loyal supporters" per oblast, 2015

Source: Survey (2015)

Regardless of a generally low level of support for the movement, a significant share of respondents in eastern and southern Ukraine did recognize the grassroots character of the Euromaidan—either as a chaotic protest movement (around 12 percent) or as a purposeful citizens' fight for their rights (more than a quarter of respondents in each macroregion) (see Figure 9.4 below). The percentage of people who chose the latter option was particularly high in Khersonska oblast (43.5 percent), Zaporizka oblast (34.5 percent) and Dnipropetrovska oblast (33.3 percent). At the same time, more than a third of respondents in the eastern and southern regions described the Euromaidan as a coup d'état organized either by the political opposition to Yanukovich or by the west. The "coup d'état" option was particularly popular in Mykolaivska oblast (51.5 percent), Kharkivska oblast (38 percent) and Odeska oblast (34.3 percent). Interestingly, this indicator was twice as high in Ukrainian-controlled part of Donetsk oblast as compared to Luhanska oblast⁴⁸ (48 percent and 22 percent, respectively) (see Figure 9.4 below).

⁴⁸ In the case of both Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the survey was conducted only in the government-controlled parts.

Figure 9.4. Macroregional patterns of attitudes toward the Euromaidan



Source: Survey (2015)

Apart from regional differences, socio-demographic factors were also important for the perceptions and attitudes toward the Euromaidan found in 2015. The percentage of loyal supporters of the Euromaidan was higher among the younger generation (44.5 percent, as compared to 40 percent among people aged 55 and more), among inhabitants of medium-sized towns and villages (45.85 percent, as compared to 33.3 percent in cities with over one million inhabitants), and among respondents with a higher education (46.9 percent, as compared to 34.5 percent among those with secondary education or lower). As respondents' educational level grew, the percentage of those who considered the Euromaidan to represent "citizens' conscious fight for their rights" also increased. The native language factor remained the most divisive: while the clear majority of Ukrainian speakers (57.6 percent) declared their approval of the Euromaidan, the share of loyal supporters was twice as low among bilinguals (24.4 percent) and even smaller among speakers of Russian (14.4 percent), almost half of whom (47.6 percent) also considered the Euromaidan to be a coup d'état. Another highly influential factor was respondents' self-attributed social status. Among respondents who evaluated their material well-being as good or very good, the ratio of loyal supporters of the Euromaidan varied from 51.5 percent to 70 percent, while among respondents who described their material situation as bad or very bad, this number did not exceed 36 percent. A quarter of respondents with lower income also declared their growing disappointment with the Euromaidan, despite initial

support for the protest. These moods can be regarded as the results of an extremely difficult economic situation, against the backdrop of the military conflict in post-Euromaidan Ukraine, which has most heavily affected the underprivileged social groups.

Hence, if analyzed only from the perspective of macroregions, attitudes toward the Euromaidan in 2015 seem to have opened the old wounds of regional and linguistic divides in Ukraine. However, the situation becomes more complex when intraregional differences and other factors—such as education, age or social status—are taken into account.

Conclusion

Analyzing the precursor of the Euromaidan, the Orange Revolution, many scholars agree that its rhetoric and outcomes represented an amalgam of both civic and ethno-national understandings of Ukrainian identity (Arel 2007; Shekhovtsov 2013). In this respect, the Euromaidan of 2013–2014 was both similar to and different from the events of 2004. While ethno-national identification was not a dominant discourse at the Euromaidan, as a specific communicative situation the protest activated an articulation of identities as “Ukrainian citizen,” understood as a mixture of ethnic, civic, local and transnational belongings. The multiethnicity of the Euromaidan—and particularly of its “martyrs”—was emphasized on numerous occasions. The experience of the Orange Revolution played a significant role in protesters’ mobilization. However, unlike in 2004, people did not rely on politicians—the leaders of the opposition—as their representatives. Strengthened self-organization and civil society, the social and cultural capital of the Euromaidan, were considered one of the crucial achievements of the movements. The Euromaidan represented various segments of Ukrainian society. The “glue” that united these different groups was not so much the idea of European integration, but rather the antiregime struggle. The majority of Maidaners saw the civil unrest as a chance to trigger urgently needed reforms of the economic and political systems.

At the same time, the level of both in-group favoritism and out-group derogation among Maidaners was quite high. Not only were political leaders and riot police “othered,” but also various frameworks of exclusion were commonly applied to participants in the “Antimaidan” movement, sometimes becoming a means of dehumanizing and subjectivizing opponents. The inhabitants of eastern and southern Ukraine, and particularly of Donbas, were commonly portrayed as regional, historical and ideo-

logical “others.” A year after the events, attitudes toward the Euromaidan remained controversial along regional, linguistic and social lines. At the same time, significant intraregional differences could be observed in the southeastern part of Ukraine.

In Dnipropetrovska, Zaporizka and Khersonska oblasts, the ratio of people sympathetic to the Euromaidan was higher than in Odeska, Mykolaivska and Kharkivska oblasts. Moreover, the perception of the Euromaidan was not at all unanimous in Ukrainian-controlled Donbas: respondents in Luhanska oblast expressed more favorable opinions toward the Euromaidan than did those in Donetsk oblast. Generally speaking, in Ukraine, the Euromaidan gained stronger support among younger respondents, inhabitants of medium-sized towns and villages, and people with a higher education. Apart from regional and native-language factors, perceived social status also divided respondents in terms of their attitudes to the Euromaidan. Economic instability has strongly affected people from lower social strata, who thus become more likely to oppose the events that triggered negative economic tendencies. Therefore, when it comes to attitudes toward the Euromaidan, no distinct dividing line can be drawn and other factors besides regionalism need to be taken into consideration.

The Euromaidan reflected existing societal divides, at the same time becoming a realm of transformation and rearticulation for Ukrainian identity. The meanings of this identity were constantly renegotiated and individually interpreted. Specific models from Ukrainian history were sometimes widely shared (as in the case of the Cossack narrative) and sometimes largely contested (as in the case of the legacy of the OUN and UPA). The Euromaidan was perceived as a crucial moment in the process of breaking ties with Russia and with the communist past. Both national Ukrainian and European identity projects were articulated as alternatives to the Soviet model and the “Russian world.” At the same time, attitudes toward the Soviet legacy were more nuanced and complex, and some Maidaners opposed the radical destruction of its material traces.

This chapter has covered only certain aspects of a very complex phenomenon of the Euromaidan, trying to give maximum voice to the protesters themselves. One has to bear in mind that the interviews analyzed above all reflect protesters’ moods and aspirations before the mass killings of February 19–20, 2014 and the subsequent events. Overall, as the results of this research show, it is crucial to regard the Euromaidan in its heterogeneity and its dynamics, not reducing the issue of identity or indeed other aspects to any single narrative, however dominant it may seem. It is also easy to fall into a methodological trap of overemphasizing the omnipotence

of national belonging. On the contrary, professional and familial loyalties dominated over civic or ethnic loyalties in the repertoire of Maidaners' identities. Therefore, in further analysis of the Euromaidan movement, it will be important to address various categories of group belonging (territorial, social, economic, educational, gender-based and so on) and their complex combinations—that may go entirely beyond traditional understandings of the concept of identity.

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10. Conclusion

OKSANA MYSHLOVSKA

The histories of different national, ethnic and religious groups intermingle, overlap and conflict along the historical borders between the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian Empires and the other states which have existed in Central and Eastern Europe over the past few centuries. The majority of states and nations that were formed on the space occupied by former multinational empires have struggled to craft their own ordinary, coherent and exclusive national narratives out of complex and overlapping history.

The notion of what is “Ukrainian” emerged relatively late as a comprehensive ethnonym. Part of the population that inhabited the borderlands of multinational states for most of its history had identified itself as *ruskii*, *rusynskyi* or *malorusskii* without endowing these appellations with political claims. Similarly, while the first mention of the term “Ukrainian language” by a foreign traveler dates back to the end of the seventeenth century, the name “Ukrainian” competed with other designations such as *ruskii*, *rusynskyi*, *malorusskii*, *yuzhnorusskii* or *poludnevoruskyi* throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Ukrainian lands which were part of different state formations adopted the designation “Ukrainian” at different speeds and times, the last being the region of Transcarpathia, and one variant of the Ukrainian language was standardized by the early Soviet period.

In the twentieth century, Ukraine was mostly part of the Soviet statehood project, which established the current state borders and promoted a common identity on the basis of Soviet patriotism and socialist values with a Soviet Ukrainian dimension. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been problematized in scholarly, political and popular discourses as an “incomplete national project” devoid of a common

national idea and divided by historical memories and heritage, political culture, values, identities, geopolitical orientations, ethnic composition, languages, religious confessions, and levels of economic development and urbanization.

The tendencies of the last two decades show that identification with “the Soviet Union” and “Soviet people” has been in decline. At the same time, the identification with Ukraine, the Ukrainian ethnicity and language as well as the adoption of a Ukrainian civic identity has been increasing. The process of national imagining can also be seen in the formulation of new values, related to democratic governance and self-expression, predominantly shared by the younger generation, Ukrainian speakers and the educated class as of the 2000s across all of Ukraine. At the same time, regions, localities and cities have been rediscovering their local and transnational history, including the history of the peoples, organizations and events that do not fit into the “nationalized version of history” promoted by the state in the post-Soviet period.

Multiple identification targets of different intensity

Individuals have multiple identities and identifications with markers such as region, nation, culture and a number of nonterritorial markers such as family, gender, age generation, profession, religion, and social status. The chapter on identities and identifications by Maria Lewicka and Bartłomiej Iwańczak establishes that the most important identification targets among different territorial scales in Ukraine are country and place of residence.

Lewicka and Iwańczak show that, in terms of the content of identities, Ukraine is divided into a Russian identification, correlated with positive attitudes toward Russia and the Russian language, and a Ukrainian identification. The chapter confirms the findings of earlier studies about different levels of identity strength across Ukraine. The population that identified itself more strongly than average with Russian nationality and with “other nationality,” geographically concentrated mostly in the east and southeast, showed weak identity profiles, with weaker attachments to cities and places of residence, weaker local identity, weaker nonterritorial identities such as gender and family, and less polarized responses to questions on national issues. The chapter explains the differences in the strength of identities by response styles shaped by the cultural context, the complexity of multiple identifications (Ukrainian and Russian), the differences between the in-group (associated with Ukrainian identification) and

the out-group (characterized by mixed Russian–Ukrainian identifications), and the underdeveloped nature of national consciousness. The outlook for Ukrainian regionalism depends on the formation of clusters that can address different analytical dimensions.

Historical legacies

Polish and Russian or Soviet influences have shaped both the Ukrainian present and past, as Poland and Russia have been the two most powerful historical and contemporary neighbors of Ukraine. Polish influences on the Russian Empire, including the Ukrainian lands, were strong even during the period of Polish partitions from the eighteenth till the beginning of the nineteenth century. Historically, Poland served as a path to Europeanization and as a contrast to the formation of modern Ruthenian or Ukrainian and Russian identities. The crystallization of separate national identities, demands and claims led to the Polish–Ukrainian–Soviet armed conflicts at the end of World War I and during the interwar and wartime periods. These conflicts—as the recent debates about the massacre in Volhynia demonstrate—still occupy center stage in inter-state memory politics. However, Poland continues to serve as a conduit for including Ukraine in European orbits. At the same time, the Russian Empire, then the Soviet Union and now Russia have included the Ukrainian lands in the Russian or Soviet imagining of a common Kyivan Rus past, in an Orthodox, pan-Slavic and more recently *Russkii mir* space. This view has materialized in the recent erection of a monument to the Kievan Prince Vladimir in the city center of Moscow.

The chapter on historical legacies, memory and attitudes shows that Ukraine is still largely united by Soviet legacies such as the current borders of the Ukrainian state, the positive image of Taras Shevchenko, aesthetic legacies reflected in the dominance of a “socialist realist” manner in the representation of new cult personalities, Soviet-era urban architecture, historiographic traditions, and the celebration of Soviet holidays (most notably, Women’s Day). Even the presidents who attempted to promote a Ukrainian nationalist narrative as a common narrative for the nation, namely Yushchenko and Poroshenko, continued to celebrate the most important Soviet holiday, commemorating victory in World War II, at the national level, albeit with a general Ukrainization and Europeanization of the war narrative at the national level and its adaptation to new realities at the local level in the center and the east. Ukraine is also united by

the myths related to the pre-Soviet period which are central for Ukrainian national identity: the myth of the Kyivan Rus origin of the Ukrainian state, and the Cossack myth. Moreover, the Romantic belief that a vernacular defines the nation and the state continues to be a strong mobilizing force in contemporary Ukraine, though not across all regions.

However, Soviet legacies are gradually ceding ground to the narratives constructed and promoted in independent Ukraine. Following the Euro-maidan Revolution, the remaining visible symbols of the Soviet regime—monuments to Soviet leaders and Soviet toponyms—became the primary targets of public revolutionary anger. These symbols were then dismantled in a more ordinary fashion following the so-called “decommunization” laws of April 2015. The national memory of the Holodomor and the commemoration of both the new martyrs of the Euromaidan shootings (the “Heavenly Hundred”) and the victims of the war in eastern Ukraine have been promoted as uniting symbols for a Ukraine that is struggling for its territorial integrity. One of the fading Soviet legacies has been the celebration of the Great October Revolution Day. At the same time, many state-led efforts to institutionalize new public holidays in independent Ukraine, such as National Day of Unification/Zluka Day on January 22, have met with little success across the country. In general, holidays instituted in independent Ukraine are still less popular than the Soviet ones, although the balance is in constant transformation. The state-led efforts to forge a common national memory have been constantly challenged and subverted by various initiatives at the local level. Also, a closer look at the legacies which supposedly unite Ukraine shows that there are regional differences in the interpretation, understanding and internalization of central myths.

Ukraine is divided by attitudes to certain historical events and figures, which underpin regional historical imagining and collective memories. Opinions are most divided about the celebration of February 23 (Defenders of the Motherland Day), May 1 (Labor Day) and August 24 (Independence Day), and about such historical figures as Lenin, Catherine II, Bandera and Mazepa, as well as such historical questions as the role of the UPA. None of the historical metanarratives (nationalist, national democratic, Soviet or Russian imperial) commands a dominant position in Ukrainian society, as reflected in the differing support for historical figures representing different narratives shown by survey respondents. Contradictory historical narratives and symbols are present in different proportions and intensities in the same social spaces across all of Ukraine. Groups celebrating different versions of the past live side by side. There are cases when individuals and groups peacefully commemorate contradictory symbols of

the past, but also cases when they come into conflict. Western Ukraine is the only region in which the nationalist historical narrative appears clearly to dominate; however, a number of Soviet legacies continue to persist even in this region. Furthermore, the region has selectively appropriated some elements of the Austro-Hungarian and Polish pasts, which also challenge the dominance of one historical narrative.

The results of the project survey (Survey 2013) show that answers to questions about the positioning of Ukraine's past as part of European history, as part of the East Slav community or as unique, about the level of interest in local or regional history, about preference for the celebration of Soviet or Ukrainian holidays and about attitudes to the most important historical figures and events do not form clear-cut macroregions. The size of the city where respondents reside, the length of their residence in one place, respondents' age, level of education and income, and their ethnic identity, language and level of religiosity are important variables in defining the attitudes and creating the dividing lines which run across regions.

Transformation of the linguistic landscape

On the basis of focus group discussions with teachers of Ukrainian language and literature in twelve cities of Ukraine, the language group established that the prestige of the Ukrainian language has increased in recent years. However, there is a consensus, shared by teachers in western Ukraine, that Russian is also important and should be learned at school along with Ukrainian and English. According to the survey, 52.9 percent of the Ukrainian respondents support the proposition that Russian should be a mandatory subject at school, but this number drops to less than 10 percent in the three oblasts of Galicia. Also, more people nationwide supported English as a mandatory school subject (57.2 percent) than Russian (52.9 percent). The survey shows that Russian is still more important than English as one of the languages that civil servants must master, in all regions except for the west. On the basis of focus group discussions, it may be observed that there have been no substantial changes in the language situation in the sphere of education in the last decade in western and eastern Ukraine. After the adoption of the law on languages in 2012, Donetsk saw a switch from Ukrainian-language to Russian-language classes and the closing of Ukrainian schools. The main changes have occurred in the center, south and north, which saw an increase in interest in the Ukrainian language.

Between the last two Ukrainian censuses, which took place in 1989 and 2001, loyalty toward the Russian language—measured by the number of individuals declaring Russian to be their only mother tongue—increased in Luhanska and Donetska oblasts. However, the loyalty to Russian as respondents' only mother tongue in these three regions is significantly lower than the loyalty to Ukrainian in the west. According to the 2013 survey, Crimea, Donetska, Odeska and Kharkivska oblasts had the highest support for Russian as a second state language. Furthermore, the number of people declaring two mother tongues, Ukrainian and Russian, increased between the two comparable surveys, which took place in 2006 and 2013, in the south and the center. Correspondingly, the number of those who declare only one mother tongue, whether Ukrainian or Russian, has decreased. The increase took place at the expense of Ukrainian as the only mother tongue, in the center, and of Russian, in the south. On the basis of the analysis of the 2013 project survey, it can be asserted that those who declare Russian to be their only mother tongue tend to favor two state languages, while there is a correlation between the consideration of Ukrainian as the only mother tongue and the rejection of Russian as a second state language. The preferred geopolitical options for those who declare Ukrainian as their only mother tongue are a fully independent and bloc-free Ukraine, and Ukraine as a member of the EU, while for those who declare Russian as their only mother tongue and those with both Ukrainian and Russian as mother tongues, the preference is for Ukraine in a union with Russia. The exceptions from this correlation are those who declare Ukrainian as their only mother tongue in Crimea, Donetska, Odeska and Kharkivska oblasts, who also prefer the option of Ukraine in a union with Russia, and those with Russian as their mother tongue in Vinnytska, Lvivska, Rivnenska, Sumska, Ternopilska and Khmelnytska oblasts, who prefer the options of a fully independent and bloc-free Ukraine and Ukraine as a member of the EU. This shows the significance of regionally dominant narratives. The focus groups with teachers conducted by the language working group demonstrated that, while the west adopts a generally tolerant attitude toward Russian, the east is less tolerant about Ukrainian.

The most interesting changes in the language situation have occurred in the north and the center. These regions have wavered between a position favoring one state language (Ukrainian) and a preference for two state languages. Here, the population has increasingly identified Ukrainian as its mother tongue and preferred Ukrainian as the sole state language. Opinions in Zhytomyrska, Vinnytska and Khmelnytska oblasts are close

to those in the western region concerning the low importance of Russian for civil servants. In Zhytomyrska, Vinnytska, Khmelnytska, Kirovohradska and Poltavska oblasts, Russian is not supported by a majority as a compulsory school subject. Overall, Zhytomyrska and Vinnytska oblasts have moved closest to the three western oblasts in their attitudes to Ukrainian and Russian. Furthermore, the acceptance of Ukrainian as the state language and as a symbol of the Ukrainian state has increased across the country. The proposition that a civil servant must master Ukrainian is supported by 86.4 percent of the population and by a broad majority in all regions (including the east and the south). Similarly, the proposition that Ukrainian should be a compulsory subject at school is supported by 83.4 percent nationwide.

The unifying dimension of the literary canon

As in other European cultures, literature has ceased to be the main arena of national self-definition. However, literature still plays an enormous role when it comes to school education and the accumulation of cultural capital in Bourdieu's sense. The project shows that there is a certain asymmetry in reading culture: Russian-language titles are widely read across all regions, whereas there is a sharp decline of interest in Ukrainian-language books in the east and the south. At the same time, there is a clear consensus about the canon of Ukrainian literature. The national poet Taras Shevchenko is clearly accepted in all Ukrainian regions, even in Donbas and Crimea. This consensus may be explained by Shevchenko's bilingualism; he wrote his poetry in Ukrainian and his prose in Russian. In Soviet times, he was presented as a martyr under Czarist rule and was inscribed in the socialist realist canon. A slight east-west divide can be observed regarding preferences for other authors. In the west, Lesia Ukrainka prevails, whereas in the south and east Nikolai Gogol, who wrote his prose in Russian with a Ukrainian tinge, enjoys more popularity.

Ukrainian authors are conducting a heated debate over the question of whether Ukrainian literature imperatively needs to be written in Ukrainian. Serhii Zhadan, who comes from the mostly Russian-speaking city of Kharkiv and writes exclusively in Ukrainian, warns against a Ukrainian-language ghetto and calls for the inclusion of Russian-language authors in the Ukrainian canon. Other younger authors reject this position and argue that Ukrainian literature needs a clear-cut linguistic identity.

Religious pluralism

In contrast to the situation in Russia, where the religious landscape is dominated by a single Orthodox Church which advocates a far-reaching *symphonia* with the state, the Ukrainian situation is characterized by an open, diverse and plural religious setting. The Ukrainian authorities' efforts to unify the three Orthodox Churches in Ukraine have been criticized by some as state interference in religious affairs. After Ukraine became independent, the number of registered religious organizations and groups, as well as of sacral buildings, increased several-fold, and in general, the role of religion in various public and private spheres has become more important, especially since the Euromaidan. Religious allegiance has been readily manifested by political and public figures in order to gain political capital.

Religiosity in Ukraine is characterized by fluid, nonfixed religious identities which defy the simplistic and inaccurate split of Ukraine along a Catholic–Orthodox line. According to the project survey (Survey 2013), levels of belief are high across the country; however, more than a third of believers do not declare any particular confessional allegiance but consider themselves as “just Orthodox” or as “believers without confession.” They are infrequent churchgoers or even unbelievers who easily shift their allegiances among different Orthodox Churches. Wanner and Yelensky interpret this as an “ambient faith,” seen as the absence of individual or institutional allegiance to a particular confession and as a statement of social and political belonging to the state and nation, in view of the historical role that religious institutions played in their creation.

In eastern Ukraine, there has been a high level of sponsorship of church construction and church affairs by the new class of oligarchs, as a matter of power and status. Furthermore, local elites in southeastern Ukraine have sought to promote a regional identity on the basis of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which has integrated elements of “all-Russian,” Soviet and Cossack identities. The level of trust in the church, the view that the church plays a positive role in society and the level of individual financial support for the church are highest in western Ukraine. Wanner and Yelensky establish that regional cultural differences in religious practices reflect historical legacies, belonging to different empires, but that variation in cultural practices does not create regional identities or underpin claims with regard to political regionalism.

Confessional boundaries among the four Eastern Christian Churches in Ukraine are transcended by the general recognition that they all reflect

the Byzantine tradition. Also, all four major churches of the Eastern rite define themselves in national terms and have all-Ukrainian aspirations, as heirs of St. Volodymyr's baptism, that underpin national unity, even if some churches are dominant only in certain regions of Ukraine. Allegiance to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has increasingly become correlated with loyalty to the Ukrainian nation and statehood, reinforcing the traditionally strong link between identity and faith in the region. At the transnational level, Ukraine remains connected to Russia by a single hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church and the ideology of *Russkii mir*, an "imagined community" based on the Russian language, nation, culture and Orthodoxy, actively promoted by the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state.

Economic attitudes to risk, envy and corruption

Attitudes to risk influence the level of entrepreneurship and economic development. The analysis of the dataset generated from the project survey established significant unconditional differences in attitudes to risk between the Donbas/southeast and the west/north/center regions, with the former being more risk averse and the latter more willing to take risks. Regional differences in attitudes to risk are explained by cultural differences, systems of values and beliefs, rather than by differences in socioeconomic condition. The analysis also found a positive correlation between attitudes to risk and to envy. Furthermore, those who declare two mother tongues, Ukrainian and Russian, are relatively more willing to take risks than those with one mother tongue. The interregional differences in attitudes to risk support the Great Frontier hypothesis, showing the difference between regions that were civilized earlier and those civilized later.

The section which studies interregional differences in levels of envy establishes that the urban population of Donbas, followed by northern and western Ukraine, has the highest levels of envy. The correlation of envy with level of wealth shows a difference in the nature of envy between Donbas and the northern and western regions. In Donbas, it is positive, meaning that more wealth leads to more envy, while in the other two regions it is negative. The section attempts to explain differences in levels of envy by the anthropological hypothesis, the theory of changes and the civilization hypothesis. According to them, levels of envy are higher in traditional rural societies, and in situations of growing aspiration, of a strong

sense of relative deprivation and of increasing inequality, as well as in historical frontier regions.

The fact that the highest levels of envy are found among the urban population in Donbas is explained by the relatively severe deprivation in the region, which was the most economically prosperous one in Soviet Ukraine and thus had more opportunities to satisfy its materialistic aspirations, and by a more recent rise in aspirations, with regional political leaders coming to power in Kyiv in the second half of the 2000s. A somewhat higher-than-average level of envy in northern Ukraine, the location of the historical Cossack state, can be explained by a fear of property loss and a strong attachment to material possessions in a region in which the period of high economic autonomy was followed by a period of unstable private property rights, as of the seventeenth century. A higher-than-average level of envy in western Ukraine can be explained by the values of a traditional society, which have remained strong in the region. Further analysis confirmed the hypotheses in the cases of Donbas and the northern region, but also in the case of western Ukraine, as there are no pronounced regional differences in the level of envy for the rural population across the country.

The section on attitudes to business risk defines three types of risk tolerance. The survey shows that firms can be divided into those with a high risk tolerance (20 percent of companies), those with a conservative appetite for risk (52 percent) and those with a moderate attitude to risk (28 percent). In terms of regional differences, all the companies from Crimea share a highly conservative risk profile, while the rest of Ukraine is characterized by mixed features with one or two types of risk tolerance prevailing.

Corruption is a practice deeply embedded into the culture of Ukrainian society, as reported and experienced by businesses, public institutions and individuals. The section on corruption and informal practices establishes that there are regional differences in the perception of corruption in public institutions. After matching in terms of firm characteristics, the results suggest that firms in the north generally find corruption and informal practices to be more pronounced in public institutions than do firms in the east and report engaging more often in these practices, while companies in the southern and western regions claim to be least exposed to such practices and to engage less often in informal practices when dealing with public institutions. Firms in the south report encountering significantly less informal practices in open tenders, in the remuneration of employees, in the use of firm resources for private gain and in competition with other companies, as compared to the east. Firms in the central region find informal practices in job applications to be more common than do firms in the east.

It is notable that many respondents do not consider informal activities to be corruption. There are also some regional differences in terms of the anti-corruption strategies employed by firms. Companies in the south are less willing to cooperate proactively with local authorities. Firms in the central region claim to mobilize mass media and the courts against corruption and to encourage national authorities to fight local corruption more often. Finally, firms in the west state that they use third parties more often than other regions do when dealing with local authorities. In general, the chapter on the economy establishes that—notwithstanding some interregional differences—there are no clear-cut and stable regions concerning attitudes to risk, envy, corruption and informal practices.

Regional dynamics

Several chapters have noted that Galicia alone has more pronounced regional particularities than other regions. It is characterized by the dominance of the Ukrainian nationalist narrative and the most intense national (Ukrainian) identity. The vision of the importance of speaking Ukrainian in order to be considered a real Ukrainian is prevalent in the region: for example, according to the project survey (Survey 2013), 96.6 percent in Ternopil'ska oblast consider this very important or fairly important, while 93.3 percent do so in Lviv'ska oblast and 89.4 percent do so in Ivano-Frankiv'ska oblast. Furthermore, the region has the highest proportion of “true believers” and the highest levels of trust in the church and of individual financial support for it. The region also has the lowest share of the population believing that Russian should be a mandatory subject at school and a language that civil servants must master.

Interesting tendencies and characteristics have also been noted in the case of the Donbas region (Luhanska and Donetsk'ska oblasts). Contrary to western Ukraine, the region is characterized by weak national identities and predominantly by social and local identities, which are unstable and in flux. This is the only region that saw an increase in the number of people who identified Russian as their only mother tongue between the 1989 and 2001 national censuses, and also a switch from Ukrainian- to Russian-language classes after the adoption of the new law on languages, in 2012, under Yanukovich. Furthermore, the region stands out in Ukraine as the region with the highest level of envy among the urban population, with a positive correlation between level of envy and actual wealth. Finally, Donbas and Crimea are the regions which showed the lowest support for

the Euromaidan, even including the younger generation. Donetsk and Luhanska oblasts were also the only region in which the majority of the population considered the Euromaidan as a coup d'état staged by the opposition with the support of the west, rather than as legitimate protests against a corrupt regime, and who regarded Putin more positively than did the rest of Ukraine in April 2014.

At the same time, while some chapters note more pronounced regional particularities of Galicia and Donbas, others identify common elements of memories and attitudes for all regions and the parallel coexistence of several pasts and presents. In Galicia, the Ukrainian nationalist narrative coexists with imprints from the Austro-Hungarian, Polish and Soviet periods, and in Donbas, Taras Shevchenko is held in high esteem and there is broad support for the proposition that civil servants must master Ukrainian and that Ukrainian should be a compulsory subject. The project survey has shown that the dividing lines are shaped by identities and the socio-economic situations of respondents, which run across regions, rather than by regional belonging.

Several chapters in the present volume find that the most interesting regions which experienced profound transformation in the last two decades, and above all since the beginning of the Euromaidan, are central and south-eastern Ukraine (except for Donbas and Crimea). Ukraine has been divided by diverging regional electoral preferences since the first competitive parliamentary elections in 1990. However, the dividing line has been gradually shifting from the west to the east, with central regions moving closer to the western ones in their electoral preferences. Hrytsak shows in his chapter on post-Euromaidan developments that the regions with weaker identity profiles have proved to be easily malleable and transformable.

The transformation of the center and the southeast of Ukraine before and after the Euromaidan has shown the dynamic character of Ukrainian divisions. At the beginning, the Euromaidan was largely supported by western and to a lesser degree central Ukraine, which was also reflected in the geographical origin of the protesters who gathered in Kyiv. The opponents of the Euromaidan organized themselves into a movement called Antimaidan; however, support for it was weaker in the east and the south than was the support for the Euromaidan in the west and the center. This development reinstated a west-east division line, first seen during the Orange Revolution in 2004; but it was less pronounced, as the share of neutral population in the east and the south was high. In January 2014, and especially after the tragic shooting of Euromaidan protesters in February 2014, support for the Euromaidan in east-central Ukraine, namely

in Zaporizka, Dnipropetrovska and later Kharkivska oblasts, increased, moving the dividing line further east. On the contrary, support for the “Russian Spring,” efforts by pro-Russian activists to establish control over local administration buildings in the east and the south and to proclaim separation from Ukraine, remained low, as a bigger part of the population in these regions remained uninvolved bystanders. The Russian Spring became successful only in locations where the pro-Russian activists were supported by law-enforcement bodies. Thus, opposition to the Russian involvement in Ukraine and a negative opinion of Putin made Ukraine more homogenous and united following the Euromaidan.

Other scholars have reflected on the post-Euromaidan transformation of the regions in similar terms. According to Zhurzhenko (2014), after the Euromaidan

the “East” or “South-East” in the old sense no longer exists. The dramatic developments of spring 2014 have demonstrated that collective identities are situational and contextual and can rapidly change, especially under conditions of territorial secession, external aggression and military conflict. In facing the separatist threat and Russian aggression, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkiv and other big and small cities have rediscovered their “Ukrainianness” and are manifesting it in various ways.

In 2015, Riabchuk published an article which revisited his series of publications on the “two Ukraines.” With the war in eastern Ukraine, the core divide is not between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, or Russophones and Ukrainophones, or “east” and “west,” but is rather an ideological divide between two different types of Ukrainian identity: non- or anti-Soviet and post- or neo-Soviet, “European” and “East Slavonic,” which subsume all other divides (ethnic, linguistic, religious, social, political and regional).

Finally, the volume identifies a number of other variables which cut across regions. In his chapter, Hrytsak points to the emergence of values linked to democratic governance and self-expression shared by the younger generation, Ukrainian speakers and people with a higher education across all regions of Ukraine since the 2000s. Hrytsak sees these values as better tools for explaining the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan protests than ethnic, linguistic or other identities and geopolitical orientations. In addition to the constitutional principles discussed above, a set of new values is believed to serve as the basis for the consolidation of Ukrainian society.

The research project has established that the size of the city where respondents reside, the length of their residence in one place, respondents' age, level of education and income, and their ethnic identity, language and level of religiosity are important variables in defining the attitudes and creating the dividing lines which run across regions.

According to the survey analysis, clear-cut macroregions could not be identified in any of the areas studied. The rural–urban divide is pronounced when it comes to the feeling of envy, whereby the urban population is more envious than the rural one in all regions. Religiosity became a kind of unifying force during the Euromaidan protests, when protesters were joined and supported by the clergy of different religious denominations. The Euromaidan represented an eclectic combination of images, messages and motivations. European Union flags and symbols were combined with the OUN red-and-black flags and with OUN and UPA leaders' portraits; the camp life and the organization of self-defense units were reminiscent of Cossack traditions. The intergenerational divide is clearly seen in support for the Euromaidan. The analysis of support for the Euromaidan on social media cited by Yaroslav Hrytsak shows that it was widely supported by internet users, and thus by the younger generation, across Ukraine, with the exception of Crimea and Donbas. Such divisions based on age, education and social status have become increasingly important. Hrytsak argues that the difference between supporters of the Euromaidan and its opponents was a difference of values—deep motivators of human behavior, which mattered more than identities. In contrast to the 2004 Orange Revolution, the Euromaidan was mainly organized by civil society groups and became an elite-challenging action, which reflected a shift from values of survival to those of self-expression among large segments of postindustrial societies, and above all among the younger generation. A number of surveys have shown that the peer values of the younger generation are closer to those of its peers in EU countries than to those of older compatriots. Values of self-expression were seen to be characteristic of people with a higher education, with middle-class status, residing in large cities and belonging to the younger generation. The 2015 survey on values has revealed a new divide, namely the divergence between religious/traditional values, characteristic of western and central Ukraine, and secular ones, more typical of eastern and southern Ukraine.

The Euromaidan became a multinational and multilingual movement, and a space where professional and familial loyalties dominated over traditional ethnic, linguistic or religious identities in the “repertoire” of identities. Participants in the protest redefined their relationship with their

“Fatherland,” which encompassed the recoding and reinterpretation of various mnemonic and cultural elements. The protest had some impact on more fixed types of identification such as nationality (understood in both ethnic and civic terms), with the number of respondents identifying themselves with a Ukrainian identity increasing between the two surveys conducted in the framework of the project in 2013 and 2015. Other territorial identities (local, regional or European) were mainly articulated as subordinate to national belonging. The creation of a group identity of Euromaidan participants took place with a simultaneous “othering” of the out-group of anti-Euromaidan supporters. As in the case of other divisions, support for the Euromaidan was defined not only by ethnic and linguistic identities but also by the level of education, the size of the place of residence and the age of respondents. The long-term impact of the Euromaidan on the transformation of identities and the dynamics of the dividing line between supporters and opponents of the Euromaidan remain open questions for scholarly investigation.

Regionalism without regions

Ukrainian citizens differ in their levels and intensity of national identity, their allegiances to local churches, their imagining of meaningful historical events and transnational connections, their religious traditions, their language preferences and practices and their attitudes to corruption. Regions have been defined by mapping such differences onto places. This becomes problematic in the Ukrainian case whenever essentialized, monolithic and out-of-context categories are employed in order to construct dividing lines running across the country. Variation in identifications, beliefs and practices does not constitute a region, but is an expression of regionalism.

In this project, we aimed to draw a new map of Ukraine, based on the empirical findings of our surveys and focus groups. In our understanding, Yaroslav Hrytsak’s formula “regionalism without regions” captures the Ukrainian case most aptly. The core issue for Ukraine is the ability of the political system to have functioning mechanisms for the channeling of regional grievances, interregional dialogue and negotiation, to represent the competing interests of different groups and to create an adequate rule of law and institutional framework.

We have come to the understanding that scholars need to apply more sophisticated approaches and to use multiple variables in studying the issue of regionalism in Ukraine, in order to avoid generalizations about “two

Ukraines” or the Catholic–Orthodox civilizational divide, and in order to capture the diversity and multifacetedness of identities, memories and attitudes and their dynamic nature. Furthermore, the project has shown that conventional analytical categories such as ethnic identity, language and religion, used to construct dividing lines, need to be reconsidered in the Ukrainian case. The chapter on identities and identifications has explored various gradations and intensities in the phenomenon of ethnic identity; the chapters on language and on religion have examined complex linguistic practices and identifications, and in-between confessional categories such as “ambient faith.” All of these can be seen as legacies of complex, multilayered and overlapping pasts. The volume also discusses multiple instances when dividing lines are either essentialized or presented as permeable or even nonexistent for political purposes. The roles and agendas of local and foreign political, clerical, academic and civil society actors have to be addressed in this connection.

On the one hand, as a very young state, Ukraine is trying to complete a nation-building process which, it hopes, would bring more homogeneity and cohesiveness. The “nationalization” of the Ukrainian state has been taking place on multiple levels. On the other hand, in an age defined by globalization, fragmentation, superdiversity and fragmented modernity, Ukraine’s incomplete, ambiguous and in-between nation-building project is part of the new normal, rather than being an exception to it. With all of these contradictory tendencies, Ukraine will continue to be a fascinating subject of scholarly research and debate for the foreseeable future.

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“Regional division” is one of the most popular and conventional metaphors to label post-Soviet Ukraine. Its reductionist tone usually neglects the complexity, numerous entanglements and contradictions of the extremely fascinating Ukrainian case that still lacks the analytical language to describe it. *Regionalism without Regions* introduces the results of two surveys of 6,000 respondents conducted in Ukraine in 2013 and 2015, and presents a truly interdisciplinary research panorama of sociological, linguistic, economical, geographical findings. The authors strive to capture the dynamics and transformations of Ukraine's identifications and identities, and their data and conclusions make this book an essential point of departure for further research.

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